UN PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: STATE-BUILDING AND HYBRIDITY

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Summary

Based on a mapping of the past decade’s practice of UN-led and delegated peace operations, the report identifies ‘state-building interventions’ and ‘hybrid operations’ as two mega-trends. The first trend indicates that peace operations have become increasingly multidimensional, long-termed and intrusive as the interveners, either by design or default, assume executive authority and perform state functions while trying to build local capacity to resume responsibility. The turn towards state-building is accompanied by a move towards hybrid operations where resources and staff from different organisations are deployed either simultaneously or sequentially. As an organisational form this may speak well to the multidimensional challenges of state-building interventions. It does, however, make it increasingly difficult to identify who is to be held accountable for the international efforts.

Resumé

På baggrund af en kortlægning af de seneste ti års praksis i Sikkerhedsrådets mandatering af fredsoperationer identificerer rapporten to mega-trends: Statsbygningsinterventioner og hybridoperationer. Den første trend er kendteget ved, at fredsoperationer omfatter flere dimensioner, varer længere og er blevet mere indgribende. Énten efter dekret eller af nød påtager eksterne aktører sig rollen som udøvende magt og udfører statslige funktioner, mens de samtidig forsøger at opbygge lokal kapacitet, der kan overtage ansvaret. Skiftet i retning af statsbygningsinterventioner er ledsaget af et skift i retning af hybridoperationer, hvor ressourcer og personale fra forskellige organisationer er udstationeret samtidig eller i forlængelse af hinanden. Som organisatorisk form kan dette være et fornuftigt svar på de multidimensionelle udfordringer, der er forbundet med statsopbygningsinterventioner, men formen gør det endnu vanskeligere at afgøre, hvem der skal holdes ansvarlig for den internationale indsats.
Introduction and Background

United Nations peacekeeping is at a historic high. More than 104,000 men and women are currently serving in UN-led peace operations, and the number is likely to grow as the mission in Darfur moves toward full deployment. Meanwhile, the number of regional or bilateral troops operating in UN-authorised (but not UN-led) peace operations is also rising, and a growing number of bilateral and multilateral development agencies are increasingly engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. It is thus not only UN peacekeeping that finds itself at a historic high but rather the entire international efforts toward establishing and maintaining peace that seem larger than ever.

This report explores how global peace operations have evolved in the past decade, and asks three basic questions to that evolution: What is going on? Why is it happening? And what sort of new challenges does it raise?

Emphasis throughout the report is on trying to identify the main trends that seem indicative for a typical 21st century peace operation. This implies painting with a fairly wide brush where one easily loses sight of the particularities of the individual operations. The purpose of the exercise is, however, not to provide a comparative study based on concrete findings from different operations, but rather to zoom in on the more generic challenges that seem relevant to most ongoing, and also possible future, peace operations.

In order to do that, the report firstly maps the Security Council’s practice of authorising peace operations in the past decade. It distinguishes between UN-led peace operations and delegated peace operations and identifies the main characteristics of each. The mapping thus provides an overview of what the Security Council has requested the UN-system to do, and what it has asked other actors to do with regard to peace operations from 1996-2006.

Based on this mapping, it is argued that two distinct yet related phenomena characterise the 21st century model of peace operations: State-Building Interventions and Hybrid Operations. The report analyses what lies behind both phenomena and how they are linked to one another. Finally, the report discusses whether this emerging model is best understood as innovative flexibility or as evading accountability.
The basic argument of the report is that the two mega-trends that dominate the policy and practice of peace operations may be pragmatic solutions to political problems but they raise serious questions of a more principled character: in and of itself the move towards state-building interventions contains a fundamental paradox of trying to build democracy through autocracy. The move towards hybrid operations aggravates this paradox by diffusing questions of international responsibility and accountability further. The crafters of future state-building hybrid peace operations thus need to establish oversight mechanisms that can allow both the Security Council and the citizens of the state-being-built to hold the state-builders accountable for their actions and omissions.

**Defining UN Peace Operations**

The concept of peace operations is strongly contested. The practice and activities it covers do not lend themselves to precise definition, and the term is – due to its positive connotations – used and misused to serve very different purposes by a variety of actors. In this report, ‘peace operations’ is used as a generic – and shorter – title for military operations authorised by the Security Council. The term thus covers traditional UN-led peacekeeping and observer missions that adhere to the principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force; second-generation UN-led operations that go beyond these principles; and delegated operations where regional organisations, or ad hoc coalitions, are acting on behalf of the UN Security Council. Focus throughout the report is on the latter two types: second generation or ‘multidimensional’ peace operations and delegated peace operations. Compared to traditional peacekeeping operations, these types of peace operations are far more challenging – not only for the Security Council itself and the many stakeholders involved in the operations, but also for bystanders and observers trying to understand what is going on.

In the literature on UN peace operations, it is common to distinguish between operations according to the nature of their mandate: does the operation have Chapter VII authorisation to use force or not? As will be discussed in more details later on, this distinction is increasingly unhelpful. Today, it has become almost standard procedure for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII when authorising new peace operations. This, however, does not mean that all peace operations – whether delegated or UN-led – have the same authorisation to use force. Delegated peace operations have often been authorised to use force in order to stabilise the situation and/or ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions, while UN-led operations have been authorised to use force for more limited purposes such as defence of the mission and – increasingly – to protect civilians (Blokker, 2005). This is partly a
reflection of differences in organisational capacity: the UN system does not have the same access to military resources as coalitions and regional security organisations; it is, however, also a reflection of the political realities in and of the Security Council and the changing international climate within which it operates. It is a well-known fact that the end of the Cold War removed the ideological barriers to cooperation in the Security Council. Less attention is, however, paid to how this has enabled the great powers to use peace operations pragmatically as a means to: 1) disengage themselves from Cold War conflicts that had lost strategic importance, 2) share the burden of responding to new armed conflicts, 3) delegate part of this burden to ad hoc coalitions and regional organisations and 4) obtain legitimacy for operations led by global or regional great powers within their own spheres of influence (Jakobsen, 2002: 273). Compared to Cold War practice, the most groundbreaking novelty has been the UN practice of sanctioning ‘spheres of influence’ operations (Jakobsen, 2002: 273). During the Cold War, it was a firmly held principle that UN peace operations were not to be undertaken by troops from countries that were thought to have a special interest in the conflict. Obviously this did not prevent global and regional powers to intervene in conflicts that they deemed sufficiently important, but when they did intervene they were acting on their own. They were neither legitimised nor influenced by the Security Council. Today, it is possible for great powers to obtain a UN mandate from the Security Council before (or after) intervening in a crisis situation that they for some reason deem necessary to end or otherwise manipulate. The Security Council’s practice of delegating peace operations is thus the flipside of the practice of increasingly accepting and legitimising spheres of influence operations. It should be noted, that spheres of influence operations are not restricted to the P5 – the permanent members of the Security Council – or even to the Permanent One – the USA. The role of Nigeria (acting through ECOWAS) and Australia in East Timor is illustrative in this regard.

Does this mean that the Security Council only turns to UN-led peace operations when no one else is willing to do the job? That the deployment of a UN-led peace operation indicates that global or regional great powers do not care enough about that particular crisis to engage themselves? And is this reason why, the most marginalised continent in the world, Africa, is home to the majority of UN-led peace operations? While Realpolitik clearly has a strong say in Security Council decision making on where – and where not – to authorise peace operations, reality is not that simple. As will be discussed in more detail throughout the report, the move towards hybrid operations entails the simultaneous or sequential deployment of UN and non-UN resources. The Security Council may thus be authorising both UN-led and delegated
forces to operate in the same theatre. As this report will argue, the choice between UN-led or delegated peace operations is no longer perceived by the Security Council as an either/or option. It is increasingly seen as a both/and option. In order to reach that and other conclusions, it is useful to explore in further detail the actual practice of the Security Council in the past decade in terms of both UN-led and delegated peace operations. This is done in the section below.
The Security Council’s Authorisation Practice since 1996

In the mid-1990s, the UN was widely seen as incapable of undertaking complex and robust peace operations. Failures in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda were taken as evidence that the world organisation could not provide an adequate response to the challenges of comprehensive civil war and state collapse (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:18). If and when military action was deemed necessary, the UN Security Council could authorise – and thereby legitimise – external armed intervention, but the UN system as such should not be tasked with the actual implementation. The era of expansive United Nations peacekeeping seemed to be passing as quickly as it had begun: regional organisations and ad hoc coalitions were the way of the future (Forman and Grene, 2004: 300).

Ten years later, the picture has turned out to be considerably more complex. Regional organisations and multinational coalitions have indeed undertaken numerous peace operations and yet, contrary to expectations, the demand for UN peacekeepers has risen even more. Today, the Security Council is once again sending UN troops to deal with complex crises situations marked by endemic civil war and state collapse. The sections below map the Security Council’s practice in the past decade in order to identify when and for what purpose the Security Council has turned to either the UN-system or to actors outside the UN-system.

