On the frontier between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics of migration in Burkina Faso – and the failure of emigration policies

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ABSTRACT

Migration policy research is biased towards receiving countries. Furthermore, even emigration policies are generally evaluated against their ability to control migration. This article asserts that ‘filling the sending-country gap’ should go beyond the role of policies in shaping (or reducing) migration. It should instead reflect the broader development goals of emigration policies, taking into consideration the capabilities of sending states. In this ‘age of migration’, it is striking how little we know about how policies can best be used by sending states as a tool for poverty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration – even in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border. One should also consider the aspirations of sending states in leveraging migration for development. With a case study on Burkina Faso – a mainly south-south sending country – policymaking is brought center stage in order to explore whether the current elaboration of an emigration policy signifies a change towards migration becoming – once again – ‘high’ politics in Burkina Faso.
INTRODUCTION

Scholars have contested the effectiveness of migration policies. While migration policy research has mainly been conducted in receiving states, even emigration policies are generally evaluated against the interests of receiving states, which is mainly the ability to control migration. This working paper asserts that ‘filling the sending-country gap’ should go beyond the role of policies in shaping (or reducing) migration. It therefore contributes to ongoing research of the interplay between receiving and sending states and the ‘failure’ of their respective policies. In this ‘age of migration’, it is striking how little we know about how policies can best be used by sending states as a tool to leverage migration for development. Analysis of emigration policies should reflect the broader development goals of emigration policies, taking into consideration the capabilities of sending states in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border. One should also consider the aspirations of sending states. This paper introduces a case study on Burkina Faso, which is a mainly south-south sending country and one of the main emigrant-sending countries in Africa. Burkina Faso is furthermore one of the poorest countries in the world, and was also one of the first African countries to attempt to leverage migration for development by the introduction of policies following independence in 1960. With a case study on Burkina Faso, policymaking is brought center stage in order to explore whether the current elaboration of an emigration policy signifies a change towards migration becoming – once again – ‘high’ politics in Burkina Faso. The article thereby brings the sending state ‘back in’ (Skocpol, 1985; Hollifield, 2007).

Bringing the sending state back in

There is an intricate relationship between immigration and emigration policies, which are affected by foreign policy considerations and bilateral relations with conflicts often translating into inter-state problems. Immigration policies, nonetheless, are less affected by emigration policies than the other way around. Sending countries are thus in asymmetric relationships with the often more powerful and wealthier host states. Sending states are therefore largely at the mercy of receiving countries with reduced ‘capabilities’ to manage migration, and a heavy reliance on labor export can generate dependency patterns (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). History shows that when immigration countries experience a reduced demand for workers, they have not been shy to halt recruitment programs or break agreements (OECD, 1974; OECD, 1976). In periods of rapid growth, African governments have welcomed labor migrants, but sometimes expelled them en masse during economic crises, of which there were 23 instances between 1958 and 1996 (Bredeloup, 1995). Migration streams between Tunisia and Libya have for example had three periods of open access and eight of expulsion between 1969 and 2013. Literature regarding sending states rarely focus on the nature and implementation of emigration policies. Research has rather measured the externalization of European borders (e.g. in North Africa) and the failure to export European immigration control (Paoletti, 2010; Betts and Milner, 2006; Boswell, 2003). “Some problematics still remain unexplored, and gaps in the research include topics such as emigration policies (rules of exit), the “diplomacy of migration” led by emigration countries.” (De Wenden, 2008). This article will further explore the relationship between emigration and immigration policies, and how sending states can best use policies as a tool for pov-
erty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration – even in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border.

The ‘failure’ of migration policies has mainly been analyzed in a context of receiving states attempting to affect the level of immigration through restrictive policy measures and increasing border control (Castles and Miller, 2009; Massey et al, 1998). While some scholars argue that immigration policies have been effective in controlling migration flows (Brochmann and Hammer, 1999; Collyer, 2006; Striwerda, 1999), most underline counter-productive effects such as discouraging return (Castles, 2004b; de Haas, 2007; Grütters, 2003). The deficiency of restrictive immigration policies to control flows has been measured through spatial, categorical, inter-temporal and reverse substitution effects of flows. Basically, instead of reducing migration, de Haas (2011) argues that migrants instead change destination, channels or limit returns.

