BUSINESS AND PEACEBUILDING
Seven Ways to Maximize Positive Impact

Jason Miklian
Peer Schouten
Cindy Horst
Øystein H. Rolandsen.
Conflict of Interest? 'Business for Peace' as Development Aid in Volatile Environments is a project funded by the Norwegian Research Council’s AIDEFECT programme.

Our primary objective was to provide the first comprehensive evaluation of ‘Business for Peace’ (B4P). We investigated: (1) business motivations and aid logics underpinning the emergence of B4P; and (2) the local impact of corporate activities under B4P in fragile and high-risk areas. We studied B4P’s achievements and shortcomings in four country cases: the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somaliland.

This project was hosted at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), with partner research organizations in Denmark and each of our case countries.

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Jason Miklian
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Insights from the research project Conflict of Interest? ‘Business for Peace’ as Development Aid in Volatile Environments, led by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
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Cover Photo: Moises Saman.
Executive Summary

What are the conditions under which businesses can move beyond ‘doing no harm’ in the fragile and conflict-affected societies where they work to deliver more tangible positive peace dividends? Designed for businesses, practitioners, scholars and others who are interested and engaged in corporate impact in such areas, this report provides an overview of the main lessons from a four-year study of corporate peacebuilding initiatives across a range of contexts. Its main findings are formulated as seven key questions which can help evaluate risks and improve impact.

1. What is the ‘conflict and business’ environment?

Sound peace contributions are premised on a continuous cycle of monitoring and feedbacks between understanding how societies can become more peaceful, action, and strong analysis—from social and political impact assessment to follow-up evaluation.

2. What is the local definition of ‘peace’?

‘Peace’ and ‘security’ are not universally-defined concepts. Thus, private sector actions for peace that are clear, concrete, done in partnership with local partners, and achievable are more likely to be viewed retroactively as ‘successful’ or valuable, or at least ‘not harmful’ by the local community.

3. How does our peace work impact socio-economic structures?

Financial flows that might be considered minor for large firms can have a major distorting impact on local communities, and these types of non-core risks and impacts should be included in social impact assessments.
4. Does our operational presence give support to conflict actors?

Corporations should assume responsibility for the peace impact of their entire operational presence, assuring that their whole chain of suppliers and subcontractors is conflict-free. In a global economy modeled on complex supply and distribution chains, due diligence of supply chains is key to a comprehensive commitment in building more peaceful societies.

5. Is our firm structured to support peace?

For the firm, two questions need to be asked before it takes on peace and development activities:

- Is there a will to conduct peacebuilding within the firm and are the CEO and the Board of Directors fully supportive of such activities?
- Is there internal knowledge and capacity available within the firm to plan and carry out a successful peacebuilding project?

6. Do we work well with other knowledge producers and peace practitioners?

Decades of peacebuilding projects have taught peacebuilders/the international community/civil society a good number of hard lessons for any actor wishing to build peace, including:

- Don't think of yourself as the 'sole savior';
- Learn from other peacebuilders in the area;
- Identify how your own unique skills can contribute to broader peace initiatives; and
- Recognize that the sum of peace-writ-little initiatives may not necessarily equal peace-writ-large.

7. What is our ‘red line’ for terminating operations?

Our research suggests that defining a clear red line before situations deteriorate would serve two purposes. It would enable a clearer pathway for withdrawal should it be necessary and it would also offer a clearer guideline to host governments, who will know
what actions or policies the corporate sector (or at least its most progressive members) will not tolerate.

Our research shows that business ‘doing good for peace and development’ can spiral into local conflict situations that prove to be worse than if nothing had been done at all. We have three main takeaways:

First, while the aspirational elements of business engagement in peace-building stand firm this commitment has yielded few positive impacts in those conflict-affected areas where it is most needed. The primary contradiction for most firms lies in the fact that the most peace-positive business strategy in a region with ongoing conflict is often simply to stay away.

Second, and of greater policy consequence, when initiatives by business for peace and development are only assessed at the firm level, they risk missing larger societal consequences. With business and peace, the parts often are less than the sum. This is shown in our research in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and, most strikingly, in Myanmar, where the absorptive capacity of a host society for business-peace ac-

Third, if substantive progress is to be solidified on how companies interact with the societies in which they work, binding regulatory initiatives are needed. They must be independently verified, universally applied across firms, and have punitive capabilities, backed by strong policy coherence and support. However, we recognize that such a scenario does not reflect current global political realities, and we may never achieve this standard.
Peacebuilding

According to the 2007 agreement by the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, peacebuilding is: “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a prioritized, sequenced, and...narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”

This publication uses the following two interpretations of ‘Peacebuilding’:

- “Direct work that intentionally focuses on addressing the factors driving and mitigating conflict”
- “Efforts to coordinate a comprehensive, multi-leveled, multi-sectoral strategy, including development, humanitarian assistance, governance, security, justice and other sectors that may not use the term peacebuilding to describe themselves [but which make a contribution to addressing conflict drivers].”

Note that peacebuilding does not only refer to initiatives in post-conflict contexts, but applies to a range of settings that are affected by fragility and political transition.

Negative Peace and Positive Peace

The terms ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ were coined by the Norwegian peace research pioneer Johan Galtung in the late 1960s. Negative peace is simply the absence of physical violence. Positive peace is the creation and maintenance of social justice through the reduction of structural violence in society. Structural violence is generated when a social institution harms citizens by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. If structural violence is addressed, the root causes of war and violence are assumed to be eliminated. ‘Positive peace’ is thus more aspirational than an achievable end state. The vast majority of peacebuilding scholars and practitioners today operate under the assumption that a combination of structural and physical violence drivers provide the basis for the inception and continuation of violent armed conflict.

Violent Conflict

Conflicts are normal elements in every society. They arise when societies develop and transform. Many conflicts are dealt with in peaceful ways—at individual and socio-political levels. Only when violence is used to resolve conflicts does it generate broader socio-economic and political concern.