UN-led Peace Operations
As mentioned in the introduction, United Nations peacekeeping deployment is at a historic high. More than 83,000 men and women in uniform and 18,000 civilians are currently serving in UN-led peace operations thereby far surpassing the previous peak from July 1993. As evident from the figure below, this increase has not been slow and gradual but rather a roller coaster ride of steep ups and dramatic downs.

The mid-1990s plunge was so deep that UN peacekeeping was widely believed not to recover from it. According to Lakhdar Brahimi, serious considerations were given to the suggestion of dismantling the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping altogether (2006: 14). By the turn of the century, UN peacekeeping unexpectedly rebounded. In 1999, the Security Council mandated major operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And in 2003, a second and even larger surge began with the deployment of five major operations (Liberia,
Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and the Sudan) and the expansion of the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Annex 1 provides an overview of UN-led peace operations established in the last decade. In October 2006, the number of UN peacekeepers had grown by more than 500% in the past 8 years (CIC, 2007: 1). Considering that the number of peace operations has remained remarkably stable – 16 were ongoing in 1996 while 15 are ongoing at the time of writing – it is evident, that the sheer size of an average UN peace operation has grown significantly in the past decade. In addition the Security Council has provided UN operations with mandates that are increasingly complex, multidisciplinary and robust.

**Complexity**
The move towards more complex and ambitious mandates dates back to the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Security Council began to intervene in internal conflicts and complex humanitarian emergencies. These so-called “second generation” peacekeep-

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1 In addition, the DPKO is in charge of three special political and/or peacebuilding missions (UNAMA in Afghanistan, UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone and BINUB in Burundi. Statistics for these can be found at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf
ing operations aimed not merely at monitoring and observing ceasefires but rather at building the foundations of a self-sustaining peace (Cockayne and Malone, 2005: 335). This remains the overall objective of most UN peace operations, but the list of activities and tasks conferred upon the peacekeepers in order to reach that objective has been expanded considerably in recent years. In the early-1990s, UN mandates typically focussed on ensuring the cessation of military hostility and the holding of free and fair elections. Today, a ‘standard’ mandate for a UN-led peace operation includes many or most of these tasks:

- Monitoring the implementation of peace agreements;
- Policing and other law and order functions;
- Re-establishing national authority;
- Providing security;
- Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants;
- Resettlement of refugees;
- Supervising and monitoring elections;
- Security sector reform;
- Human rights monitoring and training;
- Protection of civilians;
- Securing the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The list illustrates a tendency for the Security Council to give what they themselves have called “increasingly difficult and complex mandates” (UNSC, 2004:1). In Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, the Security Council has even requested the UN to administer territory and assume executive powers – a practice most thought obsolete with decolonisation.

**Personnel Composition and Contribution**

The expansion of responsibilities has led to changes in the personnel composition of UN peace operations. As evident from Annex 1, the majority of current UN peace operations employ a mixture of military and civilian competences. Military troops remain the largest group by far, but civilian police, as well as other civilians, are increasingly deployed to UN missions. In June 2007, more than 9,500 civilian police officers and close to 18,000 other civilians worked alongside the 74,000 troops and military observers that traditionally make up the core of UN peacekeeping. Civilian police forces are primarily called upon to handle security tasks unsuitable for military forces (as formed police units) and to assist in training and reforming national police forces (as part of Security Sector Reform). Most other civilians are working on logistics and
administrations, yet their presence also reflects the increasing diversity of tasks; peace operations are required to be undertaken either alone or in close partnership with other international organisations and agencies. These include building political and security structures, as in Kosovo and East Timor, building justice institutions in Sierra Leone and taking responsibility for economic governance in Liberia (CIC, 2006: 5).

Throughout the decade, Western countries have remained reluctant to contribute troops to UN-led missions – especially in Africa. The vast majority of UN soldiers are thus supplied by third world countries – most notably Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, who each contributed close to 10,000 troops to UN missions by late 2006. The sources of police personnel are slightly more diverse, and yet the majority of UN police officers are also supplied by third world countries such as Jordan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Senegal (CIC, 2007: 152). This has led some observers to warn of an informal system of ‘peacekeeping apartheid’ whereby European and American forces are deployed in NATO– or EU-led operations in Europe and the Middle East, whilst most UN troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa (de Coning, 2007: 2). Among the problems associated with this phenomenon is the lack of UN access to specialised military assets such as helicopters, light armour, and long-range lift availability as well as problems of finding sufficiently trained and well-qualified ground troops.

Recently, a number of European countries have indicated a willingness to re-engage with UN peace operations: as also evident in the French and Italian contributions to the UN-operation in Lebanon.\(^2\) Large-scale deployment of Western soldiers and police officers to UN operations in Africa remains, however, unlikely. It is thus generally expected, that the most recent UN mission – UNAMID in Darfur – will consist primarily of African troops and “as these are not numerous enough, we will certainly call upon U.N. troops, which would come mostly from Asia”, as French Foreign Minister Kouchner remarked.\(^3\)

**Chapter VII Authorisation**

As mentioned, it has become increasingly common for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the UN charter when establishing UN-led peace operations. This reflects the move towards more robust UN peace operations that was recom-
mended in the 2000-Brahimi report on United Nations Peace Operations. UN peacekeepers are now routinely given Chapter VII authorisation to use force not only in cases of self-defence but also in defence of the mission and to protect civilians and further other objectives such as protecting safe areas and humanitarian workers (Chesterman, 2004a; Holt and Berkman, 2006). The mandates given by the Security Council remain, however, often ambiguous and unclear. Very often a mandate to protect civilians is qualified by wordings such as “within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment” or something to that effect. This underlines that UN-led peace operations – despite Chapter VII authorisation to “take the necessary action” – are not expected to perform as enforcement operations. In addition to weak wordings of their mandates, they more often than not lack the necessary military capacity to mount mobile and credible operations in hostile environments such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan/Darfur.

Albeit challenged by the move towards robust mandates, the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality and minimum use of force remain in place for most UN-led peace operations. Even when the Security Council in the past decade has acted under Chapter VII, UN-led peace operations have been undertaken with the explicit consent of the host state or upon invitation by the parties to a peace agreement, and the Security Council has carefully refrained from providing any UN-led operation with as strong an enforcement mandate as it did in 1993 when UNOSOM II took over from the US-led operation in Somalia. In most situations, current peace operations furthermore work closely with the formal authorities of the host state as they try to build not only lasting peace but also functioning state institutions, thereby underlining the consent-based nature of the operations.

The practice of providing consent-based peace operations with a Chapter VII mandate is interesting from both a legal and an operational point of view.4 The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change argued that the distinction between missions based on consent and missions based on coercion has become misleading as Chapter VII mandates are now routinely given “on the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour” (UN 2004: paragraph 212-3). UN peacekeepers must be able to respond robustly to ‘spoilers’ to ensure that the peace process is kept on track. But what would happen if the consenting host government became a ‘spoiler’? How would the Security Council react, if the government withdrew its consent and requested that the UN peacekeepers

4 Thanks to David Kendal for helping me clarify my thoughts on this issue.
were pulled out of the country immediately? Surely, the response would depend on the concrete situation and the general political context within which it took place, but legally speaking it seems clear that having a Chapter VII authorisation ‘trumps’ the wishes of the host government. In principle, the UN peace operation could thus stay in place against the will of the host state – and it might even be expanded as a political response to the increasingly hostile environment within which it operates. At the end of the day, “enforcement with consent-operations” thus have an inbuilt potential to become more like regular enforcement operations. This may provide the UN troops with an implicit ‘staying power’ that might help secure the continued consent and/or buy-in to the peace process. It does, however, seem highly unlikely that a UN peace operation would be allowed to degenerate into a full-scale war-fighting operation. A much more likely scenario would be for the UN troops to stand down and give way to more regular combat forces drawn from regional powers or other states with strong interests in the country. In a sense this was what happened when the UK – upon request from the UN Secretary-General - intervened in Sierra Leone to stabilise the faltering UN peace operation there.

The revival of UN peacekeeping has produced considerable strains within the UN system. The United Nations is now operating the second largest global military deployment with only twelve professional planners in the DPKO Headquarters (DPI, 2006c). In May 2004, the President of the Security Council issued a statement noting that the Security Council was “cognizant of the challenges [the recent surge in demand for new peacekeeping operations] represents for the United Nations system” and “called upon Member States to ensure that the United Nations is provided with full political and financial support to meet these challenges” (UNSC, 2004: 1). The call remains only partially answered, and in October 2006 the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations deemed it necessary to warn publicly of overstretch (DPI, 2006a).

