



**TOWARDS A 'PEACE CONTINUUM'  
APPROACH TO CLIMATE SECURITY:  
INSIGHTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA**

## **Acknowledgements**

Working Papers make DIIS researchers' and partners' work in progress available to readers prior to formal publication. They may include documentation which is not necessarily published elsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published under the responsibility of the author alone.

This publication has received financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. It moreover draws on research for the research project 'Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland' (PACCS) (2022-2027), funded by DANIDA, based at Roskilde University. The paper reflects the views of the author alone.

## **Louise Wiuff Moe**

Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University

[louisewm@ruc.dk](mailto:louisewm@ruc.dk)

## **DIIS WORKING PAPER 2024: 01**

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Gl. Kalkbrænderi Vej 51A, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: [diis@diis.dk](mailto:diis@diis.dk)

[www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)

ISBN 978-87-7236-135-2 (pdf)

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from [www.diis.dk](http://www.diis.dk)

© Copenhagen 2024, the author and DIIS

# TOWARDS A 'PEACE CONTINUUM' APPROACH TO CLIMATE SECURITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA

**Louise Wiuff Moe**

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Part one: Gaps in the climate security agenda and the ethical and geopolitical significance of addressing them</b>	<b>5</b>
Stabilisation priorities and declining development co-operation	5
Contestations over coupling climate change to security: ‘securitisation’ and political leverage	6
Spiralling needs and dwindling finance	7
Climate change and conflict contexts – neglected realities	9
Climate (in)justice and geopolitical rivalry over influence in Africa	10
<b>Part two: Towards advancing the climate security agenda - insights from the Horn of Africa</b>	<b>12</b>
Mutually reinforcing challenges – climate, conflict, fragmentation and low external engagement	12
Regional efforts of advancing the climate security agenda	14
Key messages for advancing climate security: adopt a peace continuum approach, couple climate adaptation and institutional engagement, and promote conflict-sensitive and accessible climate finance	16
<b>Conclusion and summary of recommendations</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>23</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

Climate change is a priority area in European and broader Western initiatives for global security, with a significant focus on Africa. This paper argues that advancing the climate security agenda in Africa necessitates an approach oriented towards integrating climate adaptation and finance into a 'peace continuum', spanning prevention, peacebuilding, and development. The first section reviews gaps in advancing this agenda, notably concerning climate finance and the prioritisation of conflict-affected contexts. It asserts that addressing these gaps is essential for climate justice *and* for fostering partnerships in Africa amid growing global geopolitical competition. Drawing on insights from Africa's Horn, the second section discusses concrete challenges and opportunities for advancing a 'peace continuum approach' to climate security. It underscores the importance of strategic engagement and flexible, conflict-sensitive climate finance, notwithstanding challenges posed by institutional fragmentation and conflict. Recommendations are supported by examples of the UN, AU and IGAD initiatives and case studies from Somalia and Somaliland.

## INTRODUCTION

Climate change has become widely recognised as a security concern and a key priority area in European and broader Western initiatives for global peace and security, with a significant focus on Africa.

Within the discourse surrounding conflict-affected regions and so-called fragile states, climate change is commonly perceived as a ‘threat multiplier’, posing risks to stability by catalysing migration, contributing to resource conflicts and bolstering recruitment for non-state armed actors (Adelphi, 2017). The framing aligns with global security concerns and has accompanied the integration of climate issues into existing security and defence initiatives, with a focus on containment strategies. This paper argues, however, that the current global context, marked by geopolitical rivalries and the urgency of climate crisis, instead necessitates a *rethink* of security strategies, as well as partnerships.

Climate change acts as both a catalyst and an opportunity for such a rethink, requiring approaches orientated towards integrating climate change adaptation and finance into a ‘peace continuum’ that spans prevention, peacebuilding and development, with a focus on African regional and context specific needs.

The paper is organised in two main parts. The first part reviews the current limitations and gaps in the climate security agenda and argues for a reorientation. It begins with an examination of the emergence of the climate security agenda within broader intervention trends shaped by a rise in stabilisation and security assistance to Africa, alongside declining trust in development co-operation. It then assesses existing gaps in advancing climate security, in particular concerning the lack of committed finances for the agenda and the under-prioritisation of conflict-affected contexts. The paper argues that reorientating the agenda to address current gaps will be key not only for supporting peace and security for populations and regions most affected by climate change, but also for Europe and the West’s standing and prospects for meaningful partnerships in Africa. The backdrop against which the climate crisis unfolds is marked by increasing geopolitical rivalries including over political, economic and security influence in Africa, involving prominent actors such as Russia and China. Additionally, a growing climate justice discourse underscores the importance of advancing an Africa-centred climate security approach. Failure to do so is likely to feed disillusionment with Europe and prompt African actors to seek alliances elsewhere. Accordingly, advancing a climate-security agenda that more effectively addresses interconnected climate, security and peace challenges and needs on the African continent, matters both from a climate justice perspective, and as an imperative for fostering partnerships in the context of current global dynamics.

Having addressed key gaps in advancing the climate security agenda in part one, the second part of the paper shifts focus to examining specific challenges and opportunities for reorienting climate security approaches to better account for interconnections with peace and development as well as regional priorities. This part uses the Horn of Africa as a case study and provides insights into the

challenges of political fragmentation and conflict conditions, highlighting as well how existing grounded knowledge, efforts and areas of international-African interest convergence can be supported and leveraged. Based on insights from expert interviews with key representatives from regional and international organisations, and also drawing on field research and case examples from the contexts of Somalia and Somaliland on best and worst practices of climate security engagement, the paper presents key considerations and recommendations for advancing a partnership orientated and regionally relevant course for the climate security agenda.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The report draws on expert interviews with officials from: the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Welthungerhilfe. In addition, the second part of the report draws on fieldwork findings, based on interviews and data collection in studies undertaken as part of the DANIDA-funded research project 'Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland' (PACCS). All views/omissions/conclusions are solely those of the author.

# **PART ONE: GAPS IN THE CLIMATE SECURITY AGENDA AND THE ETHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ADDRESSING THEM**

## **Stabilisation priorities and declining development co-operation**

With the recognition of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’, key missions and organisations involved in security governance in Africa, from the United Nations (UN) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions, have incorporated climate change considerations into their frameworks. Overall, such incorporation is shaped by the emergence of the climate security agenda within a broader context where, over the past decade and a half, the nature of European and broader Western engagement with Africa has increasingly been orientated towards stabilisation (see e.g. Karlsrud 2019; Emerson 2014; Deneckere 2019). Such orientation is reflected by heightened support for military training and equipment, capacity-building initiatives within African defence sectors and involvement in military border defence programmes, all of which are closely linked to the protection of Western interests against terrorism, refugees and migration. Both the effectiveness and the sustainability of such military orientation are increasingly called into question (Shackelford et. Al. 2023; Bergmann 2023).

