

Sierra Leone Police

Review of Capabilities

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Acronyms used in this document

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
AHSI	African Human Security Initiative
AIG	Assistant Inspector General
APC	All People's Congress
ASJP	Access to Security and Justice Programme
C3	Coordination, Command and Control
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CCU	Crowd Control Unit
CDIID	Complaints, Discipline & Internal Investigation Department
CHISECs	Chieftaincy Security Committee
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIS	Criminal Intelligence Service
CISU	Central Intelligence and Security Unit
CPDTF	Commonwealth Police Development Task Force
CPF	Chiefdom Police Force
CRD	Community Relations Department
CSD	Corporate Services Department
CSV	Community Service Volunteer
DC	Detective Constable
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DI	Detective Inspector
DISECs	District Security Committees
DS	Detective Sergeant
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EMB	Executive Management Board
FSU	Family Support Unit
GD	General Duties
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IT	Information Technology
JDITF	Sierra Leone Drug Interdiction Task Force
JSCO	Justice Sector Coordinating Office
JSDP	Justice Sector Development Programme
LCU	Local Command Unit
Le.	Leones (Sierra Leone currency)
LNP	Local Needs Policing
LPP	Local Policing Plans
LPPB	Local Policing Partnership Board

LUC	Local Unit Commander
MACP	Military Aid to the Civil Power
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NASSIT	National Social Security and Insurance Trust
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSCCG	National Security Council Coordinating Group
ONS	Office of National Security
OPS	Operations
OSD	Operational Support Department
PROSECs	Provincial Security Committees
PSU	Police Support Unit
PTS	Police Training School
REGPOL	Regional Police chief
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SB	Special Branch
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SILSEP	Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic and Time bound (performance indicators)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSD	Special Security Division
TA	Technical Assistance
TCG	Tasking and Coordinating Group
TNA	Training Needs Analyses
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office in Sierra Leone
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPOL	United Nations Police
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WPC	Woman Police Constable

1. Executive Summary

1.1 The UK has provided support the Sierra Leone Police since the 1990s and despite significant progress from the point of initial support the SLP remain under pressure to increase public trust and confidence, strengthen their operational capability and uphold the basic laws of the land. There is concern about political interference, lack of domestic budgetary support, and the operational capability to police the elections in 2012.

1.2 It was a joint UK view (MoD, FCO and DFID) that the timing (20 months before the elections) presented an ideal opportunity to gain an independent review of policing in Sierra Leone. A small Review Team was tasked to work with the SLP to assess progress made, identify operational challenges and constraints (including policing at grass roots level), and where appropriate agree where areas of future support could be best targeted. This report sets out their findings and recommendations.

1.3 The UK is undergoing major change in its approach to aid and aid priorities, and this background is explored further in the introduction. It concludes that safety and security in Sierra Leone is a top priority, and the SLP are the lead in providing this. Sierra Leone remains a fragile state, and there is still potential for instability. The estimated cost of recovery from the war which finished in 2002 is in excess of £3bn, and such situations must be prevented in the future.

1.4 The SLP's current capability to provide policing functions in general, and to police the 2012 elections in particular, is assessed as poor. There are many good senior officers who are well trained, and the SLP has good policy making capacity. However, the fundamental problem is the ability to implement policing services, policy and procedures 'on the ground'. This is due to a number of reasons – poor leadership and management at local level, lack of basic resources including transport, radio communications and stationery, and lack of other facilities, including fundamentals such as electricity, office and cell capacity. This fundamentally affects the SLP's ability to respond to incidents and crimes, to police smaller communities, and to liaise with others involved in policing at local level. Declining mobility and radio communications is of particular concern in the build up to the 2012 elections.

1.5 The SLP's effectiveness to provide basic policing services has declined since the mid 2000s. The main reason for this is a paucity of national resources, with the amount of budget to support individual officers being 28% of what it was in 2002, taking account of inflation, poor exchange rates and increases in staff. This situation is compounded further as the extensive external support available in the early 2000s is no longer available. Further, the SLP are becoming increasingly reliant on income generation in the form of armed OSD officer being hired to protect banks and other private institutions. This paucity of resources manifests itself in a number of ways. Some of the police detention facilities are exceptionally poor, with detainees being kept in inhuman and degrading conditions. Heavy indebtedness, a dearth of stationery necessary for policing duties, decreasing vehicle and radio communications capacity, and an inability to maintain the police estate are all explored in this report, and recommendations are made for limited support in these areas.

1.6 The police remain very poorly paid and allowances have not kept pace with inflation. A police constable's basic salary is currently 148,520 Leones a month – about the cost of a sack of rice. Police officers have great difficulty in meeting housing, schooling and health requirements. As a consequence, the level of morale is low, and officers are increasingly resorting to a number of alternative means of providing for their families. These are seen as corrupt, or at best begging, with a consequent effect on the public's perception of the police, and the SLP's vulnerability to corrupt practices. Support for basic welfare needs is recommended.

1.7 There have been a number of interventions over the last 15 years, and these are outlined in the main report and in more detail in Annex D. There are many good officers in the SLP, and most of the senior officers have been through extensive training. Policy making is good and internal accountability mechanisms, such as CDIID and the Inspectorate, remain working, but are suffering from a lack of resources, investment and suitable training. It is recommended that these departments, together with the Community Relations Department, be supported to enable them to play a key role in developing internal accountability, and developing further community based policing.

1.8 The SLP have overall responsibility for providing safety and security for the elections in 2012. There are a number of critical, essential and standard requirements. Critical to the maintenance of order is the ability to preposition resources and respond to incidents, together with the intelligence, planning, coordination, command and control functions. This requires effective radio communications and mobility. Essential for success will be a variety of training and other equipment. Standard requirements include a media and communication strategy and logistical support such as feeding. A number of proposals are outlined in this report, and summarised in annex B. Specific election cost cannot be fully separated, as most are a combination of election costs and general support. They are summarised as follows (full details annex A and A1):

Advisory team	£0.62m
Specialist Advisers	£0.3
Communications equipment budget	£0.3m
Transport budget	£0.5m
Ministry of Internal Affairs adviser	£0.1m
Printing and publicity materials	£0.1m
Essential office machinery and support	£0.1m
Support budget	£0.6m
TOTAL	£2.62m

1.9 Effective Coordination, Command and Control (C3) and effective planning will play a critical role in the build up to and the policing of the elections. Support to this area is recommended in the form of technical expertise, and refurbishment of the basic communications systems. The SLP has submitted a bid to the UNDP managed election basket fund for financing transport and other election costs. This situation needs careful monitoring, because without mobility the SLP will not be able to police. A number of alternatives are considered in the report.

1.10 The Ministry of Internal Affairs capacity to provide strategic advice on policing and to service the Police Council is extremely limited. The Minister of Internal Affairs and the Permanent Secretary would welcome immediate help in setting up a Police Directorate within the Ministry, and this is recommended. Through this work, it is envisaged that greater external oversight mechanisms could be developed, and support the Police Council to work for better conditions of service and realistic budgets so the Government of Sierra Leone fully embrace its responsibility to provide for an effective and efficient police service.

1.11 Comment is made on a number of performance issues, including performance monitoring, perception surveys and human resource management. A matrix of indicators and a system of data collection, monitoring and evaluation is required. Some of the foundations are there (for example the internal Inspectorate), but much work is required to introduce something which is useful and meaningful. Work is or will be undertaken in this area, and other areas of government, but better coordination is required. Other issues are discussed in section G and H, with a warning about reliance on technology which has not proved to be sustainable.

1.12 There is general concern that the SLP is becoming increasingly politicised and militarised, and these issues are discussed in section B and G. There is evidence that political pressure is placed on the police to take unacceptable actions, for example directing arrests or a particular course of action. The fear is that some officers of the SLP will, through politicisation, be used to influence the outcome of the 2012 elections. This is a real possibility, but the degree to which this may happen is difficult to ascertain. A number of recommendations are made to alleviate this problem. As regards militarisation, this is discussed in section B. The Review Team could find no supporting evidence that there are plans to militarise the OSD, but some of the activities, particularly the change of uniform, are creating that perception, and perception can become reality. This situation requires careful monitoring, and recommendations are made, including the need for the SLP to become more attuned to how people perceive them.

1.13 The roles of the Local Police Partnership Boards, the Chiefdom Police and other local actors are discussed at length in section D. The current policing model for Sierra Leone, Local Needs Policing (LNP), remains a good model and should be developed to deal with the need to provide basic policing functions at local community level. This must be handled with care, and proper national standards and guidelines must be formulated and given proper legal status. In addition, oversight and accountability mechanisms must also be addressed.

1.14 The report contains a number of appendices that provide a synopsis of the recommendations made and an immediate costed plan to take the SLP through the 2012 elections. The total cost of this immediate action is circa £2.62m. Substantial cost savings, and other benefits from developing greater synergies with IMATT resources, could be realised. A further long term tapered development and support plan is proposed, designed to help the GoSL build up the SLP domestic budget to a point where it becomes sustainable. Many of the essential and standard requirements for the long term provision of policing are already outlined above. The most critical requirement is adequate funding, ensuring a sustainable budget capable of enabling the SLP to carry out its functions. This is clearly the responsibility of the GoSL, and will take several years to put in place. The design of this longer term project will address the capability of the SLP to undertake its responsibilities, and ensure effective leadership and oversight,

1.15 It is the responsibility of the GoSL to find the money to support an effective and properly paid police service. Given the current position of the Sierra Leone economy that will take several years to achieve and will require some difficult decisions concerning the priority of the police over other public services. In the meantime, if the police are not supported, they cannot provide many of the basic services and administer the law of the land. This will remain one of the big dilemmas of donor agencies as they decide on priorities. Furthermore, the problem is considered too large for one donor to support, so international coordination of effort is required.

1.16 There are a number of key risks associated with the immediate and long term projects:

Risk	Mitigation
Provision of logistics, including transport spares, radio communications and other equipment is not sustainable.	Provision of any logistics is conditional on proper compliance with asset management policy, and managed by trained personnel. An internal inspection and audit plan to ensure compliance and proper use is a prerequisite. Long term budget costs should be identified and included in future SLP budgets.

<p>No external support is given in the immediate and long term. There is a real risk that the GoSL cannot fund the SLP and the capability of the SLP will continue to decline, particularly at local level. There will be substantial risk of disorder in high risk areas, and real potential for the elections to fail. Citizens will find it increasingly difficult to get access to justice, and the SLP will not be able to fulfil its responsibilities to respond to and deal with crime and other incidents, The SLP will resort increasingly to corrupt practices, and will not be able to police with the consent of the people. There is a real risk that people will take the law into their own hands, which will lead to increased instability.</p>	<p>External support is essential whilst the GoSL endeavours to build up the police budget. This should be as outlined in this report, recognising that the problems are for the GoSL and SLP to resolve in the longer term. Coordination with other projects and donors will ensure best use of minimal resources. High quality advisers will help the GoSL and SLP plan for the future. It is also essential to improve the SLP conditions of service to help build resistance to corruption.</p>
<p>Politicisation of the SLP and militarisation.</p>	<p>In the area of politicisation, the SLP should be assisted in building resistance to political pressure. Use of existing structures, for example the Executive Management Board, and the availability of senior advisers will help. Education of politicians and firm action by the GoSL will help reduce the pressure from politicians.</p> <p>The presence of a senior adviser will help assess any move towards politicisation and determine appropriate action.</p>
<p>The continued development of locally based informal policing systems leads to increased levels of corruption and abuse of the human rights of the people they should be protecting.</p>	<p>Growth of the Local Police Partnership Boards, Chiefdom Police and community mediation projects must be controlled, and suitable oversight and accountability systems put in place to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.</p>

NOTE: a more comprehensive identification of risks is contained in annex C

2. Introduction

2.1 Policing is about enabling people to live normal lives. What constitutes normality is defined in the laws, rules and norms that apply to a particular community, both at local and national level. Policing – the adherence to and application of the laws, regulations and norms – is the responsibility of all, and successful democratic policing is a partnership between the people, the police and the government. It is often described as the rule of law. It operates at different levels. Sierra Leone has two parallel systems – local level and national level. At local level there are many actors, and the national law has to work alongside local and customary law and regulations. At national level, the national police force (SLP) is the constitutionally approved police force charged with administering the law. At local level, customary and local laws are administered by Chiefs, supported by the Chiefdom Police and Court Officials.

2.2 There has to be an effective interface between the two systems for them to work in parallel, and the importance of locally based systems is described in section D of this report. The model of policing adopted in Sierra Leone – Local Needs Policing - reflects the necessity for policing to be locally based, and the requirement to meet the needs and expectations of the local community. However, it must be delivered within national standards and guidelines, and in turn these must reflect international norms and standards, particularly in relation to Human Rights, corruption and equal opportunities. An important step on the way to ensuring strengthening the provision of justice and security is the realisation that balanced support must be given to both local and national systems. In the case of Sierra Leone, it is unclear whether the government has the will to take over the role of all security providers, currently operating at the local level, be they LPPBs, Chiefdom Police or vigilante groups. Certainly, they do not have the financial means to do so.

2.3 The importance of policing is emphasised in the recently published UK Aid Review¹. The review highlights that effective policing is a key building block of any stable and prosperous society. Without it is difficult for a country to educate its children, grow its economy or build healthcare systems. In order for a country to reach a point where it can stand on its own two feet, it means spending money now to save later. The review promises to help ten million women to access justice through courts, police and legal assistance. “People need to feel safe in their homes and know that they can go about their daily business free from violence and crime.”² Whilst there are current and planned large scale activities designed to improve access to justice (JSPD and ASJP), particularly for women, there is little planned to specifically help the Sierra Leone Police deliver these promises.

2.4 For a police service to be effective, it must be well organised, funded and led. It must have the necessary policy, procedures and tools to do the job and be able to deliver policing services on the ground. Policing must also be delivered in accordance with international norms and standards³.

2.5 The SLP has an effective and efficient policing model – Local Needs Policing. It has a good organisational structure, modernised and refined over recent years, supported by policies and procedures. Importantly, within the SLP, it is acknowledged that Local Needs Policing includes acceptance and engagement of community-based organisations, including Local Policing Partnership Boards, Community Safety Volunteers and the Chiefdom Police. Together, they form an important network to ensure safety and security, both where the SLP are present, and where they are not.

¹ UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results. DFID, March 2011

² Page 22, UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results. DFID, March 2011

³ For example, see Guidebook on Democratic Policing, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2006

2.6 The SLP has many good leaders. However, operationally it is not very effective, which means that it must rely heavily on community collaboration. The SLP does not have sufficient financial support or tools to do the job. Previous donor support rebuilt the SLP and brought it to a point in the mid 2000s where its image had greatly improved, it had an adequate level of resources, and it could deliver an acceptable level of service. An outcome of this was the SLP's ability to play its part in delivering peaceful elections in 2007. Looking back, it is also clear that this has not been sustainable within the financial means of GoSL. Since the mid-2000s little has been done to support the SLP and its effectiveness has quickly declined and continues to worsen.

2.7 Immediate action is required to improve the SLP's effectiveness. Longer term action is required to maintain effectiveness, and must be taken concomitant with support to community-based organisations. The importance of this cannot be over emphasised, and a balanced approach is crucial. The risk of not doing so could be a return to the 1990s and a state of war.

2.8 The total cost of the UN presence in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005 was \$2.8bn. Add to that the full cost of the ECOMOG intervention and the various UK military and other inputs, Special Courts, DDR and WFP programmes, it is estimated that the cost of stabilising Sierra Leone was in excess of £3bn. To put the cost of recovery into some sort of perspective, that is considerably more than the total spend on Official Development Assistance of £1.8bn on all fragile and conflict-affected states in 2010⁴. The cost of loss of life, maiming and disruption during this period is incalculable.

2.9 Quite simply, a return to unrest must be avoided at all costs. The House of Commons International Development Committee (February 2011) emphasised the importance of prevention, acknowledging that aid and soft diplomacy have a key role in conflict prevention and resolution, and "that in the future it would be much cheaper to prevent Afghanistans rather than try and fix the problem once it has gone terribly wrong"⁵.

2.10 Effective support does not mean a narrow focus on either the SLP or community-based organisations. Neither operates in a vacuum. They are dependent on one another to be effective in providing safety and security to Sierra Leone's population, and must therefore be considered together. A good example is the Local Policing Partnership Boards. The SLP is, with its current capacity, not able to manage them, but are at the same time dependent on their assistance, and vice versa. Simply providing support to the boards, and not the operational capacity of the SLP, could shift the already delicate balance of power that exists between the two. As a minimum, the risks of supporting one and not the other must be taken into account.

2.11 Many reviews have been carried out, reflecting on the success of the security activities and lessons learnt during this 'cutting edge' period. The comprehensive evaluation of DFID country programmes published in 2008⁶ identified a number of successes and also a number of challenges. Key issues identified then still remain, including lack of oversight, transparency and auditing, that the police and army are unaffordable within current domestic resourcing levels, and DFID did not have an exit strategy which would also ensure the prospect of sustainability of the institutions established.

2.12 In summary, safety and security for the population is unquestionably a top priority in Sierra Leone, but an effective police force is not affordable within Sierra Leone's domestic budget. Sierra Leone remains a fragile state, and there are concerns surrounding the potential for instability, and the SLP and other organisations' capacity to deal with disorder and provide basic services. The effectiveness of the SLP has declined since 2005 when support was focussed on the wider justice sector. This, and the willingness and ability of GoSL to sustain a strong police force must of course be taken into account in whatever programs are being considered for Sierra Leone.

⁴ Page 3, House of Commons International Development Committee, DFID Annual Report 3 Feb 2011 HC605

⁵ Page 7, *ibid*

⁶ Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone, September 2008, EV 690

2.13 The major risk if nothing is done is another period of instability at some stage, with the consequent enormous costs of recovery. Immediate actions required are straightforward and outlined in this report, together with a proposal for a longer term police specific project.

2.14 The immediate and long term financial support required is greater than one donor can support. Whilst the provision of an effective SLP is clearly the responsibility of the GoSL, it is in everybody's interests to join forces and find solutions

3 Assessment of previous interventions

3.1 There have been a number of previous interventions over the last 15 years, mostly funded by DFID. The main interventions were during the CPDTF and the CCSSP – 1998-2005. These resulted in a rebuilt, modernised force, enjoying sufficient logistics to enable the SLP to provide policing services where they could deploy, and also the ability to immediately fill the security gap caused by the progressive drawdown on the UN presence.

3.2 A more detailed account is given in annex D. In summary, the key points and interventions to date are:

3.3 1996 - Banya Committee.

3.3.1 In June 1996 the Sierra Leone Government set up a committee *"to inquire into and review the conditions of service, the recruitment and staffing policies, and the functional capabilities and administrative structure of the Republic of Sierra Leone Police ... "* The committee recommended *"There is urgent need to set up a Force in which the Police are seen as members of the community in uniform, and not as detached and disinterested custodians of public order. The citizens must be encouraged to participate in solving problems. Such cooperation will enhance the work of the Police as their action would be seen as necessary and fair and thus given authority and legitimacy. To achieve this, it is most important that the police are given sufficient resources."*

3.3.2 The Banya report went on to make a number of far reaching recommendations, many of which are still relevant today. The reason for including the Banya Committee is to show Sierra Leone itself knew what the problems were with the SLP, and wanted to do something about it.

3.4 1997 – Communications Project and Bintumani Conference

3.4.1 A communications project was prepared and agreed – it was the precursor to what exists today. A UK facilitated workshop was also held, the Bintumani Conference, which began to set out the requirements to modernise the SLP.

3.5 1998 – Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF)

3.5.1 President Kabbah first requested DFID assistance in 1996. The Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), with DFID providing the majority of the personnel and funding, was planned for 1997. However, because of the military coup in 1997 the CPDTF was not launched until after democracy was restored in early 1998. Between July 1998 and late December 1998 the UK provided financial support and professional expertise to enable immediate logistical and operational help to the SLP through the CPDTF. This work was to have continued into 1999 but the violent insurrection of 6 January 1999 caused the suspension of the initiative until mid August 1999.

3.6 1999 – British funded IGP

3.6.1 In November 1999, following a presidential request, Keith Biddle was appointed IGP. This was funded by the UK.

3.7 2000 – Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP)

3.7.1 The major thrust of UK policy in Sierra Leone during this time was to help restore peace and security through the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) process, reconstruction of the armed forces under effective civil government control, and restoration of police capacity to provide personal security to citizens, especially the poor, who had suffered much. The police service would be instrumental in enabling conflict prevention to gain ground and to provide for stability in the resettlement and rehabilitation process. The CCSSP was designed in 1999 to follow on from the CPDTF, and covered a number of areas, the main components being Accountability, Local Needs

Policing, Ethical Policing, Strategic Development and Operations, and Human Resource Development.

3.8 2002 – The war was declared over

3.9 2003 – B A Kamara appointed as IGP. Leadership of CCSSP changes.

3.9.1 The British IGP, Keith Biddle, left, and B A Kamara was appointed IGP. It was intended to start the next phase of police development in 2003, and planning for that had started in 2002 within the CCSSP. It was designed to take a much wider approach, including better access to justice, particularly for the poor and vulnerable. Some of the components of the CCSSP continued to be supported.

3.10 2005 – Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)

3.10.1 Only with the initiation of the Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP) in 2005 did a change of direction take place, when the reform focus moved from police to the justice sector as a whole. Support to the police was cut dramatically. With this shift in focus, it was almost a given that there would be a number of complications involved in broadening the focus. First of all, £25m was now earmarked for the judiciary, prisons, MIA, civil society involvement in mediation schemes and the Chiefdom Police, with only 2.5% for the SLP.

3.10.2 Priority reform areas have included out-of-date and inaccessible laws and procedures, including the indexing of customary law, prison overcrowding, delays in court, absence of adequate juvenile justice provision, lack of support mechanisms which meet the needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized to access justice and the lack of connection between community needs and police operations.

3.11 2005 – 2007 – Support to the SLP

3.11.1 The Sierra Leone Security Reform Programme (SILSEP), which ran from 1999 has provided support to the Office of National Security (ONS), Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and a range of non-security related institutions with an interest in accountability and enhanced service delivery across the security sector (parliament, civil society, media and academia).

3.11.2 Since the mid/late 2005, SILSEP provided a range of activities in support of policing. There was a permanent in country policing adviser, and a small number of consultants. The main focus of activity was on enhancing the SLP's ability to gather and analyse criminal and security intelligence and enhancing its capacity to deal with operational planning, event management and public disorder. Other work included media training, community liaison and asset management.

3.11.3 It was decided to continue supporting vehicles and communications utilising under spends from the CCSSP. Support was limited to providing technical assistance in the areas of training and management, and some spares. This initial work was from January 2005 for one year, but was extended to support the build up to the 2007 elections to ensure there was sufficient mobility and communications.

3.11.4 In 2007, eight Ministry of Defence Police officers were seconded to Sierra Leone in connection with the election policing operation. These officers were co-located with UNPOL in the four provinces.

3.11.5 The Output to Purpose Review undertaken in 2007 raised the issue of coordination, pointing out that the SLP were supported by two separately funded DFID programmes (SILSEP and JSDP). Most agreed that the situation was almost impossible to manage coherently. Consequently, the management of all the policing elements fell to the JSDP.

3.12 2011 – 2014 - Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) – 2011-2014

3.12.1 For the first time, donor supported programming in Sierra Leone will have a strong focus on what is referred to as 'non-state justice and security actors', 'community mediation projects' and 'legal aid endeavours'. Above all, the focus will be on strengthening delivery of services, where they will make the greatest impact on the population itself.

3.12.2 Apart from continuing work initiated by JSDP with paralegal and mediator dispute resolution, emphasis will also be on LPPBs, working at the local level. A national legal aid scheme will be put in place, and work will be continued with the Chiefdom Administration and Local Court Administration.

3.12.3 Activities relating to the police will centre on the interface with the general population, rather than strengthening the operational capacity of the SLP *per se*. ASJP aims to focus on the police inspectorate, CDIID, and the establishment of an independent police complaints body.

3.13 Comment

3.13.1 The Review Team were asked to assess the level of ownership and sustainability of past interventions, and the degree of impact and change which has occurred in the quality of police services.

3.13.2 It is clear from the academic literature, reports from external agencies (for example Human Rights Watch, Transparency International), Output to Purpose Reviews and discussions with many organisations and individuals that there has been enormous impact and change as a direct result of the interventions described above. Within a relatively short period a changed and more responsive police service was in place, and this had a big part to play in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. However, many other interventions were taking place at this time, including reform of the Army, restoration of Paramount Chiefs and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration projects. The UN had a big presence from 1998 to 2005, including a large civilian police contingent. To try and assess what the individual affects of all these combined interventions was is outside the scope of this review. Suffice it to say peace reigns across Sierra Leone.

3.13.3 In terms of ownership, it is clear that most of the interventions have been internalised, and continue to be developed.

3.13.4 The problem comes with sustainability. As a crude measure, any intervention that requires recurrent resources is failing, and this is reflected in the SLP's inability to provide an acceptable level of effective policing services. Communications, mobility, office machinery are a few examples. By contrast, anything that does not require lots of resourcing – for example policy making – continues. The negative effect on morale at all levels was obvious to the Review Team.

3.13.4 The SLP is still a developing police service suffering from drastic underfunding from the government, and still requires guidance, advice and support in a number of areas outlined in this report.

4 Needs and Priorities of the Sierra Leone Police

4.1 The Review Team's overall professional assessment of the SLP to respond operationally and deliver policing services is poor. Despite good senior management, policies and procedures, the fundamental problem is the delivery of these at the operational level. There are many reasons, including ineffective middle management and poor morale amongst the workforce, with concentration on how to survive as individuals and families rather than doing the job they have been trained to do. There has been much training in the past, but the application of that training is questionable.

4.2 There are areas where good work has been observed by the Review Team despite these problems – FSUs, handling of prisoners in accordance with proper procedures, operational planning capacity, activities of the Inspectorate and interview and statement taking are a few examples. The technical management of the communications system is another good example of what can be done. However, far too often many officers just sat about police stations with little to do – described as a cafe culture – with little obvious leadership. Many of the problems stem from a real lack of resources – no transport, communications or even the basics to do anything, like power, paper or forms. This means that many reported incidents are not investigated in a timely manner, and providing services in other than towns where the police are actually based is a rarity. Senior management monitoring visits are a rarity.

4.3 The Review Team got the impression that many had given up due to the lack of resources – they wanted to do the job, but simply couldn't. What follows are some more detailed assessments of the key priorities that need immediate attention.

4.4 Coordination, Command and Control (C3)

4.4.1 For any operation to be successful there must be good C3. To support that, there must be good operational planning. Part of the legacy of previous interventions the experience of previous elections is a good ability to plan at headquarters level, and an understanding of the Gold, Silver and Bronze methodology.

4.4.2 However, the management of any operation will fail if there is a:

- Lack of good management and leadership
- Lack of resources, particularly in the areas of transport, radios, and protective equipment
- Lack of training and preparedness of the public order and other units/personnel
- Poor coordination, command and control skills and facilities, including access to real time information
- Lack of timely and professional planning

4.4.3 These are particularly important if the operation covers all of Sierra Leone, and lasts covers an extended period, as is the case with the elections scheduled for 2012. If these key elements are not in place, experience shows that:

- The command and control capability of the SLP is limited, ad hoc, with overlapping roles and responsibilities
- It is impossible to get an informed view of what is happening in real time so that informed decisions can be taken
- Without proper operational support and clear leadership and orders, officers will act independently and resort to the only means of defence available
- Lack of protective equipment prevents the use of graduated non-lethal responses, and could result in resorting to lethal force

- Lack of communications severely limits the operational capability of the police, and the proper tasking of resources and understanding of what is going on.
- Lack of transport severely restricts the timely deployment of resources
- Poor information and intelligence hinders threat based planning and operational decisions
- Poor leadership and lack of training hinders professional management and use of a graduated response
- The potential for political interference is greatly increased.

4.4.4 The professional assessment of the Review Team is that few of the elements required for a successful election security operation are in place, and the current capacity to police the elections in a free and fair manner is poor.