**Delegated Peace Operations**

The absence of a standing UN military capacity has led the Security Council to rely on a delegated approach to enforcement action. Or as noted in the Brahimi-report:

> The United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter (UN, 2000: 10)
The legal basis for this practice is uncontested. The Security Council is clearly competent under Chapter VII to authorise an enforcement action including the use of force, to be carried out by Member States in general, by particular Member States or by a regional organisation and agency (DUPI, 1999: 59). The practice of delegated peace operations has, however, also included a practice of ‘retro-active endorsement’ or ‘post-facto authorisation’, the legitimacy of which remains highly contested (Durward, 2006: 353-355). This has been the case with regard to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and ECOWAS’ operations in West Africa. In these situations, UN Security Council authorisation was sought – and given – only after the operation had commenced. On the one hand, this injects “a degree of flexibility into the mandating process, balancing the benefits of authorisation with getting the job done” (Durward, 2006: 354). On the other hand, it entails a danger of undermining the UN Security Council’s global responsibility for peace and security. A useful distinction may thus be made between requested forces where the Security Council believes that a multinational force under the lead of a single state or a regional organisation is better placed to respond to a larger or fast-breaking crisis (Italian-led force in Albania; Australian-led Interfet in East Timor) and the occasional resort by groups of states – or by single states with symbolic contributions by others – to take action that is post-facto brought into a Charter framework (Jones and Cherif; 2004).

The Security Council’s practice of delegation does not contain the same clear trends as was found above in the mapping of UN-led operations. When compared to UN-led operations, several aspects do, however, stand out: delegated operations tend to focus on stabilisation and be more directly linked to the national interests of those who are authorised by the Security Council to use force. A certain western bias can be found in the Security Council’s practice, although the Security Council has also authorised African regional organisations to intervene in conflicts on that Continent. Furthermore, it seems clear that the Security Council has yet to develop systematic oversight mechanisms of the peace operations it requests others to undertake. Each of these points is touched upon briefly below. For an overview of delegated peace operations authorised by the UN Security Council from 1996-2006, see Annex 2.

**Simpler Mandates**

When compared to the UN-operations initiated in the same period, delegated peace operations have had mandates that were considerably less complex, yet significantly more robust. Non-UN-led peace operations are ‘merely’ being asked to stabilise the situation and maintain security - not to build the foundations for a self-sustaining
peace. Delegated peace operations thus tend to have much more narrowly defined objectives than the complex state- and peace-building operations conferred upon the UN-system. This is also reflected in the composition of personnel: delegated peace operations are conducted almost exclusively by military troops. Only the AU-operation in Sudan (AMIS) and the Australian-led operation in Timor-Leste (ASTUTE) include the deployment of civilian police. So far, the Security Council has thus refrained from authorising multinational forces and regional arrangements to undertake the same type of multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction operations as it is requesting from the UN system. A combination of reasons accounts for this difference between UN-led and delegated peace operations. Firstly – and related to the issue of national interests discussed below – the leading actors to whom peace operations have been delegated have rarely had a strong desire to ‘take over and run’ foreign countries. They may have wanted to stabilise a situation here and now, but in general they have not been keen on taking on the long-term strenuous tasks related to state-building. Secondly, most regional organisations do not have the multidimensional character of the UN system. They tend to be stronger than the UN on the military side, but when it comes to civilian capacity most regional organisations engaged in peace operations are considerably weaker and therefore less well positioned to engage in multidimensional reconstruction efforts. This may, however, be changing as the EU is building its own capacity for multidimensional crisis management.

The Importance of National Interests
That national interests continue to matter is evident when looking at the past ten years’ practice of delegated peace operations. The Security Council can only expect to call on members that have themselves identified a national interest in taking action. It is thus no coincidence that Australia became the lead nation in respect to East-Timor, while it was Italy that responded to the Albanian refugee crisis in 1997, France that intervened in its former colony, Côte d’Ivoire in 2003, and USA that led the Multinational Interim Force in Haiti in 2004. An associated problem is that those willing to act may sometimes be the least preferable candidates to do so in light of suspicions over their motives. This is also an issue in relation to regional organisations, especially if they are dominated by one state. In some situations, there may thus be a difficult political judgment to make between inaction and action by less than ideal actors (Wilson, 2003: 95-100). As mentioned in the introduction, the Security Council has, however, increasingly accepted that global and regional powers can undertake ‘spheres of influence operations’ with UN authorisation.
Western Bias
In the past decade, the Security Council has primarily turned to Western member states when delegating peace operations. Most delegated peace operations have been led by a Western state or a Western organisation (EU, NATO) and six of the ten delegated peace operations authorised since 1996 have been located in Europe. The Western bias is also reflected in the fact that USA, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy are the five largest troop contributors to non-UN peace operations, and that 77% of all military personnel to peace operations that are not led by the UN are under either NATO (66%) or EU (11%) command (CIC, 2007: 179-181).

By delegating peace operations, the Security Council may thus be gaining access to military resources of Western states that do not wish to put their troops under direct UN command. Going back to the notion of ‘peacekeeping apartheid’ introduced above, it is thus interesting to note that European troops are increasingly being deployed to Africa in support – but not under the control – of UN peace operations (de Coning, 2007: 29). On two occasions the EU has thus deployed its new military capacity to the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of the UN mission, MONUC, in the country, and both the EU and NATO have provided personnel and material to support AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS).

Regional Organisations in Africa
Although a clear Western bias is found in the Security Council’s practice of delegation, the Council is, especially in Africa, increasingly relying on non-Western actors to carry out peace operations on its behalf. This turn towards African Solutions for African Problems reflects the continent’s marginalised position in global politics. Politically, the African Union (AU) is by far the most important actor in that regard, and the Security Council has repeatedly confirmed its support to the AU taking on a more active role in questions related to peace and security in Africa. Operationally, the Security Council has entrusted AU with a major role in addressing the complex situation in Darfur – first through authorising the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and most recently through the establishment of a hybrid UN/AU mission with a significantly stronger mandate that includes protection of civilians. The turn towards AU in Darfur is to a large extent a response to resistance from the Khartoum government to a UN-led operation. It does, however, also reflect the Security Council’s desire to see a stronger African role in peacekeeping on the continent. Among the arguments put forward by the Security Council in this regard are the need for burden sharing – taking the load off an overstretched UN-system – and the need for a thorough
understanding of the regional context. Following an open debate on the relationship between UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, the Council President thus issued a statement noting that: “The Security Council recognizes that regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of many conflicts closer to home and to influence the prevention or resolution, owing to their knowledge of the region” (UN, 2007b). The formulation can be read as a reflection of both the post-Cold War acceptance of ‘Sphere of influence’ operations and the move towards stronger regional responsibility for peace and security.

Compared to AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is considerably more experienced in multinational military operations. ECOWAS has intervened repeatedly in the civil wars of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, albeit not always with authorisation from the Security Council. When ECOWAS first intervened in Liberia back in 1990, it was both unprecedented and controversial (Aboagye and Bah, 2005: 9). It was the first time that a regional organisation set up for economic integration had intervened in a domestic conflict and the intervention effectively polarised the region as some ECOWAS member states (French speaking) contested the political and legal basis of the intervention. Since then, the role of ECOWAS in peace operations within its region has become increasingly accepted by both the member states and the surrounding international community. In 2003, the Security Council explicitly authorised ECOWAS to deploy troops to Liberia to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and “prepare for the introduction of a longer-term United Nations stabilization force” (UNSC, 2003: 2).

**Reporting and Accountability**

Authorising someone else to act on its behalf should not imply that the Security Council is relinquishing its responsibility. The Security Council has therefore increasingly had to figure out what to put in place of the normal reporting and accountability arrangements. Resolutions sanctioning military action are increasingly containing mechanisms that provide the Security Council with some form of control over action taken in its name. The various measures introduced by the Security Council in delegated peace operations include: 1) setting specific rules of engagement and time limits to the mandates; 2) attaching UN liaison officers and civilian personnel to the operation; 3) holding briefing meetings between the Security Council and those states conducting the operation; and 4) requesting reports to be submitted to the Security Council (Jakobsen, 2000: 172). These measures have been employed in different combinations over time and the Security Council has not yet established a regular pattern for controlling delegated peace
operations. A study from 2004 thus found at least four different reporting methods in relevant Security Council resolutions:

- Simply calling for regular reports;
- Laying down a timetable for initial and subsequent reports;
- Calling for reports to be made through the Secretary-General;
- Calling for the Secretary-General to report in parallel on his own responsibility.