Another cause attributed to the ‘failure’ of both immigration and emigration policies, is the fact that migration is driven by micro-, meso – and macro-contextual factors that go beyond policies of individual states. When analyzing the macro-level, Stephen Castles underlines that the reason ‘Why migration policies fail’ (Castles, 2004) in the global north is mainly attributed to the north-south divide and factors within political systems. Hein de Haas further insists that ‘Why development instead of migration policies are bound to fail’ (de Haas, 2006a) is due to the fact that demand for both skilled and unskilled migration is likely to persist in the EU and the US. At the meso-level, determinants such as networks of individuals and transnational communities and migration systems also tend to shape migration, while other actors include multinational companies (de Haas, 2010b; Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et al, 1992; Mabogunjo, 1970; Massey et al, 1998). The work of Amartya Sen (1999) and Mahbub ul Haq (1995) for example highlights the agency of people rather than states in accessing opportunities, knowledge, services and more secure livelihoods. Neoliberal and developmentalist ideologies of the migration and development nexus shift the attention away from structural development constraints and, hence, the responsibility of migrant sending states to pursue political and economic reform (de Haas, 2012). Indeed, migration is increasingly seen as something beyond the control of states (Massey et al, 1998; Sassen 1996).

Scholars working on migration have been criticized for assuming that the natural level of analysis is the nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002, Bauböck, 2003). Nonetheless, this critic was mainly addressed to scholars working outside the African context, notably receiving countries that can be described as open access orders of developed democracies that indeed include the participation of multiple actors and stakeholders in policy- and decision-making (North et al, 2007).

In contrast, most sub-Saharan African sending states – such as Burkina Faso – can be described as a Limited Access Order where the only durable organization is the state itself (North et al, 2007). Additionally, the nation-state remains the driver for policies on cross-border movements, citizenship, social security, health services and education, and the elaboration of migration policies is monopolized by centralized governments (Fitzgerald, 2006). In the specific Sub-Saharan African context – with a large concentration of power in the presidency – the sending state perspective will be the central point of analysis in this article. ‘To use a familiar
Weberian metaphor, the speeding train of international migration is fueled by economic and sociological forces, but it is the state that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of the train or derail it altogether.” (Hollifield, 2007).

The state was brought into the field of study of the politics of international migration when the agenda of migration moved from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’ in the US (Skocpol, 1985; Freeman, 1998; Weil, 1998, Hollifield, 2007). Aristide Zolberg was the first to try to insert political variables into the equation of migration research, concluding that the state matters and has the capacity to regulate migration flows and stocks (Zolberg, 1999). As mentioned, the role of receiving states in managing migration has been largely attended to by scholars, with a classic focus on control, security and incorporation – and less so development (Dowty, 1987; Fitzgerald, 1996; Massey et al, 1998; Zolberg, 1999; Meyers, 2000; Cornelius et al, 2004).

There has nonetheless been increasing recognition of the importance of sending state initiatives in order to ensure the link between migration and development, through developing ties with the diaspora, improving the costs and usages of remittances, extending political and economic rights and exercising pressure in the destination countries (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Délaño, 2009). A growing number of research has been conducted on sending country governments efforts to strengthen ties with the diaspora (Itzigsohn, 2000; Morawska, 2001; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Smith, 2003a, 2003b; Gamlen, 2006; Agunias, 2009) – while the role of the sending state has mainly been studied in cases of high skilled migration and refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989; Iredale, 2000; Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Mcdonald and Crush, 2002).

This article will build on such research that focuses on the role of sending states in facilitating development from migration, while attempting to bring policy-making center stage and shed new light on the role of emigration policies.

**REVISITING THE OBJECTIVES OF EMIGRATION POLICIES**

Only with the advent of the nation-state in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe did the notion of legally tying populations to territorial units and to specific forms of government become commonplace, creating barriers to the mobility of citizens (Moch, 1992). Almost every dimension of human existence – social-psychological, demographic, economic and political – was re-shaped to conform to the dictates of the nation-state (Hobsbawn, 1992). State building entailed consolidating territory, centralizing authority, controlling the nobility, imposing taxes and waging warfare (Tilly, 1975, Sassen, 2006; Castles, 2009). The institutions of nationality and citizenship, which would become the hallmark of the modern nation-state, did not develop fully until the nineteenth and twentieth century (Koslowski, 1999). Modern states thus monopolize the mobility of ‘means of movement’, amongst other by the introduction of passports (Torpey, 1998).

The original intention with devising emigration policies, nonetheless, was to support out-migration of certain sections of society, such as political opponents or the poor, for example through the ‘Poor Law Amendment Act’ introduced by the Whig government in England in 1834 (Constantine, 1990). Taking the case of Italy, a sim-
ilar emigration-encouraging policy was devised during what Cometti (1958) described as the ‘golden period’ of Italian emigration legislation. Here, the management of emigration was mainly introduced with the purpose to count emigrants, not to control them (Douki, 2007).