4.4.5 The police themselves recognise these shortcomings, and are endeavouring to address some of these issues. However, without extensive and urgent support, limited improvement will take place between now and the 2012 elections.

4.4.6 Key activities to minimise the risks are:

- Support the development of effective Coordination, Command and Control (C3) systems, procedures and skills, including election and contingency planning
- The provision of transmission equipment and transport to support C3
- Improvement of the investigative ability, particularly in the areas of fraud associated with the elections, the gathering of evidence and post incident investigation
- Improving the police response to incidents in an apolitical manner, ensuring adherence to fundamental human rights and the law, and the minimisation of violence, disorder and injury
- Training in a number of areas to support the above.
- Ongoing specialist advice and support to the election process in the area of security and other areas where appropriate

4.4.7 The Review Team found that planning for the 2012 elections has already started. Transport and other requirements have been identified, but the likelihood is that sufficient finances will not be available to support all demands. The UN is supporting operations in a limited way, and the bulk of the transport and equipment is being bid for out of the basket fund. The senior officers who will plan for and manage the operation impressed the Review Team, but have asked for help (substantial external support was in place for the 2002 and 2007 elections).

4.4.8 Whilst there is possibly 18 months before the elections, tension will begin to grow several months before the Election Day and all planning and preparation should be completed before then. Immediate support is therefore recommended, as some of the essential preparatory work will take several months to complete.

4.5 Outline Plan – C3 Support

(Please see the transport and communications sections for supporting actions)

1. Provision of technical aid to support the development of effective Coordination, Command and Control (C3) systems, procedures and skills, including election and contingency planning.
2. Assist the SLP to develop a realistic detailed Election Security Strategy and costed action plans, together with a costed training needs analyses, and a gap analyses.
3. Working with the SLP and the communications adviser, identify the most cost effective minimum systems to support the operational plan.

4. Provide support if necessary to improvement of the investigative ability, particularly in the areas of fraud associated with the elections, the gathering of evidence and post incident investigation.
5. Improving the police response to incidents in an apolitical manner, ensuring adherence to fundamental human rights and the law, and the minimisation of violence, disorder and injury.

4.6 Sierra Leone Police budget

4.6.1 A key factor that determines the effectiveness and performance of the SLP is the domestic budget.

4.6.2 The budget is set each year and covers the period January to December. The budget making process includes the SLP presenting to the Finance Ministry a three year Medium Term Expenditure Forecast which is linked to the SLP's Strategic Development Plan.

4.6.3 The latest SLP submission covers the period 2011 to 2013, and the budget for 2011 has been agreed. To assist in planning, indicative ceilings for budgets up to and including 2013 are published by the Ministry of Finance.

4.6.4 The overall budget is made up of three elements:

1. **Basic Salary and allowances** – basic salaries, and allowances including rent, medical, risk, detective, technical, rice etc.
2. **Recurrent** – this covers the day to day running costs of the SLP, including fuel, new vehicles, vehicle maintenance and spares, utilities, training costs, feeding, building maintenance, uniforms etc.
3. **Development** – this covers the development of the police estate and infrastructure, including new and refurbished buildings

Budget 2011	Proposed	Allocated	% allocated
Salary and allowances	85,439,168,317	39,175,081,166	45.85
Recurrent	46,891,649,695	31,260,756,000	66.67
Development	7,545,000,000	800,000,000	10.60
Totals	139,875,818,012	71,235,837,166	50.93

Indicative Ceilings	Le m	2011	2012	2013
Recurrent		31,261	36,575	40,233
Development		800	900	1013

4.6.5 As can be seen from the table above, the agreed total budget is only 50.93% of that requested. The proposed development budget included building works at a number of police buildings and barracks which will have to be postponed. The agreed salary and allowances budget is less than that proposed, which means long overdue increases in allowances will not be paid. For example, the rice allowance was included as an allowance about 10 years ago at 41,000 Leones, and has not been increased to keep up with inflation since then. A sack of rice now costs 140,000 Leones.

4.6.6 Between December 2010 and February 2011 contracts totalling Le 21.855 Bn were signed. These included provision of uniform, 31 new vehicles, spare parts, stationery and consumables. The SLP still owe money on previous contracts, and the total due for payment due in the first quarter on 2011 was in excess of the allocation. The exact total debt of the SLP is not known, but was put at between 25 and 30 billion Leones by the Minister of Internal Affairs. At the same meeting the Minister was considering cancelling the contracts mentioned above.

4.6.7 The same problem of debt was found across Sierra Leone. The effect is that lines of credit have been stopped until the police pay off some of the debt. In practical terms, if transport is required for whatever reason, the Regional AIG has to scrape around to find enough money for 5 gallons of fuel, and there is great difficulty in providing even the basic materials. The transport manager in one region stated that all he received in the way of support was 1 ream of paper in 4 months.

4.6.8 Many other anecdotes tell the same story – the SLP cannot support operations or even basic services, for example well repairs in barracks.

4.6.9 The situation is compounded in that whilst the authorised establishment has been increased to 12,000, there is no extra provision in the recurrent budget to support the increase (for example uniforms for the new recruits, or feeding whilst at training school)

4.6.10 There were real increases in the budget during the time of the CPDTF and the early stages of the CCSSP as the GoSL tried to honour its undertaking to meet the sustainability issues. Since then there have still been rises in the recurrent budget, but given the rises in inflation and the weakness of the Leone against the Dollar, the purchasing power has declined. This is compounded by the increase in staffing levels dependent on the recurrent budget – in 2002 the pay voucher indicated 6,055, and the figure given for December 2010 is 10,163 – an increase of 4,108 personnel, or 68%. What all of this means is that the running costs available for each officer has drastically reduced over the last few years, and this affects everything,

Le m	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Recurrent	17,154	18,094	18,746	21,000	21,129	23,224	25,848	31,261
% rise	18	5	4	12	1	10	11	21
Inflation	14	12	10	12	15	9	17	
Leone:dollar	2,701	2,890	2,962	2,985	2,981	4,000	4,200	4,350
Budgeted Establishment	6,055 (2002)						10,163	

4.6.11 The effect of the Dollar:Leone value and the compound effect of inflation requires further analyses to understand why the SLP appear to be so much worse off now than in, say, 2002. Whilst the Review Team do not claim to be economists, a simple calculation using 2002 as a base year indicates that the amount of recurrent budget available to support each staff member in 2010 is only 26% of that in 2002, taking into account the effects of inflation and the dollar purchasing power. This does not take into account rising oil prices which will have a further effect.

4.6.12 Similar effects have happened to SLP salaries, and whilst no detailed calculations have been made, it is clear that the purchasing power of salaries has declined, and continues to decline in the light of rising world food prices. A crude comparison with the military, taking salaries + allowances + rice divided by the total number of staff, indicates that an average military officer receives nearly twice the personal benefits that an average police officer does. Further, the military have much better medical and barrack facilities. It is no wonder that the morale of the police is so low, and they resort to begging on the streets.

4.6.13 This serious and critical budgetary problem is one for the GoSL to resolve, and external support in analysing and preparing the argument will assist greatly.

4.6.14 A public sector pay reform study is nearly complete, and this seeks to harmonise pay across the public sector. The review team understands from the Ministry of Finance that the issue of affordability remains unresolved.

4.6.15 The SLP also have a published income generation scheme, which is subject to audit. In the main, it generates income by hiring out guards (in general OSD) to banks and other institutions. A

4.6.16 monthly charge (currently under review) is made, with 20% going to the officer for food, transport etc. During 2010, a sum of 3.724bn Leones was generated (\$887,000). This is the equivalent of 776 officers being deployed full time on income generation duties. This does not include OSD officers deployed to guard ministers, key buildings, key installations, special court etc.

4.6.17 The Deputy Inspector General explained that the income generation was used to run the force, and due to the delay in the first quarter's funding, money had to be borrowed from the welfare fund just to keep the SLP functioning – a totally unacceptable state of affairs.

4.6.18 The Director of Budgets within the Ministry of Finance was asked by the Review Team if the SLP could be made a priority case. In fact, the SLP is already a priority case, in that they are not subjected to cuts during the year as other MDAs are.

4.6.19 There is no prospect of any real increases in the foreseeable future, and there is little scope for efficiency savings.

4.7 Outline Plan – SLP Budget

1. Provide assistance to the SLP to undertake an immediate full budget analysis and build a case to present to the GoSL for exceptional support to bring SLP finances up to a level that supports an effective service. This should take into account the sustainability costs for transport, communications and bringing other infrastructure up to a minimal acceptable standard. This analysis can be used to inform the proposed long term support plan.

4.8 Operational Support Department

4.8.1 The Operational Support Department (OSD) is headed by a Director (AIG) and has approximately 3,800 members of staff. The OSD is controlled and managed centrally but has a presence across Regions and Divisions. There is a regional coordinator at each regional HQ and this coordinator acts as an adviser to the regional AIG.

4.8.2 The OSD has a number of specialised units:

- Police support units (PSU)
- Close protection units
- Mobile armed response group
- Static patrol group
- Armed intervention group
- Training group
- Escort sub-group

4.8.3 The SLP has identified that it is intent on increasing the number of OSD to 4,000 prior to the 2012 elections.

4.8.4 The current 3,800 OSD personnel include 735 new recruits who joined the SLP after a specific OSD recruitment campaign. Essentially the SLP has identified that it has had issues with posting people to OSD from normal patrol duties as some officers do not want to do that type of work, and the attrition rate is high.

4.8.5 This recruitment campaign was gender exclusive to the extent that no women were permitted to apply. This is clearly in stark contrast with any belief that the SLP is attempting to be gender sensitive and is a very worrying development. Indeed, in the OSD where the percentage of female

officers is low at 8%, positive action should have been a significant element of any specific OSD recruitment campaign.

4.8.6 There are very mixed and confusing messages regarding the initial training of these OSD recruits. Some external sources believe they did not attend PTS at all. However, the weight of opinion within the SLP (although no-one appears to know for sure) is that the recruits attended the first 12 weeks of PTS and then moved to OSD for on-the-job training and ultimately specific OSD training in batches of 300 at their training facility at Samu. The Review Team consider that all new recruits to SLP must undertake and complete the standard basic training package at PTS to ensure consistency.

4.8.7 It is believed that the OSD public order training capability was last externally assessed in 2006 and it is the view of the Review Team that a further assessment should be conducted in advance of the 2012 elections. The SLP has been unable to produce a 'Public Order Manual' although it is believed that during the initial training in 2001, such a manual and other related documentation was produced by an external consultant.

4.8.8 Each Divisional HQ should have 41 trained personnel that are entitled Crowd Control Unit (CCU). The CCUs are designed to be the first line of response to any developing local disorder situation and then, if and when that incident escalates, the OSD would be called to support.

4.8.9 Through ineffective succession planning, poorly considered transfer of personnel and consideration of continuity, these CCUs are largely ineffective and understaffed which results in OSD being called as the first responders to even the most benign crowd control or disorder situation. Resourced, trained and equipped properly, the Review Team considers the CCUs as an essential element in providing a measured and appropriate response to crowd control issues.

4.8.10 The SLP should review its capability and capacity in terms of CCUs well in advance of the 2012 elections.

4.8.11 The Review Team was provided with evidence from a number of sources both internally and externally that there was an over reliance on MACP and that it was often invoked without due process and through a lack of faith (at Governmental level) in SLP's ability to cope with larger or more critical incidents such as football matches.

4.8.12 Whilst the use and oversight of MACP is out-with this Review's terms of reference, it is apparent that there exists an opportunity to consider joint military (RSLAF) and police (OSD and CCU) training in the lead up to the 2012 elections. This training should focus on primacy, tactics and roles and responsibilities, and be focused at middle to senior management levels.

4.8.13 The maintenance and storage of public order equipment is of concern to the Review Team. In many Divisions, helmets, shields and other equipment are strewn on the floor, covered in filth and their integrity has more than likely been compromised.

4.8.14 At the main OSD store at King Harman Road, long shields are stacked flat in piles approximately 3 metres high which will place significant load on those at the bottom of the pile. Stored in this way, their integrity could be compromised and if deployed could fail. That could result in an escalation in the level of response to any disorder which may include baton rounds, CS Gas or indeed bullets.

4.8.15 The OSD officers wear a significantly different uniform from general duty police officers, which is militaristic due to its blue camouflage design. This uniform is worn at all times but there appears to be no clear rationale for differentiating OSD and general duties officers.

4.8.16 In 1991 with the outbreak of the rebel insurgency, the role of the Special Security Division (SSD), which was the precursor to the OSD, was more of a military force than a conventional police

support team. The SSD fought side by side with the military in the various war fronts in the east and south of the country and wore camouflage uniforms. The current perception amongst the communities of Sierra Leone is that this para-military approach to policing is an unwelcome development and one which the public feels threatened by.

4.8.17 The SLP needs to carefully manage public perception in relation to OSD use and deployment. As a supporting function they have a clear remit but the SLP should consider why it perceives the need to identify them as a separate identifiable unit through the use of camouflage uniforms. These uniforms offer no additional protection to the wearer, and given the Sierra Leonean environment could not be considered to offer any advantage in terms of operating more discreetly. The Review Team were concerned that the uniforms appear to intimidate and as such are not considered appropriate for an organisation that aspires to be a "Force for Good".

4.8.18 The Review Team recommends that a full review of public order training, assessment of equipment, policy and protocol be conducted as soon as possible. It may be possible to access this through USAid and UNPSIL however, given the previous UK training involvement, a public order trainer from the UK should be a part of any support package.

4.8.19 The Static Patrol Group of the OSD provides security for iconic and high profile locations, and personnel. It also provides security for private institutions such as banks, at a cost of 500,000 LE per month, of which 80% is paid into an SLP bank account and the OSD officer providing the security receives the remaining 20% directly.

4.8.20 Many police forces world-wide will charge profit driven events/organisations to provide a policing service such as at football matches and pop concerts. This is however, clearly linked to the potential for disorder or a major incident developing at the venue which would require policed. The provision of private security at Banks, Mining Companies etc, is a matter for that institution, not the police force and deprives the communities of a public service.

4.8.21 It is clear that the reported fee of 500,000 LE per month to guard a bank is far more than a constable receives in their salary and as such, the potential for income generation is significant. A more in-depth investigation into the number of OSD/GD officers deployed monthly to 'private security' tasks should be undertaken. This should be linked to scrutiny of the funds generated and what that money is used for. The Review Team are concerned that the approved increase in police numbers to 12,000 by 2012 may be a means to generate more 'private security' income generation rather than being needed to provide an enhanced policing service.

4.8.22 As has been identified earlier in this report, the OSD suffer from redundancy of resources. They have a significant number of personnel classed as being on stand-by. The Review Team suggests that the Police Inspectorate undertakes a full review of OSD, deployment and demand to assess whether the OSD remains an affordable luxury for the SLP, or whether these resources can be more gainfully used. External assistance should be provided if appropriate.

4.9 Outline Plan - OSD

1. Provide technical support to conduct a full assessment of Public Order training, equipment (including storage) and guidance manuals.
2. Ensure that any further direct recruitment to OSD is not gender exclusive, and meets the recruitment policies of the SLP.
3. Oversight of requirement for all SLP recruits, irrespective of whether direct entry into OSD, to attend the full recruit training at PTS.
4. Linked to OSD but not exclusively, provide technical support to SLP in developing its ability to more effectively succession plan particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections.

5. To examine the potential for joint training on public order and MACP primacy, tactics, roles and responsibilities between SLP and RSLAF in the lead up to the 2012 elections.
6. To support a review of OSD roles and responsibilities to ensure it is making the most effective use of resources, particularly in relation to the PSU.
7. To support an independent review of the SLP in terms of its provision of 'private security' services and transparency of income generation linked to growth in police numbers.

4.10 Intelligence

4.10.1 The gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence is often known as the 'life blood' of a police force. It is extremely difficult for a police force to operate successfully unless it has effective systems to manage intelligence and information and not surprisingly, is a key component of intelligence led policing.

4.10.2 The SLP have three identifiable structures for gathering intelligence:

- The Special Branch – domestic threats, border security, serious and organised crime and transnational crime (UK Level 2 and 3)
- Criminal Intelligence Service – which essentially looks at lower level criminality (UK level 1)
- Community intelligence which is fed in through the CIS and emanates from many sources such as LPPBs, CSVs, PROSEC, DISEC, CHISEC etc

4.10.3 Whilst receipt of intelligence is important, its management is critical both to protect the source and to ensure that it is assessed and acted upon within an accountable, auditable process.

4.10.4 The specific intelligence structures were not examined in any great detail but it was evident to the Review Team that the management of intelligence was an area that would benefit from support.

4.10.5 The storage and management of intelligence is disparate and dysfunctional and is unable to link either crimes or criminals. There is an identified need to introduce a central electronic intelligence database and training in its use to enhance the SLP's management of intelligence.

4.10.6 The SLP has already identified a suitable electronic database from a local supplier and has access to much of the IT hardware to support its introduction but apparently do not have sufficient funds for purchase and maintenance contract for the database. If it has not already done so, the SLP should consider linking this area of development to the wider consultancy IT project currently underway. However, given previous problems surrounding the procurement of local systems, including expensive yearly licence and maintenance costs, it might be prudent to offer an independent assessment of the system.

4.10.7 The Director of CIS and SB raised concern over the occupation of buildings previously allocated to them, and refurbished at DFID expense. These are now occupied by another agency. The Review Team did not have time to investigate this, but it is a matter that should be looked at by the proposed senior adviser.

4.11 DISEC, PROSEC, CHISEC

4.11.1 Within the national security architecture established after the war, District and Provincial Security Committees are an essential element of the intelligence structure that functions beyond Freetown. From 2009, the concept was devolved further to Chiefdom level in parts of the country, specifically in the border regions. The establishment of the Chiefdom Security Committees was funded by the UNDP. In brief, they are forums which coordinate all relevant security sector actors for information sharing, coordination, and planning – not unlike the NSCCG. The PROSEC/DISEC/CHISEC are formal regional forums, established to bring together primary security

players, local government and civil society representatives as well as traditional leaders to encourage the participation of local communities in dealing with security as it affects their areas. The ONS provides overall coordinating and secretarial assistance, and is a check and balance mechanism to ensure that each committee limits its focus to security-related issues.

4.11.2 The emphasis on strong links between central and local government institutions provide a critical element to the intelligence structure, which was non-existent prior to, and critically during the conflict. The security committees are a pragmatic response to a need for security and intelligence coordination at provincial and district levels, which were needed to counter internal threats to security (which predominantly originated from grievances at the local level).

4.11.3 The SLP clearly plays a fundamental role in these meetings, and it is critical that they continue to do so. Concerns were raised by the ONS that while the police leadership, the IGP in particular, engages in NSCCG meetings, officers below him, including REGPOLs are not engaged to the same extent. Participation in PROSEC/DISEC meetings is critical, however, to ensure that the security sector remains joined up to the greatest possible extent. Furthermore, in terms of intelligence, the SLP's contribution is important, given their locally embedded network of partners. PROSECs/DISECs have come to play an important role in coordination and conflict resolution at the local level. They have also been known to help inhibit and monitor paramount chiefs and security officials who have sought to discriminate against specific political actors during election periods. Finally, their presence on the ground has allowed far greater outreach to civil society and consolidation of the PROSECs, DISECs and CHISECs as part of the local communities.

4.12 Outline Plan - Intelligence

1. One of the terms of reference for the proposed senior adviser should be to ensure continued close liaison and coordination with the ONS and others. In particular, in developing the use of intelligence and information in the risk assessment that should accompany election security planning and management.
2. The feasibility of an intelligence database should be further explored and costed, including sustainability costs
3. The issue around CIS and SB accommodation should be further explored.
4. Support the SLP leadership and lower ranks in sustained participation in DISECs, PROSECs and CHISECs

4.13 Radio Communications within the Sierra Leone Police.

4.13.1 From 1998 and over the next 6 years, CCSSP supported instalment of simple radio systems in key areas of the country. Necessary training, policy and procedures were introduced. The availability of these systems was critical to the success of many policing operations and the safe and effective deployment of the SLP, and the policing of the 2002 and 2007 elections. In June 2003, following the appointment of B A Kamara as Inspector General, a letter was sent to the First Secretary DFID, Freetown, renewing the SLP's commitment to maintaining the vehicles and communications⁷.

4.13.2 After the 2007 elections donor support stopped. The review team found that many of the technical and management skills and policies that were developed up until then survive, and some of the radio systems still remain working. However, the lack of spares, financial support, and the inability to carry out service and maintenance visits means that the effectiveness of police communications has seriously declined. During visits to Regional and Divisional stations the story was the same – faulty equipment, lack of batteries and inability to repair damage caused by, for example, lightning strikes.

⁷ Letter from B A Kamara to First Secretary Development, DFID, Freetown dated 3 July 2003 (copy available)

4.13.3 Visits to the central communications department at Kingtom were refreshing. The complex was clean and tidy, records were properly maintained, and a comprehensive overview of the state of the systems was produced. Faulty equipment was available for inspection, and some new unissued equipment was in store. This could easily be brought into use with some technical support and realignment of systems and channels.

4.13.4 There are plans to develop the communications room into a national joint control room, bringing together the health authorities and the fire force. Limited building work has been agreed, but there are no resources for the equipment needs.

4.13.5 A small closed user group which allows free cellular telephone calls between key SLP officers has been established, and provides essential communications. This is not an alternative to an operational police communications system, as in times of crisis cellular networks are likely to fail.

4.13.6 During discussions, senior communications staff supported keeping to the most basic of systems, and agreed the general need for encrypted communications and the vigilant system no longer existed. Whilst this still worked after 10 years, the renewal and sustainability costs are expensive.

4.13.7 Sophisticated systems found in many developed countries are not viable. The Review Team is not aware of any other substantial donor support in this area. Given the need for radio communications and the inability of the GoSL/SLP to provide sufficient funds, it is recommended that support be given to refurbishing and developing basic communications systems by the provision of technical advice, spares and equipment. The caveat is, of course, that the review team cannot guarantee that this effort will be sustainable over the long term, but will help ensure effective policing of the 2012 elections.

4.14 Outline plan – Radio Communications Support

- Provision of TA to work with the SLP and collate all the detailed requirements to refurbish and develop the current systems.
- Identify cost effective solutions to operational needs – for example fax over cellular networks.
- Assist the SLP to set out the necessary command, control and coordination communications' architecture for the 2012 elections. Identify the equipment needs.
- Ensure coordination with the recommended incident management system.
- Assist the SLP to redefine the channel plan, and prepare a reprogramming action plan to move away from encryption and Vigilant.
- Assist the SLP in providing detailed requirements for procurement by an approved procurement agent.
- Produce a costed project delivery plan, including transport and other deployment costs (accommodation and DSA)
- Produce a long term costed plan to maintain the systems. This will cover the 2017 elections, and feed into the recommended long term tapered project.

4.15 Transport and Mobility

4.15.1 For the SLP to be effective, they must have transport and mobility. During the period 1998 to 2007, the fleet of vehicles was built up, mainly with the support of DFID. The support included the provision of spares, external management, and systems and procedures to monitor the use of

vehicles and spares. Regional workshops were also established in Kono, Kenema, Bo and Makeni, in addition to refurbishment of and additional workshops in Freetown.

4.15.2 Because of external oversight by a TA, a number of corrupt practices were constrained, including theft of fuel, theft of spares, misuse of vehicles and other practices. The GoSL agreed to build the SLP budget to service and repair vehicles, and in the early years the SLP saw real increases in their recurrent budget. However, this GoSL increase in financial support has not continued.

4.15.3 The conditions in Sierra Leone are harsh. The life expectancy of an operational vehicle, available for use 24/7, is short. A new 4x4 vehicle is expected to last at most 5-7 years, and many of those supplied under the CPDTF and CCSSP are now off the road. Large personnel carriers can last longer depending on where they are used. All the big personnel carriers supplied under the CPDTF and the CCSSP were not new. They were second hand, coming in the main from NATO reserve stock in Holland. Whilst they were in good condition and low mileage, many were 10-20 years old, but offering good value for money given the limited budget available at the time.

4.15.4 The provision of vehicles included many small motor cycles, which have proved useful in allowing officers to attend incidents. However, they are not suitable for transporting detainees, or victims of crime.

4.15.5 During the month of November 2010, a team from the SLP Inspectorate and Evaluation Unit undertook an inspection of the SLP fleet and garages across the country. The fleet at that time comprised:

Condition	Western		Northern		Eastern		Southern	
	Vehicles	Motor Bikes	Vehicles	Motor Bikes	Vehicles	Motor Bikes	Vehicles	Motor Bikes
Road Worthy	177	159	24	53	8	16	24	53
Needs repair	32	23	12	8	16	18	12	8
Off Road	0	0	2	2	0	6	2	2
Scrapped	0	0	23	40	12	6	23	40

4.15.6 According to these figures, across the country there were 233 vehicles (4x4s, trucks etc.) and 281 motor bikes working, with 72 vehicles and 57 motor bikes repairable. The situation has changed during the last 3 months. A quick check on vehicle numbers during the Review Team's visits revealed that the number of roadworthy vehicles has further reduced by about 25%. The general condition of the fleet is very poor.

4.15.7 Very limited spares are available in the stores, and at the time of the team's visit Freetown stores were undergoing an audit. Fuel allowance for running the vehicles is now devolved to Regions, and from the team's observations little is available to run the vehicles they have. The first class workshops built under previous projects are now full of scrap vehicles.

4.15.8 The November 2010 inspection report makes a number of sound observations and recommendations. It also uncovered a serious criminal matter, which has been fully investigated resulting in senior Transport Section staff awaiting trial for criminal matters relating to vehicles. The

inspection itself is an indication that the new management of the SLP are concerned about the situation, and willing to take the necessary action.

4.15.9 A Transport Department work plan has been prepared for the 2012 elections, and a bid has been submitted for vehicles for the elections to be funded out of the election basket fund. This includes 4x4 vehicles for mobile armed response, and medium and large trucks for deployment of personnel and response to incidents of disorder. The bid also includes fuel for the running of the vehicles during the election period. There is nothing apparent in the bid for future servicing and repair spares.

4.15.10 Clearly mobility is essential, and substantial sums of money are required to provide vehicles, not just for election security, but also for the day to day operation of the SLP and for the provision of services. The situation at the moment is that the recurrent budget does not support enough replacement vehicles, or servicing and maintenance costs.

4.15.11 Procurement of additional vehicles under this project is not recommended at this stage. Any requirements will have to be supported by a business case, and additional funding sought. It is a matter for the GoSL to provide fuel.

4.15.12 The SLP have considered other ways of finding transport for use during the 2012 elections – for example commandeering vehicles from other MDAs or renting vehicles. Neither offers a long term viable option, and in any event funds would have to be found to support renting, and most MDAs are in the same position regarding lack of resources. One further avenue to explore is confiscation of vehicles used in crime. There is some legislation that supports this (new drugs legislation). Given the numbers of confiscated vehicles littering police stations around the country, it is recommended that this would be a useful area for the Inspectorate to explore.

4.16 Outline Plan – Transport and Mobility

1. Provision of technical assistance
 - a. to work with the SLP to undertake a review of the condition of all vehicles to establish which can economically be repaired, and prepare an action plan
 - b. to assist in preparing a submission to clear all scrap and uneconomical vehicles under GoSL boarding rules, and the ring fencing of any income generated for use by the transport section.
 - c. to work with the transport section and the Inspectorate and review all policies and procedures, and application of the Inspectorate's recommendations.
 - d. to undertake a review of the skill level of all personnel, including previous technicians that may have been redeployed, and preparation of a training needs analyses.
 - e. to help review the transport requirements for the elections, with a prioritised plan in the likely event that the available funds will not be sufficient to provide all vehicles
 - f. to help prepare a list of all spares and other requirements, and assist in a procurement exercise (not local inferior spares)
 - g. Preparation of a long term budget for the maintenance and repair of vehicles
2. Provision of a cash limited fund to service and maintain current roadworthy fleet to prevent further deterioration, and bring back into service vehicles that are economically viable.