Meanwhile, trust in development collaboration and aid has been dwindling during the same period. This reflects evolving geopolitics, changing security landscapes, and re-evaluations of priorities. Populist trends in the West, coupled with heightened concerns over domestic security, have spurred both an inward turn leading to retreat from international development co-operation (Signé, 2023) and the redirection of aid resources towards deterring migration and countering terrorism (Yeltekin, 2022). Russia’s war against Ukraine imposed additional constraints on European budgets, due to rising expenditures on energy and defence, and led to a further re-evaluation of development collaboration (Gavas and Kappeli, 2023). These processes have, however, been characterised by shifts and fluctuations, rather than a linear trajectory. For example, in the wake of the policy crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic, compounded by war in Ukraine, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) did reach a peak in 2022. Yet, simultaneously, inflation of ODA hiked, and significant amounts of reported cost were for hosting refugees in donor countries, meaning that substantial quantities of the aid reported never reached the developing countries. Additionally, when taking geographical distribution into account, estimates have shown that the aid that reached Africa in fact *declined* by 7.4% (Craviotto, 2023).

These developments have shaped the context and parameters within which the climate security agenda has emerged.



## **Contestations over coupling climate change to security: 'securitisation' and political leverage**

Within this wider context, critiques of climate security have emerged from both research and practitioner perspectives, raising concerns that framing climate as a security threat may result in prioritising defence responses at the expense of development and adaptation solutions (Barnett, 2019; McDonald, 2018; Moe and Müller, 2024). Critics have also emphasised the importance of acknowledging historical responsibility and the disproportionate contributions of developed nations to climate change, advocating for a more equitable and just approach (Chakrabaty, 2014; 2021). Concerns moreover extend to potential conflicts and governance challenges arising from a narrow, security-focused lens, leading some states and observers to argue for a complete decoupling of climate and security (Buxton, 2021).

There is significant merit to these critiques. At the same time, however, dynamics in the wider policy landscape convey a complex picture of what and whose agendas are served in the political contestations over whether and how to frame climate change as a security concern.

First, the climate security agenda has in fact gained significant support from states and actors particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, including African states and regional organisations (UN 2021). Elevating climate change to a security concern can contribute to mobilising political leverage and attention (McDonald, 2023). Second, on the flip side, recent contestations over the incorporation of climate security priorities into the UN Security Council (UNSC) suggest that attempts to decouple climate from security can serve to marginalise climate change from high-level political considerations. In 2021, a draft UNSC resolution on the security implications of climate change faced opposition from China, India and Russia, citing concerns about securitisation, criticising reductionist views on climate as a security matter and emphasising the need to address climate change within a development framework (UNSC, 2021). Observers, however, question the authenticity of these arguments, revealing inconsistencies in positions and actions, by comparing emphasis on emissions reduction and climate financing with the three countries' de facto roles as key contributors to rising emissions and to obstructing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations (McDonald, 2023). Against this backdrop, analyses suggest that the decision to block this resolution was not driven by normative concern nor solidarity with developing countries, but connected to foreign policy interests, particularly those opposing the enhancement of political leverage on the climate change agenda (Ibid.). It is also worth noting that the two African Council members at the time, Kenya and Niger, strongly backed the resolution (it was in fact co-sponsored by Niger) (UNSC, 2021). Additionally, in the open debate preceding the draft resolution, African countries were at the forefront in arguing for integrating climate security more centrally into UNSC's responsibilities (UN, 2021).

In sum, the acknowledgment of climate change as a security matter enjoys considerable support among African stakeholders, highlighting the tangible

challenges in climate-vulnerable regions. Additionally, the security ‘framing’ is seen as a catalyst for political action on the issue (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023).

Yet, merely augmenting existing security and military solutions with a rationale of climate change fails to engage with underlying drivers of insecurities and related conflicts exacerbated by climate change, particularly in the African context where food insecurity, displacement, loss of land and livelihoods are pressing concerns. The climate crisis therefore calls for approaches that transcend traditional ‘hard security’ and defence strategy. Instead, it calls for prioritising the addressing of insecurities faced by the regions and populations most affected by climate change, recognising the interconnectedness of climate, security and peace. As will be elaborated in part two of this paper, elements of such an approach are evident in current African and UN efforts to advance the climate security agenda, connecting climate change adaptation and finance to a ‘peace continuum’ encompassing prevention, peace-making and post-conflict development (Security Council Report, 2022).

However, as the next section discusses, key challenges and gaps remain in these aspects, when considering the broader dynamics shaping international climate policy.

### Messages

- Framing climate change as a security issue can enhance political leverage but the climate security agenda should extend beyond narrow security and military solutions and place emphasis on positive security, peace and development outcomes for populations and regions hardest hit by climate change.
- Climate security discourse should not divert resources from climate financing to security mandates; rather, recognising climate as a security issue should be leveraged to enhance commitment to climate finance and adaptation. It follows that strategic coordination is key to leverage different strengths, e.g. of both United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and UNSC.

### **Spiralling needs and dwindling finance**

Climate-related impacts and insecurities have intensified, affecting populations across Africa at a pace surpassing earlier predictions. The acceleration of these impacts is evident in the deepening and spreading of humanitarian emergencies, displacement and food crises (Humanitarian Action, 2023).

Global geopolitics have added to the effects of extreme weather events and climate variability. The impacts of the Russian war against Ukraine, with staggering food prices (the highest since the 2008 global financial crisis) unfolded against a background where, according to UN’s 2023 World Economic Situations and Prospects Report, already in 2020 Africa had the highest global prevalence of food

insecurity with 26% of the population facing severe food insecurity and 60% affected by moderate or severe food insecurity according to numbers from the FAO (Yohannes-Kassahun, 2022).

As noted, the climate crisis has unfolded within a broader context of a weakening of international development co-operation, also reflected in gaps in climate finance and support for adaptation, adding up to a situation of ‘spiralling needs and dwindling finance’ (Gavas and Kappeli 2023), also exposing increasingly debated injustices. As summarised by Gavas and Kappeli (2023) in a Welthungerhilfe report, ‘while the African continent generates only 4% of global emissions, it is experiencing the most severe impacts of climate change. And yet, it receives a mere 12% of the finance needed to manage climate change’.