Zolberg (2007) has emphasized the historical shifts in emigration policies, from encouraging emigration to prohibiting migration (mainly during the Cold War Era) to ‘laissez faire’. Today, there is a trend towards a general change in emigration policies across the world in moving towards improving the rights and conditions of their workers abroad and facilitating the link between migration and development. Hence, there is no reason why the study of emigration policies should be limited to its capacity to control migration, when history shows that this has not been the main objective of such policies – except for during the Cold War and in authoritarian countries with concerns over dissidents – and especially in the light of the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the right to freedom of movement.

In that regard, de Haas (2011) adds a distinction between the effectiveness of policies – meaning the implementation of stated goals – and the effect of such policies on controlling the size, direction and nature of migration streams. This so-called ‘efficacy gap’ (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2012) (except in authoritarian states which fulfill the ‘success criterion’ of restricting emigration) will not be further analyzed in this article, since this gap is in my view obvious when policies have different stated goals. I would argue that this efficacy gap is not relevant in the context of measuring emigration policies that do not attempt to control migration flows but rather to promote their impact on development. Some would argue that this focus could be ascribed to the ‘troubled relationship’ between policy and research (Boswell, 2009; Geddes, 2014). According to numerous scholars, policy to a large extent influences research which hampers proper analysis and instead reflects donor interests (Turton, 2003; Scalettaris, 2007; Bakewell, 2008). Scholars (eg. Bakewell, 2012). De Haas also insists that “New questions for innovative migration research” should be less dominated by Northern immigration agenda’s (Berriane and de Haas, 2012), since research has been trapped in north-south policy categories and concerns, which has “tended to reproduce and justify northern preoccupations” (de Haas, 2012). Migration policy research has broadly criticized the fact that a reduction in migration – as well as return – has remained a criterion of development programs.

Even though research is still evaluating the effectiveness of policies and the role of macro-level structures versus agency-models in facilitating the ‘nexus’ between migration and development, this debate is not reflected in international resolutions. In fact, all international migration and development resolutions are based on the firm link between state intervention and facilitation, and highly recommend migration policies in sending states as the solution to ensuring development benefits of migration. This viewpoint has been persistent from the special report of the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2003, to the Global Commission on International Migration, whose report was followed by a document on international migration and development by the General Assembly of the United Nations. This served as background for the High Level Dialogue on migration at the United Nations in 2006, and the subsequent meetings of the Global
Forum on Migration and Development. The report of the Global Commission on International Migration argues that migration should be an integral part of every country’s economic and development plans. (Adepujo, 2006).

This global framework has to a large extent influenced the African Union guidelines on migration and development (developed in the context of the first High Level Forum on Migration and Development in 2006), and echoes the importance of elaborating national migration policies (African Union, 2006). Equally at the sub-regional level, the West African poverty reduction strategy paper (developed in collaboration with the Bretton woods institutions and also from 2006) highlights the development of national labor mobility policies as one of the priority action plans (ECOWAS, 2006).

In the case of West Africa, countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal have created ministries for nationals abroad (Agunias, 2009; Ratha et al, 2011) – while Burkina Faso has created a High Council for Burkinabe Abroad. Today, Burkina Faso as well as more than a dozen other Sub-Saharan African countries are furthermore abiding by the global trend that the elaboration of migration policies is the silver bullet to ensuring the link between migration and development. Only one West African country – Cape Verde – currently has a migration policy, while 9 countries in the sub-region – Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria - are in the midst of drafting policies (sources note that Senegal is also looking to develop a migration policy).

Paradoxically, in an African context this has not led to a research trend towards bringing the sending state in (Skocpol, 1985) in an attempt to analyse the implementation of emigration policies and their effect on development. Few studies have thus examined Burkina Faso’s emigration policies, even though it is among the main sending countries in Africa and the bilateral migration flows to neighboring Côte d’Ivoire are the largest on the continent. This article will therefore contribute to this by exploring the capabilities and aspirations of the Burkinabe state, and look at whether the elaboration of a migration policy means that migration will once again become ‘high politics’ in Burkina Faso.

**THE CASE OF BURKINA FASO**

Burkina Faso is a low-income landlocked sub-Saharan country with few natural resources, a harsh climate and political instability. With high poverty rates and low human development indicators, migration is – and always has been – a key livelihood strategy for households in Burkina Faso (Ratha et al, 2011; Somé, 1991). Almost 10% of its population lives abroad and much like Cape Verde (which has the highest emigration rates in Africa) it is thus a country “moulded by migration” (Carling & Åkesson, 2009: 123).