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is the object of a wide range of policies and initiatives (at national, regional, and global levels) aiming to avoid the violent escalation of socio-political tensions, including:

- Monitoring and/or intervening to stabilize a fragile situation before existing conflicts turn into violence.
- Initiating activities that address the
drivers of violent conflict and disputes—structural drivers (such as historic grievances, inequalities, exclusion) as well as more short-term triggers (such as elections).

- Establishing mechanisms that detect early warning signs and record specific indicators that may help to predict impending violence, and acting accordingly.

- Institutionalizing the idea of preventing conflict at the local, regional, and international levels through appropriate mechanisms and governance structures.

The practice of Conflict Prevention has evolved from being focused on Preventive Diplomacy to a new, more comprehensive approach that can be defined as ‘structural prevention’, which includes long-term initiatives targeting the long-term structural drivers of conflict.³

Conflict Drivers
Conflict drivers are factors and dynamics in a society that fuel tensions and can lead to violence.

Conflict Sensitivity/Do No Harm
A conflict sensitive approach involves gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and (conflict) context and acting to minimize negative and unintended impacts (‘doing no harm’), and to maximize positive impacts of intervention on conflict, within an organization’s given priorities and objectives.

Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
This is a popular catch-all term many development and peace-building actors use to categorize...
regions where issues of development and conflict intersect. Used by the World Bank and other agencies, it is also a problematic taxonomy, embracing a range of countries in very different circumstances. These areas are assumed to host “both overt crisis (organised conflict and violent disruption of socio-political processes), and latent fragmentation (contested political settlement, state predation, and failure to ensure basic rights and services).” Business initiatives for peacebuilding are usually, but not necessarily, limited to these areas.

Business

In this report, ‘business’ refers to the umbrella of national, regional, and multi-national firms operating within a target country and/or a specific conflict. This includes all operations across sectors, structure types (state-owned, private, cooperatives, etc.), and countries (e.g. Global North or Global South), and size. Throughout the report, we assume significant variation within this community, and highlight notable research relevance of the commonalities and divergences of such.

Business for Peace

Inaugurated in 2013 by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, the Business for Peace (B4P) initiative establishes businesses as partners in local peace. B4P tries to harness the pre-existing role of business in fragile and conflict-affected states to expand and deepen private sector action in support of peace. B4P is an aspirational agenda targeting key decision makers in influential firms to play a role in supporting peace. This aim is also the cornerstone of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) vision for the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and is framed as a valid complement to traditional aid and development mechanisms originating from the Global North. B4P is also the most visible public symbol of the broader effort by the private sector to become peacebuilders and global governance participants—a desire that has grown exponentially in scope since 2005. Today over €8 trillion in investments is benchmarked to the SDGs, and 20,000 companies are signatories to varied peace and development initiatives around the world.
Introduction

This report presents key findings from the 4-year PRIO project Conflict of Interest? ‘Business for Peace’ as Development Aid in Volatile Environments, funded by the Research Council of Norway. Together with partners in South Sudan, Somaliland, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Denmark, the project team studied various forms of business engagement in peace. This document presents the main findings of our project, supplemented by findings from affiliate projects by team members.

Our main audience is decision makers in foreign firms working in fragile/conflict settings who wish to ‘do no harm’ or go even further and make peace contributions, and policymakers and practitioners who wish to support these aims. Here we offer initial guidance to companies interested in starting, expanding, or evaluating a peacebuilding portfolio across conflict settings, sectors, and peace and development mechanisms.

This report is also designed for policymakers, practitioners, scholars, and others who are interested and engaged in corporate impact in fragile and conflict-affected areas. These lessons also have value for domestic firms and for investors and analysts who wish to better understand the immediate and longer term impacts of business for peace.

Multinationals on the frontline?

Multinational enterprises connect our world, and their supply chains reach deep into the fabric of each of the world’s fragile and conflict-affected societies. This fact has spurred multinational corporations and political leaders to launch initiatives to guide and regulate private sector engagement in such societies. While many are familiar with the portfolio of standards that aim at curbing negative corporate impacts in fragile and conflict-affected societies, business activities that aspire to make contributions to peace are a novelty. The B4P agenda comprises initiatives by many national and multi-national firms from around the world, and the initiatives themselves include everything from philanthropy and development aid to diplomacy and
mediation. Some of these activities have made a measurable, positive impact for peace. But most have had little real influence, and some have even made conflict worse. Why do peace and development initiatives by business sometimes backfire, and how can firms improve their capacity to help build peace?

In our research project, we investigated the assertion that businesses have a role to play in maintaining and promoting peace and societal development in conflict-affected parts of the world. Building upon the rich findings produced over the past two decades on business as a conflict actor, we explored the new premise that businesses can also contribute to peace. The premise arises from the emerging consensus among western audiences, including consumers, employees and shareholders, that corporations must deliver better social impacts in their areas of operation—in particular if these areas also constitute key beneficiaries for the Sustainable Development Goals. Business for Peace (B4P) has indeed found traction as an umbrella schematic among those business leaders convinced they can take corporate ‘win-win’ logics to help transform the ‘win-lose’ logic inherent in conflict to take actions that simultaneously bring peace, security, and local development.

Local conflict environments and contexts are, however, too diverse to claim anything in their nature beyond simplistic generalities, and attempting to deliver findings that are valid across the vast majority of conflict contexts risks delivering mere truisms. Our key takeaway is therefore that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to peacebuilding by business. By extension, it is not possible to generate one global set of best practices or step-by-step corporate peacebuilding guidance that is detailed and comprehensive enough to have actionable value or foresee all possible local particularities and consequences.