Importantly, recent agreement on initiatives like the Loss and Damage Fund, agreed to at COP27, with progress in its operationalisation at COP28, marks a wider significant recognition of the imperative to compensate those disproportionately impacted by climate change and related multiplying security risks. This has been welcomed by countries across Africa that bear the brunt of climate change despite contributing the least to its causes.

Yet central questions remain regarding its implementation, for example how to determine *additional* funds (rather than re-purposed funds or funds coming from ending other aid programmes); how to ensure that the financial resources reach the populations and contexts experiencing the gravest effects of climate change; and how to step-up conflict sensitivity in this process (Kruckow et al., 2023). Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the Loss and Damage Fund is part of a bigger negotiation also including aspects of mitigation and adaptation. As emphasised by the director of the climate and energy thinktank Powershift Africa, ‘The bill for loss and damage will only increase if adaptation is not sufficiently funded and emissions are not urgently cut (...) they are part of the same puzzle being negotiated within the global stocktake discussions’ (Lakhani, 2023). The Cop28 deal to ‘transition away’ from fossil fuels, while celebrated as a milestone, contains substantial loopholes, notably in references to costly and unproven technologies. And notwithstanding some progress at Cop28, the persistence of double standards has been evident, with Western and European governments endorsing the transition from fossil fuels while intensifying their exploitation in the context of energy supply gaps in Europe, and also remaining the chief greenhouse gas emitters. African leaders, well aware of these inconsistencies, have been grappling with how to respond to the international energy policy shifts and unevenly distributed ‘green transition’ funding (Interview, AU official, August 2023).

Moreover, considering climate adaptation – a crucial aspect of Africa’s climate action – the UNEP Adaptation Finance Gap Report 2023 highlights an annual shortfall ranging from USD194 to USD366 billion for the continent. A recent review of the financial instruments adopted by African countries, found that nearly 80% of adaptation finance in Africa comes from loans or government budgets (Donoghoe et al., 2023). This report underscores the urgency of mobilising

more grants for adaptation, given the challenging debt situation in Africa. This is particularly important considering that the top 50 most climate-vulnerable nations, are also among the nations having the most serious debt problems (Jensen, 2022). The reliance on loans and government budgets, combined with trends of donors repurposing existing development allocations rather than offering additional climate finance, pose significant obstacles to effective climate adaptation implementation (Gavas and Kappeli, 2023).

### **Climate change and conflict contexts – neglected realities**

The gaps between support and needs for climate adaptation are even more pronounced in conflict-affected states. In fact, ‘only a fraction of international climate finance flows for adaptation goes to conflict-affected contexts’ (DCA et al., 2020). Paradoxically, while conditions of conflict and institutional fragmentation exacerbate vulnerability to climate change and the demand for support, such conditions converge with particularly low donor engagement on climate finance (Gaston et al., 2023). In conflict-affected contexts, interventions and aid remain predominantly centred on emergency measures and ‘hard security’, leaving limited scope for engagements and support with a long-term strategic horizon for addressing rising human insecurity and vulnerability. This points to significant gaps, considering that out of the countries with the highest vulnerability to climate change, more than half are also affected by conflict (Conway, 2021).

Interactions between climate change and insecurity are multidirectional, with climate change, environmental degradation and resource scarcity feeding into conflict dynamics, while ‘conflict-linked environmental destruction and military activity, sustained by fossil fuel consumption, exacerbates climate change itself’ (Peace@COP28, 2023). Conflict dynamics complicate efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change, while on the flip side, climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts may themselves exacerbate tensions if approaches are not sufficiently conflict sensitive. These interconnections both underscore the deep and complex insecurities impacting people in conflict and climate vulnerable contexts and calls for significantly stepping up the commitment to context specific, long-term strategic and conflict sensitive approaches (ibid.).

Despite a growing acknowledgment of interactions between conflict and climate change, investments in initiatives that bridge the two, such as climate-linked peacebuilding efforts, continue to face constraints. According to a UNDP study of climate finance ‘vertical funds’, reviewing 146 countries, out of the top 15 recipients, only one was ranked as ‘extremely fragile’, while among fragile and extremely fragile states, only DRC and Haiti, were part of the overall top 20 recipients of climate change assistance funds in the period 2014-2021 (Gaston et al., 2023: 53).

### Message

- Wealthy countries’ failure to adequately deliver on commitments for climate adaptation support and finance negatively impacts climate security. Contexts affected by conflict and fragility are the most climate

insecure yet receive disproportionately limited donor engagement and targeted climate finance.

### **Climate (in)justice and geopolitical rivalry over influence in Africa**

The climate crisis, with its far-reaching impacts on populations throughout Africa, especially in nations grappling with ongoing conflict dynamics, is increasingly recognised as a representation of entrenched inequalities, injustices and double standards in the West's interactions with the continent. The vulnerabilities exposed by climate change—jeopardising essential aspects of human security, such as livelihoods, food and shelter—interact with the broader dynamics of conflict and instability and are increasingly seen as intertwined with existing global hierarchies that dictate whose security takes precedence and whose does not.

The rise of the climate justice discourse has been reflected in numerous statements, declarations and high-level fora by UN, AU, Regional Economic Communities and African leaders more widely. For example, climate justice was highlighted at the UNSG's closing statement at the COP28, in the UN's 'A New Agenda for Peace' (2023) and centrally emphasised in the September 2023 Nairobi Declaration, where the core message was a call for funding to climate adaptation, loss and damage and economic reforms that support climate justice for Africa.

In connection with ethical considerations, geopolitics and related rivalries at play must also be considered when charting the course for advancing the climate security agenda. Growing geopolitical tensions and competition for influence in Africa have led to increased polarisation, but they also present opportunities for African actors to forge partnerships aligned with their priorities (Signé, 2023).

Against this wider backdrop, relegating climate finance and support for climate adaptation to secondary priorities could feed further distrust and disillusionment with Western partners and compel African actors to prioritise alternative partnerships.

On the flip side, committing to address climate (in)security in a dedicated strategic manner, engaging local and regional priorities and needs, represents a significant opportunity for European and broader Western engagement to take strides towards redressing longstanding inequities and, consequently, taking important steps towards genuine partnership.

Reorienting the climate security agenda to encompass its interconnections with peace and development, may also serve as an opportunity, more widely, to revitalise partnerships and donor approaches (responding to calls for reform in both the domains of security and development).