According to the study this implies that “by ‘deciding to remain seized of’ cases in which an authorisation to use force has been conferred, the Council gives itself the opportunity to develop systematic oversight, but it has failed to do so” (Berman, 2004: 159-160). Finding appropriate mechanisms for controlling actions taken by others on its behalf remains an outstanding issue for the Security Council. In recent years, systematic dialogue on the terms of partnership and cooperation has been initiated between UN and relevant regional organisations, most notably EU and AU. The Security Council furthermore has begun to meet with regional organisations to strengthen interaction and cooperation. As will be explained in more detail later, modifications in partnership arrangements are, however, likely to take place primarily on a case-by-case approach (Forman and Grene, 2004: 306).
A 21st Century Model for UN Peace Operations

Considering the variety of peace operations authorised by the Security Council in the past decade, it is clear that identifying the ‘deep trends’ is not a straightforward task (CIC, 2006: ix). Several phenomena could be emphasised as signifying the main evolution in peace operations:

- **Protection of civilians**: Whether or not explicitly mentioned in the mandate, the responsibility to protect civilians has increasingly become a normative expectation of peace operations. The authorisation to use force to protect civilians has become implicit (Holt and Berkman, 2006).
- **Multidimensionality**: Peace operations have increasingly become mixed enterprises that deploy both military and civilian capacities in order to provide not merely ‘negative peace’ (absence of violence) but also ‘positive peace’ (social justice) (Galtung, 1969).
- **UN Revival**: UN is increasingly taken over operations initiated by combinations of regional arrangements, coalitions of the willing and pivotal states. This “passing of the peacekeeping baton back to the UN appears to confirm both the organizations unparalleled international legitimacy and the exhaustion of the financial and human resources of many non-UN peacekeepers” (Williams, 2005: 165).
- **Virtual trusteeship**: Peace operations are increasingly called upon to assume government functions. Peace operations have become increasingly intrusive and transformative, as they aim not merely to establish and maintain security but to build the lasting foundations for a stable peace.
- "**No organization left behind**": As demand for complex peace operations has increased, the number of implementing institutions has grown as well (Durch and Berkman, 2006: 2). Today, most regional organisations and development agencies are engaged in tasks related to peace building, conflict prevention and/or conflict management.
- **Peacekeeping Apartheid**: Troops to UN-led peace operations are increasingly provided by Third World states, such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan, while troops to delegated operations are primarily provided by Western states.

While some of the phenomena listed above clearly are related - e.g. multidimensionality and virtual trusteeship – others point to trends that are contradictory or at least
not as straightforwardly connected. In order to identify an emerging model for 21st century peace operations and provide an answer to the question of why UN peace operations have evolved as they have, it is useful to distinguish between the functional and organisational aspects: what kind of actions and activities are the peace operations supposed to do? And what type of structure is being set up to perform those functions? When analysed from this perspective, two mega-trends can be distilled: state-building interventions that attempt to re-establish or reform central governance structures and hybrid operations that draw on both UN capacities and resources outside the UN system. The two trends are closely linked and have ramifications for each other. In combination, they provide a reasoned answer to the question of why peace operations have evolved as they have in the past decade. In the two sections below, emphasis is firstly placed on analysing the functional aspects: what does the move towards multidimensional state-building interventions with trusteeship-like qualities imply and why is it ongoing? Subsequently, the move towards hybrid operations is analysed again focusing on the questions of what the phenomena imply and why it is evident today.

State-Building Interventions

After years of neo-liberal attempts at ‘rolling back’ the state and theoretical debate on the ‘withering away’ of states as a result of globalisation, the need for effective and well-functioning states has increasingly taken centre-stage in international politics. According to then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, “one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face” (Annan, 2005: paragraph 19). He emphasised the sovereign state as the basic and indispensable building block of the international system and argued that “if States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right (Annan, 2005: paragraph 19). Annan’s line of reasoning echoes that found in the influential policy reports on Human Security and Responsibility to Protect. Both reports underline that the fulfilment of human rights, human security and human development is directly related to the capacity of the state. Human security is considered a complement to state security – not a substitute, and the Responsibility to Protect is seen to lie first and foremost with the sovereign state – not with the international community or non-state actors. Compared to traditional notions of sovereignty and security, the reports, as well as Annan’s remark on the ‘need to ensure that all states are strong enough’, signal a shift towards a more interventionist role for the international community in the maintenance of a system of functioning states. In the 21st century, it is thus common
to claim that all states have a shared responsibility for, and interest in, securing that other states are fulfilling the functions associated with being a modern state – most notably providing control and security within its own territory. This is evident in the national security strategies formulated by the Bush-administration, and the EU’s first security strategy. Without a functioning state, both human security and international security is considered at risk and it has thus become an almost political imperative to re-establish state structures in areas where they have collapsed (Zartman, 1995; Fukuyama, 2004).

In keeping with this reasoning, peace operations have come to be seen as not only a prelude to, but an integrated part of, post-conflict state-building (Chesterman, 2005). The exact meaning and practice of state building remains contested and difficult to define. In the present context – where emphasis is on the external engagement – the term “state-building intervention” is applied in order to distinguish it from primarily internal longer-termed historical processes of state formation. A state-building intervention is thus defined as external civil and military engagement aimed at constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security.5

State-building can be seen as part of a wider peace-building strategy. While early approaches to peace-building emphasised either social relations among conflicting parties or economic determinants of peace, focus has increasingly turned towards the need for effective public institutions and state capacity (Call and Cousens, 2007: 8). State-building interventions thus aim at building functioning and self-sustaining state structures that can allow external state-builders to complete their mission and withdraw (Narten, 2007: 2). The structures, which the international community desire to build, are supposed to re-establish the social contract between the rulers and the ruled and provide for a state that is considered legitimate by its citizens. In the state-building literature, this is often translated into an emphasis on rule of law, good governance and democratisation (physical security) on the one side, and the provision of social and economic infrastructure that allows citizens a stable livelihood (economic security) on the other side. The Security Council has so far refrained from debating what state building is and what it means in a post-conflict peace operation context. It has, however, recently debated its own role in supporting security sector reform – one of the key elements in most state-building efforts – and concluded that:

5 The definition is a slight expansion of the definition offered by Chandler (2006: 1).
• Reforming the security sector in post-conflict environment is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict;
• Security sector reform priorities should be considered when mandating UN operations in order to subsequently enable timely withdrawal of the international peacekeepers (UNSC 2007a).

This formulation illustrates two things: firstly, the Security Council’s emphasis on having an exit-strategy in mind even when mandating long-termed interventions and objectives; secondly, the Security Council’s focus on pursuing security and development objectives simultaneously, not sequentially. Although it remains common to speak of discrete phases of transition, attempts to define transition timelines are usually “exercises in semantics” (IPA/CIC, 2007: 1). Most policy thinking on state-building intervention therefore highlights the need for an integrated approach that takes long-term development objectives into consideration even in the immediate pursuit of short-term stabilisation aims. In practice, this pushes military actors into fields traditionally occupied by civilian actors. Soldiers are increasingly being asked to assist in concrete reconstruction of physical infrastructure and in longer-termed build-up of national capacity to maintain and provide security and law and order (security sector reform) (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2007). The intervening actors must demonstrate tangible results of their presence to maintain (or even gain) the support of the local population and avoid hostility and violent attacks. This has turned out to be critical as international aid workers and peacekeepers increasingly have become targets for violent attacks and kidnappings (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver, 2007).

The remarks made by Under-Secretary-General for DPKO in an interoffice memorandum outlining reforms for DPKO are indicative of both the reasoning behind, and some of the challenges related to, this expansion of peace operation tasks:

“Even in the process of initial stabilization we must begin to treat the symptoms of chronic deprivation and start the long-term effort of tackling the underlying causes of conflict. This is leading us to undertake a much broader range of tasks in UN peace operations, such as support for public administration, restructuring of rule of law institutions and local government ... I welcome these developments, as bringing us into more direct contact with the communities we serve and enabling us to better address their needs. But it also raises real questions for us as to the Department’s capacity to undertake an
expanded set of tasks and what is required to perform them successfully” (DPKO, 2005: 2)

The move towards state-building interventions suggests that the deployment of military forces is not merely a tool for preventing the resumption of conflict, but rather an integrated part of the overall purpose – namely to assist in re-building war-torn states on the basis of international norms and standards. To keep up with this development, the DPKO has suggested that the existing set of peacekeeping principles may need to be expanded as answers are found to the following questions:

- To what extent should peacekeepers be involved in performing key functions of the state given the need to build the capacity of indigenous actors and institutions to maintain sustainable peace?
- When and how should peacekeeping operations be terminated while keeping the prospects of long-term peace-building alive?
- How should peacekeeping operations relate to the range of UN and non-UN actors also present in the conflict and post-conflict settings? (DPKO, 2006: 7)

**Virtual Trusteeship**
State-building interventions are typically deployed to areas where the formal governing institutions and state structures are either non-existing or have virtually ceased to function – so called failed or collapsed states. In practice, this has led to the invention of two distinct classes of ‘virtual trusteeships’:

- A formal model of *transitional administration* – applied in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor – where the UN Security Council has explicitly authorised the mission to assume some or all government functions temporarily;
- An informal *light footprint* model where “the UN has been called upon to exercise transitional administration-like powers without being explicitly authorised to do so” (Chesterman, 2004b: 227).