We nevertheless found commonalities in the business-peace projects that we studied, including those that were beneficial, and ones that were not. We present these findings through ‘Seven Key Questions’ that private sector peace contributors should ask, and detail how they can help firms and policymakers improve project design and support. In the presentation of these questions, we show a series of positive and negative examples from our research, highlighting how careful and inclusive planning and implementation of any business-peace venture is essential to its success.

But even this may not be enough in many settings. We then offer three reflections about future trends in the business and peace space, highlighting where opportunities for further policy advancement can be made. As thousands of firms worldwide are starting to navigate complex peacebuilding and development spaces in conflict-torn communities, these findings can help businesses better understand where they can make meaningful contributions, and help them ask questions to develop ethically responsible projects that are less likely to be ineffective or unintentionally inflame conflict. Last, we summarize the project’s structure, outputs, and collaborators, and offer an annex of key terms that are commonly used in the business-peace discussion.
We collate our findings into a presentation of **seven key questions** that businesses working to make a peace contribution in fragile and conflict-affected areas should ask and attempt to answer. These questions are designed to address both specific peacebuilding activities by business, and the broader consequences of their operational presence.

We explored the following sectors in our cases, to varying degrees:

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Table 1
1. What is the ‘conflict and business’ environment?

When a business works in a given fragile and conflict-affected area (or plans to), a host of unique considerations should be assessed regarding the firm’s impact upon society. The most important first step—one that we fully recognize is challenging, time-consuming, complex, and potentially a source of dispute within firms themselves—is to build a thorough understanding of the political context and local conflict environment. This includes:

- Who are the key parties to (violent) conflicts at the local, regional, and national levels and why are they fighting? What are the ethnic, socio-economic, and other divisions within society: How do these divisions manifest in inequalities and grievances, and who is benefiting from the current socio-economic structure? Are there other underlying or latent tensions that could lead to conflict in the future? Not mapping these issues may cause business operations to increase conflict and societal tensions.

- Competition over jobs created by business operations is a typical problem where some segments of society monopolize opportunities to the detriment of others.

- For example, in Somaliland, the logistics operator DP World acquired the Berbera port concession. Berbera port is one of the main economic resources in Somaliland, and has played a central role in balancing clan and regional power dynamics. The concession being in the hands of a foreign business risks disrupting Somaliland’s fragile peace.

- Who is conducting this mapping, and what biases and/or blind spots might they have? Has the firm dedicated enough resources to confidently say that the analysis is sound and holistic? For example, there are local, national, regional, and international perspectives on conflict, and NGOs, INGOs, IGOs, consulting firms, and in-house analyses each have different strengths and weaknesses regarding social impact analysis and assessment for conflict and business.

- How, precisely, do business and conflict intersect? While popular attention often hovers upon spectacular cases like ‘blood diamonds’
or ‘conflict gold’, in practice the ties between business and conflict financing are rarely so clean-cut. For the firm, knowing if their activities are contributing to conflict (or peace) first requires in-depth knowledge of the financial flows of conflict, in particular how parties to conflict receive funding, and how such funding is employed.  

Seven Key Questions

1. How does a firm gain operational access to the conflict environment? For example, what role will the local government play? Partnerships with local government are often essential or even mandated by law, but they can be tricky. In some cases, the government’s presence in the area of operation might be negligible and access is negotiated with local ‘big’ men or even warlords. Furthermore, building local government capacity is essential to long term societal health, but local officials may be more interested in graft or doling out favors to associates instead of local development. A business might even find itself in the role of watchdog of its own essential partner in case of corruption or other anti-society factors.

2. Problematizing forward implications of local relationships can be a valuable step.

3. In Myanmar, multinationals are restricted to mandatory joint ventures with local firms for operational functions. While this builds local capacity, it also increases military elites’ hold on power and profits, furthering the inequalities that form the root causes of the conflict. In the borderland between Sudan and South Sudan, lack of central government reach means that traders and private sector operators, even oil companies, need to rely upon a heterogenous patchwork of local power holders, including UN peacekeepers stationed locally.

4. How does the firm define and calculate ‘risk’? Companies are typically good at conducting financial and reputational risk assessments, but their political and social risk assessments are usually either poorly done, firm-centric, or in many cases not conducted at all. These narrow conceptions reduce actionable information to a firm, potentially adversely affecting prof-
itability, competitive advantage, and local reputation.

▪ For example, the Virunga Alliance implements an electrification scheme in Eastern Congo based on its own conflict analysis. Yet the very beneficiaries Virunga initially hoped to reach have become left out as larger financial objectives became important to evaluate success, risking further disenfranchisement of local populations and increasing tensions.

▪ In Brazil, Norwegian firm Hydro tried to break with its predecessor’s past friction with local populations through better Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. However, in adopting conventional CSR strategies, it reproduced a bias towards core business risks at the detriment of community relations, ruptures that later turned an environmental spill into a major public relations disaster.

Key Policy Takeaway

▪ Any firm that does not adequately assess the conflict and business environment—and regularly re-assess it beyond an internal profit/risk calculation alone—creates significant but unnecessary blind spots that are detrimental to local populations and potentially carry severe future consequences for firm operations and profitability. Sound peace contributions are premised on a continuous cycle of monitoring and feedbacks between theory of change, action, and grounded data—from social and political impact assessment to follow-up evaluation.
2. What is the local definition of ‘peace’?

A context-based understanding of local conflict environments requires not only an understanding of conflict drivers, but also what constitutes ‘peace’ for those communities living within conflict. Even in the absence of an internationally ‘recognized’ civil war, levels of insecurity and violence might be high and block any initiative towards social and economic development. Conversely, during protracted low-intensity civil wars, larger areas might be sufficiently stable for long-term investments to take place. Thus, in many cases, the formal statuses of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ might be blurred at the local level. This indicates that in each of the stages from design to implementation and evaluation, the perceptions of local populations should be in focus. As international aid and development agencies have discovered, importing assumptions about what local communities want in the pursuit of peace can lead to initiatives that are ineffective or even counter-productive to long-term peacebuilding.