## Messages

- Growing geopolitical competition for influence in Africa has led to polarisation, but also presents opportunities for African actors to forge partnerships aligned with their priorities. This should be considered in reorientating the climate security agenda.
- Relegating support and finance for climate adaptation to secondary priorities can feed distrust and disillusionment with Western partners and compel African actors to prioritise alternative partnerships.
- Committing to address climate (in)security in a dedicated strategic manner, attuned to local and regional priorities, represents a significant opportunity for European/broader Western engagement to redress longstanding inequities and build partnership distinct from other external actors.
- Orientating the climate security agenda toward integrating peace and development needs, may hold the opportunity to revitalize partnerships and donor approaches, addressing reform needs in both security and development domains.

## **PART TWO: TOWARDS ADVANCING THE CLIMATE SECURITY AGENDA - INSIGHTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA**

Having addressed key gaps in advancing the climate security agenda in the first part, this part of the paper shifts focus to examining concrete challenges and opportunities for addressing these gaps and advancing climate security approaches, using the Horn of Africa as a case study. The dynamics in the Horn of Africa strongly exemplify the compound challenges arising from the intersection of climate change, conflict and institutional fragmentation.

At the same time, with its long history and experience of harsh climate conditions, the region has often been at the centre of local, national and regional efforts to prevent and respond to climate-related insecurities. Despite strained national capacities to formulate and implement climate policies, the Horn of Africa has demonstrated impressive efforts, expertise and capacities at the regional, providing entry points for further support level (see also Destrijcker et. al. 2023). Moreover, the region has emerged as a site wherein the United Nations has introduced new climate security initiatives and partnerships, and also where country specific approaches in the making hold important lessons.

### **Mutually reinforcing challenges – climate, conflict, fragmentation and low external engagement**

The Horn of Africa region is experiencing a persistent and worsening climate crisis. Food and livelihood insecurities as well as forced displacement, especially from rural to urban areas, are key impacts of this crisis. The region's rural populations' livelihoods depend on rain-fed agriculture and livestock rearing, which make them some of the world's most vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation. The catastrophic human consequences of climate change against a wider backdrop of regional armed conflict, and international geopolitics shaped by Russia's war in Ukraine, were starkly illustrated by the recent acute food crisis in Somalia, where four consecutive rainy seasons failed. In the wake of the Russian war against Ukraine, this converged with a surge in food prices 'by an average 23.9% in 2020-22' (Okou et. al., 2022). The cumulative effects pushed the region's food system to a threshold, creating a humanitarian crisis and a surge of internally displaced people as well as wider adverse impacts on developmental and peace efforts in the region.

Moreover, dynamics of conflict, coupled with political fragmentation, further exacerbate vulnerabilities to climate change and diminish capacities and support for effective responses and adaptation. Against the backdrop of fragmented politics in the region, the crisis is profoundly underrepresented in international debates and support mechanisms, including, for example, climate finance, adaptation and the implementation of the loss and damage framework (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023).

The most climate change-exposed populations in the region are often also among the most politically marginalised, feeding into climate concerns taking a secondary

position – for donors as well as governments in the regions – as other priorities, including those related to conflict dynamics, take precedence (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). In Ethiopia, for example, areas of acute food insecurity in Tigray, Somali and Afar regions overlap with a high occurrence of conflict also involving the Ethiopian forces, and with pastoralists being particularly exposed due to the confluence of climate effects and political as well as socioeconomic marginalisation (Sax et al., 2023). Djibouti’s political dynamics, with an overlay of external competition over military bases, also divert attention away from climate and environmental concerns. And in Sudan, the ongoing war undercuts conditions for addressing pressing climate issues and related impacts such as the recent locust outbreaks (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Meanwhile, in Somalia, prolonged armed conflict, counterterrorism priorities and the series of ineffective central governments have left very limited sustained attention on climate change (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). Somaliland, in turn, has progressed in developing policy frameworks and priorities in the field of climate change, and also has a long-established Ministry of Environment and Climate Change but the absence of international recognition renders Somaliland ineligible to engage in formal international forums, and leaves it with very limited capacity and funds to implement policies (Musse, 2023).<sup>2</sup>

This dynamic, of conflict and political fragmentation feeding into climate vulnerability and leaving less capacities to address it, is reinforced by ‘the rule of thumb’ that ‘donors tend to favour safer places’ (Gaston et al., 2023). Due to donor risk aversion, related to for example physical insecurity, high costs, risks of politization and project disruptions, contexts shaped by conflict and fragility generally receive particularly limited external support for climate adaptation and finance. Also, in terms of international projects specifically targeting climate security support, the Horn of Africa has received a remarkably low number even in comparison to other conflict-affected regions, such as the Sahel where terrorism and migration have been high concerns on the international agenda (see numbers presented in Gaston et al. 2023: 15). Accordingly, the Horn of Africa paradigmatically illustrates a recurring pattern: regions grappling with the compound challenges of conflict, political fragmentation and climate change – thereby being particularly in need of support – often receive disproportionately limited external donor engagement and targeted climate finance.

In stepping up such engagement, existing grounded knowledge, efforts and priorities needs to be supported and leveraged. This will necessitate adopting more flexible yet strategic and grounded approaches. There are enormous challenges facing such support, given the multitude of conflicting agendas, alliances and politics involved, both globally and within the regional African context. Nonetheless, within this complexity, there are also areas of converging

<sup>2</sup> This research is part of the DANIDA funded research project Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland PACCS (Musse, 2023).



interests and ongoing efforts, offering opportunities for engagement and partnerships.

The subsequent sub-sections explore specific opportunities and cases, drawing insights from expert interviews with officials from the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Welthungerhilfe. Additionally, it incorporates insights and case studies based on climate adaptation research in the region.

### **Regional efforts of advancing the climate security agenda**

Despite their limited resources, as well as internal divisions and divergent agendas among member states, regional organisations play a central role in advancing and shaping a climate security agenda attuned to the region's specific needs (which often cut across national borders). Moreover, they can serve to provide a level of continuity, sustaining efforts amid challenges like conflict and war dynamics that may hinder national initiatives. Consequently, they offer important potential entry points for establishing partnerships.

The AU has demonstrated significant leadership on the climate change agenda. For example, on the very same day where UNSC did not reach consensus for a climate security resolution (see part one, above), the AU Peace and Security Council was able to speak with one voice, issuing a communique that emphasised the need for 'a climate-sensitive planning dimension in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts' and moreover highlighted the significance of early warning on climate (in)security (AU Communique 2021, 3; see also Mattheis et al. 2023). The AU also promptly responded to the crisis of food insecurity that hit Africa, and the Horn in particular, in the context of droughts combining with hiking food prices related to Russia's war in Ukraine (Mattheis et al., 2023: 19).