4.17 Logistics

4.17.1 Apart from some formal registers, there were very few printed forms, for example witness statement forms, case file covers and exhibit labels, Even blank paper was in short supply, and

officers had to draw up their own forms where needed. At the time of the visit, it was not possible, even at police headquarters, to obtain any photocopies due to machines not working and lack of toner. The Review Team paid for copies to be taken to a street vendor for photocopying. At station level there were few reference materials, for example Force Standing Orders, Standard Operating Procedures or legal references.

4.17.2 As a consequence, anyone seeking the services of the police or visiting police stations are faced with a view of inefficiency, and an inability to act unless money is paid on the pretext of supplying the basics.

4.17.3 It comes down to the budget – or lack of it – which is described in more detail above.

4.17.4 The provision of logistics is vital if the SLP is to be capable of providing a service, and the budget must be built up.

4.18 Outline Plan – Logistics

1. Immediate support in the form of a cash limited budget for the adviser to support immediate priorities in this area and improve operational effectiveness.

4.19 Welfare

4.19.1 The comments above also apply to efforts of the SLP to look after their own members of the force. Here it is necessary to use some specific observations to highlight the problem.

- The number of officers dying in service due to ill health during 2010 was well over 100.
- At Kissy, the busiest police station in Freetown serving over 1m population, there is no toilet or running water in the station for officers to use.
- There is no water in Kissy barracks serving many hundreds of police officers and their families. In the cells, detainees are kept in inhuman and degrading conditions. The cell passage was running with urine and faeces. Drinking water was, in the main, brought in by relatives and friends.
- The SLP cannot afford to supply even basic drugs at the police hospital or other police clinics around the country.
- At Bo, the hospital bill at just one hospital used to treat police officers takes approximately 25% of the recurrent budget allocation. If it isn't paid, the hospital will not treat officers.
- At Bo barracks, the only well serving 4-5,000 officers, families and the surrounding community is out of action for want of repairs and extending to reach water in the dry season. Water had to be collected from a nearby swamp, and incidents of water borne diseases were commonplace.

4.19.2 It is important in projects like this to do something for the officers, and through them their families. Financial support in the form of higher wages and better allowances are a matter for the GoSL, but as indicated a number of low cost quick fixes can make an immediate difference.

4.20 Outline Plan – Welfare

1. Provision of a cash limited budget to enable quick fixes in the area of welfare. This should be managed by the senior adviser in conjunction with the senior officers of the SLP to avoid misspend. Learning lessons from previous projects, drugs should only be provided when there is certainty that corrupt practices are eliminated.

4.21 Police Training School

4.21.1 Based at Hastings, the PTS has 61 trainers at various ranks, 12 of whom will soon be deployed on UN missions. As has been previously articulated, the SLP is increasing its strength to 12,000 by 2012. This additional recruitment has placed significant additional demand on PTS with class intakes of 700 stretching capacity and capability to deliver effective learning. The training of 500 new recruits will commence in March 2011.

4.21.2 Both the Commander and his Deputy were both new to their positions and were unable to articulate the breadth and depth of the training programme at PTS. The SLP should consider continuity and succession planning as an effective tool to building and developing an effective Force that is able to provide stability and consolidation.

4.21.3 The SLP must ensure there remain sufficient skilled trainers at the PTS particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections to manage the additional bulge in recruitment.

4.21.4 The review team were assured that every new recruit must undertake the basic police training before being selected for other departments, such as OSD. However, there appears to be exceptions to this rule, specifically the recent direct OSD recruitment tranche.

4.21.5 It also appears, despite having taken an initial selection written test on application, each student is again tested on arrival at PTS. The rationale for this appears uncertain however, it appears the PTS do not have sufficient faith in the oversight and robustness of the initial selection test as a result of poor invigilation and impersonation at local examination centres and this requires to be addressed by the Director of HR as a matter of urgency.

4.21.6 Evidence was obtained that suggested those recruits, whilst at PTS with 'assessed' lower intellect levels but who were quote -'big and strong' were destined for the OSD as they would be unable to perform the more demanding role of general duties officer. There are two concerns relating to this finding. First, the standard entrance exam and recruitment and selection process should be based on identifying those applicants able to perform the role of general duties officer as a common minimum standard. Secondly, to send those identified as being unable to perform this standard role to OSD where they are issued with and carry firearms routinely and thereby could be faced with making life or death 'shoot or no shoot' decisions, without apparently the mental capacity (as assessed by those at PTS) to perform normal patrol duties is a significant concern.

4.21.7 It appears that the 735 police officers recently directly recruited into OSD completed only the first 12 week training package and then were deployed to OSD for on-the-job training and did not return for the final 4 weeks of training at PTS nor sit the final examination.

4.21.8 The SLP must ensure this situation does not arise again and that all staff receives the minimum initial training programme to quality assure all recruits to the same standard.

4.21.9 There exists some worrying values and beliefs at the PTS. Women are generally considered to perform as well as men whilst at PTS but are believed to be the weaker sex, lazy, noisy and a disruptive element. There were a number of other gender issues identified at PTS but these are discussed under the relevant chapter herein.

4.21.10 Class sizes are on average 60-70 students, most of who have to sit on the floor or tables as there are insufficient chairs, and this does not create an effective learning environment. It is understood that the German donor GIZ plans to refurbish and furnish four classes at PTS in the new financial year.

4.21.11 Student learning materials are dated and require both updated, amended and gender impact assessed. Each student should be able to leave with a copy of the training material however this does not happen, apparently through a lack of resources.

4.21.12 The JSDP is currently conducting a comprehensive review of a number of areas of donor supported training within the SLP and specifically at PTS. The SLP Head of Training does not consider that there is sufficient expertise within the SLP to deliver training in many critical areas such as community policing, forensics and investigative skills.

4.21.13 Supported by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the SLP send officers to the Police Training Academy in Botswana. It is incongruous to consider then that the SLP have aspirations to establish a Police Academy within Sierra Leone that other Police Forces can send their staff to receive training.

4.22 Outline Plan – Police Training School

1. Support the SLP to conduct a full review of its recruit training materials
2. Support the production of sufficient recruit training materials that will permit new recruits to have their own copy.
3. Review the SLP Annual Training Plan to ensure it is fit for purpose and costed.
4. Review the JSDP Training Assessment report when published to assess developmental needs.
5. Support the Head of Training to develop a single, trusted recruitment process that is based on a common minimum standard.
6. Support the SLP to ensure that gender, equality and human rights issues are 'golden threads' that run through all training materials and inputs.
7. Support the SLP to deliver self-sufficiency in all training needs.

5 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Police Directorate

5.1 The Minister of Internal Affairs is the police Minister. The roles of the Ministry and the Minister were set out in The Sierra Leone Gazette No 47 30 July 2002. The overall Mission Statement is "Development of policies and programmes for maintaining internal security and safety by undertaking activities under the following major headings....." The list includes the police (Internal Security) and public safety matters.

5.2 In order to carry out these roles the Minister has little administrative support or access to expert advice. This hinders his ability to discharge his police related responsibilities. Officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs have little experience in matters of police administration (although the permanent secretary is required by the Constitution to be the secretary to the Police Council).

5.3 This multiplicity of claims on the Minister's attention (and lack of the administrative means to tackle them) is not in itself, in practice, quite the formidable problem it might seem. The reason for this unexpected relief however is itself an even larger difficulty: although the Minister is a member of the Police Council he does not chair it and indeed is simply one ordinary member among a number of ordinary members, without having any specific duties or responsibilities to fulfil as a result of his membership.

5.4 The Police Council has to be regarded as the present constitutional structure for securing police accountability and civilian oversight of policing. How effective Police Council is in either of these roles is a matter for debate. The drafting of the parts of the Constitution which govern it was unclear. Among the principal effects were

- giving the Council responsibility for day-to-day personnel matters
- denying the chief officer responsibility for these matters
- failing to give the responsible Minister clear responsibilities
- clouding the arrangements for police accountability

and in particular

- declaring (in section 157(4)) that "...the Inspector-General of Police shall be responsible for the operational control...of the Police Force" "subject to...the control and direction of the Police Council". [Emphasis added].

5.5 However, the Police (Discipline) Regulations, 2001 now clarifies the situation. Section 2.(1) states "the operational control and administration of the Force is vested in the Inspector-General, including the effective deployment, posting, transfers and other movement of members of the force." Subject to S2.(2).... "The Police Council may give broad policy guidelines to the Inspector-General to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities."

5.6 Police directorate: design, functions and structure

5.6.1 Attempts were made during the time of the CPDTF and the CCSSP to introduce a Police Directorate into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Unfortunately, this has not happened to date. An expert, Roger Pearson, undertook a study of the Ministry in 1999, and submitted recommendations in relation to a number of issues, including the establishment of a Police Directorate. His recommendations are still relevant.

5.6.2 The structure of an administrative unit is determined by its functions - what it is there to do. The first step is therefore to try to identify the main areas of work a new police directorate would be expected to cover.

5.6.3 Section 156 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 says that the Police Council's secretariat shall be provided by the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is clearly a statutory duty for the directorate to assume.

5.6.4 Development, drafting, refinement in discussion with shareholders, and negotiation (where necessary) of the various statements required to clarify roles and responsibilities of those involved in overseeing and monitoring policing will require support from the Ministry.

5.6.5 There will be two further substantial areas of work for the police directorate to tackle: developing ideas and arrangements for the better civilian oversight of policing and the longer-term arrangements for Sierra Leone police governance.

5.6.6 These are particularly large programme of work, including identifying the content of primary legislation - the new Police Act - and preparing instructions for the parliamentary draftsman, explanatory notes on clauses, speaking notes for the Minister's use in the Bill's parliamentary consideration, and so on.

5.6.7 This will also entail a large quantity of drafting delegated legislation to cover in some detail important areas of police government, administration, and conditions of service such as pay and allowances; qualifications for appointment; promotion; retirement; discipline, and so on of police officers.

5.6.8 A case could be made for staffing a section to provide some sort of research and statistics function, and the Police Inspectorate (which would provide professional advice on policing to the Minister) would also report to the Minister via the directorate.

5.6.9 However, the projects identified above are in their nature time-limited, and as they are accomplished staff could move from them to picking up permanent directorate functions.

5.6.10 It is suggested, as a first step, that the new Police Directorate should initially comprise *three sections*: a secretariat to service the Police Council and other matters as necessary, including liaison with the Inspectorate; legislation to deal with the police White Paper and subsequent legislation; and the third section, which might be called communications.

5.7 Civilian oversight of policing

5.7.1 The most fundamental expressions of civilian oversight include the fact that the chief officer is an officer of the law, answerable to the law in respect of any unlawful act he or his officers may commit; and the fact that the Minister is answerable to Parliament for policing matters. But further measures beyond these are needed.

5.7.2 An important role for this function, pending new police legislation, for the existing Police Council as a *national*-level co-ordinator of community and other public views on policing. What the detailed arrangements for *local* oversight and police/community communication also needs resolving, but it is expected important parts to be played by District (and perhaps Regional) councils and paramount chiefs, among others. (The links with the local needs policing approach are clear). The Police Council would then co-ordinate and present the range of local views to national institutions - Minister and Inspector-General.

5.7.3 These interim arrangements for civilian oversight seem unlikely to be particularly satisfactory. Proposals for permanent new governance arrangements for these purposes will have to be devised by the Police Directorate and enacted by any new Police Bill. It may be likely that, whatever the shape of the detail eventually enacted, it will have to provide for the new body - which may not be called the Police Council - to represent both local and national views, and probably to be made up of some mixture of elected and appointed persons.

5.7.4 It is noted that the Ombudsman has an independent complaints and oversight role. It is also noted that with the recent restructuring of the Ministry for Internal Affairs and Ministry for Local Government, there may be an argument for parallel advice in the Ministry of Local Government regarding the oversight and direction of the Chiefdom Police

5.8 Current position

5.8.1 Initial discussions with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hon. Musa Tarawally, and the Permanent Secretary, M. Konah Koroma, on 28 January 2011 indicated a willingness to progress the establishment of a Police Directorate within the Ministry.

5.9 Outline Plan – Ministry of Internal Affairs

1. Immediate TA support to verify previous findings and recommendations, and bring them up to date. Consideration should be given to the role of the Ombudsman, and the direction and oversight of the Chiefdom Police.
2. Preparation of a strategy and costed action plan, including a full training needs analysis, to deliver the findings.
3. Assistance in preparing an agreement that the GoSL will fully fund the staffing and running costs of the new Directorate.

6 Community Policing – Opportunities, Challenges and Constraints

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 The current model of policing – Local Needs Policing – was designed and developed for Sierra Leone. It is community based, and encapsulates all the requirements for a good, community based policing system. Over time it has become established throughout Sierra Leone and understood not just by the police themselves, but by the communities they serve. Whilst LNP was developed during the war, as policing was able to be re-established, it provided a model that was able to respond to different local needs both geographically and temporally.

6.1.2 The organisational structure that supported the model – Local Command Unit – was again designed to provide the simplest and most efficient structure to deliver LNP. At the same time as LNP was being developed, the rest of the organisational structure was modernised, with support to LNP being a central theme. Rather than everything supporting headquarters, the previous hierarchical system was turned on its head and everything supported LNP at community level.

6.1.3 As defined, LNP is not a soft option as some believe. There will be occasions when the SLP will have to deal with disorder or firearms incidents at the local level. There may be a murder. The Local Unit Commander has the option to call in specialists and/or larger support units to deal with such issues – by definition the LCU has to meet the needs of the local community. The organisational structure of the SLP recognises that specialist units cannot be continually maintained at local level – it simply is not the best use of resources.

6.1.4 Local Partnership Boards were successfully piloted at an early stage. These were introduced to enable representatives of the local communities to have a say in policing. Their success was based on the realisation that many problems previously left to the police to sort out could actually be resolved with people working together. An early classic example was in Kissy where there was a problem involving local taxis. The representative of the drivers who sat on the partnership board took it upon himself, with the help of other members, to sort the problem out without using police powers. Looking back, it was a good example how non-state actors get involved in resolving local policing problems that do not require formal police action.

6.1.5 During the early stages of the CCSSP, SLP were going through a massive change programme that had to be carefully managed, and on his return from the Bramshill, B A Kamara, later to become IGP when Keith Biddle left, was put in charge of change management. The original Local Partnership Boards were further developed and became known as Local Police Partnership Boards, and now form an integral part of policing.

6.1.6 LNP is defined as a **system of policing that meets the needs and expectations of the local community, but delivered within national standards and guidelines.**

6.1.7 To the credit of the SLP Local Needs Policing (LNP) remains a cornerstone of the ethos that guides provision of safety and security across Sierra Leone's communities. Almost everybody the Review Team spoke to, police and civilians, would note that previously – before as well as during the war – there was a gap between the police and the civilians. It was with the introduction of the LNP concept that they started “working side by side”, one interviewee commented. It was also noted that “previously, policing was difficult because of the perception of the community of the police. They thought we were not doing our lawful duty, and that we were not committed.” At the same time, it was also noted that “people still have that perception about the police. That we are corrupt and, wicked, that we are threats.” Structured liaising through the Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs), for instance, has therefore proven vital.

6.1.8 In sum, therefore, it was clear from our discussions with the SLP that there is a deep-seated acceptance among police officers of the need to work in an integrated manner, both with the communities themselves through LPPBs and with the Chiefdom Police Force (CPF) through the Native Administration. SLP relations with those bodies formally fall within the Community Relations Department (CRD), although LPPB members more often go straight to the LUC. This is partly the case because many key LPPB members, often businessmen, support the police financially, and therefore have direct access to the SLP leadership at divisional level. The need to work closely with these institutions is made even more pertinent by lack of funding from the government of the SLP. Officers are not paid a living wage, which leads to corruption, and they do not receive adequate logistical support.

6.1.9 The three institutions, whose functions and responsibilities are outlined below, include the SLP (through the CRD and the LCU), the LPPBs and the CPF. To enhance public safety and security, it is vital that all three are given support to ensure integration of statutory, chiefly and semi-private providers.

6.2 Community Relations Department

6.2.1 While LPPB members often liaise directly with the LUC, the Community Relations Department (CRD) formally links up with locally embedded security providers and liaises with the communities about their security concerns and needs.

6.2.2 “We take the police to the community,” as it was explained to us. In turn, CRD is not dealing with criminal matters as such, but deal with minor disputes – not unlike the role of the LPPBs and Chiefdom Police.

6.2.3 Time and again the Review Team were reminded that the police cannot be everywhere at any given moment. CRD, and the SLP as a whole, therefore rely on proactive support from the LPPBs in particular, as well as the Chiefdom Police.

6.2.3 The function of the CRD is also to develop sensitization programs and community visitations, e.g. speak to school children about the consequences of violence, fighting and abusive language. Police divisions in densely populated areas, for example Freetown, are divided into zones, and meetings are at times summoned in each zone.

6.2.4 It was noted that when the communities themselves cannot deal with the matters, they bring them to the police, primarily civil offenses that cannot go to court. “We are just like the chiefs” one officer commented, meaning that they settle cases outside the judiciary. The LPPBs were referred to as the spearhead of their efforts, who call meetings when necessary. The LPPBs are very much an extension of the SLP, whereas the Chiefdom Police is more of a separate entity.

6.3 Community Security Volunteers (CSVs)

6.3.1 In Freetown, specifically, it was also noted that they work with the Community Security Volunteers (CSVs), distributed according to zones, and under the guidance of the LPPBs. CSVs work directly with OPS. They support night patrols, and ‘sensitize’ the communities on the roles and functions of the CSVs. The CSVs are paid an allowance of 2,000 Leones per day unlike LPPB members who receive nothing. They are selected from the communities, by executive members of the LPPB. “These people are like police, but they are not police”, the LPPB Chairman in East Division noted. They were even referred to as “our own civil defence force”. In sum setting up community-based security organizations is not a new phenomenon in Sierra Leone, but existed both before and during the conflict in the 1990s.

6.3.2 The CSVs are also given priority when recruitment into the SLP takes place.

6.4 Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs)

6.4.1 The role of the LPPBs is crucial as already indicated above. Importantly, guided by the concept of Local Needs Policing, they were established to enable the local communities to have a say and be involved in finding solutions to local problems, and to act as an interface between the SLP and the local community. In brief, they are locally owned.

6.4.2 Moreover, they bridge the gap that continues to exist between the police and the population, due to public perception of and lack of logistical support to the SLP. Most importantly, and to the frustration of the partnership board members themselves, they receive no financial or logistical support, and have no formal office space. They work on a voluntary basis, and until the financial situation within Sierra Leone's civil service improves, it might be worth encouraging that the LPPBs continue to be managed as such.

6.5 No policy or legal basis of the LPPBs

6.5.1 Their role is not legally defined, but has until now been outlined and implemented at the operational level. "They organize themselves," The LUC of Eastern Division noted. A number of the LUCs that the Review Team spoke to called for a constitution of the LPPBs, meaning a formal document that outlines the roles and responsibilities of the boards. Some were aware of a constitution having been developed, and that it was sitting with the police leadership, but they did not know why it had not been released (a document had already been produced by the SLP in 2009).

6.5.2 It is worth considering how to support a process of formalization of the boards through future legislation on policing. The JSDP has supported the further development of guidelines for the boards. The document is currently being discussed at Police HQ, and is likely to be ratified in the near future. This will be an important development in terms of guiding further development of the boards. Another important initiative was the training provided for LPPB Chairmen together with regular police officers across the country at the PTS in Hastings.

6.5.3 In general, a greater degree of formalization of the partnership boards would be of benefit, e.g., through the consistent provision of training and development of written material on their functions and responsibilities. Neither may ensure coherence across the country, but may ensure greater recognition of their work, which would be supported by the police as well as the LPPBs themselves. Given the role that paramount and lesser chiefs often play in establishing the boards, support from the local leadership is likely as well.

6.6 Formalization through ID Cards and standardized clothing

6.6.1 Issuing ID cards, which has already been done in Freetown's Eastern Division, would support this process. In general, it is important that CSVs in particular are clearly identifiable. LUC East Division in Freetown: "Sometimes people say they are CSVs when they are armed robbers; so it is important that they can show that they are indeed part of us." In Eastern Division, CSVs were provided with "white t-shirts with the crest, just like SLP uniforms." This is not a country-wide initiative, but in the case of Eastern Division, one of the most crowded areas in Freetown, the initiative has been taken out of perceived necessity.

6.7 Striking consistency of LPPB role across the country

6.7.1 Despite the lack of formal cross-country guidance so far, there is remarkable consistency in the role that the board members play in the areas that the Review Team visited. Their role was described by the LUC in Kenema as "to complement the effort of the police." He continued: "If you think of the numerical strength, it is far below the fast growing population. We rely on the board to give us information, and the boards have been very instrumental in this regard."

6.7.2 It was added "we depend on civilians to give us information in difficult cases." Indeed, in a review of the JSDP's training of LPPB Chairmen one participant noted: "We provide information and

police act on the information.” It is as another participant commented “intelligence and community led policing” that has been developed. “The board makes it easier,” The LUC of East Division noted, “a murder has been committed, we call the board and we tell them that ‘we want you to go and find the person for us’. Before the reform, we were not having the board, and it was difficult to police. The difference is that now, when we want information, we contact the chairman, he will then call the zonal heads. They will discuss and come back.”

6.8 Accessing communities through the boards

6.8.1 The boards are also significant in terms of gaining access as already described above: “The Sierra Leone business, this family business, they will save their sons. Initially, when I came here,” The LUC of Eastern Division told us, “a serious theft occurred – the chiefs saw it, and the CSVs arrested the criminals. They held them, called the police, but when we came they were no longer there. I sent my intelligence people out there, but we could not do anything. If it had been an outsider to their own community, they would have reported the case to us, but since it was done by their own community, they dealt with it within themselves.” Even with the establishment of the boards, communal access of the SLP is a challenge, which has little to do with their logistical conditions, and more to do with general relations between the population and the SLP.

6.9 Civil not criminal cases?

6.9.1 The LPPB members that the Review Team spoke to would emphasise that they were strictly dealing with minor civil and not criminal cases. A number of the board Chairmen would nonetheless refer to cases of a criminal nature, including domestic violence, where board members dealt with the case rather than referring it to the police. As a general rule, cases that are ‘above’ a community are referred to as ‘blood crimes’, including murder, wounding and so forth.

6.10 Structure of the LPPB

6.10.1 LPPBs consist of a group of civilians constituting an executive and are headed by a Chairman (followed by a Vice Chairman, Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General, Organizing Secretary, Social Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, Public Relations Officer, youth representatives, women representatives, auditors, and advisers to the board). Apart from the executive and advisers, there are general members of the board.

6.11 Business and political interests within the LPPBs

6.11.1 It is worth pointing out that when the involvement of ‘the community’ is discussed in the context of LPPBs, ‘community’ in practice means the local authorities. At village level this means the chiefs (town chiefs or head-men, section and paramount chiefs), and not *necessarily* the general population. In other words, boards fit the power structures in the countryside, and a vehicle for enhancing authority, which is probably why they have been relatively successful. It also means, of course, that the boards are not politically neutral bodies.

6.11.2 While the LUC in Makeni noted the LPPB is not a ‘money-making thing’, there are other benefits from being a member. The Chairman of Kissy Division noted that he had wanted to become the Chairman to secure his business. In Kenema and Bo both the Chairmen are Lebanese shop owners who are able to consolidate their positions, both vis-à-vis the police and in the communities where they live.

6.11.3 Other members, such as the Secretary-General in Makeni, are also the Chairman of the ruling party, APC. On a number of occasions, including Kissy division, the Review Team heard stories about how board members had paid for the construction of new police posts, and in Kenema they have started, but not finished, the construction of a hospital for the SLP. In the East Division, the LUC is currently negotiating with the LPPBs, including tribal heads, to reconstruct a police post. “We are handicapped in terms of building the structure”, it was noted.

6.11.4 At times, LPPB members also supply fuel and transportation for the police. At the same time, the Chairman in Bo noted: “We have our policies – number one: we are not policemen. We are only supporting the police to be able to police properly. We force them. We pressure them.”

6.12 Meeting structure

6.12.1 LPPBs meet regularly with the LUC of their division, usually once a month where security concerns are shared. Membership is officially open to all civilians, but all the Chairmen that the Review Team spoke to were ‘people of importance’ within the community, often businessmen. As the LUC in Makeni noted, however, the LPPB is not a ‘money-making thing’.

6.13 LPPB role in police promotion and recruitment

6.13.1 On occasions LPPBs also play a role in recruitment and promotion of police officers. In some cases LPPB members are engaged on the promotion board.

6.14 Chiefdom Police

6.14.1 The legislation establishing the Chiefdom Police is the Chiefdom Police Act (Cap 284, Laws of Sierra Leone of 1960). According to the Act, they are employed by Chiefdom Councils upon the recommendation of District Watch Committees comprising the District Commissioner, the Superior Police Officer commanding the police district and one representative from each Chiefdom in the district, as appointed by the district’s Chiefdom Committee (sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Chiefdom Police Act).

6.14.2 The Chiefdom Police serve process and summons from local courts and also keep law and order in the courts. Their other duties include:

- The detection of crime
- The apprehension of offenders
- The maintenance of law and order
- The enforcement of all lawful by-laws and orders made by the Chiefdom Council
- Assistance with the collection of chiefdom revenue
- Any other duties assigned by the District Officers or Superior Police Officers
- As required by the Chiefdom Committees.

6.14.3 Other key legislation includes The 2004 Local Government Act, The Chiefdom Police Rules (1961), The Chiefdom Councils Act (1938), and The Chiefdom Police Ordinance (1959).

6.14.4 As Chiefdom police are involved in the arrest and detention of people, they must conform with the provisions of the Constitution, which means, inter alia, that they must conform with fundamental Human Rights contained in the Constitution.

6.14.5 The Chiefdom Police has historically experienced an entirely different trajectory of development to that of the LPPBs. However, they do continue to play a vital role in Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms (outside the Western Area). That said, the JSDP has already begun a process of engagement with the Chiefdom Police (working through the Paramount Chiefs). A TNA of the Chiefdom Police was carried out in August 2009 in Moyamba District by JSDP and the SLP.

6.14.6 Both in Moyamba and other districts, the Review Team was able to verify key findings of the TNA, including that training is minimal, if not non-existent. According to what the Review Team were told, Chiefdom Police officers have received no training since the 1980s apart from that provided by JSDP. Uniforms are not supplied (although in Makeni, they did receive uniforms from the prison services), and they lack basic equipment such as handcuffs, communications and mobility.

6.14.7 Most importantly, the Native Administration, which includes the Chiefdom Police, is not being paid regular salaries. As a consequence most of the officers want to leave their job, and are not eligible for pension through the National Social Security and Insurance Trust (NASSIT).

6.14.8 On one level, the Chiefdom Police has similar functions to that of the partnership board: "At times, where there is no police presence, we use the chiefdom police." Just as with the LPPBs, the Chiefdom Police were mentioned as important in dealing with civil matters, including petty theft, unpaid loans, extra-marital affairs, etc

6.15 Is the current model of policing still appropriate for Sierra Leone?

6.15.1 The context in which policing has to be delivered is much different now than when LNP was first developed. As stability has returned, people have been able to move back into their villages, and customary systems have also returned. New legislation also puts an onus on local government and Chiefs to maintain order in their communities (Local Government Act and Chieftaincy Act). However, it is impossible for the SLP in a climate of lack of resources to be everywhere. Stability also means that minor issues become the norm, many of which do not need police powers to resolve, and are better sorted at a local level using traditional methods or civil, not criminal, law. The question is – does LNP still offer a good model?