For example, in Eastern Congo, definitions of ‘peace’ are attached to a consideration of personal benefits, which are in turn tied to the position any given stakeholder holds within society and the prevalent politico-economic structure. Because of these cleavages, there is no single stakeholder able to legitimately represent a unified local interest. In contrast, long-distance trade in markets along the border of Sudan and South Sudan is by and large taking place in a “no war no peace” situation where a heterogenous set of conflict actors agree to protect the market and let merchants transport their goods across vast distances.

What is the relationship between local communities and local or regional elites, who are often the gatekeepers for business? What are local communities seeking to do in order to bring ‘peace’ to their environments, and how does it relate to corporate conceptions of ‘development’, ‘security’ and ‘stability’? Many firms assume that these three conceptions are universally defined. However, local communities often have far different and oftentimes competing definitions.
Seven Key Questions

communities? In other words, are our corporate risk reduction activities also designed to reduce risk in the local community, or might they (knowingly or unknowingly) exacerbate it? Our findings suggest that firms that are the most engaged in the process of discovery with local communities are better able to design project operations in a conflict-sensitive manner.17

▪ For example, one mining firm in DRC had its CSR consultant housed outside of the company compound. The consultant was fluent in local languages and lived with the communities. In this way, he was able to piece together a complex but highly relevant picture of the operational context and identify stakeholders and those priorities the mining firm could act upon. Conversely, environmental pollution from oil production in South Sudan and from aluminium processing trailings in Brazil has killed livestock and displaced people, which exacerbates communal tension.

▪ Business is one of dozens or even hundreds of complementary or
competing actors within any given peace and conflict ecosystem. Thus, firms cannot act alone effectively. Nor should they see themselves as political or economic saviors to conflict communities. In fact, such solo peace attempts can have more severe repercussions in terms of profit and reputational damage than doing nothing at all as firms become lightning rods for political failures.18

Peace is not an end-game or an ideal state of societal being; it is a constant political process. As a result, the most effective initiatives under the Business for Peace umbrella have typically been conceptualized as making one small positive impact towards that aim.19 In short, business-for-peace projects should be partnerships, not dictates of social action or one-off financial-based handouts or ‘gifts’.

Peace writ little (creating a local island of peaceful stability and societal security) is an attractive goal of many extractive firms in particular, as it satisfies the dual goals of operational security and community engagement. However, there is little evidence that such activities contribute to the greater goal of peace writ large (durable peace within a society). In fact, our findings suggest that the opposite may be true: local peace developed without engagement in larger socioeconomic or political dynamics can erode government capacity while simultaneously raising citizen expectations, thereby exacerbating conflict drivers such as a sense of relative deprivation.20

**Key Policy Takeaway**

‘Peace’ and ‘security’ are not universally-defined concepts, and projecting foreign understandings of such onto local communities—particularly through the complex lens of business—can be counterproductive in peacebuilding. Thus, B4P project goals that are clear, concrete, done in partnership with local partners, and achievable are more likely to be viewed by the local community as successful or valuable.
3. How does our peace work impact socio-economic structures?

What are the main socio-economic structures in existing or proposed areas of operation? How does the political economy of peace and conflict work in the region for business interests? The focus is on how a firm’s economic footprint alters fragile local balances of power, which are themselves often the products of complex negotiation and even violent conflict.

Is the firm aware of international best practice, and does it apply such? For example, the OECD Development Assistance Committee has established global criteria for peacebuilding effectiveness, with universal principles for monitoring and evaluating development assistance that should also apply to business and peace: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. Recognizing the attention that conflict and fragile contexts warrant in international aid, OECD/DAC has articulated these criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Combined with the OECD 10 Fragile States Principles (table 3), these criteria are also useful.
Increasingly, firms have become adept at conducting due diligence assessments of potential partners. However, few firms consider due diligence efforts to go beyond impacts on the firm alone to also study possible societal impacts. Our findings reiterate that if business efforts to rebuild society will be taken seriously, dialogue—especially with aggrieved communities—cannot simply be a quarterly or yearly box to tick.22

For example, in Somaliland, clan elders and other local stakeholders lost their opportunities for influencing decision-making processes at Berbera port after its concessions went to a foreign multinational firm. Their efforts to communicate to DP World through letters and press releases had no effect.

How does this initiative for peace by business help local communities? This question is often assumed, but seldom investigated. Sometimes corporate initiatives for peace provide something that is not wanted or needed, or duplicate an existing peace and development effort. For example,

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<th>The 10 Fragile States Principles</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Take context as the starting point</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Ensure all activities do no harm</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Focus on state building as the central objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Prioritise prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Act fast…but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”)</td>
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businesses often think that they contribute to development by providing jobs. However, this very provision can anger local communities in their area of operation when labor is sourced from big cities hundreds or even thousands of miles away.\textsuperscript{23} Worse, sometimes new projects attract more people than jobs to a given area, leaving the local community with worse rates of unemployment than it had before the project began.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
\item For example, in Brazil, a mining firm sources its trained staff nationally and flags local employment figures as a peace contribution. Yet local communities resent that the company sources from far outside of the region, leaving low-paid manual labor jobs for them.
\item How do business activities for ‘peace’ relate to people who will not benefit from the project and mitigate perceptions of relative deprivation? Most B4P proponents argue that businesses can deliver a ‘win-win’ logic into conflict situations, but the recurrent pattern is more accurately described, in terms of local perceptions, as carrying a ‘win-lose’ logic. For example, most projects claim to deliver socio-economic gains to society, but in practice the distribution of said gains is often so severely skewed that the bottom part of society receives a gain so inconsequential that it can even be conflict-generating itself.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Key Policy Takeaway}

The very presence of businesses operating in conflict-affected and fragile states make them part of conflict dynamics. Financial flows that might be considered minor for large firms can have foundational impacts upon vulnerable local communities. Firms should, through fact-finding missions and analyses, be prepared for the comparative large scale of their operational impact (and low scale of their peace impact) in fragile settings, and balance the expectations of this role with their own capacity (or willingness) to act as positive change makers.
4. Does our operational presence give support to conflict actors?