Regarding institutionalisation, climate change has been a cross-cutting theme in the African Peace and Security Architecture (2016-2020 Roadmap) since 2016. In 2022, a process was initiated to develop a Common African Position on Climate Security, demonstrating a strong consensus to advance climate security as a core agenda, and recognising that effective responses to climate (in)security require coordinated and context-specific African approaches (Interview, AU official, August 2023). In initiating steps towards a Common African Position, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission identified 15 key messages – based on wider consultations – that were feeding into inputs at Cop27 and Cop28, including advocacy for the Loss and Damage Fund.

Another core process informing the development of a Common African Position has been the AU-guided undertaking of an Africa Continental Climate Security Risk Assessment (highlighted in the abovementioned Communique), placing emphasis on the need of more grounded knowledge and insights into the context specific drivers and interconnections between climate, (in)security and peace (personal communication, AU official, August 2023).

At the sub-regional level, IGAD, in close collaboration with the AU, is at the forefront of advancing a climate security agenda centred on the specific regional needs. IGAD, formed in 1996, grew out of an intergovernmental initiative in 1986 focused on addressing and reducing the impacts of droughts and natural disasters in the region. The organisation thereby has longstanding and deep contextual knowledge on the impacts of environmental and climate change and has consistently sought to advance related institutional knowledge and response capacity. In 2003 the *Drought Monitoring Centre-Nairobi (DCMN)* was adopted as a specialised IGAD institution, and advanced into the *IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)*. In 2022 IGAD set up a Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, to be integrated within ICPAC.

Exemplifying IGAD's responsiveness to specific regional concerns, the organisation has shown significant initiative in addressing the particular needs of pastoralists, a vital yet marginalised livelihood in the Horn and East Africa, especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In response to drought-induced challenges affecting pastoral livelihoods and mobility patterns, IGAD established the *IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD)* in 2011. This initiative, aligned with the recognition of pastoralism's importance among IGAD member states, aims to enhance rangeland management in cross-border areas of Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda; an approach that contrasts donor biases favouring crop production (Interview, Welthungerhilfe Area Manager in Somaliland, August 2023) and policies aiming at restricting migration. In 2021, IGAD Council of Ministers adopted the *IGAD Protocol on Transhumance*, that focuses on supporting and regulating safe cross-border mobility and use of common rangelands by pastoralists. The protocol represents a proactive approach to climate change adaptation linked with migration and mobility, specifically addressing the interrelated dynamics of climate change, livelihood insecurity and conflict dynamics (in particular conflicts related to land access). The focus is on demonstrating how providing adequate support for pastoralists and related environmental resource management – in this case land, pasture and water – can contribute to maintaining peace (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Additionally, IGAD's 2023 Sustainable Ecosystem Management (SEM) project<sup>3</sup> aligns with similar aims of the protocol, addressing critical pastoral challenges in a region facing a drought crisis. These efforts and frameworks have been strengthened through support and collaboration between IGAD and international organisations, such as the UN, the European Union (EU) and the International Organization for Migration, as well as through bilateral assistance.

The following section elaborates on the proposition that external actors aiming to advance and substantiate the climate security agenda should engage with existing regional and contextual efforts as well as priorities. It presents three key considerations, aimed at informing such engagements, derived from expert interviews with officials from the AU, the IGAD, and the UN, as well as case studies from Somalia and Somaliland. In addition to providing recommendations

<sup>3</sup> Supported by the government of Sweden.

to inform engagements related to climate security in conflict-affected and institutionally fragmented contexts, the aim is also to present concrete illustrative examples of ongoing efforts in this direction.

**Key messages for advancing climate security: adopt a peace continuum approach, couple climate adaptation and institutional engagement, and promote conflict-sensitive and accessible climate finance**

**Integrating climate change adaptation and finance into a ‘peace continuum’**

Regional, national and local actors in the Horn of Africa have first-hand experience of the spiralling (in)security implications of climate change. Climate security is, accordingly, a strong priority, and the framing of climate change as a security issue provides political leverage.

‘As it is a security issue, we’ve been able to elevate...we have been able to advocate...at the highest level...which is what we have not always had access to’ (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023).

At the same time, key regional climate security priorities reflect an orientation that includes but clearly moves beyond ‘hard’ security concerns, and places strong emphasis on context specific drivers at play in the interaction between climate change, conflict and peace – centrally including issues of food insecurity, loss of livelihood, loss of access to land, past histories of violence, etc. (Interviews, AU official, and IGAD official, August 2023; see also Security Council Report 2022; AU Communique 2021; IGAD 2022). In turn, addressing such drivers through prioritising climate adaptation and finance is understood as a core contribution to peace. In advancing the climate security agenda in this direction, connecting climate change adaptation to a ‘peace continuum’ across prevention, peace-making and post-conflict development, the UN (and member states working through the UN) and African regional actors can leverage significant convergence of interest and priorities (Security Council Report, 2022; Interviews AU official and IGAD official, August 2023).

*Case 1: Advancing a ‘peace continuum’ approach to climate change in Somalia*

While at the level of the UNSC, Russia vetoed the formal incorporation of climate change as a security matter, the Council has maintained a strong thematic engagement on climate and managed to include climate components at peacekeeping mission and political missions levels. The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was the first UN field mission to include a Climate Security and Environmental Advisor and dedicate capacity to assess context specific climate security risk interactions, develop related strategies for responding and communicate findings to the UNSC. The advisor has taken key roles in leading efforts to build national government capacities for coordination and implementation of its climate policy plans; efforts to coordinate on climate issues across UN agencies, national, regional (including AU and IGAD) and INGO actors in Somalia; as well as efforts to mainstream climate issues across security, peace, development and adaptation areas. A key current focus of the climate security

efforts within UNSOM revolves around ‘climate-peace dialogues’, seeking to reframe natural resource management and land access from being a security risk to being approached as an entry point for dialogue and collaboration (Interview, UN climate security and environmental advisor, December 2023; see also Russo 2022). These efforts are coordinated by the advisor with the political and mediation teams of UNSOM, as well as regional actors. In a context like Somalia, shaped by deeply complex political dynamics and entrenched armed conflict, the integration of a climate security advisor is, of course, no panacea for peace- and development-driven climate security solutions for stabilising overarching conflict dynamics. However, it does remain an important step within a wider strategic prioritisation (UN 2023, 21) of efforts to offer alternatives beyond more narrow ‘hard security’ or ‘humanitarian emergency’ solutions that tend to prevail in conflict contexts, to instead advancing a strategic agenda for climate adaptation to be a catalyst for peace.