The informal model has primarily been applied in Africa where the intervening actors effectively have had to undertake basic law and order functions while trying to build national capacity to assume responsibility. The model, however, has its name from the

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6 That Africa has not yet been the theatre of a formal transitional administration-type operation is not a co-incidence. The absence of political will to commit resources to undertake such operations coupled with their difficulty has so far effectively prevented the Security Council from authorising a ‘proper’ transitional administration intervention in Africa (Chesterman 2005: 6).
intervention in Afghanistan. Following the US-led invasion in 2003, the international community deliberately chose not to establish a formal transitional administration in that country. Based on strong recommendation from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, the international community agreed to aim for a ‘light footprint’ where as much responsibility as possible was placed on Afghan institutions and people. Under the full-fledged transitional administration model, the external state-builders hold full, or some executive legislative and judicial authority, while in the informal light footprint model, the state-building engagement is supposed to be of a more consultative nature (Narten, 2007: 8). The combination of external conditionality and weak national capacity does, however, make the light footprint ‘partnership’ between international and national actors quite unequal and the actual level of intrusiveness may in effect be as high in the informal model as in the formal model.

A systematic study of why the Security Council has opted for a full-fledged transitional administration in some cases and a ‘light footprint’ in others has yet to be made. It seems, however, reasonable to assume that hard-core politics is a major part of the explanation. The Security Council has only mandated transitional administration in situations where major Western states have been willing to contribute both financially and substantively to the operation. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, where NATO was involved from the start, and in East Timor, where Australia took on a lead role. Another explanation could be that the Security Council only initiates transitional administrations in situations where the state-being-built is not already recognised as a sovereign state. It would be significantly more difficult to revoke an existing state’s sovereignty than to temporarily assume it from a new state (as in the case of East Timor). In the case of Africa, both reasons seem valid and may explain why the continent so far has experienced only light footprint operations. No Western state has had strong enough interests in African conflicts to push for a formal revoking of the sovereignty of one or more African state. A third explanation, however, may be that the model of transitional administration was used only briefly as an experiment in a few cases at a particular point in history. The Security Council will not apply that model any more. This explanation is returned to in the concluding reflections on the sustainability of the emerging model for UN peace operations. Emphasis here remains on identifying the main characteristics of a state-building peace operation.

Both models are of a transitory nature. The purpose is not to place the country under permanent international tutelage but rather to establish local ownership that can sustain the results achieved by the international engagement and allow external state-builders to withdraw (Narten, 2007). This has proven to be a major challenge
for any state-building intervention, whether in the shape of a transitional administration or a light footprint. A commonly suggested solution is that international state-builders must improve their knowledge and understanding of the concrete political context within which they are operating. This will increase their capacity to identify potential ‘drivers of change’ and/or engage in a broad-based process of dialogue and consultation. The ‘and/or’ highlights the dilemma that international state-builders often find themselves confronted with: should they opt for an inclusive approach where attempts may even be made at co-opting “spoilers”, or should they focus more exclusively on supporting the “reform-friendly” forces in societies? Answers to that question – albeit often posed in technical terms – are essentially political and must be made on a case-by-case basis.

When approached in more principal – and critical – terms, the difficulties of ensuring local ownership and the dangers of violent resistance reflects an internal contradiction in the practice of virtual trusteeship: the attempt to establish institutions for self-governance through benevolent autocracy (Chesterman, 2005). The moral authority of international state-building interventions rest on their capacity to serve the interests of the local population, yet the local population is – at least partially and temporarily – deemed to be unable to determine their own interests (Chandler, 2006). Either formally or informally, international control is considered necessary to provide the people with the ‘proper’ institutions they need to be able to govern themselves. As will be discussed below, this points to the need for establishing mechanisms that can hold international state-builders accountable for their actions, since “the central paradox of international administrations is that they are tasked with facilitating democratic governance while they themselves lack accountability to the population they administer” (McCann, 2007: 1).

**Hybrid Operations**

In July 2007, the Security Council established “an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur” (UNSC 2007c). This was the first peace operation to be officially labelled as a *hybrid operation*, but various forms of hybridity have been applied informally for years both in Sudan and elsewhere. In fact, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that preceded UNAMID was a hybrid operation in anything but name: African countries provided troops and police to the mission; EU, NATO and bilateral countries contributed financial, logistics and strategic airlift support; and the UN provided ‘support packages’ of personnel, armed personnel carriers and other equipment (Bah and Johnstone, 2007: 3).
But what exactly is a hybrid operation? And what are the advantages and challenges of turning towards hybridity?

As a model, hybrid operation is evolving on a case-by-case basis. In the case of Sudan, hybridity has been a response to both the Government of Khartoum’s resistance to a UN-led peace operation and the limited capacity of the AU. Other hybrid operations have emerged for different reasons and in different situations. This obviously makes it difficult to define and categorise hybrid operations. The term is therefore often considered self-explanatory and left undefined. The Swedish Challenges-project provides the following description, which will serve as a working definition for this report:

“Increasingly operations have taken on a hybrid character with two or more organizations responsible for different elements of the international response. Differences in circumstances have led to no standard form being adopted, and thus the UN has sometimes deployed troops alongside those of other organizations with or without formal coordination, or preceded or followed a multinational, regional or bilateral force, with responsibilities and relationships changing as the mission matures” (2006:12).

Most attempts at categorising hybrid operations are inspired by a report prepared to the DPKO’s department for Best Practices (Jones and Cherif, 2004; see e.g. Challenges, 2006; Durch and Berkman, 2006). The report distinguishes between four different types of formal arrangements:

- Integrated operations: different organisations operate within a single or joined chain of command;
- Coordinated operations: different organisations operate side-by-side but coordinated;
- Parallel operations: UN deploys alongside another organisations force without formal coordination;
- Sequential operations: UN precedes or follows another force.

To get a fuller picture of what is actually happening on the ground the report suggests supplementing this formal picture with an analysis of the functional features of the mission. Five different features – several of which may be present in any given missions – are identified:
• Short-term military support: the provision of enhanced military support to an existing or newly-deploying UN operation;
• Civilian-Military division of labour: one organisation in charge of civilian and police dimensions of operations, another in charge of military;
• Linked Peacekeeping-Observer operations: the UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate but coordinated commands;
• Hand-over operations: the UN precedes or follows a regional or multinational force operation;
• Integrated operations: all organisations operating under common command.

Evidently, there is some overlap between the formal and functional categories. In combination they nevertheless provide an overview of the many possibilities explored by the Security Council so far. This overview is presented in table 2:

Table 2: Hybrid Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Features</th>
<th>Formal Relationship</th>
<th>Sequential operations</th>
<th>Parallel operations</th>
<th>Coordinated operations</th>
<th>Integrated operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hand-over operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOMOG-UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOMIL-UNMIL (Liberia)</td>
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<td>INTERFET-UNTAET (East Timor)</td>
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<td>AMIB - ONUB (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short-term military support</td>
<td>EU -MONUC (DRC)</td>
<td>UK-UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MONUC (DRC)</td>
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<td>EU -MONUC (DRC)</td>
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<td>MONUC (DRC)</td>
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<td>AMIS (Sudan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linked peacekeeping – observer</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNOMIG-CIS (Georgia)</td>
<td>UNMEE-AU (Ethiopia/Eritrea)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian-Military Division of labour</td>
<td>UNAMA-Coalition (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>UNAMA-ISAF (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>UNMIK-KFOR (Kosovo)</td>
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<td>Integrated functions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAET (East Timor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The table is adapted from Challenges 2006 and Durch and Berkman 2006.
As noted, hybrid operations are evolving on a case-by-case basis. It is thus difficult to provide a general explanation as to why the Security Council is authorising hybrid operations and/or welcoming the assistance of other organisations in support of UN-led operations. On a macro-scale, one factor seems, however, to be decisive: the UN remains the only international organisation capable of providing long-term multidimensional assistance on a global scale, but it does not have the ability to execute high-end or intensive military operations (Durch and Berkman, 2006: 3). Most of the hybrid operations have thus consisted in either short-term military support to a UN operation (e.g. EU to MONUC, UK to UNAMSIL) or in the UN deploying a long-term mission to take over after a short-term regional intervention (e.g. ECOWAS in Liberia).

The latter practice is also known as ‘re-hatting’, a term that underlines the sequencing of the operations. Sequencing appears to work because it plays on the respective strengths of the organisations. The Security Council remains averse to deploying UN troops into situations where a comprehensive peace agreement is not yet in place. In contrast, regional organisations have been more willing to undertake stabilisation operations – often in relation to their own efforts to broker a peace agreement. They do, however, lack the staying power and/or the multidimensional capability of the UN (de Coning, 2007: 10). Seen from the perspective of state-building interventions, the practice of sequencing is problematic, because it may prevent or complicate the necessary integration of short-term stabilisation objectives and longer-termed reconstruction objectives.

In some situations, hybrid operations have gradually taken on an integrated character where different organisations have been working together under a more or less common command. The case that comes closest to this model is probably the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which after a few months in operation took over command of the multinational military operation previously led by Australia. In other situations, separate chains of command have been upheld for the civilian and military components of the international engagement. This is most clearly illustrated by the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan, where a relative small UN presence – UNAMA – is in charge of coordinating civilian efforts, while NATO remains in charge of the military operation (ISAF). The set-up in Kosovo with a full-fledged UN transitional administration (UNMIK) operating alongside a large NATO-mission (KFOR) provides another example.