Few corporations today directly manage (insourcing) the whole of their operational activities in fragile and conflict-affected societies. Instead, they mostly operate through layers of subcontracting and affiliates. An employee tasked to deliver guidance on such settings should ask: Can we ensure these adhere to our principles without upending our business objectives?

Even in some of the most-regulated economic sectors, it has proven impossible to guarantee conflict-free supply chains. Insourcing conflict typically takes two shapes: Either subcontractors are owned by parties to the conflict, or they make payments to conflict actors that are not reported upward.

What is a conflict actor? It seems simple to believe that one can stay at arm’s length from conflict actors, such as rebel insurgencies, when doing business—especially if the firm relies on subcontractors for distribution. However, indirect payments to regimes that function as conflict actors through human rights abuses, civil liberties restrictions, and corruption is more problematic. Such indirect support is more or less accepted in many situations in the international community (Saudi Arabia and Myanmar are good examples).

As a business, are we paying conflict actors to operate at any stage of the supply chain or distribution chain, including our subcontractors? Supply chain analysis tends to focus upon ethical extraction of resources, but many multinationals outsource non-core functions to local business through complex supply and distribution chains. This outsourcing can be by design, adding a layer of deniability if a firm feels that it cannot ethically extract a key resource or enter a key market without directly engaging conflict actors. While this creates local employment and private-sector development, contractors in conflict zones are often owned by military-political elites. Thus, a firm should take a holistic perspective when asking: Do our outsourcing tasks exacerbate conflict?

Getting resources to markets is a key form of power, and in conflict environments, control over obligatory passage points that allow for access and evacuation of resources is a central bone of contestation (and spoil to win). Most firms assume that they must pay in such situations because ‘everyone pays’. This can mean taxation to a repressive regime, or payments to rebel groups to use roads in their territories. But what are the consequences if a firm refuses to pay, and, noting that all conflicts are different, is this assessment based on assumed or actual knowledge? Reporting frameworks for ethical compliance and social responsibility such as the Global Reporting Initiative are proliferating rapidly, but firms need to first decide for themselves what ‘compliance’ means in terms of interacting with conflict actors—otherwise, they risk interactions that are later exposed as unethical or even illegal.

What is the relationship between due diligence and ethical peace-building by business, and who is deciding what ‘due diligence’ means in practice? When ethical action and market access require different responses, firms still
Corporations should assume responsibility for the peace impacts of their entire operational presence, ensuring that their whole chain of suppliers and subcontractors is conflict-free. In a global economy consistently modeled on complex supply and distribution chains, due diligence of supply chains is key to building more peaceful societies.

Key Policy Takeaway

Tend to favor the latter despite frequently promising that they have institutionalized the former. For example, in Myanmar, Coca-Cola and Microsoft continue to partner with criminal actors (drugs, minerals, and weapons traffickers on US sanctions lists) and their respective internal due diligence mechanisms ultimately found no fault with this. However, both firms have CSR statements and reports that specifically prohibit this type of relationship. An external due diligence assessor would have raised the issue more forcefully, perhaps requiring a delay to enter the market while a more suitable partner (with a more acceptable human rights background) was found.
ERUPTION IS DEADLY

STOP IT!
5. Is our firm structured to support peace?

Businesses are not unitary entities, but complex social actors. In contexts of conflict and fragility, they face multiple choices and needs and adapt their strategies accordingly. Some of these strategies are path-dependent and reflect previous corporate practice in managing risk and change. Others result from specific organizational forms or context-specificities. Each strategy choice or combination of strategies is contingent on depth of crisis, perception of opportunity, and access to policy-making. Thus, the very structure of a given firm can tell us a good deal about its ability to incorporate and promote peace. Here we outline some of the most important considerations for successful peace-building by business at the firm level.

- Is the CEO and the board engaged in the idea and practice of peace, and willing to dedicate company resources to such? For the firm, this often means that peacebuilding action needs to stay in the operational box of activities, and not be sent to the CSR or public relations departments. Just like any other business initiative, B4P projects that are integrated into operations look more legitimate in the eyes of local communities. Corporate philanthropy can be seen as disingenuous if the operational dynamics of the firm itself contribute to conflict (i.e. by paying governments or rebels for access and security).²⁹

- Do employees have the ability (and support) to halt a profitable yet conflict-generating project? These are thankless and often career-threatening (or even life-threatening) tasks, akin to being an internal whistleblower. However, they often deliver a more advantageous long-term path of action for the firm, in terms of reputational risk as well as profitability in providing preventative action instead of disaster control.³⁰

- For example, what is considered best practice or good corporate culture in headquarters countries can differ radically from that in country offices. HQs might commit outwardly to good corporate principles, but evaluate country offices only on indicators of growth—leaving intact and even fostering corporate cultures premised on disregard for HQ principles.
How is the peace action sustainable? How is it profitable, in the short- and long-term (i.e., How does this help the company)? What are the benchmarks for such? How important is sustainability to the success of the project? What are the expectations of the local community as concerns scale and timeframe—and does it differ from information given to community leaders?

Key Policy Takeaway

For a firm, two questions need to be asked before it takes on peace and development activities:

Is there a will to conduct peacebuilding within the firm and are the CEO and the board fully supportive of such activities?

Is there internal knowledge and capacity available within the firm to make a peacebuilding project a success?
6. Do we work well with other knowledge producers and peace practitioners?