Such prioritisation is also evident in broader strategic considerations, such as the proposed plans for new funding mechanisms within the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund for more ‘risk tolerant’ support and climate finance (UN, 2023). In Somalia, projects funded by the Peacebuilding Fund have demonstrated encouraging outcomes by facilitating local-level collaboration on resource management and dispute resolution, resulting in significant peace dividends at the grassroots level (Gaston et al., 2023). Despite the positive indicators, these projects did encounter the challenges inherent to donor risk aversion, including heightened insecurity and volatility, posing significant risk of project disruptions (Gaston et al., 2023: 54). The key argument here, then, is not to oversimplify the path forward, but to highlight the significance of tailored efforts, particularly in regions and countries most vulnerable to the compounding effects of climate change and conflict.

### Message

- The climate security agenda has strong regional backing but needs an orientation towards integrating climate change adaptation and finance more effectively into a ‘peace continuum’ that spans prevention, peacebuilding and development, tailored to local contexts. The related convergence of priorities between regional HoA initiatives and the evolving UN climate-security approach should be leveraged.

### **Coupling climate security with institution-building: the need for flexible strategic approaches**

The abovementioned logic, of mutual reinforcing dynamics between political fragmentation and low external donor engagement with a long-term strategic focus, is a significant obstacle to advancing a regionally and strategically relevant climate security agenda.

As discussed, at national levels political fragmentation tends to go hand in hand with limited resources and other pressing concerns diverting attention away from climate change. And while at the regional level, organisations in the Horn of Africa have managed to create significant institutional foundations and

mechanisms for moving climate security forward, they remain deeply donor dependent. Also, as they operate in a region with multiple crises and armed conflicts, they cannot rely on stable member state contributions.

‘So, in a lot of ways, we don’t get to set our agenda (...) we have to ensure that most of our priorities (are) whatever it is the international community has decided is important’ (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023).

Leveraging capacity among regional, national and local actors and institutions, and adapting climate security efforts to grounded priorities and knowledge is crucial for advancing climate security. However, in contexts where institutions are fragmented or contested, institutional engagement presents a key challenge: identifying counterparts when the state’s authority is not ‘given’. Efforts to couple climate security with institution building will therefore need to adopt flexible context-specific approaches for engagement and partnerships, navigating the diverse compositions of actors, institutions, power dynamics and networks.

At the regional level, in the Horn of Africa, examples of efforts to strengthen institutional partnerships, frameworks and capacities on climate security include the ongoing collaboration of IGAD and the UN Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, appointed in 2018. This collaboration and support have helped the region move beyond ad hoc interactions and parallel implementation among regional and international actors by strengthening coordination on climate security efforts, including across different sectors (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). The appointment of the UN Special Envoy took place under the umbrella of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) which is an initiative of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), established in 2018. The CSM has been a platform for both coordination and support for implementation across climate, peace and security policies and plans, including the UN Comprehensive Regional Prevention Strategy, the IGAD Regional Climate Change Strategy 2023-2030, the aforementioned IGAD Protocol on Transhumance, and the Kampala Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (UN CSM 2023).

At the broader institutional level, the UN has expressed its intention to enhance the role of the Peacebuilding Commission as a platform for engagement and co-operation with both regional organisations and member states, in particular with a focus on addressing issues that ‘lie between peace and development’, such as climate change (UN, 2023: 32)

The national level is where addressing institutional fragmentation tends to pose particular challenges. To circumvent issues related to state weakness, external programmes and donors often opt for engaging directly with communities through pre-designed projects, as community approaches can be effective in reaching those in need of support. Yet, this also produces dilemmas, since ‘if you don’t support institutions, you can’t have lasting change’ and too often support is based on ‘piecemeal interventions that...end up being maladaptive, creating dependency on the ground...and not developing the knowledge needed for long

term responses' (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023; Similar views were expressed in interview with political analyst, Somaliland, August 2023). Yet, while institutional engagement and capacity-building is important, it is not necessarily equivalent to state-centric top-down approaches. Rather, emphasis should be on prioritising approaches that focus on engaging, strengthening and building upon existing efforts and knowledge, be it regional organisations or mechanisms, governmental structures and/or local or community-based organisations with institutional authority and legitimacy in a given context.

#### Message

- Strategic engagement focused on coupling climate-security with institution-building and sustainable adaptation, faces significant challenges in contexts shaped by institutional fragmentation and conflict, but should nonetheless be prioritised as a core objective. This will require context-specific approaches to partnerships, navigating the diverse compositions of actors, institutions and power dynamics.

#### **Flexible, accessible and conflict sensitive climate financing**

Centralised bureaucratic regulation for accessing climate finance poses a major obstacle to advancing the climate security agenda in politically fragmented contexts (see also Chambers, forthcoming). Additionally, it contributes to the abovementioned problems of externally driven piecemeal approaches, where international NGOs accessing funds pursue their own projects, bypassing local authorities and institutions. As a result, funds may fail to be grounded and embedded within the specific context, including its institutions, priorities and needs, thereby diminishing sustainability prospects (observations during fieldworks, Somaliland 2023).

So, while climate finance needs to be stepped up, it is also crucial to make finance approaches and reporting requirements more flexible in the first place: 'If we do not have the financial institutions that qualify for access, even for the existing finance that is there, then how do we go to fight for additional finance?' (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023).

#### Message

- Climate finance and support for climate adaptation need to be flexible, accessible and conflict-sensitive to actually work within contexts affected by conflict and institutional fragmentation.

*Case 2: Droughts, displacement crises and responses in Somaliland – reviewing best and worst practice for climate adaptation support<sup>4</sup>*

Somaliland has experienced intensifying climate change impacts and insecurity, most recently devastating droughts in 2017-2018 and again in 2021-2022. Pastoralist communities, in particular, had their livelihood undercut, and Somaliland has been grappling with a surge of internal displacement, as rural populations – in particular pastoralists – have relocated to camps in urban and peri-urban areas. A key response from external donors have been to offer humanitarian support through cash transfers, primarily unconditional. Unconditional cash transfers have served as crucial support in the immediate food and livelihood crisis many pastoralists were facing. Yet, what should have been a short-term measure, became a prolonged means of support, with significant unintended effects. First, finance went to unconditional cash transfers whereas (more cumbersome) efforts to support adaptation for pastoralists (such as rangeland restoration, restocking etc.) in pastoral areas have remained severely under-prioritised (Interview, FAO official, August 2023), leading some to argue that cash transfers came into competition with pastoralism and livestock production which remains a key livelihood and economic pillar in Somaliland. Second, cash transfers came to act as a pull factor, for rural-urban migration, and in some cases fed into a rise in land conflicts. In Burao, a serious conflict broke out over access to unconditional cash transfer cards, allocated to IDPs settled within specific land slots. The fact that cash transfers have been provided by a number of different donors, in many instances with very limited or no coordination with Somaliland authorities (neither with the national authorities, nor at the city government level), has added additional challenges in regards to dealing with the unintended consequences (Fadal and Barud, 2023). The case strongly demonstrates the shortcomings of donor-driven, short term, uncoordinated adaptation support, also lacking conflict-sensitivity.