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The term ‘hybrid operations’ is increasingly used as shorthand for the different and overlapping forms of international engagement currently found in many crisis and conflict zones. In a sense, the term provides a positive spin on what for years has been seen as a general lack of international coherency and coordination. What appeared as disorder is being re-phrased as part of a deliberate strategy, as hybrid operations “mix and match capacities from different organisations to generate combined responses to crisis” (CIC, 2007:7). Merely rephrasing something does not solve inherent problems of incoherency and contradictory objectives. Hybrid operations are by nature complex, multinational, multicultural and multi-dimensional operations. They furthermore take place in difficult political, security, economic and humanitarian environments. Both characteristics provide them with a strong need for effective co-operation and coordination – but not necessarily with the mechanisms or political arrangements for achieving this. Considering the complexity of modern peace operations, it is evident that the constructions required cannot be simple bilateral relationships between the UN and regional arrangements. Organising a degree of predictability in those complex arrangements, whilst preserving the necessary political autonomy of each organisation and the responsibilities of the Security Council, will be a major challenge in the years to come (Challenges 2006: 56). In the past decade, the Security Council has debated its cooperation with regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security on several occasions. The most recent debate took place on 28th March 2007, where the Security Council re-iterated its “intention to consider further steps to promote closer and more operational cooperation between the UN and regional, sub-regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping” (UNSC 2007b). This vague formulation indicates the basic dynamic of the Council. While supporting the general idea of cooperation with regional organisations, the Security Council remains reluctant to focus in detail on abstract issues. It prefers to resolve detailed questions in an ad hoc way in specific concrete situations (SCR, 2007: 3–4). This is particularly true of the Permanent Members, who in general are opposed to introducing rules and measures that may limit the Council’s room for manoeuvring in future situations.

Finding appropriate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination is important for operational efficiency. It is, however, also essential to holding international actors involved in peace operations legally accountable for their actions and any failure to act (Challenges 2006: 19). Depending of the circumstances of the deployment, states, organisations and individuals in peace operations are accountable to, amongst others: the UN and Member States of the UN, regional organisations, other international organisations and Member States of those organisations, host nations,
troop contributing states to that particular peace operation, national organisations, non-governmental organisations, and the general population. Accountability in hybrid operations can therefore become extremely diffused and confusing as military and civilian peacekeepers, humanitarian agents and contractors try to identify the myriad of relevant organisations and bodies to which they can, should or must report (Challenges, 2006).
Innovative Flexibility or Evading Accountability?

If state-building and hybridity, as argued above, indicates the main novelty in the Security Council’s peace-operation-practice in the past decade, how are we to understand and greet these phenomena? On the one hand, they can be seen as timely responses to the challenges of our time. On the other hand, however, they also raise new and fundamental challenges about how to ensure accountability of the hybrid state-building interventions. Both arguments are discussed in turn below.

Innovative Flexibility

Ever since its inception, UN peace operations have emerged and evolved “not by design but out of necessity” (Cockayne and Malone, 2005: 332). “The lack of an express mention of peacekeeping in the Charter has not inhibited its development. In fact, it may have helped establish peacekeeping as a flexible response to international crisis” (Murphy, 2007: 5). Similarly, the power of the United Nations Security Council to administer territory is not mentioned in the UN charter. Here as in Peacekeeping, practice has led theory, and the Charter has been shown to be a flexible – some would say malleable – instrument (Chesterman, 2004b: 219).

The move toward state-building intervention can be seen as the deliberate result of new policy thinking in response to the perceived dangers presented by collapsing state. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has been increasingly concerned with establishing self-sustaining peace in the aftermath of civil war. This objective has come to be seen as involving more than merely stabilising the situation and monitoring post-conflict elections. The entire state structure must be rebuilt in order to ensure that they function in accordance with international standards of good governance, human rights and democracy. A longer-termed and more intrusive international engagement is thus deemed necessary, and the Security Council is accordingly providing peace operations with mandates that combine the military presence with support for the establishment of functioning state structures. In the meantime – while indigenous state structures are being built and the local capacity to perform state functions remains lacking – the international presence is asked, either by default or design, to perform some, or all, executive functions. The practice of state-building interventions can thus be seen as directly reflecting the way policy makers in the Security Council define the problem (state collapse) and the remedy (state-building) they prescribe to solve it.
Similarly, the move towards hybrid operations can be seen as a logical response to the operational challenges presented by such state-building interventions: no multilateral institution has the capacity and resources needed to deal with all the dimensions involved in state-building. Or as the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, has remarked:

“While the UN remains the primary institution to undertake global peace operations, the exponential growth in peace operations demonstrates the compelling need for cooperation based on comparative advantage” (CIC, 2007b: vii)

In practice the turn towards hybrid operations has not been the result of a deliberate strategic choice made by the Security Council, or by any other actor for that matter. It has been brought about primarily as the incremental result of discrete ad hoc responses to various capacity constraints and political realities in the Security Council and/or the specific crisis situation. This may be said to reflect a degree of flexibility, which has led some observers to argue that:

“Contrary to conventional wisdom, the UN is a flexible organization. The UN can provide political cover for innovative operational mechanisms – as it has done in Timor-Leste by deploying its police alongside the Australian-led multinational force, and in Lebanon by accepting that European forces would make their own logistical arrangements to get on the ground. The UN has demonstrated a comparative advantage in being able to combine forces from around the world to handle crisis in both Africa and the Middle East (CIC 2007a: 10).”

In this regard, the emergent practice of hybrid operations can be seen as a pragmatic move towards realising Kofi Annan’s vision of an “interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities” outlined in his report to the 2005 World Summit (UN 2005: paragraph 112). From an optimistic point of view, the emerging model for 21st century peace operations can thus be said to present a format that allows the international community to address state collapse. As always, however, any solution comes with its own problems.

**Evading Accountability**

Experience from places as diverse as Kosovo, East-Timor, Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrate that to build self-sustaining state structures is anything
but easy for external actors. Achieving genuine local ownership and support for the new institutions and policies remain a continuous concern in all four interventions. Within the state-building literature this problem is increasingly being related to the principal paradox of state-building interventions: external actors are exercising power for the purpose of building a democratic state, yet they themselves lack accountability to the population of the very state they are building. A growing number of scholars are thus asking ‘who guards the guardians’? (Caplan, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Zaum, 2006; McCann, 2006).

To the extent that international state-builders are ‘guarded’ – in the sense of being held accountable for their actions – it is through international mechanisms of reporting. Not through direct linkages to the people whose lives the intervention is supposed to improve. In most cases, the UN Security Council exercise a degree of general oversight through reporting requirements to the Council (normally every three or six months) while some bureaucratic oversight of the UN-elements of the operation are provided by the Secretariat (Zaum, 2006: 469). This is often supplemented by individual reporting to other international organisations. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the High Representative thus reports to the Peace Implementation Council and the Council of the European Union: while the Stabilization Force (SFOR) reports to NATO, and the international judges on the Bosnian Constitutional Court to the European Court of Human Rights (Caplan, 2005: 1).

In addition to such systems of reporting ‘upwards’ and ‘outwards’, only few mechanisms of ‘downward’ and ‘inward’ accountability can be identified. Country-specific Ombudsman offices have been established in Bosnia and East Timor to allow the population access to redress for possible wrongdoings of the international administrators. This model has, however, only been applied in situations where a formal transitional administration has been set up – nothing similar has been attempted in ‘light footprint’ state-building interventions. And even in the formal transitional administrations, the ombudsman’s jurisdiction has been limited. In the case of Kosovo, the Ombudsman can thus receive and investigate complaints concerning human rights violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by UNMIK as well as by any local institution. His jurisdiction does not, however, extend to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). In Bosnia-Herzegovina there are three ombudsperson institutions, but neither of them extend to international actions (Caplan, 2005: 467-8).

Many multilateral development institutions have established measures that provide some form of redress for stakeholders. The World Bank’s Inspection Panel is
one example. In principle, the Panel can investigate complaints from local citizens everywhere the Bank has projects. The Panel remains, however, peripheral both to ‘ordinary’ developing countries in general and to countries undergoing a state-building intervention in particular. In the more than ten years of its existence, only one case has been from a country with an ongoing state-building intervention.\(^9\)

The lack of accountability measures between the international state-builders and the people they are trying to assist – and whose territory they administer – is further aggravated by the immunity, which international organisations tend to evoke for their staff (Caplan, 2005: 469-70; Zaum, 2006: 470-2). The immunity principle is well known in international law. In relation to state-building interventions, it is, however, problematic. Firstly, the logic behind the principle – to prevent the host state from interfering in the international organisation’s activities – cannot be applied to international administrations that exercise sovereign functions. Secondly, the claim to immunity is incompatible with the mandate to establish democratic institutions and the rule of law. And finally, it violates the basic human right of the right to a remedy (Zaum, 2006: 471).