Adapting a hard-learned lesson from the peacebuilding and development community, business activities for peacebuilding are much more likely to be effective if they are conducted in partnership with other peace-positive actors. Such partners can include local offices of multilateral bodies, INGOs, NGOs, foreign or domestic development agencies, local civil society groups, and other engaged peace actors. This collaboration serves three primary aims. First, it allows firms to avoid duplicating existing community engagements. Second, it gives the firm more legitimacy as an actor willing to build peace as the firm is presumed to be not the only decision-maker on peace action and willing to listen to civil society for direction on such. Third, firms can more quickly gain awareness of local circumstances and learn how to ask the right questions and find the best practice in peacebuilding adapted to the specific locality.

Firms should consider the breadth and depth of collaboration, and what they expect to achieve from their efforts to build peace. For example, do they envision deeper collaboration that offers guidance for operational activities, or are such engagements strictly limited to CSR-style ventures? How do they see their impact on (and engagement with) local government in support of capacity-building?

In cases of economic opening or rebuilding after conflict, there is often a ‘gold rush’ mentality as businesses see new market opportunities and governments see new revenue opportunities. But rapid economic expansion can paper over the very structural societal cleavages that caused the conflict in the first place. Thus, when considering what constitutes a holistic social impact by business, one must first survey the overall peace and development field.

Firms can also recognize their unique skillsets, which often go under-recognized by both the business and peacebuilding communities. What can business do that aid and development agencies cannot (or won’t)? Answers include but are not limited to: regulatory knowledge, particularly on corruption, and access to political elites, who are often more
inclined to listen to businesses over NGOs, academics, or foreign policymakers.

Firms often claim that they are willing to listen to civil society, and seek out their opinion on complex social dynamics—but few if any are willing to let civil society or development agencies veto operational decisions. No such situations were uncovered by our research. ‘Win-win’ logics of profit and peace mean that the simple suggestions (e.g. to build schools instead of hospitals based on community need) are fine, but ones that adversely affect profit (e.g. deliver more profit sharing to a wider set of local constituents) are more difficult to support.

Regarding asking the ‘right questions’, our findings suggest that most business-peace ventures are not problematized for their long-term impact, and under-formulated in general.\(^3\) While B4P develops its own guidance, best practices taken from peacebuilding over many decades can serve as a valuable guide in the interim.

For example, questions asked should include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asking the ‘Right Questions’</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance:</strong> does the goal of your business-peace initiative address, directly or indirectly, key drivers of conflict or peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is the stated goal social or political in nature?</strong> If not, is there an explicit longer-term strategy for effecting socio-political change, or does the program make linkages to the activities of other programs or agencies in the socio-political realm?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How was the goal developed? By whom?</strong> Were grantees/partners part of the process? How well does your goal align with what you are actually working on? How likely are activities going to “add up” to the goal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is it realistic that the project/program will achieve the goal? How?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How can the goal be measured? How will you know that the program/project has an impact on the larger conflict context?</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4

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**Key Policy Takeaway**

Don’t go in alone; learn from other peacebuilders; identify the firm’s unique skills; recognize that the sum of peace-writ-little initiatives does not necessarily equal peace writ large. We need coordination—a ‘Delivering as One’—for the private sector.
Most firms have institutionalized clear principles for social responsibility and ethical action, typically codified through their participation in a number of multilateral agreements for good practice in fragile situations, or through Corporate Social Responsibility and Creating Shared Value frameworks. However, the decision of when to leave a deteriorating situation is rarely clear in the moment, and in practice firms tend to employ strained justifications to remain when their own corporate principles would suggest a different course of action.

What actions are a bridge too far? Most, if not all, firms would agree that material support to a conflict actor would constitute an action that in principle would mean an immediate shutdown or re-organization of operations. However, our research has shown that such changes are the exception, not the rule. Firms using subcontractors to gain market access are particular offenders. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia, they know that their distributors must pay rebel groups for transportation access in order to deliver their products—and they typically subsidize payments accordingly.\(^{34}\)

In the above examples, foreign firms walk the line of legality in their actions, offering a ‘see no evil’ perspective when their products leave the distribution center. But supply chain logics should not be limited to extractive firms, the most sophisticated of which have mine-to-market tracing. Consumer goods firms in particular need to have a more developed understanding of what it takes to get their products to market from fragile settings, both for their immediate desire to make sure that they are not supporting conflict actors, and also for the more medium-term reputational damage that could result from others tracing their delivery chains and uncovering such violations.

For example, Heineken in Burundi is praised by the Dutch government for its peace contributions, engaging in innovative CSR initiatives that create local value. However, in constituting the largest single tax payer of the small war-torn country, Heineken is also singularly responsible for holding a highly contested, human-rights-violating regime in power. What is more important: commitment to local staff and wider impact, or less direct but highly problematic impact on the other hand?

Who is making that assessment? Most firms currently assess questions like these in their risk and due diligence departments. But these divisions typically only explore the negative side of the equation, asking how they limit exposure to conflict actors and best ensure deniability of claims made otherwise.\(^{35}\) A more constructive approach would be an independent analysis conducted by organizations that specialize in conflict-sensitive operations, which may have the added benefit of uncovering alternative means of operation that the company had not considered in a ‘business as usual’ model.