6.15.2 The Review Team considers that the LNP remains an effective model. LNP is about meeting the policing needs and expectations of the local community. Resolution of 'policing' problems does not necessarily require the SLP. There are a number of ways that problems can be – and are – resolved. However, it is the second part of the definition that is critically important – national standards and guidelines. Without them, there is a risk of people 'taking the law into their own hands' or using their power to their own ends, without regard to fundamental issues such as Human Rights. The Review Team has seen the growth of LPPBs in some areas, undertaking dispute resolution, and the growth of neighbourhood watch schemes and community volunteers. It is not clear that national standards and guidelines are fully developed, promulgated and understood. There is also a lack of external monitoring and oversight mechanisms. This is a justifiable criticism of the SLP themselves, which is being addressed albeit slowly. The same principles must apply to anyone who is involved in policing in its widest sense.

6.15.3 Any regulations required could be made through the Police Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 158 of the Constitution.

6.15.4 It is important to note that 'no person shall raise any Police Force except by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament' (Article 155 of the Constitution). The SLP and the Chiefdom Police are both established as such.

6.15.5 In summary, LNP still remains an excellent model of policing for Sierra Leone, and can be further developed to meet the needs and expectations of local communities and incorporate the growth of more locally based systems of policing in its widest sense. However, this development must be handled with caution, and national standards and guidelines, together with systems of monitoring and oversight must be developed and implemented.

6.16 Outline Plan – Community Policing:

1. Map presence and functions of LPPBs across Sierra Leone, and support the establishment of boards where they do not exist.
2. Promote the voluntary basis of the LPPBs in urban and rural areas until such a time when the Government of Sierra Leone can afford to fund and run the SLP independently from external resources.
3. Support the further development of a LPPB constitution.

4. In continuation of 3, support wide promotion of the document across Sierra Leone, both with the SLP and the general population.
5. In the longer-term advocate for the inclusion of LPPBs in legislation on policing as an important link between the national police, SLP, and local communities.
6. Make CSVs clearly identifiable, and develop and standardize issuance of ID Cards for CSVs and LPPBs.
7. Develop structured, regular and coherent collective training for the SLP, LPPBs, and Chiefdom Police on roles, responsibilities and mandates to ensure that each know their functions.
8. Build on the initiatives around building the capacity of the Chiefdom Police already taken by JSDP.
9. Produce a costed project delivery plan.
10. Specifically regarding LPPBS:
 - LPPB chair should be independent.
 - Formally act as a local oversight, accountability and performance monitoring mechanism, linked to the SLP Inspectorate and any external oversight mechanism developed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This will require detailed operational procedures and formal training.
 - All state and non-state actors involved in policing should have a representative on the LPPB. This will ensure anyone involved in policing, particularly non-state actors, have a set of national standards and guidelines to work to. Chiefdom Police will become part of the LPPB process, and this will require clarity with regards to their statutory functions and limitations on powers of arrest, detention, search etc..
 - A formal public meeting structure should be established to enable ordinary member of the public to have their say.
 - A system should be introduced where selected members of the LPPB have to right to visit police stations and posts unannounced to check on prisoner handling.
 - Care should be taken to protect the operational independence of the SLP. The LPPB are there to act as an accountability and oversight mechanism, and support the SLP in their role as lead on policing issues.
 - Consideration should be given to establishing and supporting a National Association of LPPBs. This will enable a national voice to negotiate travel and other expenses, spread lessons and good practice and have a powerful say in national police budget negotiations and the like. The Chairperson of the national association should have a seat on the Police Council (perhaps one of the independent positions).

7 Gender Sensitive Policing and the Handling of Victims of SGBV

7.1 Gender in the SLP

7.1.1 As at January 2011, 16% of the SLP strength was female. The Western Area has the highest ratio of female to male officers at 25% whilst the North, South and East are significantly lower at 11%, 14% and 13% respectively.

7.1.2 Of the 102 officers at Superintendent rank and above, only 7 (7%) are female.

7.1.3 The gender divide within OSD is particularly wide with only approximately 8% female officers, and the SLP should ensure that it is satisfied that it is sufficiently pro-active and considers positive action to redress the gender imbalance.

7.1.4 DIZ have supported the SLP with the development of a Gender and Sexual Harassment Policy although this has not yet been finalised. The AIG HR is the Force lead on gender issues.

7.1.5 It appears that many female police officers have a belief that normal line management structures are influenced by gender. A DI in an FSU stated that her ultimate line manager was the current Director of Support Services because she was the most senior female officer in the Force, as opposed to the Director of Crime Services, under whose structure FSUs currently sit. The emerging, apparently accepted trend is that women look after women within the SLP in terms of welfare and career opportunities.

7.1.6 It was particularly concerning to observe senior male police officers publicly call women the weaker sex, that they were less physically able and less intelligent than their male counterparts. This may go some way to explaining why it would appear female officers have retreated to within their own gender group for welfare and support, but this needs addressing urgently.

7.1.7 The Review Team conducted a number of female officer only focus groups during their period in-country. The overall belief from female officers is that the SLP has significantly improved its approach to the integration of women within the organisation. Some female officers believed that female graduate officers were being prioritised for promotion although no real evidence has been obtained to support this belief. In general, the female officers considered that they had equality in terms of access to departments, postings and development.

7.1.8 The PTS (supported by JSDP) provided a month long middle management course in October/November 2010 for female sergeants and inspectors. Such courses, if not similarly available to men, have the potential to be considered as positive discrimination rather than positive action and SLP needs to be cautious about such an approach. Whilst the curriculum of the course has not been examined, it would be difficult to envisage why such a course was gender specific.

7.1.9 Gender exclusive language is common place throughout the SLP both verbally and in writing. The review team viewed the PTS Sergeant's Development Course training material and found numerous examples of gender exclusive language which only serves to marginalise women. One particular phrase relates to how a sergeant should improve morale and specifies that "he should support his men". The subliminal messaging suggests that only men are sergeants and only men are officers.

7.1.10 Other than the Police Discipline Regulations, there is no formal and accountable process to mediate or manage lower level staff conduct issues such as lower level harassment, inappropriate language and bullying. The introduction of a Grievance Policy would address this need.

7.1.11 The SLP should ensure that gender awareness training is a theme that runs throughout all training courses.

7.1.12 Female officers wear name badges that specify their sexuality i.e. WPC and W/Inspector. The name badge has a unique officer number as well as their name and this is more than sufficient for identification purposes. The use of the letter W (for woman) in front of rank should be discontinued to encourage gender neutral reference.

7.1.13 The SLP does not have any flexible or part-time working arrangements. The review team would contend that even if these were introduced, the take up would be low, as references to poor pay and conditions were a common complaint throughout the review period. It is unlikely that police officers, either male or female, would consider a reduction in salary that would accompany part-time working. The SLP are not sufficiently mature in terms of their HR capacity to manage flexible working or indeed job share arrangements.

7.1.14 The inability, through budgetary constraints, of the SLP to invest in infrastructure and capital costs means there are very few separate male and female restroom facilities. In fact, in some stations there are no rest room facilities at all. This is unlikely to change in the near future and any existing arrangements are likely to have been achieved through default rather than design.

7.1.15 The recruitment and selection fitness test has not been gender assessed and as such both males and females are tested for their physical fitness in a similar way. Anecdotal evidence was provided that on a pro-rata basis, more females than males failed the fitness test and this is an area that would benefit from closer assessment to ensure that it does not favour one sex to the detriment of the other.

7.2 Outline Plan - Gender:

- Support the SLP to introduce a gender impact assessment process for all SOPs, policies and strategies.
- Support the SLP to ensure that it adheres to its gender mainstream policy particularly in relation to recruitment.
- Support the SLP to produce an Equality and Fairness at work policy.
- Support the SLP to tackle the clear belief that exists amongst its staff that women are the weaker sex and therefore are not equal.
- Assess the selection and recruitment process to ensure it does not discriminate against women.
- Support the SLP to remove the gender identification label of W (woman).
- Support the SLP produce a Grievance Policy where staff can address internal bullying, harassment inequality issues within a structured framework.

7.3 Sexual and Gender Based Violence

7.3.1 Although currently contractually and commercially sensitive, it is noted that the ASJP contains a significant review component in relation to the FSUs.

7.3.2 The SLP introduced the concept of Family Support Units (FSU) in 2001 to professionalise the service provided to the victims of sexual and gender based violence. In 2006, the number of FSUs across Sierra Leone grew to 26 and as of January 2011, there are 43 functioning FSUs.

7.3.3 There is no specific strategic vision for FSUs within the SLP other than reference to their development within the 2009-2011 Strategic Plan.

7.3.4 There are approximately 327 police officers working within FSUs in Sierra Leone.

7.3.5 The staffing of each FSU varies however it is generally consistent that a DI is responsible for each FSU and reports to the FSU Superintendent who is based at CID HQ in Freetown. The number of detectives and detective sergeants at each FSU is variable and there was no evidence that the allocation of resources has been based on any analysis of demand, which is a critical issue to ensure that there are sufficient resources available to respond to incidents.

7.3.6 With the exception of 12 locations, all FSUs are attached to or an integral part of an existing police station. In terms of victim support and sensitivity, the benefits of having separate but associated FSUs cannot be underestimated. However it is recognised that the capital budget does not currently exist to support such infrastructure development.

7.3.7 In the Force half-yearly crime statistics report from January to June 2010, there were a total of 2,300 crimes classed as "Offences against women and children". A calculation based on the number of staff in FSU (minus 43 posts for DIs as managers) would equate to an average case load of 8 cases per officer (DC and DS) or 9 per DC (deducting 43 DS posts) over a six month period, which essentially is 1.5 cases per DC per month, which the review team does not consider to be a significant workload.

7.3.8 According to the 2009 SLP Annual Crime Statistics Report, reported crimes of domestic violence increased from 396 in 2007 to 654 in 2009. The 2010 six-monthly Crime Statistics Report (Jan – June) reveals this figure has apparently risen to 868 for the first six months of that year (as compared to 654 for the full year 2009). This increase could be a result of an actual increase in these crimes or, from a more positive viewpoint, an increase in confidence in actually reporting crimes over this period. Every FSU spoken to by the Review Team was able to communicate the sensitisation work they were doing (or had been doing when they had transport available) in the communities, schools, women's groups etc. It is important to more fully understand the reason for the increase in reported crimes and additional analysis will be required.

7.3.9 The number of reported rapes has dropped from 135 in 2007 to 115 in 2009. The six-monthly crime statistics for Jan – Jun 2010 indicates 74 reported rapes, The full 2010 crime statistics were not available to the Review Team as the report was being prepared during their time in-country.

7.3.10 There exists some concern that the crime statistics, which are gathered at each FSU locally and then sent to the FSU Supt at CID HQ, are inaccurate and that the Supt has to visit each FSU to check their veracity. The JSDP has funded the installation of an electronic database system at Bo, Kenema and Makeni, which includes three computers and a server. However these are not as yet operational and there is no network connection or sufficient trained staff to operate the computers, although this is planned for March 2011. Power is also a problem, and where there are working generators there is no money for fuel.

7.3.11 It is unsurprising that Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Makeni, as the main conurbations within Sierra Leone, have the highest prevalence of both Rape and Domestic Violence. The focus on reducing these crimes through sensitisation, swift and thorough investigation and successful prosecution should focus on these areas.

7.3.12 The success, or otherwise of the FSUs in investigating and prosecuting SGBV is unknown. There are no 'detected crime' rates maintained that are reliable and often, any subsequent Court trial outcome is not fed back to the Force or investigating officers that would assist in developing investigations and case file preparation quality.

7.3.13 The JSCO Donor Mapping report referred to in this report highlights that there are seven separate organisations providing SGBV training/support however, the focus appears to be in the

South (3) and East (3) rather than the West (where there are no donors mapped as providing SGBV assistance) and North (1), where crime statistics reveal the highest prevalence of SGBV. The contribution of JSDP has been significant both in supporting training and funding the 'model' FSU at Moyamba. GIZ have also provided significant support to SGBV training to SLP.

7.3.14 It is apparent that there may be an opportunity to exert greater coordination of effort in the areas of all SGBV issues, including training, sensitisation, investigation, prosecution, access to medical care etc to ensure a single Sierra Leone collective vision and strategic direction.

7.3.15 Evidence was presented to the review team during their visits to local FSUs that officers were active in sensitising the community to the issue of SGBV and that they visited tribal leaders, schools and communities as well as accessing local radio to reduce and prevent instances of SGBV as well as attempting to change mindsets. Many FSUs outside of Freetown highlighted that this work had ceased due to the shortage of transport to enable them to access communities.

7.3.16 Access to justice for the victims of sexual crimes is problematic. The Court requires medical evidence to substantiate the charge. When a crime is reported, the police will issue the victim with a requirement to obtain medical evidence, which the victim often had to pay for. The SLP does not operate any form of contract to retain or access clinical support for medical examinations in such cases.

7.3.17 Such examination should be free, and Article 23(b) of the Domestic Violence Act 2007 states the Minister for Social Welfare ***may make regulations providing for (the modalities for the provision of free medical treatment for victims).***

7.3.18 It has been reported to the Review Team that such regulations have been made and that Government Hospitals have been directed to provide free medical examinations to victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse but that some clinical staff are refusing to recognise this direction and still charge victims for examination.

7.3.19 Confusion may be arising as the 2007 Act refers only to domestic violence which is defined as ***"an offence under this Act for any person in a domestic relationship to engage in any act of domestic violence"***. This includes physical or sexual abuse. It is apparent then that any sexual crime committed outside of a domestic relationship such as a 'stranger rape' may not be included in the provisions for free medical examinations.

7.3.20 The draft SLP SGBV SOP refers to paragraph 23(b) of the Domestic Violence Act 2007 and clearly identifies that no charge should be made to the victim by the police for a medical certificate and that medical examinations are free. It is however ambiguous whether this relates to only physical or sexual abuse in a domestic relationship or, focusing on sexual abuse, all such crimes irrespective of whether in a domestic relationship or not.

7.3.21 This ambiguity requires to be addressed with urgency as it is discriminatory and marginalises victims not in a domestic relationship making access to justice mechanisms difficult. One other issue for the SLP is that a number of offences may go unreported (skewing statistics), offenders remain at liberty and public confidence in the ability of the state to provide security continues to fall, potentially destabilising the communities.

7.3.22 It is understood that some consideration is being given to explore the potential to divert some SGBV cases to paralegals and community mediators to reduce the burden on courts and achieve swifter results. The Review Team would urge any such development be carefully considered regarding the impact on victims and the potential for repeat victimisation and repeat offending. Swift justice is not always the best justice.

7.3.23 A pleasing addition to some FSUs was the integration of a Social Welfare worker to enhance the partnership approach to tackling SGBV and share information. The Force should continue to work with their relevant partners in local government to adopt an holistic approach to dealing with SGBV as referred to above in terms of a single collective vision and strategic direction.

7.3.24 A Police Inspectorate review of FSUs at Makeni, Bo, Kenema and Freetown was conducted in August/September 2010. A total of 14 recommendations were made with the majority being administrative. One of the recommendations was that FSUs should be managed locally by LUCs and the Review Team supports this recommendation.

7.3.25 However, it will be essential that the Director of Crime Services retains a professional head of service such as the current FSU Supt to maintain corporate impetus and strategic direction and an oversight capability for development of the whole FSU estate and staff. It was apparent both to the Police Inspectorate and this Review Team that the current remote line management structures do not engender effective oversight arrangements either of staff, quality of work or care of the FSU estate.

7.3.26 Should the SLP direct LUCs to take greater responsibility for FSUs in their areas then this must be accompanied by confidence in their ability to manage, support and direct this specific area of policing.

7.3.27 The Police Inspectorate review was very critical of the FSU at Makeni, and one of their findings states ***“The team also observed that the Regional Commander needs to replace the entire staff of the FSU Unit in Makeni with intelligence personnel as the present ones lack investigative capacity”***

7.3.28 The Police Inspectorate review also reflects the views of this Review Team in respect of the quality of investigations and level of training for FSU staff. The SLP training appears ad-hoc, it can move from one month to two weeks without any other rationale other than lack of funding for food and per diems for staff.

7.3.29 The development of a stakeholder group focusing on women and children at district levels would assist in delivering a more joined up approach to SGBV. Stakeholders such as SLP, Social Welfare, Health and Education would derive great benefit from working together in a formal structure to develop their approach to these important issues.

7.3.30 Identification of plain clothes FSU officers was an issue for the Review Team as none wore any badge or identity card that separated them from the public in often very busy offices. It would be beneficial to introduce some form of corporate identity card that could be worn when the situation is appropriate such as in police stations or when in the communities delivering sensitising inputs.

7.3.31 The process of reporting and recording crime is covered under the relevant section within this report. However, it is appropriate to discuss one particular issue in this section. It is essential, to reduce the trauma to a victim of SGBV, that they should have to relate the crime to as few people as possible. Some victims have to report the crime at the police station community service area before being taken to the FSU. This practice should cease. As soon as it is identified that someone wishes to report an SGBV case, they should be accompanied and passed over to the local FSU, where available. It is understood the SOP referred to above will provide guidance on this issue.

7.3.32 The FSUs also deal with youth offenders (14 -17 years). There are no juvenile cells at police stations and the Force policy is unambiguous that juveniles will not be placed with in cells with adults. This presents a logistical issue when a juvenile is arrested and held at a police station whilst an investigation is in progress. These juveniles often have to sleep on the floor of the custody area or FSU office until such time as a parent or guardian uplifts them or they are handed over to the local probation officer or social welfare. The review team accepts that the SLP faces significant budgetary

issues, however there must be an acknowledgement that this practice is unacceptable and places both the juvenile and the SLP at risk.

7.3.33 A number of donor interventions have included training police prosecutors on SGBV issues and this is a welcome addition to the development of a well trained police prosecution team. Although no figures were presented, it is understood that SGBV cases have proven to be very difficult to prosecute and this emphasises the requirement to provide high quality SGBV training to prosecutors and indeed investigators.

7.3.34 Other than in Freetown, where there are three run by the NGO Women in Crisis, there are no refuges available for victims of domestic abuse. Women who report such crimes are often ostracised and marginalised by family and communities and have nowhere to turn other than return home to face the prospect of repeat victimisation.

7.3.35 Any future assistance to the Justice Sector in Sierra Leone should also examine the potential to hold SGBV cases in Chambers, excluding the public where appropriate and particularly for child victims - facing an attacker again can often be a tremendously traumatic experience.

7.4 Outline Plan - SGBV:

1. Support the SLP to engage with the Ministry of Health at a strategic level to ensure SGBV victim's medical examinations are free.
2. Support the SLP and the Ministry of Education to develop a joint SGBV training package for delivery in schools.
3. Support the SLP to develop a strategic vision for FSUs.
4. Provide technical support to conduct a full review as to the quality and relevance of FSU staff investigative and interview training.
5. Ensure, through ASJP or JSCO that donor coordination is achieved and consider a stakeholder structure that achieves a 'single vision' for Sierra Leone.
6. Support a full demand and resource modelling exercise for FSUs.
7. Support the SLP to produce identity cards and lanyards for plain clothes officers.
8. Support the SLP production of enhanced performance indicators and analysis to identify communities most at risk.
9. Scope the potential to have District level stakeholder committees that could synergise the delivery of services to children and women.
10. Engage with the Justice Sector to assess the potential for holding certain court cases in private particularly for child victims of SGBV.
11. Continue to support specific SGBV issues as a key tenet of police prosecutor training.

8 Support from other Donors and Agencies

8.1 Donor Support

8.1.1 The Review Team would draw attention to the Justice Sector Mapping exercise recently conducted by the JSCO. This provides a more comprehensive assessment of justice sector donor support that the Review Team would have been able to conduct in the time and resources available to them during the review period.

8.1.2 The JSDP interventions have not been listed in detail, as they should be familiar to this report's audience. It is worth noting however that the JSDP policing support component was a very small part of the overall programme and amounted to approximately £600,000 (2.5%).

8.1.3 However, during interviews with a number of donors, information regarding planned interventions for 2011-2012 was identified:

- USAid - \$1.2million programme focusing on public order training and preparedness for 2012 elections.
- GIZ – 800,000 euro programme for 2011-2012. Refurbishment of 4 classrooms at PTS and support for SGBV training, Advanced Financial Services course, strategic pre-deployment training for Peace Keeping Operations.
- UNIPSIL - \$1,054,140 programme for 2011-2012. Provide support to ONS including ONS regional workshops, security sector and political party conferences, NSCC national meetings. Strengthen institutional capacity and infrastructure, logistics and impartiality of SLP including maintenance of vehicles, purchase of and training on new communication equipment. Training SLP, Fire, Prison, Chiefdom police, MACP personnel on election security (10,500 personnel in 16 workshops). Provide fuel and rations for SLP in lead up to 2012 elections. Crowd control training to SLP assigned to election security (2500 officers trained in 36 sessions).
- UNDP/UNIPSIL/UNPOL - \$199,638.24 logistical support to CDIID, vehicles, printers, cameras, consumables which has been delivered. On-going support to strengthen its investigative and internal oversight capacity.
- JDITF – Submission to build permanent accommodation for TCU costing \$460,000.

8.1.4 It is understood that USAid and UNIPSIL will discuss the public order training elements of both their programmes to ensure they complement each other (as well as anything coming out of this review's recommendation). The concern for the Review Team is that the SLP received extensive Public Order Training from the Metropolitan Police over a number of years, and the strategy and operational set up is based on the UK. Any non-comparative training from the US may not be helpful.

8.2 Elections 2012

8.2.1 There is a basket fund mechanism set up to support the 2012 elections. Contributors include DFID, EU, Ireland, Japan and Denmark. It is managed by the UNDP, with NEC and the SLP being implementing partners. Procurement is carried out by the UNDP.

8.2.2 The SLP have already put in a request for a budget to meet election needs, including transport, fuel, communications and ration. It also includes bids to cover training, intelligence management, media, CID, sensitisation activities and CDIID election related activities. The grand total is \$11.740m (including \$8.73m for vehicles and fuel). This bid is supported by an outline costed action plan.

8.2.3 The Review Team was informed that bids of \$56m have been submitted to the basket fund, against an approximate commitment of about \$34m. Clearly there is a big shortfall, and the Director of Budgets was aware that the GoSL will have to find some money. He recognised that the most

immediate priority was to meet the transport needs of the SLP. However, the NEC Commissioners pointed out that there was some 'shying away' from the basket fund in relation to vehicles for the police.

8.2.4 The Review Team were told by the NEC Commissioners that whilst the 2007 elections went well, there was a major problem in the distribution and deployment of the police. The police must be on site (polling stations and centres) some days before to secure the ground for the distribution of polling materials. Money for rations must be available and distributed in good time. Transport was also a problem, leading to delays in deployment and problems in security patrols in some areas.

8.2.5 It was clear to the Review Team that there is scope for uncertainty amongst donors about who is supporting what in relation to the general support of the SLP, and for the elections. Provision of funds cannot be left to the last minute, as procurement cycles can last for many months.

8.3 Outline Plan – Donor Support

1. Provision of technical aid to help research fully who is providing what to the SLP in relation to the elections, and identify in detail the gaps in funding, assess the resulting risks, and help find solutions. This should be coordinated with other outline plans in this paper, and could probably be combined with other actions to save money.

9 UK Support to Improve Police Operational Capability

PERFORMANCE

9.1 *Strategic Planning and Monitoring*

9.1.1 In 2009, with the support of JSDP and a local consultant, SLP produced a three year Strategic Plan (2009-2011). This plan is due to be refreshed before the end of 2011 and a new three year strategic development plan published. The current plan identifies the SLP mission and values and communicates strategic priorities, goals and objectives.

9.1.2 JSDP indicated that the production of the 2009-2011 plan involved comprehensive internal and external consultation and it is essential that this continues in the development of the new three year plan. To avoid becoming a ritualistic cyclical event, the plan must be better linked to the financial planning process and be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Time-bound) aligned with clearer lines of accountability.

9.1.3 The SLP has not yet measured progress towards achieving any of the goals, objectives and targets and this is a critical omission that requires to be addressed, and should be an annual process. Essentially, the SLP has, as yet, no understanding of what it has achieved in terms of activities or outcomes for the 2009-2011 Strategic Plan.

9.1.4 The SLP aspires to be an intelligence led organisation but suffers from an absence of many components that would facilitate this, such as an understanding of the true nature of demand, logistics and key performance data and ability to analyse information and intelligence.

9.1.5 The SLP would benefit from the production of an annual Strategic Assessment which identifies what specific areas of criminality and disorder it should focus on.

9.1.6 The Review Team understands that the Director of Corporate Affairs intends to request an environmental, risk and threat assessment from all LUCs. This, linked with crime statistics and other available performance information, would be sufficient to develop a basic Strategic Assessment and Control Strategy (this sets strategic policing priorities and details intelligence, prevention and enforcement priorities). The natural progression from this would be that each Region would then produce their own Strategic Assessment and focus on Regional crime/disorder issues and ultimately each Division would undertake a similar exercise.

9.1.7 The Review Team accept that this level of intelligence led policing development is unachievable within the current context but nonetheless, an overarching Strategic Assessment and Control Strategy would be beneficial and unite the Force with a common understanding of what issues it should focus on to provide safer communities. It should not, however, hinder LUCs addressing local issues outside of the Control Strategy but they should ensure where the priority areas affect their communities they must take measures to address these in their annual Local Policing Plans (LPPs).

9.1.8 The existence of LPPs is important, but the understanding at 'grass root' level is essential. The Review Team found little evidence of an awareness of the overall Force strategic direction, vision and LPPs below ASP level. As described above, LPPs that link to local issues will develop a greater overall understanding of the overall strategic direction and vision of the SLP.

9.1.9 Donor support in the continued development of intelligence led policing and production of Strategic Assessments and Control Strategy is considered to be necessary.

9.1.10 The Inspector General should consider publishing an Annual Performance report that is available to the public which would enhance SLPs transparency and assist with building trust and confidence.

9.2 Incident logging and management

9.2.1 Linked to the development of intelligence led policing, the SLP needs to introduce a basic but robust incident management system within its Communication Centre. This would provide them with the ability to monitor demand and, analysed in association with its crime recording system would enable the SLP to have a more accurate, but basic, representation of variations in calls for service across the Country. This in turn would support the need to match resources to demand across Sierra Leone.

9.2.2 The process of recording crime is basic, paper based but consistent across the Country through the introduction of Crime Writers and Crime Records Branches at each Divisional HQ. The statistics are gathered locally and sent to the Corporate Services Department (CSD) at HQ monthly.

9.2.3 The CSD is the performance hub for the SLP. It provides the EMB with research, analysis and strategic planning. It is clear that the services it provides are constrained through the lack training and equipment particularly in the arena of research and analysis and this is an area that would benefit from donor support.

9.2.4 The CSD Chief Superintendent also highlighted the under resourcing issues within his unit. He had recently lost 4 staff to the UN Mission in Darfur and was doubtful those staff would be replaced but, if they were, the replacements would likely have no technical skills that would be useful in CSD.

9.2.5 Succession planning and coaching/mentoring are key HR issues that SLP has not fully grasped and needs to consider when transferring staff across the police estate.

9.3 Perception surveys – internal and external

9.3.1 The CSD, supported by JSDP, conducted a Public Perception Survey in 2009. The results from this survey are still in draft format (as of March 2011) and have not been considered or actioned, which is of particular concern.

9.3.2 The SLP also produce an internal Personnel Perception Survey but were unable to provide the Review Team with a copy of this.

9.3.3 These surveys are useful when supported by an action plan to follow up on the various findings. It appears no such action plans exist and as such the surveys are essentially impotent, especially as the Public Perception report is now more than a year old.

9.3.4 The 'Survey of Crime Victims in Sierra Leone' was conducted during May to June 2008 by Dr Annie Barbara Chikwanha, African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) and is also a useful reference document. It would be useful to conduct another similar survey to that of Dr Chikwanha's to identify whether victim's experiences had changed for the better or worse in the last two years.

9.4 Crime recording and monitoring

9.4.1 One of the significant gaps in performance management is that there are no records of 'detected' or 'solved' crime that are easily accessible (SLP terminology is 'charged to court'). Not one LUC or deputy interviewed by the Review Team was able to communicate how successful their officers were in investigating and detecting crime – this knowledge is an essential component of

reducing the fear of crime in the communities. Indeed, whilst many staff spoke about reducing the fear of crime, none at LCU level were able to convey what that actually meant and how it was being achieved or measured.