The problematic accountability of state-building interventions is increasingly acknowledged. Albeit writing in his personal capacity, it is worth quoting the then-Director of Communication in the office of the UN Secretary-General at some length:

International officials often find themselves endowed with more or less absolute power. It is not even clear that they are legally bound by international human rights instruments. .... Above all, it is not clear to whom and how they are accountable. In the case of UN administrations, they report to the Secretary-General, who in turn reports to the Security Council, usually at three-month or six-month intervals. The Council does not really have any mechanism, and its members seldom have much appetite, for scrutinizing the conduct of an administration in detail. As for the administered, they have little recourse unless they can reach the media and public opinion of influential member states. If they are learning to govern themselves democratically, it is not exactly by example (Mortimer, 2004: 13).

\(^9\) This was in 2005, when pygmies in the Democratic Republic of Congo complained that they were harmed by the forestry-sector reform activities supported by World Bank. The Panel recommended that their claims were investigated. The investigation remains ongoing (World Bank, 2006: 22-27). The Panel was established in 1993 and has in total received 49 complaints.
This quotation illustrates that it is the democratic ambitions of state-building interventions, which fuels their moral paradox. The interventions aim at establishing institutions that will allow the people of the country to govern themselves freely. Yet, these people are – at least temporarily – considered unable to determine their own interests and they are not provided with measures that allow them hold those exercising power on their behalf accountable (Bain, 2001; Chandler, 2006). Morally, the intervention is justified as a temporary arrangement that can ensure that the people get the proper institutions they need to be able to govern themselves responsibly, and in the meantime, some measure of external control is needed to prevent them from fighting amongst themselves and/or choosing corrupt and divisive leaders (Bain, 2001). Such moral reasoning is not new, but resembles arguments in support of colonialism and imperialism. The main difference is that today, empire is in ‘denial’ – it is not “hesitant to intervene but to assume political responsibility” (Chandler, 2006: 96).

Compared to the complex and ad hoc multinational hybrid arrangements that are the norm today, the ‘system of mandates’ introduced by the League of Nation and the subsequent ‘trusteeships’ of the United Nations were much simpler. They basically implied that a non-sovereign territory was placed under the control of a single imperial power, which notionally at least was accountable for its management to the rest of the international community (Mortimer, 2004: 7). Today, no major power will assume such responsibility. Instead, the international presence consists of a variety of military and civilian actors that each have their own mechanisms of ‘upward’ accountability and whose ‘downward’ accountability rests on vaguely defined notions of local ‘ownership’, ‘participation’ and ‘consultation’. In this sense, the move towards hybrid operations is further aggravating the accountability deficit by diffusing and circumscribing the international accountability mechanisms that – albeit limited and weak – may exist.

To provide for more coherent international accountability mechanisms, it has been suggested that delegated peace operations should be seen as part of UN peacekeeping to ensure that the UN both gets credit and is held responsible for the actions of the missions it authorises (Jones and Cherif, 2004). So far, the Security Council has, however, failed to develop systematic mechanisms that can provide it with oversight of delegated peace operations. The political dynamics of the Security Council are likely to prevent more general mechanisms from emerging, as especially the Permanent Five prefer to approach these issues on an ad hoc basis. A more realistic avenue towards stronger international accountability may be thus to improve cooperation and coordination between the many international actors involved in peace operations in order to allow for more coherent international engagement. This could in
turn increase transparency and thus enable better oversight of what is going on. As indicated above, the Security Council is, in principle, supportive of strengthening cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations. In this area as well, the Council has, however, so far been reluctant to general and systematic rules and regulations, as these are perceived to be potentially restricting the Council in finding appropriate responses to future crisis.

The Council’s aversion of dealing with the more abstract aspects of state-building intervention points to a fundamental issue that is working against the establishment of systematic mechanisms for international oversight and accountability. State-building interventions – especially in the form of a transitional administration – remain a rare, but no longer exceptional, form of rule. So far, however, it has been “improvised as a series of pragmatic responses to particular crisis” (Mortimer, 2004: 10). It is not the subject of any official doctrine or any general, thematic resolution of either the General Assembly or the Security Council. The necessity of placing a territory under some form of international administration has been accepted in specific cases, but the idea that it might become a permanent or recurrent feature of international life is instinctively felt to be dangerous, since it undermines the principle of sovereign equality on which the current international order is built (Mortimer, 2004: 12). Restrictions on sovereignty may be justified by referring to the situation as an emergency – a period of exception while ‘normality’ is restored. But when the period of exception lasts for years, perhaps decades, it is increasingly difficult to regard the arrangement as an ‘emergency’ – and the question of Who Guards the Guardians becomes increasingly pressing.

State-building interventions are difficult to fit into traditional notions of representative democracies. They are established and sustained by international processes – not by the people, the demos, who live on the territory. This, however, need not imply that they have to remain unaccountable to the local population. Several suggestions have been made to establish and strengthen mechanisms that give local citizens and institutions access to redress: the institution of the ombudsman could be enlarged and strengthened; the jurisdiction of national courts could be expanded and allow for reviews of the international authorities’ exercise of power; and referenda could be held on major elements of reform plan (Caplan, 2005: 470; McCann, 2007: 18). Simple and intuitively easy changes in international working procedures, such as ensuring that all documents are translated into the local languages and made available to local stakeholders, civil society representatives and media, could also help establish some form of ‘downward’ and ‘inward’ accountability of the international state-builders.
To ensure that the entire group of international state-builders is answerable to, on the one hand, the Security Council on whose behalf they are acting and, on the other hand, the particular population for whom they are trying to build a state, there is a need to think more thoroughly about the fundamental paradox of state-building and try to identify remedies and measures that might ease some of the most thorny elements of the paradox. As pointed out by Kofi Annan’s director of communication: “The United Nations must surely aspire to do better than appointing a despot and hoping that he or she will prove enlightened” (Mortimer, 2004: 13).
Concluding Reflections

Both hybrid operations and state-building interventions are relatively new features in the Security Council’s toolbox, yet the title of the report boldly indicates that they will be with us for a while – albeit probably not for the entire course of the 21st century. As pointed out by Gowan and Johnstone, efforts to predict the future of peacekeeping almost always prove unsuccessful (2007: 1). The current growth in UN peace operations could be reversed very rapidly as it did in the 1990s, and the mere scale of the ongoing operations is no guarantee that they will survive: perhaps, quite the contrary. A combination of operational overstretch and frustrated political ambitions can easily pave the way for both a downscaling of ongoing operations and a stronger aversion in the Security Council for establishing new major operations. The predictions made in this report on the future model of peace operations and the challenges associated with it may thus quickly prove to be wrong or irrelevant. Nevertheless, judging from the present climate in the Security Council and the surrounding debates held in relevant international fora, it seems safe to forecast that peace operations will remain multi-dimensional and multi-organisational when undertaken in the years to come.

The hybrid character of a UN peace operation is probably the most stable trend. It is driven not only by the Security Council but also by independent developments in and of relevant organisations. It is thus interesting to note that despite the constitutional crisis in the EU, the efforts to build an independent European crisis management capacity are continuing according to schedule. It is also worth noting that NATO is reforming to improve its capacity to undertake out-of-area operations, and that the need for building stronger African capacity to engage in peace operations is increasingly recognised by the donor community. There is no reason to expect the Security Council to refrain from trying to utilise all of these forces – either sequentially or simultaneously – when confronted with future crisis situations.

Whether or not the trend towards state-building will also be an enduring feature is more difficult to tell. The failures in Iraq and increasingly Afghanistan may prompt a significant lowering of the international ambitions and increase the aversion of any form of longer-termed responsibilities in foreign countries. This, however, need not necessarily imply that state-building will be discarded altogether. It could simply mean a significant lowering of ambitions regarding democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. As evident in Iraq, the objective of building effective state
institutions that can uphold law and order and control the territory may be pursued, while simultaneously lowering the liberal ambitions. The growing emphasis placed on security sector reform in UN peace operations and policy thinking may indicate that this development is already ongoing also within the UN system. Again, this need not imply that state-building is on its way out. On the contrary, it may imply that focus is turning towards the true core of state-building: bringing the Leviathan back in (Paris, 2006). Such a development is reinforced by the linkages made between state collapse and all sorts of trans-national threats, including, most notably, terrorism but also trafficking and organised crime. These linkages provide a strong political push towards ensuring that all territories are brought under the control of central governments, which can enter into binding international cooperation and help curb the trans-national threats. The demand for state-building interventions thus seems likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. The main question may therefore be, how that demand will be met. In general, it seems likely that the UN will remain the main supplier of long-term multidimensional international engagement in post-conflict situations. No other international organisation or major power seems interested in taking on such responsibilities. It furthermore seems likely that the future format for UN state-building interventions will be the ‘light footprint’ model. This model has the advantage of upholding the formal sovereignty of the state-being-built. It is therefore considered less threatening to an international order that is built on the idea of sovereign equality among states.