In a nearby location, Aroori, a significantly different approach can be observed, centred on long-term adaptive solutions for drought affected pastoralists (Awaale 2023). Aroori plain (20,000 hectares (ha)), is a grazing reserve that has been used as a livestock holding ground to support an export livestock market, but developed into a grazing reserve for livestock during drought. During the 2021-2022 drought, the protected area proved crucial for saving the livelihood for hundreds of pastoral households with their livestock. This incidence, in turn, highlighted the need for long-term strategic regulation of the land, with sufficient resting periods; and Aroori has been developed as a communal testing and demonstration ground for rangeland management in support of pastoralists communities, also involving a new 'Livestock Centre of Excellence' that will provide research, training and support for animal production, fodder production and livestock health. The role of Somaliland's government in establishing and protecting Aroori has been buttressed by substantial technical and financial support from the Somaliland

<sup>4</sup> This case study is part of the DANIDA funded research project Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland (PACCS) (Fadal and Barud 2023; Awale 2023).

Development Fund (SDF) (Awale, 2023). SDF is a fund established in 2012 as vehicle through which donors and partners can support Somaliland's development goals. While Somaliland's unrecognised status poses significant limitations in regard to access to climate finance, the SDF is an example of a flexible funding mechanisms allowing support for Somaliland's government and partners. In sum, the case exemplifies contextually relevant climate change adaptation, leveraging community collaboration and supported through flexible and relevant funding arrangements.

## **CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

This paper has examined key challenges and opportunities for advancing the climate security agenda in conflict-affected contexts in Africa.

The paper's first part focused on the wider international policy developments as well as geopolitical dynamics shaping the climate security agenda. It identified gaps in advancing climate security, particularly regarding insufficient finances, under-prioritisation of conflict-affected areas and a too narrow security focus. Reorienting the agenda to address these gaps is crucial both for supporting peace and security in climate-affected regions and for Europe and the West's standing and chances for fostering meaningful partnerships in Africa.

The first part of the paper offered the following key messages:

- Framing climate change as a security issue can enhance political leverage but the climate-security agenda should extend beyond narrow security and military solutions and place emphasis on positive security, peace and development outcomes for populations and regions hardest hit by climate change.
- Climate security discourse should not divert resources from climate financing to security mandates, but recognising climate as a security issue should be leveraged to enhance commitment to climate finance and adaptation. It follows that strategic coordination is key to leverage different strengths, e.g. of both UNFCCC and UNSC.
- Wealthy countries' failure to adequately deliver on commitments for climate adaptation support and finance negatively impacts climate security. Contexts affected by conflict and fragility are the most climate insecure yet receive disproportionately limited donor engagement and targeted climate finance.
- Growing geopolitical competition for influence in Africa has led to polarisation, but also presents opportunities for African actors to forge partnerships aligned with their priorities. This should be considered in reorientating the climate security agenda.



- Relegating support and finance for climate adaptation to secondary priorities can feed distrust and disillusionment with Western partners and compel African actors to prioritise alternative partnerships.
- Committing to address climate (in)security in a dedicated strategic manner, attuned to local and regional priorities, represents a significant opportunity for European/broader Western engagement to redress longstanding inequities and build partnership distinct from other external actors.
- Orientating the climate security agenda toward integrating peace and development needs, may hold the opportunity to revitalize partnerships and donor approaches, addressing reform needs in both security and development domains

In the second part of the paper, following the discussion of key gaps in advancing the climate security agenda, concrete challenges and opportunities for addressing these gaps were examined. Using the Horn of Africa as a case study, this part explored opportunities for climate security approaches aligning with regional and contextual needs, by integrating climate change adaptation more effectively into a ‘peace continuum’ spanning prevention, peacebuilding and development. Recommendations for engaging in climate security in conflict-affected and institutionally fragmented contexts were provided, alongside illustrative examples from expert interviews and case studies in Somalia and Somaliland.

The second part of the paper offered the following key messages:

- The climate security agenda has strong regional backing but needs an orientation towards integrating climate change adaptation and finance more effectively into a ‘peace continuum’ that spans prevention, peacebuilding and development, tailored to local contexts. The related convergence of priorities between regional HoA initiatives and the evolving UN climate-security approach should be leveraged.
- Strategic engagement focused on coupling climate-security with institution-building and sustainable adaptation, faces significant challenges in contexts shaped by institutional fragmentation and conflict, but should nonetheless be prioritised as a core objective. This will require context-specific approaches to partnerships, navigating the diverse compositions of actors, institutions and power dynamics.
- Climate finance and support for climate adaptation need to be flexible, accessible and conflict-sensitive to actually work within contexts affected by conflict and institutional fragmentation.

## REFERENCES

- Adelphi (2017). Insurgency, Terrorism, and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate: Analysing the Links Between Climate Change and Non-state Armed Groups, <https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-climate-summary>
- African Union Communique (2021). Adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 1051st meeting held on 26 November 2021 on the theme: Climate Change and Peace and Security: The need for an Informed Climate-Security-Development nexus for Africa.
- Awale, A. I. (2023). Rangeland Management Practices in Somaliland with Emphasis on Aroori Grazing Reserve. Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland (PACCS) Project Field Report.
- Barnett, J. (2019). Global environmental change I: climate resilient peace? *Progress in Human Geography*, 43(5): 927–936.
- Bergmann, J. (2023). Heading in the Wrong Direction? Rethinking the EU’s Approach to Peace and Security in Africa. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-spotlight-26-the-eu-should-rethink-its-approach-to-african-peace-and-security>
- Buxton, N. (2021). A primer on climate security: the dangers of militarising the climate crisis Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.
- Chakrabaty, D. (2014). Climate and capital: on conjoined histories. *Critical Inquiry*, 41(4): 1–23.
- Chakrabaty, D. (2021). The climate of history in a planetary age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Charbonneau, B. (2022). The climate of counterinsurgency and the future of security in the Sahel. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 138:97-104.
- Chambers, J. (2024). DFC Metstudy: Climate Change and Conflict: Lessons from Danida-funded Research.
- Conway, G. (2021). On peace, security and climate finance at COP26, UNDP Blog, 12 November 2021, <https://www.undp.org/blog/peace-security-and-climate-finance-cop26>
- Craviotto, N. (2023). Little to Celebrate: An assessment of Official Development Assistance in 2022, Eurodad, Briefing paper, June 2023.
- Danish Church Aid (DCA), Norwegian Church Aid and ActAlliance, (2020). Winning the Peace: Peacebuilding and Climate Change in Mali and Somalia. Policy Report, 8 June.