9.4.2 Other than ad-hoc local monitoring, the SLP does not record or produce performance information in relation to staff abstraction rates (sickness, training, leave, court attendance etc) which is an important factor in determining operating capability/capacity. This should be considered as an area for improvement linked to the CSD.

9.5 Redundancy of resources

9.5.1 Redundancy of resources is a critical issue. It was disappointing to see so many police officers sitting or wandering about apparently without purpose at the LCUs visited by the Review Team.

9.5.2 One particular Divisional HQ had 40 OSD officers on 'stand by' in case there was a disturbance or riot in the area. The lack of vehicles was often quoted as a reason for many staff being tied to police stations. With a little innovative leadership and direction, these resources could easily be more actively engaged in policing duties. When interviewed, the AIG OSD considered it essential to have resources on stand-by as there would be no ability to muster a critical mass of officers to manage a large disturbance due to a lack of logistics.

9.5.3 It was more than apparent that there is an obvious 'café culture' and police officers only leave the station when it is essential for them to do so. The SLP needs to urgently review this worrying trend and consider how best to use these redundant resources in a more proactive way to develop community relationships and build trust and confidence.

9.5.4 The Review Team is aware that both the SLP and MIA have a clear desire to improve visibility in the communities through targeted foot patrols and this is a positive step forward but they must link this to intelligence, tasking and effective output and outcome recording.

9.5.5 The Tasking and Coordination Meeting (TCG) structures are now clearly embedded within Divisional business with weekly meetings being held and good representative attendance. In some areas, the chair of the LPPB attends the TCG and this is a very positive example of engaging with communities in delivering a policing service and one which should be replicated in all areas.

9.5.6 There was also evidence presented that the communities were providing intelligence and information to the police, often through the LPPB, in relation to crime hot spots or 'grey areas' as they are known in Sierra Leone. Positive and swift SLP action in response to this information and intelligence is useful in building confidence and perceptions of professionalism and response to community concerns.

9.6 Human Resource Management

9.6.1 Performance is inextricably linked to leadership and the Review Team reviewed the rank structure linked to the resources managed at each level.

Rank	Actual (current)	Ratio to rank below (rounded up)	Approved for 2012	Ratio to rank below (rounded up)
Chief Supt	22	1:3	40	1:2
Supt	68	1:2	70	1:4

ASP	130	1:7	300	1:2
Insp	907	1:3	700	1:4
Sgt	2402	1:3	2500	1:3
PC	6386		7767	

9.6.2 The ratios as highlighted in red are indicators of significant over management and associated on-costs. The one in grey indicates a potential for too much responsibility. Those in black are realistic ratios based on UK policing ratios.

9.6.3 Whilst the 2012 establishment figure of 12,000 has only recently been approved by the Police Council and Finance Ministry, it remains an area that would benefit from a further review as there are potential budgetary savings in reducing the management on-costs through reducing the supervision ratios. The SLP currently has 207 more Inspectors than it may need. The rationale for the increase in Chief Superintendents from 22 to 40 is as yet unexplained but concerning.

9.6.4 The current Operational strength of the SLP as at 1st February 2011 was 9,806 police officers which included non-frontline police officers such as mechanics, technicians and drivers. The actual number of such officers is unknown but is estimated to be about 10-15% of the total operational workforce.

9.6.5 There is clear scope to consider a workforce modernisation programme and examine the potential to 'civilianise' these non-frontline posts. This was under consideration some years ago, but has not progressed. There seems little benefit in training a new recruit in police powers and responsibilities for 20 weeks to then place them in a role which could be fulfilled by a civilian, potentially with more suitable skills, such as a mechanic.

9.6.6 The requirement to recruit an additional 2,000 police officers in advance of the 2012 Elections might have been mitigated with a workforce modernisation programme. Experienced and trained police officers could have been diverted to police work and replaced with civilian staff with the appropriate skills and training for those jobs. This would also have reduced the impact on recruit training at PTS and freed up capacity for more appropriate refresher training and management training. In any event, an establishment figure should not be based on a requirement that comes round once every 5 years.

9.7 Outline Plan – Performance

1. Provide support to the SLP to enhance its ability to be a more intelligence led organisation.
2. Linked to 1, and through leadership development and operational accountability, to embed a culture of pro-activity across the SLP as opposed to its current generally reactive nature.
3. Linked to 1 and 2, to support the development of measures of operational pro-activity such as foot patrols, community meetings attended, schools visited etc.
4. Linked to 1,2 and 3, to work in collaboration with DFID's Harvard consultants to develop a locally relevant, robust enhanced performance matrix and supporting SOP. This will require local technical input and training across the SLP.
5. Support should be given to LUCs in order that they are able to have a greater understanding of how to develop, understand and use enhanced performance measure.
6. Provide technical support to the Inspectorate and CSD in terms of strategic planning, monitoring and reporting on action plans, presentation and communication skills, data gathering and analysis and research methodologies.

7. Support the SLP to develop an enhanced incident recording and management system that can be used to measure and analyse calls for service.
8. Provide technical assistance in the development of a public annual performance report.
9. Support the production of a communication strategy that is able to deliver the strategy, vision, aims and objectives to all SLP staff.
10. Provide strategic and technical support to SLP to undertake a workforce modernisation programme.
11. To support the SLP in developing a more robust business change programme and project/work-stream coordination.

9.8 Corruption

9.8.1 Sierra Leone is 134th worst country in the world out of 178.⁸ It is 28 out of 47 in the Sub-Saharan Africa sub index, based on 5 surveys.

9.8.2 Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010 report indicates that, over the last 3 years, 53% of Sierra Leonean respondents thought that the level of corruption had decreased, and that 73% thought that the Government's actions in the fight against corruption were effective. This is set against a global increase of corruption over the last 3 years. However, out of 11 institutions the police were perceived as the most corrupt,

9.8.3 "Throughout 2009 the government of President Ernest Bai Koroma made notable progress in addressing endemic corruption and weak rule of law, thus distancing Sierra Leone further from the issues that gave rise to its 11-year armed conflict that ended in 2002. However persistent weaknesses within the police and judiciary... illuminated the fragility of these gains."⁹

9.8.4 This raises important considerations. Firstly, there is an improvement in the perception that the problem of corruption is decreasing and being tackled, but the Police remain the most corrupt institution. Secondly, this improvement in corruption also means that Sierra Leone continues to distance itself from one of the causes of the armed conflict, but the persistent weaknesses in the police and the judiciary means that these gains are fragile. In other words, if the decline of the SLP continues, the potential for a return to armed conflict increases.

9.8.5 But how does corruption in the SLP manifest itself, and can anything be done? Corruption, viewed by an outsider, comes in many forms. Greed – corrupt payments for the award of contracts, misuse of police assets for private gain, demand for payments to investigate crime, payments for basic materials, for example paper and fuel to record and investigate complaints, harassment by traffic officers and at road check points – the list is long.

9.8.6 However, it is too simplistic to say, for example, little can be done until police conditions of service are improved, and the police receive a living wage. There are ways of building resistance to corruption, and reducing the opportunity. In the area of greed, proper audit and inspectorate procedures, backed up by internal investigations (and external by the ACC as appropriate) can reduce corruption. There is good evidence that the drive to address these issues by the new IGP is having an effect. Recent investigation of practices in the Transport section has resulted in a senior officer being arrested and awaiting trial for corruption and another senior officer in the same section has been suspended awaiting action for misuse of police equipment.

⁸ Source: Transparency International, Corruption Transparency Index, 2010.

⁹ Human Rights Watch, Country Summary, 2010.

9.8.7 Where they remain, good leadership, training, stores management and practices introduced in the early years of police reform reduce misuse of assets, and as far as possible ensures sustainability. A good example is the communications department, where there are proper stores and asset registers, equipment (including scrap equipment) appear properly accounted for. Remarkably much of the original system remains working due to proper handling designed to extend life of equipment, and methods introduced to know who is abusing equipment.

9.8.8 There has been a noticeable increase in the number of traffic officers on the streets, particularly in Freetown. These are identifiable by the white sleeves. In 1999/2000 the traffic department was fundamentally reorganised with the intention of eliminating harassment and extortion from drivers. It was a way of doing business. A driver of a taxi knew a dangerous car could be kept on the road if he paid off the police. The police officer knew that he could get money from the driver to avoid arrest and prosecution. Officers who wanted to join the traffic department could do so by paying a bribe to those in charge. It was a well organised practice, with money going up the chain of command. This system was broken, and few, if any traffic officers were left on the streets. Today, traffic officers (in white sleeves) are in evidence on the streets, but there is evidence that CDIID do monitor the behaviour of traffic officers, and there are instructions that traffic officers should not interact with drivers unless investigating offences.

9.8.9 It became necessary to hire a private vehicle to enable Review Team visits. On one journey, three police officers stopped the vehicle and their behaviour and interaction was observed without making them aware of whom they had stopped. There was no suggestion of demanding money for some offence, or demand to see a driving licence or other documentation, or check the vehicle for faults. The three officers all had name tags, and were very polite. It was simply a question of begging. How can a police force demand respect when open begging like this is common place? When it was finally revealed to the officers (one man and two women) who the occupants were, their reaction was one of surprise, but also one of thanks that they had found people who understood their plight.

9.8.10 Several other interviews with police officers highlighted the sadness and personal concern that they have over the need to resort to such practices in order to live and support their families. Interviews with civilians demonstrated that they knew the sorry state the police were in, and were willing to help – for example the chairman of the LPPB in Bo, also a businessman, who often helped out with repairs to barracks, and others who supplied goods to the police free of charge.

9.8.11 Much of the perception of corruption within the police is formed by the action of traffic officers, road checks and the request for money to undertake investigations, supply paper or supply fuel and mobility. Again, this is a reversion to former times and must be halted. Part of the solution is on the ground monitoring and enforcement of discipline. Part is training and the application of that training. Part is ensuring basics, such as paper, forms and mobility are available. All of these things can be addressed with relatively simple actions, and recommendations are made in this area.

9.8.12 Two points need to be highlighted. The first is that the SLP continue to lose respect in the eyes of the public. It has not been possible to find any direct evidence in the way of independent perception surveys, but anecdotally it is quite apparent. Secondly, the issues described above, particularly the request for payment to undertake investigations combined with the overarching goal of access to justice by the poorest people, means that there is a fundamental barrier to access to justice for those who cannot pay.

9.8.13 In many ways the situation has reverted to what was evident in 1999/2000. Donor resources available at the time, imposition of discipline, elimination of corrupt practices, slight improvements in conditions of services and real increases in the budgetary support by the GoSL in the years to 2003 alleviated the problem.

9.8.14 However, there is a worrying decline in the ability of the SLP to support its officers and provide basic services over recent years. It is clear that many officers in the SLP at all levels are demoralised and frustrated at not being able to live a basic existence without resorting to what are seen as corrupt practices, and not being able to do their job due to lack of basic facilities. The SLP continue to decline, and urgent action is required to halt that decline, and begin to re-establish the force in accordance with their mission statement and development plan objectives.

9.9 Outline Plan – Corruption

1. As part of the wider recommendation for an adviser, provide advice and assistance to develop a close working relationship with the ACC to explore ways of building resistance to corruption.
2. Provision of forms and papers, together with an education and media campaign, to eliminate the need to ask for money for paper and pens.
3. Support to the Inspectorate and CDIID to uncover and investigate more serious case of corruption.
4. Support in undertaking a full personnel budget review (see outline plan – SLP Budget).
5. Provision of a cash limited budget to help provide fundamentals like water at barracks and police stations, and basic drugs for use in the police hospital and clinics on a prioritised basis.

9.10 Accountability

9.11 CDIID - Internal

9.11.1 Created in 2001, the CDIID is the professional standards body for the SLP and sits within the AIG Corporate Affairs portfolio. Headed by a Superintendent, the CDIID has a presence at all Divisional HQs across Sierra Leone.

9.11.2 It is essential for any modern or developing police force to be held accountable for its actions or non actions and generally an internal investigative capacity such as CDIID performs that function. It is often the case that an independent external scrutiny/oversight body will also exist to ensure that the police force is investigating complaints and misconduct professionally and this builds public trust and confidence.

9.11.3 The formation of such an oversight body or committee has been proposed by JSDP and indeed others over a lengthy period of time but, as yet, none exists.

9.11.4 The UNDP supported a CDIID funding project, of which \$199,638.24 has being spent on logistics such as vehicles and computers. There is also an extensive technical and capacity building package built into the proposal (not costed) which the UN Police Section of UNIPSIL will support. The project outcomes are:

1. Integrity of Sierra Leone Police improved and maintained.
2. Transparent and accountable police service capable of promoting the rule of law, protecting and respect of the human rights of citizens.

9.11.5 It is noted that the ASJP also contains a proposal to provide support to the CDIID. DFID should coordinate any proposed activity under ASJP with UNDP and examine any synergies that can be achieved, but more importantly avoid donor duplication.

9.11.6 Between January and December 2010, the CDIID dealt with 1,623 cases of complaints and misconduct although it was unable to break this down any further. The only performance information available was the number of cases by Region and in total plus the outcome of the cases.

9.11.7 Interestingly, by far the most cases investigated were based at HQ (694), with the West Area being the closest second at 436 cases. CDIID explained that many cases were reported at HQ but related to complaints in other Regions or Areas. CDIID were unable to identify from the 694 cases reported at HQ how many were attributable to other Regions or Areas and de-facto, the number of cases attributed to the various Regions and Areas during 2010 are clearly inaccurate.

9.11.8 The CDIID suffers from a lack of analytical capacity (as identified elsewhere even at the most simplistic level) and as such was unable to identify any emerging trends in complaints or misconduct (although this information is available). The absence of this analysis makes it very difficult to address emerging or current trends and put mitigation measures in place, such as training or briefings and for AIGs and LUCs to understand specific issues in their own areas of responsibility.

9.11.9 In the Transparency International Corruption Perception Survey, Sierra Leone has moved from position 146 worst out of 178 in 2009 to position 134 in 2010, so it appears positive country wide progress has been made.

9.11.10 However, the 2008 Survey of Victims of Crime Report by AHSI, referred to elsewhere (1200 people surveyed) identified that Law Enforcement was where the majority (93.5%) of respondents – victims of crime - had experienced corruption to receive a service.

9.11.11 Additionally, the Review Team spoke with the ACC and confirmation was provided during that interview that triangulated the Team's research. SLP are still viewed by the public as the most corrupt institution within Sierra Leone and that a public perception report that identified this was due to be published soon.

9.11.12 Whilst the CDIID indicated that it conducted some covert, proactive operations, it was clear that this was not a particular focus. With the public perception of its integrity being so low, the SLP must make more effort to identify corruption, particularly at the public interface, and to inform the public of their actions.

9.11.13 It was also noted that there was no facility available within the SLP for 'confidential reporting' of corrupt practices or misconduct either internally or externally. Whilst it may be recognised that these can sometimes be used for malicious purposes, the availability of the facility sends a strong message internally and should support public confidence levels.

9.11.14 It is clear that significant effort is still required to build Sierra Leonean's trust and confidence that they have a police service that is fair, honest and impartial. It is possible that some actions could have significant effect for little cost. For example, whilst the police are seen as the most corrupt organisation, much of this appears due to the practice of the police asking for money for paper and pens, transport and the like in order to record and undertake investigations. This has been a long term problem, and is partly based on the fact that there are no formal forms, paper or transport at police stations. The simple provision of forms and paper, together with a standard set of visible posters explain to the public that they should not provide money for these things should improve things.

9.12 External

9.12.1 There is informal external accountability through, for example, the press and LPPBs. The Police Council also provides some form of external accountability, as does Parliament. However, there is need for a more formal structure, and this is discussed in other sections of this report.

9.12.2 In discussions with the ACC Commissioner, it is encouraging that rather than carry out a series of sting operations, more long term effect will be for the ACC to work with the SLP to explore ways of reducing corrupt practices, particularly at road checks.

9.13 Outline Plan - Accountability

1. Support the ASJP and UNDP in developing CDIID's capacity and capability with particular emphasis on proactive 'test purchasing' operations.
2. Continue to lobby for an independent police complaints committee.
3. Support the development of enhanced performance data gathering and analysis.
4. Provision of forms, publicity and other material.
5. The SLP should introduce a confidential facility for staff and the public to report cases of misconduct anonymously.

9.14 Custody

9.14.1 The standard of care for prisoners in police custody was briefly examined. At all the police stations visited, the accommodation and facilities do not meet the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Resolutions 663 C of 31st July 1957 and 2076 of 13th May 1977), and are in breach of basic Human Rights by keeping detainees in inhuman and degrading conditions. This requirement is set out in Articles 20.1 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone – "No person shall be subject to any form of torture or any punishment or other treatment which is inhuman or degrading."

9.14.2 Whilst these Resolutions generally apply to prisoners within a formal prison setting rather than temporarily in police custody, they serve as a good indicator to assess the level of care, particularly as many police detainees can spend up to 3 days in a police cell (longer if application made to the Court).

9.14.3 The cells visited were poorly ventilated, were overcrowded, had no toilets or washing facilities. There were however, relatively well maintained records of who was in custody and the reasons for their detention. There were also separate cells for women, but none for juveniles. Unfortunately, many of those who were in custody were there for very minor offences. Feeding arrangements were ad-hoc and it is generally accepted that unless the custody's family bring food, they are not fed.

9.14.4 It is evident that a full review of the SLP's detention facilities is required linked to a review of the application of bail and requirement to detain a person whilst an investigation is on-going. Whilst in-Country, the Review Team were aware that the Police Inspectorate was conducting an examination of the custody area at CID HQ, due mainly to escapes from that location. The inspection template was not available for examination. The SLP have limited funds available to improve the estate.

9.14.5 In addition, the LPPBs role could be enhanced with the development of a 'lay visitors' scheme to police custody facilities. This would entitle them to visit a police station, inspect conditions, speak to prisoners, examine records and report to the LUC and subsequently the Police Inspectorate.

9.15 Outline Plan - Custody

1. Provide technical support to the Police Inspectorate to develop a robust Inspection methodology for police custody facilities and bail arrangements.
2. Support the SLP in developing a 'custody lay advisor' scheme and reporting template.
3. Provide a cash limited budget to enable 'quick fix' improvements in support of the Police Inspectorate findings.

9.16 The Political Context of Policing in Sierra Leone

9.16.1 The Review Team were asked to consider the extent to which the police have or are being politicised, the concern being that the SLP will be used to influence the re-election of the current Government at the 2012 elections.

9.16.2 The Review Team listened to a wide spectrum of opinion and perceptions, ranging from views that the police, particularly the new intake of the OSD, were all from the North and APC supporters, to views that the selection process was fair, taking recruits from all areas of Sierra Leone in accordance with SLP recruitment criteria. They also heard concerns that the recently appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, Hon. Musa Tarawally, has been appointed to influence the activities and behaviours of the SLP for the 2012 elections to ensure the APC wins.

9.16.3 There is general concern that the President brought in his own team of bodyguards, who have been appointed as police officers, at least one with Superintending rank, without proper training. A number of these guards went to Morocco for training, but it is not known the effect of this. Some have a very bad reputation and are reputed to abuse their power in Freetown with impunity. It is a cause for concern for the SLP, who are using disciplinary measure wherever possible to mitigate the problem.

9.16.4 Further views concerned the recent changes at IGP and DIG level, and that they were political appointments. It is worth remembering that when the current government was elected, the senior SLP officers were not immediately changed as was anticipated at the time, and in fact remained in post until 2010.

9.16.5 What is clear from talking to a wide range of police officers of all ranks, considerable pressure can be placed on police officers to carry out the wishes of politicians, including Ministers, Members of Parliament, Paramount Chiefs and local councillors. This has always been the case, and it requires a very strong individual to say no. The Review Team were informed of incidents where, because the police did not bow to pressure, individuals were transferred or their promotion opportunities were compromised.

9.16.6 Clearly politics play a part in the appointment of the IGP. The power to appoint (and remove) a person as IGP rests with the President, subject to the approval of Parliament, acting on the advice of the Police Council, which is chaired by the Vice President¹⁰. One of the recommendations for the proposed police directorate is to clarify the law in relation to the independence of the SLP (see section C). In the Constitution, the IGP is made "responsible for the operational control and administration of the Police Force" but is subject to the "control and direction of the Police Council"¹¹. However, the Police (Discipline) Regulations, 2001 now clarifies the situation. Section 2.(1) states "the operational control and administration of the Force is vested in the Inspector-General, including the effective deployment, posting, transfers and other movement of members of the force." Subject to S2.(2).... "The Police Council may give broad policy guidelines to the Inspector-General to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities." In other words, politicians should not interfere with policing, although there should be an interface.

9.16.7 Putting the 2012 elections to one side, it is the day to day pressures politicians exert which causes the most problems. A good example of this, if the press report is to be believed, is where the Minister of Internal Affairs ordered the arrest of all senior members of staff following a fire at Kenema hospital on 28 February 2011¹². There are many similar anecdotes. Whether such actions are designed to gain favour amongst voters, frustration at the lack of ability of the police or a belief that it is their job - the end result is police officers are put in an unenviable position.

9.16.8 On the face of it, the recent recruitment of 735 personnel into the OSD is of great concern. The Review Team were told that the great majority of these recruits were from the North, and all were APC supporters. They were political appointees, with allocations to various politicians and Paramount

¹⁰ Sections 153 and 157 The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991.

¹¹ Ibid, section 157(4)

¹² http://standardtimespress.net/cgi-bin/artman/publish/article_5038.shtml

Chiefs who were allowed to nominate 'their boys'. The Review Team were told that the Vice President himself ordered the recruitment of 200 of these people. Finally, they were also told that all 735 were sent to Kono for the elections, the implication being to make sure the populace voted for APC.

9.16.9 On the other hand, the Review Team listened to a number of different views by senior officers, both at Headquarters and in the Regions. Whilst hard factual evidence is difficult to find, the story seems to be that because of difficulties in getting general duties officers to transfer to OSD, a specific recruitment exercise was carried out to directly recruit into the OSD. This was apparently advertised as such, and only men could apply.

9.16.10 SLP policy is that recruitment has been devolved, so North, South and East Regions were each allocated 100 places, and Western Region 200. The proper recruitment procedures were followed (examination, screening etc.), and all recruits attended the first part of basic recruit training course at PTS Hastings (12 weeks general police duties). They then did 'on the job' training (it is not clear if this was as general duties officers, or with the OSD). They then attended specialist OSD training in Samu, the OSD training school, in batches of 300. The review team were also told that, due to shortage of resources for the Kono elections, one course of 300 was interrupted and were deployed to Kono for the duration of the elections. There is a suggestion the recruitment standards were compromised for this batch of recruits.

9.16.11 Apparently the Vice President was petitioned by a number of potential recruits who had not been selected due to shortage of budget, and following high level meetings it was decided to make more money available, and the number rose from 500 to 735.

9.16.12 To establish exactly the balance of ethnic origin of these recruits and the veracity of the various stories was outside the scope of the current mission, The SLP did offer open access to all the personnel files.

9.16.13 This whole incident raises a number of worrying issues, some of which are addressed elsewhere in this report. The SLP assured the Review Team that they were aware of the problems created by some of the above, and about 50 officers have so far been disciplined.

9.16.14 Other sections of this report make a number of suggestions on how to minimise politicisation and derived practices such as corruption within the police. The long-standing issue of how the Police Council is run is referred to. How to strengthen the CDIID will be an important element of the future ASJP. Community involvement in acknowledgment of the political context in which they operate at the grassroots is discussed, and has been pursued through JSDP and will fit robustly within the ASJP.

9.16.15 The bottom line is, however, that the Sierra Leonean state is under-resourced, technical capacity of the SLP and the civil service is generally low, and corruption is rife. In other words, the issues and events that are being mentioned in this section reflect the structural constraints on the Sierra Leonean state, and cannot be dealt with in the short term. They must, however, be taken into consideration as programs are being designed and implemented by donors and partners.

9.17 Outline Plan – Political Context

As part of the external adviser's TOR:

1. In an effort to reduce political pressure on the police, develop a programme of sensitisation of politicians as to their responsibilities regarding policing. This will require close liaison with the SLP and appropriate Parliamentary bodies
2. Help negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding and/or a Code of Conduct surrounding the roles and responsibilities of the various parties.

3. Ensure middle and senior SLP officers are conversant with their statutory rights and duties, with sufficient copies to refer to.
4. Support a media campaign to sensitise the public on these issues, and review recruitment material to emphasis political interference is not tolerated.

10 Data Collection, Monitoring and Evaluation

10.1 The Review Team was asked within the original TORs to ***‘examine and design a baseline matrix that be used for data collection, monitoring and evaluation of future police performance and impact’***.

10.2 The SLP has a range of potential performance measures including:

- Crime statistics
- Traffic accidents
- Daily situation reports
- Detainee records
- Public satisfaction survey
- Personnel satisfaction survey
- Budget reports
- Establishment and actual staff figures including gender split
- Strategic Plan (if measured and assessed)
- Local Policing Plans (if measured and assessed)
- Number of CDIID cases
- Management on-cost information

10.3 Other measures could be developed but would require significant investment in terms of training, development of processes and leadership to ensure adherence:

- Abstraction rates (sickness, training, court, leave etc)
- Demand for service (incident recording and management system)
- Response times
- Solved or detected crime rates
- Victim surveys

10.4 The Review Team understands that DFID sponsored consultants from Harvard University are visiting Sierra Leone to develop local performance metrics and as such would wish to engage with these consultants prior to developing any performance matrix. Within the ASJP there is also work to be done on performance monitoring. This is clearly an area for better coordination.

10.5 The SLP does not currently have the capability or capacity to broaden their performance and reporting regime and this must be developed through technical and strategic support at the same time as an enhanced performance matrix is developed. Reliance on technology, other than central databases, should be avoided.

10.6 The Police Inspectorate is within the Corporate Affairs portfolio and is responsible for auditing and assessing adherence to SLP standard operating procedures and conducting thematic inspections to improve operational and organisational effectiveness and efficiency. Recent Inspections have included the custody facilities and processes at CID HQ, an inspection of the Transportation Unit and of the Communications Section.

10.7 The Review Team was pleased to note that a programme of planned inspections had been developed. It is clear that further support in terms of technical skills such as inspection methodology, research and analysis and presentational skills would be of great benefit.

10.8 There is a clear linkage between support for the Inspectorate and that of the CSD and as such coordination of support in the two areas would reduce costs and time and provide continuity of training and aid a degree of succession planning give both areas sit within the same portfolio – Corporate Affairs.

10.9 Outline Plan – Baseline Matrix:

1. Provide support to the SLP to enhance its ability to be a more intelligence led organisation.
2. Linked to 1, and through leadership development and operational accountability, to embed a culture of pro-activity across the SLP as opposed to its current generally reactive nature.
3. Linked to 1 and 2, to support the development of measures of operational pro-activity such as foot patrols, community meetings attended, schools visited etc.
4. Linked to 1, 2 and 3, to work in collaboration with DFID's Harvard consultants to develop a locally relevant, robust enhanced performance matrix and supporting SOP. This will require local technical input and training across the SLP.
5. Support should be given to LUCs in order that they are able to have a greater understanding of how to develop, understand and use enhanced performance measure.
6. Provide technical support to the Inspectorate and CSD in terms of strategic planning, monitoring and reporting on action plans, presentation and communication skills, data gathering and analysis and research methodologies.
7. Support the SLP to develop an enhanced incident recording and management system that can be used to measure and analyse calls for service.
8. Provide technical assistance in the development of a public annual performance report.
9. Support the production of a communication strategy that is able to deliver the strategy, vision, aims and objectives to all SLP staff.
10. Provide strategic and technical support to SLP to undertake a workforce modernisation programme.
11. To support the SLP in developing a more robust business change programme and project/work-stream coordination.

11 Additional assessments and analyses required

11.1 The Review Team was asked to identify any additional assessments/analysis that may be required to inform development support to the security and justice sectors.