The concept of sovereignty is, however, in flux. The practice of state-building interventions is indicative of the re-interpretation of sovereignty, which has been ongoing since the mid-1990s and is expressed in notions of sovereignty as the ‘responsibility to protect’. To take that re-interpretation further, however, there is a need to look more closely at the linkages between responsibility and accountability and try to figure what sort of measures and mechanisms that can help ensure accountability in situations where sovereign responsibilities have been shifted to the international level. It remains to be seen whether the Security Council and the rest of the state-building community will be as innovative and flexible in answering that question, as they have been in inventing hybrid state-building intervention.
### Annexes


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (mandating SCR(s))</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Maximum troops/Military Observers/Civilian Police</th>
<th>Civilian staff int./local/UNV</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES (1037)</td>
<td>Eastern Slovenia</td>
<td>Jan 1996-Jan 1998</td>
<td>Supervise and facilitate demilitarization, monitor return of refugees, contribute to maintenance of peace and security, establish temporary police force, undertake tasks related to civil adm. and public services, organize elections</td>
<td>4,791/100/453</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP (1038)</td>
<td>Prevlaka Peninsula</td>
<td>Feb 1996-Dec 2002</td>
<td>Monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula</td>
<td>-/28/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIH (1063)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>July 1996-July 1997</td>
<td>Assist GoH in professionalization of the police and the maintenance of peace and security</td>
<td>1,287/-/267</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA (1094)</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Jan 1997-May 1997</td>
<td>Verify ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>-/132/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA (1118)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>June 1997-Feb 1999</td>
<td>Assist in consolidating peace and reconciliation</td>
<td>3,026/253/361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPOHUH (1141)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Dec 1997-Mar 2000</td>
<td>Assist GoH in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police</td>
<td>-/-284</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL (1181)</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>July 1998-Oct 1999</td>
<td>Monitor military and political situation, disarmament and demobilization, assist in monitoring respect for int. law</td>
<td>-/192/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIK</strong> (1244)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>June 1999 -</td>
<td>Establish an interim civilian administration that performs the whole spectrum of essential adm. functions and services</td>
<td>-/37/4,519</td>
<td>509/2,044/148</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNAMET</strong> (1246)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>June 1999 - Sep 1999</td>
<td>Organize and conduct referendum</td>
<td>-/50/271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNAMSIL</strong> (1270, 1289)</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Oct 1999 - Dec 2005</td>
<td>Originally: DDR. In 2000 mandate revised to include provision of security at key locations, incl. all sites of DDR-program, and facilitation of free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>17,105/261/54</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES (from Feb 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNTAET</strong> (1272)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Oct 1999 - May 2002</td>
<td>Administer the territory and exercise legislative and executive authority</td>
<td>8,950/200/1640</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MONUC</strong> (1279)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Nov 1999 -</td>
<td>Monitor implementation of ceasefire agreement, investigate violations, facilitate humanitarian assistance, demining</td>
<td>7,431/554/61</td>
<td>959/2,063/656</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMEE</strong> (1312, 1430)</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
<td>July 2000 -</td>
<td>Establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire</td>
<td>3,854/219/-</td>
<td>135/187/61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMISET</strong> (1410)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002 - May 2005</td>
<td>Provide assistance to core adm. structures, provide interim law enforcement and public security</td>
<td>3,742/111/730</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MINUCI</strong> (1479)</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>May 2003 - ??</td>
<td>Facilitate implementation of peace agreement</td>
<td>-/25/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIL</strong> (1509)</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Sep 2003 -</td>
<td>Support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and peace process, protect UN staff, facilities and civilians, support humanitarian and human rights activities; assist in national security reform</td>
<td>14,750/250/1,115</td>
<td>516/839/251</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNOCI</strong> (1528 and 1709)</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Apr. 2004 -</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups, support DDR and SSR, electoral support, protect UN personnel, monitor arms embargo, support humanitarian assistance,</td>
<td>7,854/7200/1,157</td>
<td>366/508/228</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 1 (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH (1542)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004 -</td>
<td>Ensure a secure and stable environment, assist in police reform and DDR, protect UN personnel and civilians under imminent threat, support the constitutional and political process, electoral assistance, promote human rights</td>
<td>7,036/-/1,793</td>
<td>417/529//169</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>June 2004-Dec 2006</td>
<td>Ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements, carry out and monitor disarmament and demobilization, electoral support, protect UN personnel, support border monitoring and security sector reform</td>
<td>5,400/168/97</td>
<td>262/327/105</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (1590)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Mar 2005 -</td>
<td>Support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement, monitor and verify ceasefire agreement, assist in DDR, support police reforms, rule of law, human rights protection, protect UN personnel. Mandate expanded in Aug. 2006 to cover implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (observe and monitor)</td>
<td>8,800/598/613</td>
<td>742/1,874/159</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT (1704)</td>
<td>Timor-Leste (East Timor)</td>
<td>Aug 2006 -</td>
<td>Support Government consolidate stability, support electoral process, ensure restoration and maintenance of public security, support security sector reform, facilitate provision of relief and recovery assistance</td>
<td>-/33/1,641</td>
<td>80/227/34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (425, 426 and 1701)</td>
<td>Lebanon [Mar 1978]</td>
<td>Aug 2006 -</td>
<td>Monitor cessation of hostilities, accompany and support Lebanese armed forces deploy throughout the South, help ensure humanitarian access</td>
<td>13,251/-/-</td>
<td>100/305/-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 The table draws on Appendix 1 in Malone (2004). The update is based on information drawn from DPKO’s website, including the ‘Facts and Figures’ pages for each operation (accessed 30th May 2007) and CIC, 2007. Operations in Italics were ongoing at the time of writing. Only the figures and mandates for ongoing operations have been updated.

11 The figures are drawn table 5.25 in CIC (2006) and indicate the number of international and local civilians and UN Volunteers working for the UN DPKO mission per 30th September 2006. Staff with contracts of less than one year is not included. Figures do not include staff from UN specialised agencies, funds and programs.

12 UNIFIL was established in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (resolutions 425 and 426). The mandate and size of the operation was substantially expanded in 2006 and is therefore included in the table.
**Annex 2: Delegated peace operations tasked and authorised by the UN, 1996 - 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (original SCRs)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Lead Actor</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Maximum troops/ Military Observers/ Civilian Police</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFOR (1088)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Dec. 1996 - July 2004</td>
<td>Deter hostilities and stabilize the peace, contribute to a secure environment</td>
<td>36,300/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF (1101)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>April 1997 - Aug. 1997</td>
<td>Ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid, take control of port from which migrants leave for Italy, stabilize internal situation to allow for elections</td>
<td>6,294/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XFOR (1203)</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Dec. 1998 - Mar. 1999</td>
<td>Extract OSCE verifiers</td>
<td>2,300/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR (1244)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>June 1999 -</td>
<td>Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, enforce compliance with agreements, assist UNMIK</td>
<td>42,700/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFF (1371)</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Sep. 2001 - Dec. 2002</td>
<td>Follow-on force to NATO Task Force Harvest (operated without UN mandate)</td>
<td>1,011/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF (1386)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Dec. 2001 -</td>
<td>Assist in maintaining security</td>
<td>4,988/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licorne/ MICECI (1464)</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>France/ ECOWAS</td>
<td>Feb. 2003 - Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Take necessary steps to guarantee security and movement of ECOWAS and French forces, ensure the protection of civilians</td>
<td>5,300/ -/ -</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (original SCRs)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Lead Actor</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemis (1484)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>May 2003 - Sept. 2003</td>
<td>Contribute in close coordination with MONUC to stabilize security situation and improve humanitarian situation</td>
<td>1,850/-/-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIF (1529)</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Mar 2004 - June 2004</td>
<td>Contribute to a secure and stable environment, provision of humanitarian assistance and the access of international humanitarian workers, assistance to the Haitian police and the Haitian Coast Guard. Facilitate a UN follow-on mission</td>
<td>2,731/-/14</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea (1551)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>July 2004 -</td>
<td>Continue the efforts hitherto done by SFOR to implement and ensure compliance with the peace agreement</td>
<td>5,935/-/-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS (1556)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Monitoring ceasefire in Darfur</td>
<td>4,980/601/1,346</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo (1671)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>April 2006 - Nov. 2006</td>
<td>Take all necessary measures to support MONUC stabilize a situation, contribute to protection of civilians, contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa</td>
<td>2,370/-/-</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTUTE (1690)</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>June 2006 - Sep. 2006</td>
<td>Restore and maintain security, provision of humanitarian assistance and access</td>
<td>1,085/-/445</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 The table draws on appendix 2 in Malone (2004). The update is primarily based on CIC (2006) and material drawn from the UN Security Council’s website (accessed 31 May 2006). Operations in Italics were ongoing at the time of writing.

14 This number reflects the deployment 15 March 2004 (http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/30486.htm). It has not been possible to find the maximum number of troops deployed.
Literature