- Deneckere, M. (2019). The uncharted path towards a European Peace Facility. *European Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion paper*, 248:1-16.
- Destrijcker, L., A. Foong, A. Mahamoud and J. C. Diffenbacher, (2023). Key climate security actors and frameworks in Eastern Africa, ICPALD and Adelphi Report, March.
- Donoghoe, M., Perry, A. Gross, S., Ljjasz-Vasquez, E., Keller, J. B., Macarthur, J. W., Patnaik, S., Rabe, B. G., Roeghse, S., Kirisci, K., Signé, L., and Victor, D. G. (2023). The successes and failures of COP28. Brookings Commentary, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-successes-and-failures-of-cop28/>
- Emerson, S. (2014). Back to the future: the evolution of US counterterrorism policy in Africa. *Insight on Africa*, 6(1): 43-56.
- Fadal, M., Barud, M. (2023). Somaliland IDPs Durable Solutions Nexus with Unconditional Cash Assistance. Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland (PACCS) Project Field Report.
- Gaston, E., Brown, O., al-Dawsari, N., Downing, C., Day, A., and Bodewig, R. (2023). Climate-Security and Peacebuilding. Thematic Review. United Nations University, Centre for Policy Research.
- Gavas, M., and Kappeli, A. (2023). Europe can only score points with developing countries if it sees eye to eye, *Development Policy & Agenda 2030*, Welthungerhilfe, [How the EU can score points with developing countries - Welthungerhilfe](#)
- Humanitarian Action (2023). The spiraling climate crisis is intensifying needs and vulnerabilities. *Global Humanitarian Overview 2024*, <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2024/article/spiraling-climate-crisis-intensifying-needs-and-vulnerabilities>
- IGAD (2022). Addressing Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa, Policy Brief No. 1, Nov 2022.
- Jensen, L. (2022). Avoiding 'too little too late' on international debt relief, *Development Futures Series Working Papers*, United Nations Development Programme, New York, NY, <https://www.undp.org/publications/dfs-avoiding-too-little-too-late-international-debt-relief>
- Karlsrud, J. (2019). From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism. *International Peacekeeping*, 26(1): 1-21.
- Kruckow, C., Strumpf, N., and Mackaill Hill, H. (2023). Why conflict sensitivity matters: takeaways from the discussion on the Loss and Damage Fund, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwicklung. Peacebuilding Forum.
- Lakhani, N. (2023). \$700m pledged to loss and damage fund at Cop28 covers less than 0.2% needed, *The Guardian* 6 Dec. 2023,

<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/06/700m-pledged-to-loss-and-damage-fund-cop28-covers-less-than-02-percent-needed>

Mattheis, F., Deleglise, D., and Staeger, U. (2023). African Union: The African political integration process and its impact on EU-AU relations in the field of foreign and security policy. Study, requested by the AFET Committee.

McDonald, M. (2018). Climate change and security: towards ecological security? *International Theory*, 10(2): 153–180.

McDonald, M. (2023). Immovable Objects? Impediments to a UN Security Council resolution on climate change. *International Affairs*, 99(4): 1635-1651.

Moe, L. W., and Müller, M. M. (2024). Knowledge production at the environment-security nexus: between orthodoxy and transformation. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 151: 103597.

Musse, S. (2023). Climate Change Governance in Somaliland: Gaps, Potentials and Policy Actions for Pastoral Climate Change Resilience. Pastoralist Climate Change Resilience in Somaliland (PACCS) project Field Report.

Okou, C., Spray, J., and Unsal, D. F. (2022). African Food Prices Are Soaring Amid High Import Reliance. IMF Blog Sep 27 2022, <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/26/africa-food-prices-are-soaring-amid-high-import-reliance>

Peace@Cop28 Community. (2023). Recommendations for accelerating climate action in communities affected by conflict. Ecosystem for Peace – A compendium of ideas, [Peace@COP28: Recommendations for accelerating climate action in communities affected by conflict | by Ecosystem for Peace - A compendium of ideas | Medium](https://www.peaceatcop28.org/recommendations-for-accelerating-climate-action-in-communities-affected-by-conflict)

Russo, J. (2022). *The UN Environmental and Climate Adviser in Somalia*. International Peace Institute. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43845>

Sax, N., Hassan, G. M., Abdi, A. N., Garcia, T. F., Madurga-Lopez, I., Carneiro, B., Liebig, T., Läderach, P., and Pacillo, G. (2023). How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict I Ethiopia? Climate Security Pathway Analysis, CGIAR Factsheet 2023/3.

Shackelford, E., Kessler, E., and E. Sanderson. (2023). Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, report, <https://globalaffairs.org/research/report/less-more-new-strategy-us-security-assistance-africa>

Signé, L. (2023). Development strategies in a changing global political economy, in OECD, Debating the Aid System, Development Co-operation Report 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1787/bdba0621-en>, chapter 2: 45-70.

Security Council Report (2022). The UN Security Council and Climate Change: Tracking the Agenda after the 2021 Veto. Research Report, 2022 no. 4.

UN Security Council (2021). '8864th meeting, Thursday, 23 September', S/PV.8864.UN. (2021). People, Countries Impacted by Climate Change Also Vulnerable to Terrorist Recruitment, Violence, Speakers Tell Security Council in Open Debate, Meeting Coverage, SC/14728, 9 December.

UN (2023). Our Common Agenda. A New Agenda for Peace. Policy Brief 9, July 2023.

UN Climate Security Mechanism (UN CSM). (2023) Progress Report, May 2023

Yeltekin, D. (2022). Militarized adaptation? How the global south is adopting climate security approaches. Transnational Institute Discussion Paper (November). Available at: [https:// www.tni.org/en/publication/militarised-adaptation](https://www.tni.org/en/publication/militarised-adaptation)

Yohannes-Kassahun, B. (2022). One Year Later: The Impact of the Russian conflict with Ukraine on Africa. UN, Office of the Special Advisor, <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa>

Walls, M., Osuteye, E., and Abdi, U. (2023). Climate Change and Urbanisation in the Somali Horn. UCL/The Barlett Development Planning Unit, Concept Note.