11.2 The Review Team has seen the Project Document and proposed interventions relating to the ASJP due to start in August 2011. Within that project, there are a number of inception phases that require further research, mapping and analysis. Implicit in some of the outline plans set out in this report is the need to undertake a number of assessments and analysis of the current situation – for example communications needs and the detail of what needs to be done in relation to repairs etc.

11.3 Additionally, there are further assessments ongoing and planned for other donors.

11.4 What is important is that these various assessments and analyses are coordinated and shared between the various donors and agencies, and as far as possible the GoSL manages the co-ordination.

12 Improved Future Police Security

12.1 The majority of the initiatives set out in this report are immediate, and designed to improve the effectiveness of the SLP, and through them local policing, and to support the police through the 2012 elections.

12.2 There is a need for a much longer term support project. On the basis of the information gleaned by the Review Team, little is scheduled to directly support the SLP in the future. However, the SLP is in a state of decline, with little prospect of improved financial support from the GoSL. In order to undertake its role as the lead on safety and security within Sierra Leone, it is proposed that support is given over a longer period to enable the GoSL to build up its support to the SLP in a sustainable way. 5 years is the minimum period suggested – ideally it should be longer – and one benefit is that it will take the SLP through to the 2017 elections with some certainty of support.

12.3 In order to build sustainability, this proposed project should be tapered, where in the first year most support is funded by donors, with limited contribution by the GoSL. Over the remaining years, the GoSL will undertake to increase its commitment on a yearly basis, until such time as the SLP become self sustainable. Any support from donors should be conditional on the GoSL fulfilling its agreed commitment.

12.4 It is suggested the long term support project should be along the same lines as the immediate proposal set out in this report, with a clear understanding that the future of the SLP is the responsibility of the GoSL, and that all donors should work together and combine resources to make it happen.

12.5 If approved in concept, it will be the responsibility of the advisory team to develop a detailed proposal by the end of 2011, so that funding can be sought. It is anticipated that such a tapered support project will cost around £20m.

Outline of proposed immediate and election support.

Below is an outline of the immediate/2012 support. These are not full TORs, but do give an outline of how to get most out of the resources that will be required to successfully deliver this programme of work.

Total budget - £2.5m (Assumes cost savings by using IMATT facilities)

Central to the support is a small team of 3 advisers:

1. **Senior adviser**, working with and mentoring the IGP, DIG and AIGs. He/she will also act as an interface with all other appropriate MDAs (for example Police Council, ONS and ACC), IMATT and donors. He/she will provide advice on a wide range of issues at the strategic level, and will undertake the activities as indicated in the outline plans. He/she will also act as the Project Manager, and manage the funds in accordance with DFID policy. He/she will prepare the long term tapered project if approved, calling on assistance as agreed with DFID. This will combine a number of roles in the interests of coordination, efficiency and cost effectiveness. Chief Officer level, with a broad range of experience and skills, and strategic command trained.
2. **Provincial and Divisional adviser**. He/she will deputise for the senior adviser, ensuring continuity. His/her main role will be working closely with and mentoring Provincial and Divisional Commanders, and act as an interface with Resident Ministers and local councils. Superintending level or equivalent, with a broad range of experience and skills, particularly at Divisional Commander level.
3. **Station adviser**. He/she will act as a mentor and on the job adviser at police station level, and work closely with the Inspectorate. Inspector/Sgt level or equivalent, with a broad range of experience and skills.

This team will work closely with all levels of the SLP, guiding and transferring as much knowledge as possible. They will manage all aspects of the support, and deliver the outline plans, with particular emphasis on developing all aspect of policing at local level.

Any support required should come from the SLP. Office accommodation will be at Police Headquarters, or other police premises, and provided free of charge. Allowances will have to be paid to ensure supporting officers can carry out their duties without distraction.

Expert Advisers:

NOTE: All advisers on this project will have proven ability and willingness to work closely with the SLP and transfer knowledge. As far as possible, the SLP will take the lead, and provide any support required.

Transport adviser. An adviser who is familiar with all aspect of fleet management and has experience of working in an environment such as Sierra Leone.

Communications Adviser. An adviser who is experienced in specifying and delivering radio systems in difficult environments, and project managing such systems.

C3 Adviser. A senior police officer or equivalent, who is experienced in planning and managing operations in difficult environments. He/she must be experienced in planning for and the management of election policing in African countries. He/she must be fully conversant with Coordination, Command and Control protocols, and has experience in public order management.

Ministry of Internal Affairs Adviser. He/she must have experience in developing a Police Directorate in difficult environments, and have experience in developing external oversight and accountability mechanisms.

Training Adviser. He/she must have extensive management of training experience at senior level, and be skilled in undertaking training needs analyses, course design and designing training strategies.

Research, Planning and Analytical Adviser. He/she must have extensive knowledge and experience in designing and managing a research and planning department, together with proven monitoring, evaluation and analytical skills. He/she must be prepared to work in difficult environments, and with predominately paper based system.

There are a number of budget lines. These will be cash limited, and will be required to support activities outlined until after the elections in 2012. It will be the responsibility of the Senior Adviser/Project Manager to manage these budgets.

Every opportunity will be taken to persuade the GoSL to provide more resources to the police, and seek out other sources of support.

Budget Lines:

Office Costs - £10,000

It is expected that accommodation will be provided free of charge at suitable police buildings. This budget is to support equipment, printing, internet, clean toilet provision, air conditioning, power and so on.

Communications Support - £300,000

This cash limited budget will be used to refurbish, repair or replace current equipment, and support development of the systems to support the C3 requirements for the 2012 elections. Care will be taken to combine this budget with any other potential donor support in this area. It will also be used to cover the deployment costs of SLP engineers.

Transport Support - £500,000

This cash limited budget will be used to repair as many broken down vehicles as economically viable, and to service and maintain the existing fleet. The most cost effective solution will be researched by the transport adviser regarding the provision of quality spares. Repair/replacement of garage tools will also have to be covered in this budget. It is unlikely to cover all needs, so the SLP will have to prioritise. Care will be taken to combine this budget with any other potential donor support in this area. It will also be used to cover the deployment costs of mechanics.

Printing and Publicity materials - £100,000

This budget is intended to support the publication and dissemination of reference materials, Standing Orders, training materials, sensitisation posters and such like.

Essential Office Machinery and support – £100,000

Refurbishment or renewal of broken office machinery – computers (but only as absolute necessity), photocopiers, printers, provision of paper and the like. Consideration of an electronic forms database to enable local printing of forms will be considered.

Support for Inspectorate, CDIID and others, and unallocated - £200,000

A key component of the programme is to enable the SLP to better monitor and evaluate service delivery using their own people. This will require substantial support in the first instance, including mobility, subsistence and the like. Some training will also be required, as will limited technology. There will be a number of unforeseen demands, hence an unallocated budget, which should be managed by the Senior Adviser/Project Manager to enable quick fixes.

Welfare - £200,000

Support to SLP staff is essential to improve morale and provide basic services, such as clean water and basic drugs and medical care, to as many as possible within this cash limited budget. Every opportunity will be taken to access any other similar funds available.

Cells - £100,000

Detainees are kept in conditions that do not meet basic human rights. In support of a comprehensive thematic Inspection, this money will be used to improve these conditions on a prioritised basis.

Project vehicles - £90,000

This budget is to ensure vehicles of a proper standard are available to the project team and fulfil the HMG duty of care requirements. SLP drivers will be used.

All costs have been calculated at a minimum level, and **do not include any management on costs**, or service provider costs. It is hoped that the advisers can be contracted and managed locally, thus saving considerable on costs.

A spread sheet showing the projected working days and financial workings for the advisers is at annex A (1).

Recommendations - initial costings
 Immediate (to get through elections)

Flight 800
 \$:£ 1.57

Appendix A (1)

	Number of days	Total fees	Accommodation	Flights	Local transport	Expenses	Incidentals	Budget	Notes
Main advisory team									
Senior adviser within the Police - now until after elections 2012	300	180,000	30,096	8,000	Project vehicles	10,500	2,000	230,596	20 months, with average of 15 working days a month. Minimum 2 project vehicles required to comply with duty of care. Accommodation cost could be substantially reduced if IMATT facilities used.
Provincial and Divisional Adviser	300	150,000	30,096	8,000	Project vehicles	10,500	2,000	200,596	As above. With good planning, continuous presence can be achieved at minimum cost.
Station Adviser	300	135,000	30,096	8,000	Project vehicles	10,500	2,000	185,596	Will share project vehicles.
Expert Advice:									
Transport adviser	100	50,000	10,318	4,000	Project vehicles	3,600	1,000	68,918	Will share project vehicles.
Communications adviser	100	50,000	10,318	4,000	Project vehicles	3,600	1,000	68,918	Will share project vehicles.
C3 adviser	100	50,000	10,318	3,200	Project vehicles	3,600	1,000	68,118	Will share project vehicles.
MIA adviser	150	75,000	14,618	4,800	Project vehicles	5,250	1,500	101,168	Will share project vehicles.
Training adviser	60	30,000	6,019	2,400	Project vehicles	2,100	750	41,269	Will share project vehicles.
Research, Planning and Analytical Adviser	80	40,000	7,739	3,200	Project vehicles	2,700	750	54,389	Will share project vehicles.
Office costs								10,000	Anticipated accommodation in Police HQ - set up costs, fuel for generator etc. Good internet connections for support from UK.
Total communication equipment budget								300,000	Detailed requirements during inception phase
Total transport budget								500,000	Detailed requirements during inception phase. This is maximum budget, and SLP will have to priorities within this, and add more if possible. Will require appointment of procurement agent. Shipping cost will have to be included. The objective will be to assess the feasibility and value for money of repairing existing vehicles, clear out all other scrap (using money to support SLP transport budget), service and maintain existing fleet, reestablish policies and procedures, limited technical training, tools and equipment.
Printing and publicity materials								100,000	Support distribution of SOPs, Force Orders, Station posters etc
Essential office machinery and support								100,000	Refurbish/new essential printers, photocopiers, toner etc
Support (inspectorate, CDIID etc) and unallocated								200,000	There will be a number of urgent demands, and the ability to respond quickly - quick fixes - is essential
Welfare								200,000	To include provision of drugs and clean water for police stations, barracks etc throughout the country.
Cells								100,000	Most prisoners are kept in inhuman and degrading conditions. Linked to thematic inspection of prisoner handling.
Project vehicles (at least 3 vehicles, fuel and maintenance)								90,000	Minimum 3 project vehicles required to comply with duty of care. Vehicles, fuel and maintenance, and drivers (SLP plus allowance)
TOTAL		760,000	149,618	45,600		52,350	12,000	2,619,568	
Possible savings:									
Use IMATT accomodation								149,618	
								2,469,950	

Common theme throughout this budget is that sums proposed will not support everything, and part of the learning process will be better planning and the need to prioritise. This will help in planning sustainability and better budget management. It will also help in getting additional support from the domestic budget. It does not support general fuel costs (although specific missions may require this). Most visits outside Freetown will involve accompanying SLP officers - accommodation and feeding costs will have to be supported.

Part of the learning process will be joint planning of the detail with SLP staff - probably Corporate Services taking the lead. There will be a number of expectations of the SLP in providing good staff and other support where possible.

Requires very close coordination with other donors, which in itself will be a good learning exercise for the SLP.

Longer term (5 years) tapered project

A longer term tapered project is proposed. This will be designed to maintain basic SLP services, and build sustainability over the period. with the GoSL taking on an increasing proportion of the cost. and building a budget capable of supporting policing services

Annex B

Outline Plans and Recommendations	Responsibility	Link with other projects
<p>Advisory and PM Team of three – see annex A for more detail :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Senior Adviser and Project Manager (CPO level, also PM) 2. Provincial and Divisional Adviser (Supt level) 3. Station level adviser (Sgt level) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comms TA • C3 TA • Transport TA • MIA TA • Training Adviser • Research, Planning, Analytical TA <p>In all cases key is to support the SLP counterparts</p>	Key person responsible	Indicates main links to other known projects
<p>Outline Plan – C3 Support</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Main report 4.5</p>		
<p>(Please see the transport and communications sections for supporting actions)</p>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provision of technical aid to support the development of effective Coordination, Command and Control (C3) systems, procedures and skills, including election and contingency planning. 	C3 TA	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Assist the SLP to develop a realistic detailed Election Security Strategy and costed action plans, together with a costed training needs analyses, and a gap analyses. 	C3 TA	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Working with the SLP and the communications adviser, identify the most cost effective minimum systems to support the operational plan. 	C3 TA and Comms TA	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Provide support if necessary to improvement of the investigative ability, particularly in the areas of fraud associated with the elections, the gathering of evidence and post incident investigation. 	Advisory Team, supported by specialist advice in necessary.	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Improving the police response to incidents in an apolitical manner, ensuring adherence to fundamental human rights and the law, and the minimisation of violence, disorder and injury. 	Advisory Team	

Outline Plan – SLP Budget	Main report 4.7		
1. Provide assistance to the SLP to undertake an immediate full budget analysis and build a case to present to the GoSL for exceptional support to bring SLP finances up to a level that supports an effective service. This should take into account the sustainability costs for transport, communications and bringing other infrastructure up to a minimal acceptable standard. This analysis can be used to inform the proposed long term support plan.	Senior Adviser		
Outline Plan – OSD	Main report 4.9		
1. Provide technical support to conduct a full assessment of Public Order training, equipment (including storage) and guidance manuals.	C3 TA	USAid, UNIPSL	
2. Ensure that any further direct recruitment to OSD is not gender exclusive, and meets the recruitment policies of the SLP.	Senior Adviser		
3. Oversight of requirement for all SLP recruits, irrespective of whether direct entry into OSD, to attend the full recruit training at PTS.	Senior Adviser		
4. Linked to OSD but not exclusively, provide technical support to SLP in developing its ability to more effectively succession plan particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections.	Senior Adviser		
5. To examine the potential for joint training on public order and MACP primacy, tactics, roles and responsibilities between SLP and RSLAF in the lead up to the 2012 elections.	Senior Adviser		
6. To support a review of OSD roles and responsibilities to ensure it is making the most effective use of resources, particularly in relation to the PSU.	Senior Adviser + C3 adviser		
7. To support an independent review of the SLP in terms of its provision of 'private security' services and transparency of income generation linked to growth in police numbers.	Senior Adviser		
Outline Plan – Intelligence	Main report 4.12		
1. One of the terms of reference for the proposed senior adviser should be to ensure continued close liaison and coordination with the ONS and others. In particular, in developing the use of intelligence and information in the risk assessment that should accompany election security planning and management.	Senior Adviser		
2. The feasibility of an intelligence database should be further explored and costed, including sustainability costs	Advisory Team		
3. The issue around CIS and SB accommodation should be further explored.	Senior Adviser		
4. Support the SLP leadership and lower ranks in sustained participation in DISECs,	Advisory Team		

PROSECs and CHISECs		
Outline plan – Radio Communications Support	Main report 4.14	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of TA to work with the SLP and collate all the detailed requirements to refurbish and develop the current systems. 	Comms TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify cost effective solutions to operational needs – for example fax over cellular networks. 	Comms TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist the SLP to set out the necessary command, control and coordination communications' architecture for the 2012 elections. Identify the equipment needs. 	Comms TA with C3 TA and Advisory Team	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure coordination with the recommended incident management system. 	C3 TA with Comms TA and Senior Adviser	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist the SLP to redefine the channel plan, and prepare a reprogramming action plan to move away from encryption and Vigilant. 	Comms TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist the SLP in providing detailed requirements for procurement by an approved procurement agent. 	Comms TA and Senior Adviser	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produce a costed project delivery plan, including transport and other deployment costs (accommodation and DSA) 	Comms TA and Senior Adviser	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produce a 5 year costed plan to maintain the systems. This will cover the 2017 elections, and feed into the recommended long term tapered project. 	Comms TA and Senior Adviser	
Outline Plan – Transport and Mobility	Main report 4.16	
1. Provision of technical assistance		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> to work with the SLP to undertake a review of the condition of all vehicles to establish which can economically be repaired, and prepare an action plan 	Transport TA	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> to assist in preparing a submission to clear all scrap and uneconomical vehicles under GoSL boarding rules, and the ring fencing of any income generated for use by the transport section. 	Transport TA and Senior Adviser	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> to work with the transport section and the Inspectorate and review all policies and procedures, and application of the Inspectorate's recommendations. 	Transport TA and Senior Adviser	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> to undertake a review of the skill level of all personnel, including previous technicians that may have been redeployed, and preparation of a training needs analyses. 	Transport TA	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> to help review the transport requirements for the elections, with a prioritised plan in the likely event that the available funds will not be sufficient to provide 	Transport TA, C3 TA and Advisory Team	

all vehicles		
f. to help prepare a list of all spares and other requirements, and assist in a procurement exercise (not local inferior spares)	Transport TA	
g. Preparation of a long term budget for the maintenance and repair of vehicles	Transport TA and Senior Adviser	
2. Provision of a cash limited fund to service and maintain current roadworthy fleet to prevent further deterioration, and bring back into service vehicles that are economically viable.	Senior Adviser and Transport TA	
Outline Plan – Logistics	Main report 4.18	
1. Immediate support in the form of a cash limited budget for the adviser to support immediate priorities in this area and improve operational effectiveness.	Senior Adviser and Team	
Outline Plan – Welfare	Main report 4.20	
1. Provision of a cash limited budget to enable quick fixes in the area of welfare. This should be managed by the senior adviser in conjunction with the senior officers of the SLP to avoid misspend. Learning lessons from previous projects, drugs should only be provided when there is certainty that corrupt practices are eliminated.	Senior Adviser and Team	
Outline Plan – Police Training School	Main report 4.22	JSDP, ASJP, UNPOL, others
1. Support the SLP to conduct a full review of its recruit training materials	Training Adviser	
2. Support the production of sufficient recruit training materials that will permit new recruits to have their own copy.	Training Adviser	
3. Review the SLP Annual Training Plan to ensure it is fit for purpose and costed.	Training Adviser	
4. Review the JSDP Training Assessment report when published to assess developmental needs.	Training Adviser	
5. Support the Head of Training to develop a single, trusted recruitment process that is based on a common minimum standard.	Training Adviser	
6. Support the SLP to ensure that gender, equality and human rights issues are 'golden threads' that run through all training materials and inputs.	Training Adviser	
7. Support the SLP to deliver self-sufficiency in all training needs.	Training Adviser	
Outline Plan – Ministry of Internal Affairs	Main report 5.9	
1. Immediate TA support to verify previous findings and recommendations, and bring them up to date. Consideration should be given to the role of the Ombudsman, and the direction and oversight of the Chiefdom Police.	MIA TA and Senior Adviser	

2. Preparation of a strategy and costed action plan, including a full training needs analysis, to deliver the findings.	MIA TA and Senior Adviser	
3. Assistance in preparing an agreement that the GoSL will fully fund the staffing and running costs of the new Directorate.	MIA TA and Senior Adviser	
Outline Plan – Community Policing	Main report 6.16	
1. Map presence and functions of LPPBs across Sierra Leone, and support the establishment of boards where they do not exist.	Advisory Team	
2. Promote the voluntary basis of the LPPBs in urban and rural areas until such a time when the Government of Sierra Leone can afford to fund and run the SLP independently from external resources.	Advisory Team	JSDP, ASJP
3. Support the further development of a LPPB constitution.	Senior Adviser	JSDP, ASJP
4. In continuation of 3, support wide promotion of the document across Sierra Leone, both with the SLP and the general population.	Advisory Team	JSDP, ASJP
5. In the longer-term advocate for the inclusion of LPPBs in legislation on policing as an important link between the national police, SLP, and local communities.	MIA TA and Senior Adviser	JSDP, ASJP
6. Make CSVs clearly identifiable, and develop and standardize issuance of ID Cards for CSVs and LPPBs.	Advisory Team	JSDP, ASJP
7. Develop structured, regular and coherent collective training for the SLP, LPPBs, and Chiefdom Police on roles, responsibilities and mandates to ensure that each know their functions.	Advisory Team	JSDP, ASJP
8. Build on the initiatives around building the capacity of the Chiefdom Police already taken by JSDP.	Advisory Team	SDP, ASJP
9. Produce a costed project delivery plan.	Senior Advisor	
10. Specifically regarding LPPBS:	Senior Adviser, MIA advisor	SDP, ASJP
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LPPB chair should be independent. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formally act as a local oversight, accountability and performance monitoring mechanism, linked to the SLP Inspectorate and any external oversight 		

mechanism developed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This will require detailed operational procedures and formal training.		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All state and non-state actors involved in policing should have a representative on the LPPB. This will ensure anyone involved in policing, particularly non-state actors, have a set of national standards and guidelines to work to. Chiefdom Police will become part of the LPPB process, and this will require clarity with regards to their statutory functions and limitations on powers of arrest, detention, search etc.. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A formal public meeting structure should be established to enable ordinary member of the public to have their say. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A system should be introduced where selected members of the LPPB have to right to visit police stations and posts unannounced to check on prisoner handling. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Care should be taken to protect the operational independence of the SLP. The LPPB are there to act as an accountability and oversight mechanism, and support the SLP in their role as lead on policing issues. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consideration should be given to establishing and supporting a National Association of LPPBs. This will enable a national voice to negotiate travel and other expenses, spread lessons and good practice and have a powerful say in national police budget negotiations and the like. The NALPPB should have a seat on the Police Council (perhaps one of the independent positions). 		
Outline Plan – Gender	Main report 7.2	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP to introduce a gender impact assessment process for all SOPs, policies and strategies. 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP to ensure that it adheres to its gender mainstream policy particularly in relation to recruitment. 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP to produce an Equality and Fairness at work policy. 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP to tackle the clear belief that exists amongst its staff that women are the weaker sex and therefore are not equal. 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assess the selection and recruitment process to ensure it does not discriminate against women. 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP to remove the gender identification label of W (woman). 	Advisory Team, Training TA	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the SLP produce a Grievance Policy where staff can address internal bullying, 	Advisory Team, Training TA	

harassment inequality issues within a structured framework.		
Outline Plan – SGBV	Main report 7.4	
1. Support the SLP to engage with the Ministry of Health at a strategic level to ensure SGBV victim’s medical examinations are free.	Senior Adviser	ASJP
2. Support the SLP and the Ministry of Education to develop a joint SGBV training package for delivery in schools.	Advisory Team	ASJP
3. Support the SLP develop a strategic vision for FSUs.	Advisory Team	
4. Provide technical support to conduct a full review as to the quality and relevance of FSU staff investigative and interview training.	Advisory Team	ASJP
5. Ensure, through ASJP or JSCO that donor coordination is achieved and consider a stakeholder structure that achieves a ‘single vision’ for Sierra Leone.	Advisory Team	ASJP, JSCO
6. Support a full demand and resource modelling exercise for FSUs.	Senior Adviser	ASJP
7. Support the SLP to produce identity cards and lanyards for plain clothes officers.	Senior Adviser	ASJP
8. Support the SLP production of enhanced performance indicators and analysis to identify communities most at risk.	Research, Planning, Analytical TA	ASJP
9. Scope the potential to have District level stakeholder committees that could synergise the delivery of services to children and women.	Advisory Team	ASJP, JSCO
10. Engage with the Justice Sector to assess the potential for holding certain court cases in private particularly for child victims of SGBV.	Senior Adviser	ASJP
11. Continue to support specific SGBV issues as a key tenet of police prosecutor training.	Senior Adviser, Training TA	ASJP
Outline Plan – Donor Support	Main report 8.3	
1. Provision of technical aid to help research fully who is providing what to the SLP in relation to the elections, and identify in detail the gaps in funding, assess the resulting risks, and help find solutions. This should be coordinated with other outline plans in this paper, and could probably be combined with other actions to save money.	Senior Adviser	ASJP, JSCO
Outline Plan – Performance	Main report 9.7	
1. Provide support to the SLP to enhance its ability to be a more intelligence led organisation.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
2. Linked to 1, and through leadership development and operational accountability, to embed a culture of pro-activity across the SLP as opposed to its current generally reactive nature.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
3. Linked to 1 and 2, to support the development of measures of operational pro-activity	Advisory Team, Research,	

such as foot patrols, community meetings attended, schools visited etc.	Planning, Analytical TA	
4. Linked to 1,2 and 3, to work in collaboration with DFID's Harvard consultants to develop a locally relevant, robust enhanced performance matrix and supporting SOP. This will require local technical input and training across the SLP.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
5. Support should be given to LUCs in order that they are able to have a greater understanding of how to develop, understand and use enhanced performance measure.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA, Training TA	
6. Provide technical support to the Inspectorate and CSD in terms of strategic planning, monitoring and reporting on action plans, presentation and communication skills, data gathering and analysis and research methodologies.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
7. Support the SLP to develop an enhanced incident recording and management system that can be used to measure and analyse calls for service.	Senior Adviser, C3 TA, Comms TA,	
8. Provide technical assistance in the development of a public annual performance report.	Senior Adviser, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
9. Support the production of a communication strategy that is able to deliver the strategy, vision, aims and objectives to all SLP staff.	Advisory Team	
10. Provide strategic and technical support to SLP to undertake a workforce modernisation programme.	Advisory Team	
11. To support the SLP in developing a more robust business change programme and project/work-stream coordination.	Senior Adviser and Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
Outline Plan – Corruption	Main report 9.9	
1. As part of the wider recommendation for an adviser, provide advice and assistance to develop a close working relationship with the ACC to explore ways of building resistance to corruption.	Senior Adviser	ACC, ASJP, JSCO
2. Provision of forms and papers, together with an education and media campaign, to eliminate the need to ask for money for paper and pens.	Senior Adviser	
3. Support to the Inspectorate and CDIID to uncover and investigate more serious case of corruption.	Advisory Team	
4. Support in undertaking a full personnel budget review (see outline plan – SLP Budget).	Senior Adviser, Training TA	
5. Provision of a cash limited budget to help provide fundamentals like water at barracks and police stations, and basic drugs for use in the police hospital and clinics on a prioritised basis.	Senior Adviser	

Outline Plan – Accountability	Main report 9.13		
1. Support the ASJP and UNDP in developing CDIID’s capacity and capability with particular emphasis on proactive ‘test purchasing’ operations.	Advisory Team		ASJP
2. Continue to lobby for an independent police complaints committee.	Senior Adviser, MIA TA		
3. Support the development of enhanced performance data gathering and analysis.	Senior Adviser, Research, Planning, Analytical TA		
4. Provision of forms, publicity and other material.	Senior Adviser		
5. The SLP should introduce a confidential facility for staff and the public to report cases of misconduct anonymously.	Senior Adviser		
Outline Plan – Custody	Main report 9.15		
1. Provide technical support to the Police Inspectorate to develop a robust Inspection methodology for police custody facilities and bail arrangements.	Advisory Team		
2. Support the SLP in developing a ‘custody lay advisor’ scheme and reporting template.	Advisory Team		ASJP
3. Provide a cash limited budget to enable ‘quick fix’ improvements in support of the Police Inspectorate findings.	Senior Adviser		
Outline Plan – Political Context	Main report 9.17		
As part of the external adviser’s TOR:			
1. In an effort to reduce political pressure on the police, develop a programme of sensitisation of politicians as to their responsibilities regarding policing. This will require close liaison with the SLP and appropriate Parliamentary bodies.	Senior Adviser, MIA TA		
2. Help negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding and/or a Code of Conduct surrounding the roles and responsibilities of the various parties.	Senior Adviser, MIA TA		
3. Ensure middle and senior SLP officers are conversant with their statutory rights and duties, with sufficient copies to refer to.	Senior Adviser, MIA TA		
4. Support a media campaign to sensitise the public on these issues, and review recruitment material to emphasis political interference is not tolerated.	Senior Adviser, MIA TA		
Outline Plan – Baseline Matrix	Main report 10.9		
1. Provide support to the SLP to enhance its ability to be a more intelligence led organisation.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA		
2. Linked to 1, and through leadership development and operational accountability, to embed a culture of pro-activity across the SLP as opposed to its current generally	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA		

reactive nature.		
3. Linked to 1 and 2, to support the development of measures of operational pro-activity such as foot patrols, community meetings attended, schools visited etc.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
4. Linked to 1,2 and 3, to work in collaboration with DFID's Harvard consultants to develop a locally relevant, robust enhanced performance matrix and supporting SOP. This will require local technical input and training across the SLP.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	Harvard, ASJP, JSCO
5. Support should be given to LUCs in order that they are able to have a greater understanding of how to develop, understand and use enhanced performance measure.	Advisory Team,	
6. Provide technical support to the Inspectorate and CSD in terms of strategic planning, monitoring and reporting on action plans, presentation and communication skills, data gathering and analysis and research methodologies.	Senior Adviser, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
7. Support the SLP to develop an enhanced incident recording and management system that can be used to measure and analyse calls for service.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA, Comms TA, C3 TA	
8. Provide technical assistance in the development of a public annual performance report.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
9. Support the production of a communication strategy that is able to deliver the strategy, vision, aims and objectives to all SLP staff.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
10. Provide strategic and technical support to SLP to undertake a workforce modernisation programme.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	
11. To support the SLP in developing a more robust business change programme and project/work-stream coordination.	Advisory Team, Research, Planning, Analytical TA	

Sierra Leone Police Review Mission, 15 January to 8 March 2011

Synopsis of Key Findings against Terms of References

Note: To be read in conjunction with annex A and A1 – Outline of proposed immediate and 2012 elections support, and annex B – Collated outline plans

Headlines	Emerging recommendations (see annex B for more detail)	Risks
<p>TOR A Assess the level of ownership and sustainability of past interventions and the degree of impact and change which has occurred in the quality of police services.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the systems and procedures, organisation development and policies remain. Policy making structures are sound, and there are some good examples where, given proper management, control, training and discipline, it is possible to sustain as far as resources remain available (e.g. communications systems). • There is pride in owning the changes that have taken place at all levels – they need the capacity to deliver. • The fundamental organisational change that took place in the early years still remains, and encouragingly has been further developed. However, the lack of resources has meant that service delivery, particularly at ground level, has worsened. • Local Needs Policing remains the philosophy, and LPPBs have developed well in most cases. • Whilst there was mobility, communications and other logistical support the SLP became increasingly respected and responsive to demand. • Attention was also paid to welfare of officers. There are serious concerns about the ability of the SLP to look after their men and women. • There are lessons to be learned about the withdrawing of support, and the lack of a proper exit plan for such projects. • Closer working and planning with RSLAF and IMATT. Need to have better understanding of use of MACP, and monitoring/oversight of use. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support with 3 person advisory team at senior, provincial and local level. Roles can be combined (project manager, scoping and design of recommended long term support project, and others depending of skill set of adviser) • Logistical support – printed material (notices, training notes etc.) • Ensure coordination with other projects, and other donor support to ensure best value for money. • Welfare element to improve medical care and water for police and families in barracks – improved morale and availability for duty. • Meaningful monitoring and evaluation must be developed (see TOR H below) • Support the radio communications system. Technical advice, refurbish existing systems and make more sustainable by reverting to basics, small enhancements in preparation for elections. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception surveys are a good tool, but must be properly undertaken to avoid biased results. • If no support is given, decline will continue, and the much needed coordination and cooperation between different projects will suffer. • Provision of logistics must include provision supporting sustainability in the short to medium term. • The risk of doing nothing is far too great to ignore. • The investment in the SLP was great, and much is still sustainable. There is a risk that everything will be wasted if nothing is done. • If no support given, there are serious doubts that the SLP can police the elections.