For peace projects in particular, what is the exit and post-project strategy? Does the project have a clear end date, and do beneficiaries know it? If the timeframe is
‘forever’, how are contingencies for cancellation addressed in-house, and how are they communicated to local communities? Our research suggests that B4P-specific activities that promise a general ‘improvement’ in local peace and development tend to be viewed more negatively by local populations than ones where people were informed of project limitations from the outset, largely because of the draw of over-promising ‘change’ or ‘development’ to those in need in order to win goodwill.36

Key Policy Takeaway

Our research suggests that defining a clear ‘red line’ before situations deteriorate—and transparently sharing it with shareholders and host governments—would serve two purposes. First, it would enable a clearer pathway for withdrawal should it be necessary. This reduces the likelihood that self-justifying rationales can be used to excuse negative impact, and provides management (particularly country directors) the ability to execute withdrawal with greater clarity for profit implications. Second, it offers a clearer guideline to host governments, who will know what actions or policies the corporate sector (or at least its most progressive members) will not tolerate, as opposed to the divergent set of self-assessment tools that currently exist.
The interest in peace engagement by the private sector in fragile regions is often more genuine and more powerful than critical scholars recognize, but the conditions and context for such engagements need to be much more narrowly defined. Altruistic aims alone aren’t enough to ensure that the B4P project can deliver peace at any level, and our research shows that business ‘doing good for peace and development’ can spiral into local conflict situations that prove to be worse than if nothing had been done at all. We have three points:

First, while the aspirational elements of business engagement in peace-building stand firm, there is little evidence to date that this commitment has yielded significant positive impacts in those conflict-affected areas where it is most needed. This is despite the fact that the blueprint for positive contributions has long ago been compiled in bullet-point lists of clear recommendations, evidence, and best practices (e.g. ‘source locally’; ‘be conflict sensitive’; ‘involve communities in decision-making’).

The primary contradiction for most firms lies in the fact that the most peace-positive business strategy in a region with ongoing conflict is often simply to stay away.

Second, and of greater policy consequence, when initiatives by business for peace and development are only assessed at the firm level, they risk missing larger societal consequences. With business and peace, the parts often are less than the sum. This is shown in our research in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and, most strikingly, in Myanmar, where the absorptive capacity of a host society for business-peace action is so overwhelmed that cumulative spillover effects of business-peace projects (which may all be individually laudable and locally positive) create a collective negative effect upon the host society—from social, financial, and governance angles. Indeed, one particularity of conflict-affected areas is that interventions to deliver universal public goods often exacerbate the inequalities that gave rise to the conflict.

As such, when considering which conditions and policies can support a “political economy of peaceful development”, the cumulative impact of the private sector must be studied, particularly in the new topics of busi-
ness and human rights; investment and peace; and business and United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice, and Sustainable Institutions. Also, overpromising positive impact by business may risk a boomerang effect, with local populations disillusioned by a business community that promised to cure societal ails. Firms can elect for a more cautious approach, recognizing that self-interest can be an aim (through reduced risk and potential for better local corporate relations), and that it is legitimate to present business-peace activities in a ‘thinner’ way as opposed to promising a ‘thicker’ peace impact.

Thus, we offer more incremental suggestions. **Multinational firms in particular could better contribute to peace and development in conflict-affected countries by helping governments to close legal loopholes.** For example, those that facilitate mass tax evasion through offshoring and transfer pricing, or by demanding the insertion of clauses that require host governments to publish how taxes paid are spent. Firms operating in conflict-affected societies should be totally transparent to outside scrutiny by publishing all relevant documentation on how they deal with risk, security, and community development. And governments interested in a bigger role for the private sector in peace and development could help reduce trade barriers that negatively affect countries with low GDP growth (and by extension an increase in fragility) precisely because they are forced to stick to primary resource exportation.

Third, if real progress is to be made on how companies interact with the societies in which they work, binding regulatory initiatives must be implemented. They must be independently verified, universally applied across firms, and have punitive capabilities, coupled with policy coherence and support in both Global North and Global South countries. However, we recognize that such a scenario does not reflect current realities, and that this standard may never be achieved. Still, we see hope in the increasingly intertwined relations between private enterprise and the pursuit of peace. For example, we found several explicit or implicit examples of how local business has contributed to peace objectives. Local business leaders in particular are uniquely positioned to navigate conflict economies as well as to transform them into peace economies. Yet local businesspeople in situations of conflict are usually and understandably not too eager to become overtly visible, for their own political, reputational, and personal risk. As a result, we advocate policy that could amplify the voices of such actors, finding ways to support those local business initiatives that intervene meaningfully in conflict situations.
About the Project

This booklet highlights research from the four-year project “Conflict of Interest? ‘Business for Peace’ as Development Aid in Volatile Environments”, funded by the Norwegian Research Council’s AIDEFFECT programme.

Our primary objective was to provide the first comprehensive evaluation of ‘Business for Peace’ (B4P). We investigated: (1) business motivations and aid logics underpinning the emergence of B4P; and (2) the local impact of corporate activities under B4P in fragile and high-risk areas. We studied B4P’s achievements and shortcomings in four country cases: the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somaliland.

Our secondary objectives were: creating case-specific knowledge on B4P and peacebuilding that can be studied comparatively; informing policy debates on B4P in the Norwegian and international aid and development communities through this policy toolkit; and building academic knowledge of B4P and corporate governance in conflict and/or fragile areas of business operation.

This project was hosted at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), with partner research organizations in Denmark and each of our case countries. The primary researchers were Jason Miklian, Peer Schouten, Cindy Horst, and Øystein H. Rolandsen (see page 38).

We would like to acknowledge the following people for their valuable insights and support during the project:

- Juan Pablo Medina Bickel
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- Min Zaw Oo
- Angelika Rettberg
- Phillip Ripman
- Marie Sandnes
- Dan Smith
- Leimer Tejeda.
Team Members

Jason Miklian is a Senior Researcher at PRIO and fellow at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. His primary topic of study is in the breadth and depth of business engagements in global peacebuilding and development activities in conflict-affected and fragile states. He also researches how demands for natural resources (such as iron, diamonds, and rare earth elements) and market access by consumer goods firms can influence how business, governance and violent conflict intersect in fragile countries.

Peer Schouten is a postdoctoral fellow at DIIS, editor-in-chief at Theory Talks, and an associate researcher at the International Peace Information Service in Antwerp. His overall research interests include, among others, International Relations theory; conflict dynamics in volatile environments; the role of business in peace and conflict; mineral extraction and conflict economies; and the politics of infrastructure. He has extensive field experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.