<p>TOR B Identify the needs and priorities of the Sierra Leone Police for institutional capacity development, which will lead to improved delivery of operational capability and policing services (to be read in conjunction with output to assess capability of SLP to police the 2112 elections).</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SLP capacity to offer policing services across the nation is poor. • Coordination, command and control need support. • Police budget has failed to keep pace with inflation – much worse off than in 2002. • The force is heavily indebted • There is evidence that some politicisation of the police has taken place, most worryingly in the OSD. • Whilst there is very good policy making structures and capacity at Headquarters level, understanding and implementation at ground level is poor. • Removal of support to the police during mid 2000s has had a dramatic effect, and for a number of reasons the police can only offer a limited service. • Their current capacity to police the 2012 elections is very poor, despite substantial increases in police numbers. • Perceived corruption in areas of procurement and resource management will have to be addressed • Basic resources – even paper – is in short supply, and opens opportunities for corruption, and restricts access to justice for the poorest. • Good plans to address these issues are thwarted due to perceived lack of resources • Recent changes at the top, together with emerging changes in policy and action to resolve some of these issues, is reassuring • Welfare issues need to be addressed. • Police Training School needs support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The presence of an external advisory team during the next 18 months as TOR A • Emphasis on support should be placed on ensuring implementation of the well thought out policies and procedures, and enabling the police to deliver policing services at ground level. • Provide advice and support as appropriate – for example new Crime Directorate structure, and realignment of ownership of FSU, with development of investigative and scenes of crime support (adviser) • Support to the development of Command, Control and Communications, including refurbishment of the basic communications system and introduction of a simple computerised incident logging and management system. • Support to improve mobility at ground level to enable police to improve service delivery and respond to incidents and reports. Includes thorough review of the transport section, with a view to putting some broken down vehicles back on the road by the supply of spares and technical expertise, and clearance of scrapped vehicles, using income to support transport section. • Advice on the manpower structure of the SLP. Supervisory ratio is too high. The ongoing review of pay and conditions would benefit from some external expert advice to help implementation. (adviser) • Support to the internal inspectorate and CDIID to increase activity and on the ground activity (adviser, and technical support) • To provide support to the election planning process and command, control and coordination by provision of expert advice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It appears that a number of recruits have been taken into the OSD without proper training. This poses a significant risk in terms of command and control, and discipline. • To directly supply HMG funded vehicles to the OSD exposes HMG to significant risk if these people act inappropriately using HMG supplied vehicles. Current thinking as that any vehicle provision should be targeted at service delivery at ground level. This will also send a message to GOSL about the consequences of political interference. • It should be possible to have a generally unarmed policy. A prerequisite will be mobility, communications and good command, control and coordination. • If vehicles are supplied, this must be conditional. Allocation is agreed and ring fenced (for example not commandeered for Presidential escort, but solely used for FSU). Spares for 3 years supplied and properly accounted for (subject to external audit). GOSL to undertake sufficient fuel supply. Good existing SLP policy on drivers and use of police vehicles to be fully complied with. Ownership not to be transferred until donors satisfied conditions complied with, with the option to take back vehicles. If OSD vehicles are not forthcoming from the elections basket fund, mobility will have to be addressed elsewhere, or the SLP cannot police the elections. • It will not be possible to cover all the country – local ‘policing’ will be only option. • Essential to coordinate all known donor activities generally, and election specific , or money will be wasted.
<p>TOR C Assess the capacity for strategic planning and direction on policing, within the Ministry for Internal Affairs, as GoSL’s institutional and policy lead.</p>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity for the MIA to act as institutional and policy lead virtually nonexistent. • Need to consider alongside Police Council. • Minister and Permanent Secretary would welcome advice and support to develop Ministry • Need to review legislation on roles and responsibilities of involved parties/agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate action: Provide suitable professional to review current situation (with reference to previous work undertaken) and establish directorate and consider external oversight/Inspectorate requirements. Need to review and update current law. To include Police Council. Likely to require support budget to establish. • Specialist required to support training review and update of materials, and strategy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current set up is unsatisfactory, and effectively allows politicisation of the police. • Minister/Vice President (Police Council Chair) may not support recommendations. • Difficulty in finding suitable Sierra Leoneans to fill posts – will require training • Lack of local budget to support and sustain Directorate • Will require new legislation – Constitutional section will require referendum
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<p>TOR D Identify other government institutions and non-state organisations which may assist in the delivery of, or demand for improved police services, and outline immediate or longer-term support options.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Relations Department should be lead in developing community based policing service, but do not have enough resources. • Ensure Community Service Volunteers are easily identified. LPPB and CSVs do not have proper ID cards (nor do police) • The Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs) appear to be developing well, and some limited Chiefdom Police training has taken place. There is a need to map LPPBs, and support where not established. • LPPBs do not receive sufficient funding for transport etc. There is a need to consider how payment for transport can be made in some places. • LPPBs do not have a legal footing, with consequent lack of clarity of roles and sanctions when things go wrong. • Further training/seminars required to enhance effectiveness of SLP, Chiefdom Police, LPPBs and others, and ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities. • PROSEC and DISEC security organisations appear to offer some local oversight and accountability, and continue to be a vital information sharing mechanism among security sector actors outside Freetown. • Some limited initiatives affecting local policing already started by JSDP. Need to spread these, and involve SLP (CRD) more. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations to improve local needs policing. We think there is good potential in this area, which could usefully be owned by the SLP using the soon to be enhanced Community Relations Department. Coordination is required (adviser) to refine this thinking, and align with the new ASJP. Other recommendations (e.g. mobility support at ground level) need to be linked. • Map presence and functions of LPPBs across Sierra Leone, and support the establishment of boards where they do not exist. • Promote the voluntary basis of the LPPBs in urban and rural areas until such a time when the Government of Sierra Leone can afford to fund and run the SLP independently from external resources. • Support the further development of a LPPB constitution, and support wide promotion of the document across Sierra Leone, both with the SLP and the general population. • In the longer-term advocate for the inclusion of LPPBs in legislation on policing as an important link between the national police, SLP, and local communities. • Develop and standardize issuance of ID Cards for CSVs and LPPBs (could be linked to an IMATT ID card project for joint use of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a danger that non adherence to SLP policy on the functions of LPPBs, and lack of oversight and accountability, could result in LPPBs exceeding their roles and responsibility. Risk that politicisation of police impact of private interest could take place through LPPBs. Local capacity to visit all Chiefdoms will reduce this risk, and enable development. • Payment to LPPBs should be resisted. A move from a volunteer body to any form of paid body will change the dynamics with the SLP, and equally important create a financial demand that cannot be met in the medium-term by GOSL. • If proper national standards and guidelines, oversight and accountability mechanisms are not in place, risk of different areas doing 'own thing'.

	<p>resources).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make CSVs clearly identifiable by clothing. • Develop structured, regular and coherent collective training for the SLP, LPPBs, and Chiefdom Police on roles, responsibilities and mandates to ensure that each know their functions. • Build on the initiatives around building the capacity of the Chiefdom Police already taken by JSDP. • Produce a costed project delivery plan. 	
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TOR E
 Assess the degree of progress towards more gender sensitive policing, both in terms of organisational management (recruitment; promotion, treatment of female officers etc.) and in the quality of police services, particularly victims of SGBV.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a Gender Mainstream SOP although this was not fully assessed. • There is widespread use of gender exclusive language both verbally and in written communications. • Women are widely considered to be the weaker sex across even by those who hold Chief Superintendent positions. • Female police officers generally feel that they have equality of opportunity within the workplace. • There are no policies that facilitate flexible, part-time, job share opportunities. • The recruit fitness test has not been assessed to ensure it does not discriminate. • Contrary to any thoughts on gender mainstreaming, SLP ran a male only recruitment campaign for OSD. • 16% of Force is female but significantly lower at higher ranks. Force seems to struggle with understanding difference between positive action and positive discrimination. • There is no strategic direction for FSUs. • An SGBV SOP is being produced and is almost finalised. • Despite access to medical exams for victims of domestic violence and sexual assaults 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the SLP to gender impact assess SOPs, training materials etc. • Production of a Grievance Policy. • Deliver support to understand positive action and discrimination. • Assess recruitment policy to ensure it is non-discriminatory. • Support the removal of the term WPC and replace with PC for all police officers. • Support production of an Equality and Fairness at Work Policy. • Support more effective relationships at a local level between Police, Health and Education to address and coordinate and share information and strategy to deal with SGBV and child issues. • Encourage the SLP to stop gender exclusive recruitment strategies. • Support the development of enhanced performance measures and the ability to analyse these which will provide the ability to review resource allocation to demand and consider being more intelligent led. • Support the production of an overarching FSU strategy that could be linked to similar Health and Education Ministry strategies to have a joint strategic vision to SGBV across Sierra Leone. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women are marginalised and considered the weaker sex and potentially institutionalise this belief leading to unrest amongst female officers. • Women fail to apply for SLP as it is considered institutionally sexist. • Positive discrimination favouring women could cause unrest amongst male officers. • Victims of SGBV and domestic violence are unable to access justice and their experience is traumatic. Offenders escape justice and this reinforces communities acceptance of such crimes and subjugates women and places children at risk.
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<p>apparently free, doctors still charge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance stats for FSUs are poor. • Donors are supporting SGBV training. • Domestic violence offences are rising but no understanding if this is a positive or negative performance indicator. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the sensitisation process with a particular focus in schools and younger females but link this to development of above strategy and production of a specifically design training input that can be universally delivered across SL to ensure continuity of message. 	
<p>TOR F Map support provided to the SLP by other agencies including UN, EU, US and GTZ to help DFID avoid duplicating existing/planned efforts, particularly in relation to the 2012 elections.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSCO have recently drafted a justice sector donor mapping exercise. • Planned interventions for 2011-2012 have not been included in this mapping exercise. • There has been very limited support for SLP previously and indeed planned interventions for this year are limited to election preparedness and supporting various training programmes. • Donor coordination appears weak in Sierra Leone, International Agencies appear to be working very much in isolation and unaware of other donors plans and this is critical when developing their own plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater coordination of Donor support is required. • USAid's and UNIPSIL's Public Order support programmes may require a UK policing input to support them given the previous UK PO Training programme. • The JSCO should have access to all current and planned justice sector (which includes all SLP programmes) donor support projects on-going and planned to ensure effective coordination and reduction in duplication. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need for continued coordination • SLP must be fully consulted on all projects in the design phase. • Fail to coordinate encourages donor dependency, is not cost effective nor deliver value for money.
<p>TOR G Provide an approach (short and medium to longer term) for UK support to improve Police operational capability that takes into consideration: current political influence, perception of civilian population, internal and external accountability deficits and the alignment of Chiefdom Police in terms of the best means of providing policing at the village level.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A major finding is the desire and usefulness of widespread education, by all means possible, at all levels, and involving all involved. The opportunity to discuss and understand respective roles and responsibilities is very important. • There is a need for a senior adviser to be embedded specifically in the SLP to help in many areas. • Perception surveys indicate the police are seen as the most corrupt organisation. However, they are also the most visible. Matrix of M&E tools need developing and refining. • There is political interference, but the extent is difficult to empirically establish. We know, however, that there is resistance to this, but an external adviser will greatly enhance the ability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design, involving the coordination of all involved, of a comprehensive education/training/media strategy • Specific training for police and military (include others involved in securing the elections). Support for the training, and the provision of training materials. • Closer joint planning and possibly training with the RSLAF and IMATT • (see recommendations in TOR D above) • Support perception surveys as necessary. Victim survey, based on previous work, needs replicating. • Awareness meetings/seminars on the issue of political interference involving police and politicians – better understanding of what policing is, roles and responsibilities and 	<p>Close coordination with justice projects is a must. Failure will not only affect the police, but the success of other projects.</p> <p>The cost of recovering from another war is enormous, both in human and money terms. The risk of unrest must be mitigated wherever possible.</p>

<p>to resist interference by in creating confidence and introducing and external factor. Education of politicians can also be undertaken by the adviser.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited external oversight (the role of the LPPBs is important here). Improvements in the Ministry and Police Council are required. Establishment of an independent police complaints commission is progressing too slowly (adviser can help push) • Internal Inspectorate and CDIID are well established, but require further support. • The interface between the SLP and local policing systems is poor and needs to be developed and supported. Further work will be discussion and coordination will be required between the SLP, SLP adviser and new ASJP. • 	<p>consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to the internal inspectorate and CDIID • Improve the ability of the SLP to engage local communities. This will require support for mobility, training materials, and the planned objective of improving beat patrols. • Must be good coordination structures to get the most out of complementary police and ASJP activities • Develop police directorate and functions of MIA and Police Council. Review and modernisation of law. Push introduction of independent police complaints commission, and innovative joint initiatives with the ACC. 	
<p>TOR H Examine and design a baseline matrix that can be used for data collection, monitoring and evaluation of future police performance and impact.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The collection of performance data is weak and analysis is almost non-existent. • The current systems are unreliable, bureaucratic and time consuming. • Staff responsible for collecting and analysing data have significant skill gaps and have received very little or no training. There is obvious understaffing. • There are clear opportunities to develop SLP strategic planning capacity and capability and support its development as a more intelligence led police service. • LUCs are not as aware of performance issues in their areas as they should be. • Any change in performance culture, process, policy, analysis and reporting will require specific technical expertise and technical support. • Performance should be reported on annually to the public. • The Police Inspectorate have developed an annual Inspection plan but the methodologies are somewhat basic. • Greater understanding of demand, not just recorded crime, is required. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A specific and more detailed piece of work will be required, together with a training plan and support at local level. • Technical expertise will be required across a range of areas from communication skills, analysis, inspection methodology and reporting, strategic planning and research. • Development of an incident recording and management system is important. • Training for staff will need to be associated with tenure of post and effective succession planning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current data should not be relied on in many areas for a number of reasons (poor communication, non standard recording etc) Links to the recommendation to support Inspectorate and Corporate services. • An organisation that fails to plan and understand its business is planning to fail its customers and given the levels of mistrust the public have in the police can only serve to undermine the delivery of safer communities.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No evidence of assessing the impact of plans and objectives or developing actions plans for areas such as public perception surveys which is still in draft format from 2009. 		
<p>TOR I Identify any additional assessments/analysis that may be required to inform development support to the security and justice sectors.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The implementation phase of the new ASJP provides a real opportunity to ensure many of the findings in this review are incorporated into the new project. The provision of a specific police adviser will mean the ASJP project will be better focussed, provided the adviser is fully interfaced with the ASJP. Much training of police officers has been undertaken, but the value of training alone must be questioned and addressed. Emphasis must be placed on training needs, competencies of those trained, tenure of post, resource requirements necessary for training to be implemented on the ground, tutoring and mentoring on the ground, and better monitoring of the effectiveness and application of training. The capacity of the SLP to absorb the quantity of training must be considered. There is a need for a longer term police support project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure good interface with ASJP and other projects, donor support, NGO activity, and GoSL activities (JSPD, ASJP, American public order project, UN police support, GTZ etc) and ensure good coordination. Develop a fresh approach to training, taking into account training needs, competencies of those trained, tenure of post, resource requirements necessary for training to be implemented on the ground, tutoring and mentoring on the ground, and better monitoring of the effectiveness and application of training. Asses the capacity of the SLP to absorb training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failure to closely coordinate all donor activity will result in waste of resources and loss of opportunity.
<p>TOR J Consider other areas where UK support could contribute to improved police security taking into consideration the portfolio of activities already supported and strategies adopted by other donors.</p>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The overwhelming conclusion of this review is that the SLP's effectiveness and ability to provide basic policing services needs urgent attention. In the short term to stop the decline and police the elections, and in the longer term to maintain a level of policing, and create sustainability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The provision on a police specific advisory team will inform all longer term initiatives. One of the TORs for that person should be to design a 5 year tapered project to enable the GoSL to build proper financial support. The approach to the outcomes of this review must be dynamic, and sufficient flexibility built into any consequent actions and interventions. To have very tight TORs will hinder interventions, and opportunities will be missed to undertake 'quick fix' initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is a real risk that the real level of SLP domestic funding will continue to fall, and the already poor police service will decline further. Sierra Leone is still a fragile state, and an effective police force is crucial to safety and security. If the country becomes unstable again, the recovery costs are great.

1 The Development of Policing in Sierra Leone

1.1 The team were asked to assess the effectiveness of previous interventions. What follows is an account of the inputs that have affected the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) as an institution, and policing in a wider context, particularly the importance of locally based systems. Developments have been described in some detail, as it is important to remember that interventions have long term consequences, and it is easy to overlook work that has already been undertaken. It also serves to illustrate the length of time such reform programmes take. It also serves as institutional memory for future reference, as it proved difficult to find source material.

1.2 The reason for going back to the early 1990s is so the reader can see that there was a progression of inputs designed to deal with the circumstances at the time, and the willingness of the UK government to do its part in building the SLP to a point where it became effective. It does not cover the many other important inputs, for example dealing with the military, DDR, and the restoration of the Paramount Chiefs, which have had an impact on Sierra Leone. It must also be remembered that activities in the early days were undertaken in a context where, for example, DFID presence on the ground was very limited. Today, the context is very different.

1.3 The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) of today is directly descended from the British Colonial Police Force, which policed Sierra Leone between the years of 1808 and 1961. Typically the SLP had developed from a colonial frontier force and had inherited a para-military style. The SLP rank structure was divided on racial grounds with the commissioned ranks being formerly reserved for British expatriates, whilst gazetted African officers and non-commissioned officers formed the bulk of the working ranks.

1.4 Following independence in 1961, the SLP maintained its British roots together with the para-militarism and over elongated rank system. Initially, the SLP, in accordance with British tradition and the provisions of the Police Act 1964, operated almost free of political interference and partisan direction. Unfortunately this changed around 1978 when a one party state became operative and since then the SLP has suffered from political intrigue and corruption.

1.5 The policing infrastructure was neglected, hardly ever receiving routine care and maintenance, and the GoSL at times deliberately supplied very little equipment. In addition the terms and conditions of service for police officers have become so eroded that most police officers and their families were (and remain) living in poverty.

1.6 The role of the police is set out in the Constitution of 1991, and the Police Act 1964. It can be summarised as:

- The protection of life and property, and ensuring the safety and security of the people
- The maintenance and enforcement of law and order
- Responding appropriately to the local policing needs of the community
- The apprehension of offenders
- The prevention and detection of crime
- The investigation of offences and prosecution of offenders

1.7 The UK has previously provided support to the SLP. Between 1991 and 1994 the UK funded a resident senior training consultant but this input was not sustained as the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) were unable to provide the required recurrent finance after the project had been completed. Further assistance to the SLP was postponed until they produced a Development Plan. A 5 year plan – the Blueprint – was published in 1995, but was not ratified by the government of the time.

1.8 In April 1996, the then ODA police adviser, Geoffrey Bredemear, visited Sierra Leone and concluded that the SLP had limited policing capacity due to years of neglect. He did note, on the positive side, that there was a commitment to change coming from the government and the police. A number of recommendations were made, including organisational change, training and assistance to improve the operational capacity of the SLP.

1.9 In June 1996 the Sierra Leone Government set up a committee *"to inquire into and review the conditions of service, the recruitment and staffing policies, and the functional capabilities and administrative structure of the Republic of Sierra Leone Police ... "* (Dr Banya Report 1996).

1.10 It is worth just reiterating some of the findings and recommendations, as various commentators have failed to recognise the importance of the fact that Sierra Leone understood the problems, knew the solutions, and wanted to do something about it. They themselves knew the importance of community based policing. The committee recommended *"There is urgent need to set up a Force in which the Police are seen as members of the community in uniform, and not as detached and disinterested custodians of public order. The citizens must be encouraged to participate in solving problems. Such cooperation will enhance the work of the Police as their action would be seen as necessary and fair and thus given authority and legitimacy. To achieve this, it is most important that the police are given sufficient resources."*

1.11 It is frustrating to say the least that many of the Banya recommendations made 15 years ago still remain valid today. In fact the vast majority of the findings relating to conditions of service are as relevant today as in 1996.

1.12 In 1997 a communications project, supported by the UK, was prepared and agreed. This would give much needed police communications. A UK facilitated workshop was also held - the Bintumani Conference – beginning to set out the requirements to modernise the SLP.

1.13 President Kabbah first requested DFID assistance in 1996. The Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), with DFID providing the majority of the personnel and funding, was planned for 1997 but because of that year's military coup was not launched until after democracy was restored in early 1998.

1.14 Between July 1998 and late December 1998 the UK provided finance and professional expertise to enable immediate logistical and operational help to the SLP through the CPDTF. This work was to have continued into 1999 but the violent insurrection of 6 January 1999 caused the suspension of the initiative until mid - August 1999.

1.15 On 14 August 1998 GoSL's commitment to the development of a democratic police service was announced by President Kabbah in the form of a Police Charter and Mission Statement. This set out GoSL's expectations of the SLP, and GoSL's commitment to manage and equip it appropriately. It reflected and supported the findings of the Banya report.

1.16 DFID remained the main source of funding for the CPDTF (£1.2m covering the cost of UK team members, additional expert support, emergency repairs to buildings including the police hospital, basic communications in Freetown and limited emergency transport). Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Canada each provided or funded a team member. DFID also provided funds to equip and train the SLP to manage public order, to provide emergency humanitarian assistance for police officers and their families, and for uniforms. The task of the CPDTF is best described as the fire fighting phase, trying to get the SLP back on its feet.

1.17 In November 1999, following a presidential request Keith Biddle was appointed IGP. This was funded by the UK.

1.18 A watershed seminar was held in December 1998. This involved most of the senior officers of the SLP and set out the future of policing.

1.19 Part of the CPDTF's work was to research and design a further major project. During the later part of 1999 detailed analysis was carried out to determine the needs of the SLP and how best to start the long and difficult process of rebuilding it. The project was agreed, and in the second half of 2000 the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) commenced. It was scheduled to run for 3 years, and then become part of a further far reaching project involving a much wider community safety and justice sector. Much of the planning for this wider project began in 2002, but did not start until 2005.

2 Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project – CCSSP

2.1 The rationale behind the setting up of the CCSSP is set out below, together with some of the problem analysis that underpinned the project, and a brief description of the elements of the CCSSP.

2.2 By the start of the CCSSP there was a large contingent of police within the UN missions – UN CIVPOL. It is often asked what the difference was between the CCSSP and the UNCIVPOL. The CCSSP was very much a development project, whereas the UNCIVPOL focussed on facilitating delivery.

2.3 The major thrust of UK policy in Sierra Leone during this time was to help restore peace and security through the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) process, reconstruction of the armed forces under effective civil government control, and restoration of police capacity to provide personal security to citizens, especially the poor, who had suffered much. The police service would be instrumental in enabling conflict prevention to gain ground and to provide for stability in the resettlement and rehabilitation process.

2.4 Vital complementary DFID involvement envisaged the restoration of the paramount chiefs as the nucleus of civil society and community rebuilding, assistance with presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002, an anti-corruption programme, rebuilding of the legal system, and public service reform.

2.5 The re-establishment of democratic policing required the SLP to have the ability to identify and deal with threats against the state, including violent disorder and armed criminality. That entailed sensitive areas of work including the re-establishment of a Special Branch and the re-arming and training of the OSG (SSD). It was agreed that these matters were an integral element in the development of the SLP, and it was considered that only non-lethal equipment and associated training, and non-covert special branch activities would be appropriate for DFID funding. Support for other elements was considered by the FCO.

3 Problem Analysis - 1999

3.1 A problem analysis was undertaken by the CPDTF in 1999 and informed the design of the CCSSP. In summary:

3.2 Colonial legacy and years of neglect

3.2.1 The British Colonial Police Force policed Sierra Leone from 1808 until independence in 1961.

3.2.2 In 1978, with the advent of a one party state, the SLP became the subject of political interference, and became progressively riddled with political intrigue and corruption. Human and physical infrastructure suffered increasingly from neglect. There was little equipment, and officers and their families lived in poverty, some supplementing their meagre income by corruption.

3.3 Police Buildings and equipment

3.3.1 Almost all police buildings suffered damage during the rebel activity; many were totally destroyed. Housing is deplorable, often lacking easy access to clean water and basic sanitation. According to international observers police cells are amongst the worst in the world, with no natural light, fresh air flow or toilet facilities. They are in contravention of international human rights norms.

3.3.2 Many vehicles were destroyed or "requisitioned" by the Kamajors (irregular civil defence groups). Other essential equipment was also destroyed or looted.

3.4 Institutional Weaknesses

3.4.1 The SLP were ineffective and lacked dynamic local leadership and direction. While in the short term the leadership issue was addressed by the appointment of an expatriate IGP, morale and confidence remained low.

3.4.2 The organisational culture needed re-orientating towards openness, pro-activity and service to the community. Changes to police culture - never easy to achieve – were hampered by corruption, lack of public confidence, lack of resources and the uncertainty of the peace process.

3.5 Displaced persons and the growth of crime

3.5.1 The civil war displaced thousands of people, many of whom sought refuge in Freetown and major centres of population, increasing the pressure on the police and other services.

3.5.2 Overcrowding, poverty and large numbers of ex-combatants with continuing access to weapons all contributing to an increasing crime rate which includes armed robbery and high levels of rape and abuse of children.

3.6 Constitutional/Legal

3.6.1 The 1991 Constitution provides for civilian oversight of the SLP by a Police Council. The constitutional provisions are unsatisfactory as:-

- they fail to describe the responsibilities of the Minister;
- the Minister is just another ordinary member of the Council;
- the Council can meddle in day-to-day personnel matters thus undermining the IGP;
- the Council has authority over operational matters thus clouding the arrangements for police accountability.

3.6.2 There were no external mechanisms to set and monitor policing standards and objectives, to promote transparency and accountability, or to ensure that complaints are properly and impartially investigated. GoSL intended, with support of the project, to establish a Police Directorate within the MSS to deal with these deficiencies.

3.6.3 The 1964 Police Act needed modernising to ensure that the roles of the police and the IGP are clear and to remove the possibility of political interference. A White Paper on policing was required as a precursor to new legislation.

3.7 Police response

3.7.1 The SLP's operational capacity was severely handicapped by a lack of management information, a reactive rather than pro-active approach and the inefficient use of human and material resources. These problems were aggravated by inadequate and unreliable communication and intelligence systems, a paucity of vehicles and inappropriate and inadequate means of controlling disorder. Many areas of Sierra Leone were not being policed fully. The SLP required considerable logistical and technical support before it could provide effective policing for the community.

3.8 Police Firearms and Riot Control Equipment

3.8.1 Sierra Leone has a policy of unarmed policing, and the GoSL wanted to retain this positive image. However in the face of the frequent criminal use of firearms and the targeting of police officers by rebels (the SLP suffered over 300 deaths due to rebel activity in 1999) they would be unable to sustain this policy unless unarmed officers are reassured that they have access to effective and reliable armed support. This would have to be provided by a retrained and reequipped Operations Support Division (OSD), formally the SSD.

3.9 Relations with the public

3.9.1 The historic use of the SLP as a repressive arm of the state and their institutionalised corruption had resulted in mistrust and disrespect. While people wished to see the SLP take prime responsibility for law and order, unethical behaviour had to be addressed if appropriate police/community relations were to develop. Improvements to officers' terms and conditions will have to be part of the solution.

3.10 Justification

3.10.1 Safety and security is essential to stability and economic viability. Involving the community and assisting the SLP to become more accountable, responsive and effective would make a major contribution. Without the proposed assistance the SLP would remain ineffective, crime and disorder would continue to increase, and the odds against future stability would lengthen.

3.10.2 It was recognised the involvement of the community in policing issues, together with more effective accountability systems, would encourage greater scrutiny of police actions, and help to keep respect for the rights of individuals high on the police and government agenda.

3.11 CCSSP Description

3.11.1 The project design recognised that the SLP alone cannot ensure safety and security to the people of Sierra Leone, and that the community, together with traditional and customary policing and justice systems, needed to be fully integrated into the process. This would be achieved by establishing a Community/Police Forum, consisting of selected civil society organisations and representatives, to enhance and monitor the accountability of the SLP to the community. The Forum would meet on a regular basis to jointly review progress and issues arising with the management team and steering group committee.

3.11.2 The SLP with the assistance of the CPDTF had already embarked on a programme of change. The project would strengthen this process and address the problems identified above. It was agreed that sustainability would be improved by GoSL, DFID would commit long term to police reform, and the project's aim of improving co-ordination and linkages between the police and elements of the informal justice system would be developed.

3.11.3 The essential components of the project are set out below.

COMPONENT	OUTPUTS
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a police directorate in the MSS, with trained staff • a White Paper on Policing, and a new Police Act • independent accountability structures e.g. complaints investigation, Inspectorate. • Establishment of a civil society forum
LNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased community awareness of policing, access to justice and rights • trained local needs police officers including victim support, domestic violence and crime prevention • police/community consultation mechanisms to provide communities with a 'voice' in local policing and a role in crime prevention. • research and action to establish links and working relationships between informal and formal policing systems
Ethical policing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • improved police behaviour and attitudes • improved treatment and recording of persons in custody • improved respect for detainees' rights • improved treatment of victims particularly women and children • established policing standards and means of monitoring • internal accountability systems
Strategic development and operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a more appropriate SLP structure • improved management, performance, intelligence and financial systems • improved policy making structures • improved deployment and effectiveness of resources • improved management and control of public order • quality control systems
Human resource development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • improved recruit and probationer training courses and systems • management/supervisors' development programmes and training • improved personnel, promotion and HR development systems • improved specialist skills particularly investigative skills

3.11.4 These components would be supported by the provision of equipment (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, communications and training equipment); limited building costs to improve the treatment of victims and suspects; and other miscellaneous support items. The longer term rehabilitation of the police estate would be covered by the government's overall rehabilitation programme and/or other donors

3.11.5 DFID would also provide training and equipment for the OSD, apart from the weapons and weapon training which is being funded separately.

3.11.6 Alongside the CCSP a 3 year SLP Development Plan was agreed. The restructured organisation of SLP (achieved within the budget) would be a flatter organisation with fewer senior

ranks and an increased percentage of officers on operational duties. Decision making would be devolved as closely as possible to the point of service delivery. Promotion would be based on merit.

3.11.7 The style of operational delivery of service was community orientated through LNP. This change would be supported by comprehensive in-service training and programmes to educate the community about their rights, the role of the police, and the methods they can use to support community safety and security.

3.11.8 Essential departments, such as the Criminal Investigation Department, which along with all criminal records was destroyed in January 1999, would need to be re-equipped so that professional investigative support could be provided to support local policing.

3.11.9 Essential operational support mechanisms such as radio and telecommunications networks were inadequate and needed to be developed. Similarly transport was a major problem and needed to be provided together with the means to maintain it and monitor its use.

3.11.10 Hardly any use was made of information technology. A strategy would be formulated and a limited start made on introducing technology, hoping to create savings and improve effectiveness. For example, personnel records needed to be brought up to date and a personnel database would help both to improve human resource management and to eradicate 'ghost workers'.

3.11.11 Effectiveness requires good quality staff, properly managed. Personnel management barely existed. Comprehensive human resource management policies were introduced. Female officers were under-represented in the managerial and supervisory ranks and allegations of ethnic discrimination were frequently made: the formulation and promulgation of an equal opportunities policy was a priority.

3.11.12 Security was a key aspect of the GoSL recovery programme, and a pre-requisite to achieving macro-economic stability and business and investor confidence. International experience in dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations highlighted the importance of establishing security as an essential precondition for sustained development and poverty reduction. As demilitarisation proceeded the need to re-equip, re-train, and re-deploy the police force became an increasing priority for government and donors.

3.11.13 The main economic benefits associated with the CCSSP included improved security and personal safety for the people of Sierra Leone. Without the project the SLP police force would remain ineffective, crime would become more severe and endemic and the future of the peace process would be at risk.

3.11.14 The support for the SLP continued without major interruption, and the CCSSP commenced work in August 2000. The project benefited from frequent external reviews.

3.11.15 An 'output to purpose review' in 2002 concluded that good progress had been made in most areas addressed by the project, but particularly in those relating to the development of:

- Senior officers
- Internal audit, accountability and personnel systems
- The internal promulgation and acceptance of a community based policing philosophy, which includes the establishment of Family Support Units (FSU).
- Police/community consultation and involvement, including working with traditional leaders
- Operational responsiveness and public order management.

3.11.16 Towards the end of 2002 the war was declared 'done done' by the President, elections had been peacefully held, and many areas of the country were opening up. It was time to move on to the next phase of development and address the wider issues of access to security and justice. The CCSSP team, supported by further expertises, undertook detailed research and began to prepare the next project which would support the wider justice sector. It was intended for this phase to follow on from CCSSP, but it did not commence until 2005.

3.11.17 The Sierra Leone Security Reform Programme (SILSEP), which ran from 1999 has provided support to the Office of National Security (ONS), Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and a range of non-security related institutions with an interest in accountability and enhanced service delivery across the security sector (parliament, civil society, media and academia). An output to purpose

review¹ was undertaken in April 2007, and a number of recommendations made. It is interesting to note that many of the concerns and comments made are still relevant today.

3.11.18 Since the mid/late 2005, SILSEP provided a range of activities in support of policing. There was a permanent in country policing adviser, and a small number of consultants. The main focus of activity was on enhancing the SLP's ability to gather and analyse criminal and security intelligence and enhancing its capacity to deal with operational planning, event management and public disorder. Other work included media training, community liaison and asset management. The provision of support across these areas has been well-received by the SLP and is considered to have been appropriate, timely and professionally delivered by the three consultants involved (Two funded by SILSEP, one by JSDP) with positive effect.

3.11.19 The OPR concluded that public order training had been delivered to a high standard, and provided the SLP with urgently needed planning and event management capacity. Almost 1,500 police personnel were been trained, all of whom may rapidly be formed into Crowd Control Units (CCUs). However, the Review Team found that the CCUs were now generally ineffective.

3.11.20 Eight Ministry of Defence Police officers were seconded to Sierra Leone in connection with the election policing operation. These officers are co-located with UNPOL in the four provinces. It was decided to continue supporting vehicles and communications utilising under spends from the CCSSP. Support was limited to providing technical assistance in the areas of training and management, and some spares. This initial work was from January 2005 for one year, but was extended to support the build up to the 2007 elections to ensure there was sufficient mobility and communications.

3.11.21 The OPR raised the issue of coordination, pointing out that the SLP were supported by two separately funded DFID programmes (SILSEP and JSDP). Most agreed that the situation was almost impossible to manage coherently. Consequently, the management of all the policing elements fell to the JSDP.

3.11.22 After the 2007 elections, apart from support given by the JSDP, all DFID funded support stopped.

4 Justice Sector Development Program – 2005-2011

4.1 Only with the initiation of the Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP) in 2005 did a change of direction take place, when the reform focus moved from police to the justice sector as a whole. Support to the police was cut dramatically. There is no denying the huge importance of and significant impact of CPDTF and CCSSP on the police. In the words of one of the JSDP advisors who arrived in Sierra Leone in 2005: "The SLP is the only functional unit in MIA, there is a huge imbalance. The SLP is frustrated in terms of the judiciary, which is better, but not functioning."

4.2 The JSDP therefore came to constitute a fundamental break with both the approach and management of the CCSSP. The most radical change was a shift towards the governing structures of the justice sector and on the delivery of services at the local level, and outside Freetown, with an emphasis on Moyamba District, the 'pilot district' outside the Western Area.

4.3 With this shift in focus, it was almost a given that there would be a number of complications involved in broadening the focus. First of all, £25m was now earmarked for the judiciary, prisons, MIA, civil society involvement in mediation schemes and the Chiefdom Police, with only 2.5% for the SLP.

4.4 Priority reform areas have included out-of-date and inaccessible laws and procedures, including the indexing of customary law, prison overcrowding, delays in court, absence of adequate juvenile justice provision, lack of support mechanisms which meet the needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized to access justice and the lack of connection between community needs and police operations.

4.5 The focus on the SLP as an institution, ensuring that it would be able to perform effectively as provider of internal security, was definitively being taken over by DFID's focus on development. This shift in focus has been held consistently by the JSDP, both at the central level and in Moyamba District.

4.6 In Freetown, a heavy emphasis was been put on what can best be described as governance-related activities. A Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan for 2008-2010 was launched

¹ SILSEP Output to Purpose Review, April 2007 File Ref: SSDAT/20/5/2/2

in February 2008. As a strategic document, it has been regarded as an important contribution to Freetown-based reform efforts across the justice sector. A Justice Sector Co-ordination Office was established in July 2007, located adjacent to Attorney General and Solicitor General's offices within the Ministry of Justice in Freetown. Again, this body has been viewed by external assessors as a pivotal link within the overall justice sector.

4.7 Importantly, and very visible to the team, the focus on supporting SLP procurement completely disappeared with the onset of the JSDP, and does not seem to be taken up again in the future with the Access to Security and Justice Program (ASJP). While this prioritization may be understandable, it raises concerns about the ability of the SLP to properly police the 2012 general elections, and especially those in 2017. Donors may want to carefully assess the risks of not supporting vehicle and communication assistance, even if doing so will not *necessarily* be sustainable in the short of medium-term.

4.8 The difficulty for the SLP has been that as support was refocused into other areas, the financial burden that remains for the Ministry of Finance in terms of both recurrent and capital replacement expenditure has, not surprisingly, turned out to be unaffordable. It was obvious, therefore, that the SLP remains strongly dependent on contributions by external actors. Arguably, this is something of a double blow. It may be argued that withdrawal of international funding led to short-term paralysis and degradation of service with a real danger of a slide towards the way things were prior to the onset of reforms.

5 Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP) – 2011-2014

5.1 For the first time, donor supported programming in Sierra Leone will have a strong focus on what is referred to as 'non-state justice and security actors', 'community mediation projects' and 'legal aid endeavours'. Above all, the focus will be on strengthening delivery of services, where they will make the greatest impact on the population itself.

5.2 Apart from continuing work initiated by JSDP with paralegal and mediator dispute resolution, emphasis will also be on LPPBs, working at the local level. A national legal aid scheme will be put in place, and work will be continued with the Chiefdom Administration and Local Court Administration.

5.3 Activities relating to the police will centre on the interface with the general population, rather than strengthening the operational capacity of the SLP *per se*. ASJP aims to focus on the police inspectorate, CDIID, and the establishment of an independent police complaints body.

5.4 In the program documentation developed for the ASJP so far, there is no indication to provide support for the operational capacity of the SLP, which, as this report clearly indicates, is in decline.

5.5 Any additional support to the SLP must interface with the ASJP. For ease of reference, below is a summary of how the ASJP will involve the SLP.

6 Interface with the new Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP)

6.1 The new ASJP, which follows on from the existing JSDP, is expected to commence in August 2011. Its goal is to secure the conditions for consolidating peace and stability in Sierra Leone, and the purpose is to increase access to responsive, accountable and effective security and justice services, especially for the poor, vulnerable and those living in remote and marginalised communities.

6.2 A number of results are expected by 2014. Results that specifically affect policing include:

- increased convictions of perpetrators by the FSUs
- Greater access and choice of justice services to justice in remote and marginalised communities by inter alia support to the Chiefdom Police
- Increased confidence through effective interaction between state and no-states partners facilitated by mechanisms like the LPPBs
- By 2012, police at the national and local levels are equipped to ensure voter safety by effectively mitigating risks to election violence, particularly for the most vulnerable and excluded, leading to a peaceful and credible outcome.

6.3 The ASJP emphasises its compliance with DFID's policy guidance which itself emphasises that security and justice areas essential for sustainable development in fragile states, and underpins HMG's Strategy for Sierra Leone. The total estimated cost is £19.4 million over 4 years.

6.4 The JSCO will be supported to facilitate the development and implementation of the new JSRSIP (2011 – 2013), and coordinate better service delivery and strengthen monitoring and

evaluation systems. The ONS will also be supported to further its coordinating, information sharing and early warning functions on a diminishing basis. This recognises the SLP's lead in community safety and security.

6.5 The ASJP adopts a community based approach to service provision and dispute resolution, recognising the potential for election violence and the threat to stability in 2012. LPPBs are seen as key to empowering individuals and their communities to play an active part in improving the quality and access to justice and security services.

6.6 In relation to strengthening accountability, more effective policy direction and oversight to improve service delivery and increase trust and confidence in, inter alia, the SLP, support will be given to MIA. The ASJP will also focus on the SLP's internal accountability and oversight structures, and will also support demonstrating improvements to the public in their management of security for the 2012 elections.

6.7 There are a number of more specific inputs, for example training of police prosecutors.

6.8 The ASJP recognises that 85% of Sierra Leoneans access justice through their traditional authorities and Local Courts where customary law is practiced, and the fact that these traditional governance structures are also critical to maintaining peace and stability at grass roots level. It also recognises that performance is generally poor, citing under funding, weak oversight mechanisms, and susceptibility to political interference.

6.9 Whilst there has been some improvement (activities of ONS and JSCO), linkages within and across the justice and security sectors are inadequate.

6.10 The design of the ASJP is flexible, and DFIDSL reserves the right to refocus interventions, and notes the critical need to deliver ASJP support to elections security management in a timely manner and to ensure the police can mobilise effectively. There will be a pre-inception phase to improve knowledge and understanding, followed by a six month inception phase, during which time start up activities will commence.

6.11 In the area of monitoring and evaluation, a comprehensive result based M&E system and strategy will be designed and commissioned during the inception phase.

7 Comment

7.1 The above intentionally sets out in some detail the various interventions that have taken place. It describes the trajectory of reform of the security and justice sector in a conflict and post conflict era. It begins with small scale interventions (training, communications), followed by 'fire fighting' in an attempt to re-build and modernise the police as a working entity, re-establishing the police across the country to support the population to return to normality and their homes, to allow the UN to draw down, and then addressing the much wider issues of access to security and justice at national and local level in a stable society.

7.2 Within the main body of the report sustainability of these interventions are discussed. It is clear that the vision shared by all those involved in the early days has to a great extent been achieved and validated. The very fact that people can now concentrate on the wider issues is testament to the involvement and dedication of so many Sierra Leoneans, some of whom lost their lives in the process. The problem now is sustaining the progress made.

Annex E

List of interviews and meetings.

Commissioner J Kamara	Anti Corruption Commission
British High Commissioner and senior staff	BHC
Defence Attaché	BHC
Chiefdom Police	Bo
Paramount Chief	Bo
Resident Minister	Bo
Mammy Queen and Police Wives	Bo Police Barracks
Bob Bradley	British Council (JSDP)
Janice Drewe	British Council (JSDP)
John Magbity	British Council (JSDP)
Peter Viner	British Council (JSDP)
Marcella Macauley	Campaign for Good Governance
Community Relations Department	Central Freetown
LUC	Central Freetown
Superintendent	Central Freetown
Open Society	Civil society
Search for Common Ground	Civil society
Sonia Warner	DFID Governance Adviser
Various staff	DFID London
Head of Freetown Metropolitan Police	Freetown
LPPB Chairman	Freetown East
Ada Hakobyan	GIZ
Minister of Internal Affairs	GOSL
Permanent Secretary to Minister of Internal Affairs	GOSL
Superintendent	Head of FSU
Commander IMATT	IMATT
Military Police	IMATT
Coordinator and other staff	Justice Sector Coordination Unit
CIS	Kenema
LPPB focus group	Kenema
Resident Minister	Kenema
LPPB Chairman	Kissy
Detainees in Cells	Kissy
Caretaker Chief and elders	Koribondo Chiefdom
Focus group	Koribondo Chiefdom
Local Court	Koribondo Chiefdom
Police post	Koribondo Chiefdom
Chiefdom Police	Makeni
FSU	Makeni
LPPB Secretary	Makeni
Permanent Secretary to Minister of Internal Affairs	MIA
Director of Budgets and Deputy	Ministry of Finance
Chiefdom Police	Moyamba
LPPB Secretary-General	Moyamba
OSD coordinator	Moyamba
Paramount Chief (stand-in)	Moyamba
Electoral Commissioners (3)	NEC
Campaign for Good Governance	NGO
Garry Horlacher	ONS
Kellie Conteh	ONS

Larrie Bassie	ONS
Commander	PTS Hastings
Deputy Commander	PTS Hastings
Recruit focus group	PTS Hastings
Selection of trainees	PTS Hastings
Director and Country Director	Search for Common Ground
Director and Staff, Communications	SLP
Directors and Staff, Transport	SLP
AIG Regpol South	SLP Bo
Community Relations Department	SLP Bo
FSU staff	SLP Bo
LPPB Chairman	SLP Bo
OSD coordinator	SLP Bo
Various Police Staff	SLP Bo
ASP	SLP Congo Cross
Constable focus group	SLP Congo Cross
CRD	SLP Congo Cross
Custody staff	SLP Congo Cross
Custody staff	SLP Congo Cross
Female officer focus group	SLP Congo Cross
Information Officer	SLP Congo Cross
LUC	SLP Congo Cross
LUC	SLP Congo Cross
Sergeant focus group	SLP Congo Cross
Superintendent	SLP CRD HQ
Superintendent	SLP East Freetown
LUC	SLP Freetown East
Chief Superintendent Corporate Affairs	SLP HQ
Deputy Inspector General	SLP HQ
Director and Deputy OSD	SLP HQ
Director of Corporate Affairs	SLP HQ
Head of Research and Planning	SLP HQ
Director of Crime Services	SLP HQ
Director of HR Management	SLP HQ
Director of Integrated Intelligence	SLP HQ
Director of Operations	SLP HQ
IG Staff Officer	SLP HQ
Inspector General	SLP HQ
Corporate service staff	SLP HQ
Head of Training	SLP HQ
Superintendent CDIID	SLP HQ
AIG Regpol East	SLP Kenema
Deputy LUC	SLP Kenema
FSU staff	SLP Kenema
LUC	SLP Kenema
LUC	SLP Kenema
OSD Regional coordinator	SLP Kenema
Various Police Staff	SLP Kenema
CDIID	SLP Kissy
CIS	SLP Kissy
CRB	SLP Kissy
Community Relations Department	SLP Kissy
Custody Staff	SLP Kissy
Custody Staff	SLP Kissy

FSU staff	SLP Kissy
LUC	SLP Kissy
Special Branch	SLP Kissy
Superintendent	SLP Kissy
Superintendent	SLP Kissy
LUC and staff	SLP Makeni
Regional Commander and staff	SLP Makeni
Various Police Staff	SLP Makeni
Acting LUC	SLP Moyamba
Community Relations Department	SLP Moyamba
FSU staff	SLP Moyamba
Various Police Staff	SLP Moyamba
Commander OPPD	SLP Murray Road
Head of Transnational Crime Unit	SLP Murray Road
Senior Police Adviser and others	UNPOL, UNIOSIL
Abuduali Jalloh	USAid
Jean Benedict	USAid
Consultants, USAID, Public Order Project	USAID
Various informal discussions with members of the SLP and public.	

Sierra Leone Police (SLP) – Review of SLP capabilities**Terms of Reference for international consultants****Background**

1. DFID has a long history of engagement with the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) dating back to 1997. Since then, a range of support has been provided through the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project in 2000, followed by assistance through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) from 2001. From 2005, support has been provided under the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) which ends in September 2011. JSDP will be succeeded by the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP), which has recently been approved and due to commence in August 2011.

2. The transition period between the two Programmes presents a good opportunity to take stock of progress and impact achieved thus far, from the central strategic and policy level to the quality of community policing services at the grass roots level. There will also be a specific focus on security planning for the 2012 elections. This review will be critical in helping to determine the exact nature of future UK support to the SLP over the next four years.

Objectives

3. The main objectives of the Consultants will be to:

- a) Assess the level of ownership and sustainability of past interventions and the degree of impact and change which has occurred in the quality of police services.
- b) Identify the needs and priorities of the Sierra Leone Police for institutional capacity development, which will lead to improved delivery of operational capability and policing services.
- c) Assess the capacity for strategic planning and direction on policing, within the Ministry for Internal Affairs, as GoSL's institutional and policy lead.
- d) Identify other government institutions and non-state organisations which may assist in the delivery of, or demand for improved police services, and outline immediate or longer-term support options.
- e) Assess the degree of progress towards more gender sensitive policing, both in terms of organisational management (recruitment; promotion, treatment of female officers etc.) and in the quality of police services, particularly victims of SGBV.
- f) Map support provided to the SLP by other agencies including UN, EU, US and GTZ to help DFID avoid duplicating existing/planned efforts, particularly in relation to the 2012 elections.
- g) Provide an approach (short and medium to longer term) for UK support to improve Police operational capability that takes into consideration: current political influence, perception of civilian population, internal and external accountability deficits, the alignment of Chiefdom Police in terms of the best means of providing policing at the village level.
- h) Examine and design a baseline matrix that can be used for data collection, monitoring and evaluation of future police performance and impact
- i) Identify any additional assessments/analysis that may be required to inform development support to the security and justice sectors
- j) Consider other areas where UK support could contribute to improved police security taking into consideration the portfolio of activities already supported and strategies adopted by other donors.

Outputs

4. Based on the findings, the consultants will produce a written report:
 - Outlining immediate short-term options for support and longer-term strategic options, taking into consideration ASJP's proposed interventions; the SLP's Strategic Plan 2009-2011 under implementation and its successor covering 2011-2013 which is currently under development. Provide an indicative budget where possible.
 - Identifying the capability of the SLP to provide the necessary security requirements for the 2012 elections and the feasibility of their Elections Action Plan. Make recommendations for DFID's support under ASJP for election security within the framework of the Elections Action Plan which should complement support provided by other partners
 - Identifying the current operational capability of the Sierra Leone Police, shortcomings and efforts to align Chiefdom police to improve the quality of policing to the grassroots level.
 - Identifying opportunities, challenges and constraints to delivering effective policing at the community level, including assessing the operations of the Local Police Partnership Boards as a mechanism for improving community safety and security.
 - Produce a baseline matrix that can be used for collection, monitoring and evaluation of future police performance.
5. In addition, time permitting; the report should also include other potential areas of UK support/cooperation that would further enhance the SLP security & community operations.

Scope of work

6. The consultants will
 - Work with Sierra Leone Police officials at all levels to assess their operational capacity to provide effective, efficient and affordable policing services, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups. The Corporate Service Department should be the main entry point. Staff in the Family Support Units should also be consulted.
 - Also consult with Ministry of Internal Affairs as the institutional policy lead; Ministry of Finance as under resourcing is a major constraint and the ACC on corruption within the SLP.
 - Consult with all relevant stakeholders including MOD (IMATT), ONS, UN Mission and Agencies, Justice Sector Development Programme staff, Justice Sector Coordination Office, law enforcement agencies, Attorney General's Office, IGP, Chief District Officer, District Courts, NGOs and CSOs;
 - Draw on relevant studies on citizens' perceptions of the quality of the services provided by the Police
 - Consider how international, regional and UK support to policing practices would contribute to the wider goal of public security reform in Sierra Leone.
 - Make indicative recommendations on other potential areas of UK support relating to public safety & security which can be further explored in coming months.

Timing

7. The adviser will visit Sierra Leone on 25 January for two weeks for activities which would include one week within the capital Freetown, gaining an understanding of the SLP

architecture and how it fits within the peace and security framework, disposition and current scale of force.

Week 2: Identifying strengths and weaknesses in Command (including the relationship with RSLAF) and Communications.

Weeks 3-5: visiting police stations and boarder areas to assess capability, basic understanding of the law and processes relating to the support of the public. This should include visits to communities outside of Freetown and major the regional centres.

Week 6: Assembling the report and delivering outcomes to the country team.

The visit and subsequent reports should be completed before the end of FY 10/11.

Essential skills

8. The consultants will have:

- experience of designing and implementing public security programmes in a post-conflict environment, preferably in Africa;
- ability to facilitate project design in a way that ensures the Police and other relevant stakeholder take ownership, accountability and responsibility for the project outputs;
- ability to draw on relevant analysis including political economy analysis, country governance assessments, conflict assessments and national strategies and development plans;
- sound understanding of FCO/DFID/MOD working
- experience in donor coordinated programmes
- ability to work effectively on sensitive issues in a deeply politicised and unpredictable environment.

Management arrangements

9. The consultants will report to the Defence Adviser at BHC Sierra Leone (Project manager), on completion the report will be made available to representatives from the MOD, FCO & DFID.

**BHC Sierra Leone
January 2011**