Cindy Horst is Research Director and Research Professor in Migration and Refugee Studies at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Her research interests include: mobility in conflict; diaspora; humanitarianism; refugee protection; (transnational) civic engagement; and theorizing on societal transformation. She is particularly interested in methodological innovations that allow for critical and ethically conscious research engagement, through shared anthropology and multi-sited ethnography.

Øystein H. Rolandsen is a Senior Researcher at PRIO. His research interests include: political violence and peacebuilding (in Eastern Africa and Horn of Africa), humanitarian policy and practices, forced migration and borders, African rebels and government counter-insurgency strategies. He is particularly interested in the history and current affairs of the two Sudans, which allows for critical approaches to peace negotiations and post-war interventions.
Primary project partners and collaborators were:

**DIIS** is an independent public research institution for international studies. It conducts and communicates multidisciplinary research on globalisation, security, development and foreign policy and within these areas it aims to be agenda-setting in research, policy and public debate. DIIS participates in academic networks and publishes in high-ranking academic journals, always striving to excel in academic scholarship. DIIS continuously assesses Denmark’s foreign and political situation and informs the Danish media, politicians and the public about its work.

**The Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes (ASSODIP)** is a non-governmental organization under Congolese law active in North Kivu, with a vision of supporting rural populations with respect to human rights and development. ASSODIP is a member of the Groupe d’Appui à la Traçabilité et la Transparence dans la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (GATT-NR) and the Groupe d’Associations pour les droits de l’Homme et la Paix (GADHOP), focusing on human rights in the mining sector, the fight against slavery and the monitoring and documentation of human rights violations in villages.

**Ar Yone Oo** is a registered, non-political, non-sectarian and not-for-profit organization operating in various parts of Myanmar. It is committed to serve the most vulnerable people without prejudice of gender, religious or ethnic background. It initiates the establishment and capacity building of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) for sustainability of development projects. Ar Yone Oo has 70 staff members; its Head Office is in Yangon.

**Ahmed M. Musa** is a doctoral researcher at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. His research is focusing on Post-1991 Somali Livestock Trade. His research interests include governance in fragile areas, post-war economy and dryland issues. He is currently working on three academic papers: (1) The Effects of post-1991 Decentralisation in Somalia on Livestock Trade in the Berbera Corridor (2) Livestock Export Trade in Somaliland: Actors’ Perspectives of Opportunities and Constraints and (3) State-formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland: The impact of the private sector in an unrecognized state.

**KUSH**’s vision is that Africa’s immense natural, cultural and religious diversities are transformed into a source of enrichment and strength away from genocidal conflicts. Its mission is to provide vehicles for international partnership and participation in support of local African Initiatives. In South Sudan, KUSH supports grassroots peace initiatives to bring stability to the two independent Sudans. In Abyei, Kush is championing a Stabilization, Resilience and Recovery Agenda.

**RIWI** is a global leader in economic and social surveys of reliable randomized and replicable data in challenging locations. RIWI conducted rapid capture of broad, non-incentivized randomized opinion and perceptions data in Myanmar for this project through anonymous language-appropriate opt-in surveys. RIWI uses best-in-class geo-location databases with Haversine and Equirectangular approximation algorithms. RIWI has successfully completed surveys of up to 400,000 respondents for the World Bank, Gates Foundation, United Nations and others.
Selected Publications

Here is a selection of publications connected to the project, as well as related publications that are part of other projects that our researchers have been involved with.

The project team have also written a series of articles for a special issue of the journal *Conflict, Security and Development*, which is currently scheduled to be published in fall 2018.


Notes


3 See https://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/conflict-prevention.

4 Ibid.


6 Elements of this section adapted from Schouten and Miklian (2018), ibid.

7 Funding for this project was provided through the Research Council of Norway’s AID Effect programme, project number 237723. Some findings come from ongoing research by the project team through parallel projects, and contextualized for this presentation of findings. Such findings are noted accordingly.

8 Fragile and conflict affected states or environments is an evolving label involving, overall, a combination of weak governance, persistent social tensions, and deeply engrained poverty and inequality. For a comprehensive approach, see the OECD’s 2016 States of Fragility report.


12 In highly violent areas, this task may be too dangerous to undertake. For example, gathering information on illegal activities. E.g., narco-trafficking, places those gathering the information as well as the firm at substantial risk. In such environments, it may thus not be feasible to conduct a peacebuilding program. We thank Christine Cheng for this point.


16 Schouten and Marijnen, op. cit.


18 Miklian, 2013, op. cit.


23 Hoelscher and Rustad, 2018, op. cit; Ganson, 2018, op. cit.


25 Miklian, 2018, op. cit; Schouten and Miklian, 2018, op. Cit.

26 Schouten and Miklian, 2018, op. cit.


31 CDA, 2018, op cit.


34 Schouten and Miklian, 2018, op. cit.


37 This section adapted from Miklian and Schouten, 2018, op. cit.

38 Ganson and McCloud, 2018, op cit.; Schouten and Marijnen, 2018, op. cit; Miklian, 2018, op. cit.
What are the conditions under which businesses can move beyond ‘doing no harm’ in the fragile and conflict-affected societies where they work to deliver more tangible positive peace dividends? Designed for businesses, practitioners, scholars and others who are interested and engaged in corporate impact in such areas, this report provides an overview of the main lessons from a four-year study of corporate peacebuilding initiatives across a range of contexts. Its main findings are formulated as seven key questions which can help evaluate risks and improve impact.

**What is the ‘conflict and business’ environment?**

**What is the local definition of ‘peace’?**

**How does our peace work impact socio-economic structures?**

**Does our operational presence give support to conflict actors?**

**Is our firm structured to support peace?**

**Do we work well with other knowledge producers and peace practitioners?**

**What is our ‘red line’ for terminating operations?**