An estimated 94% of these migrants stay within Africa (UNDP, 2009). Emigration to Côte d’Ivoire represents the largest bilateral migration flows on the African continent, which has continued to shape its development (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). With a rapidly growing population, and similarly increasing youth unemployment, one can suggest that mobility trends might even increase in the future (Bloom et al, 2007). Diaspora policies have been developed in Burkina Faso similar to efforts undertaken in other African countries; this includes dual citizenship and the right to vote in an attempt to encourage
remittances and diaspora investments. (de Wenden, 2011).

When comparing the scenario in Burkina Faso to the global trends of perceptions on the link between migration and development, one can underline several policy similarities:

With a developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, Burkina Faso pursued a proactive policy on labor mobility based on the export of cheap labor to Côte d’Ivoire after independence (Dabire et al, 2009). Similarly, the authoritarian governments of Japan, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia encouraged migration for economic reasons through institutionalizing emigration and negotiating recruitment agreements with destination countries (Cannistraro and Rosoli 1979; Schierup 1986). Similar efforts of managing migration spurred in the Philippines during the same period (Martin et al, 2004).

This trend was substituted by a general change to pessimism in regards to the efficiency of emigration policies and towards neo-Marxism during the 1970s and 1980s (de Haas, 2010). The Mexican federal government, for example, adopted a ‘policy of no policy’ in 1974 after it had failed to regulate emigration for most of the twentieth century (Fitzgerald, 2006). In the case of Burkina Faso, the efforts on bilateral agreements showed to be unsuccessful – with several neighboring countries not abiding by the regional conventions – and Burkina Faso instead applied what has been termed as an ‘anti-migration policy’ in 1980 (Broekhuis, 2007). This reflected a global trend of governments around the world attempting to control emigration through a large set of incentives (Lowell and Findlay, 2001; IOM, 2003). In that period, authoritarian states used instruments such as registration and passport requirements to prevent or control exit, such as in the former Soviet Union (Matthews 1993). Smitten by the poor treatment of Burkinabe migrants during their travels and in the course of their work, amongst other through the abuse of labor rights, the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress (CMRPN) adopted a Decree on 11 March 1981 imposing exit visas, including to Côte d’Ivoire (Dabire et al, 2009; Wilkins, 1989). This was coupled by countermeasures for the retention of potential migrants through political incentives by the development of the volta valleys in the early 1970s.

In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall came the subsequent liberalization of emigration from the socialist world. After this so-called ‘exit revolution’ (Zolberg, 2007; 55), Aristide Zolberg instead outlined immigration policies as barriers to movement as one of the major topics for ‘migration in a changing world’ (Zolberg, 1989). For example, the agenda of the Ivorian state (which has throughout time been the main destination country for Burkinabe migrants), presents a classic focus on control, security and incorporation from a receiving state perspective. Controlling immigration has been high politics since the economic downfall and the death of President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 (Hollifield, 2007). Emigration policies, on the other hand, shifted focus toward supporting the development effects of migration. However, it should be noted that sub-Saharan African migration policies are far from ideal and often lack coordination and harmonization.

However, it should be noted that the diaspora will only be allowed to vote abroad by 2015 at the end of Blaise Compaore’s current term. The National independent commission for elections tried to set up voting systems for the Burkinabe abroad already for the 2010 election, but administrative restraints led to a postponement until 2015.

However, it should be noted that in 2011 permissions to exit a country were still necessary in authoritarian states such as Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cuba, Israel, Jordan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan.
among the least developed in the world, for example far behind the Colombo Process countries\(^3\) which are proactively renegotiating, reviewing and renewing their migration policies as a means to compete in the global political economy. Burkina Faso’s approach to international migration can for example be characterized as ‘laissez faire’ during the rule of Blaise Compaore from 1987 until the recent uprisings in late October 2014 (Dabi-re et al, 2009).

### BURKINABÉ MIGRATION IN BETWEEN ‘HIGH’ AND ‘LOW’ POLITICS OF MIGRATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Burkinabe migrants have found themselves in between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics at home and abroad since independence (Hollifield, 2007). Even though Burkinabe migrants are increasingly reaching new destinations (Ratha et al, 2011), a south-south mindset – dominated by the relationship with Cote d’Ivoire – has to a large extent dictated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade, and has created a delay in placing international migration on the development agenda in Burkina Faso (Broekhuis, 2007). The question remains whether the current elaboration of a migration policy implies a shift toward migration becoming high politics in Burkina Faso?

From 1960 until 1993, during the rule of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny – and during the so-called ‘Ivorian miracle’ – the policy of increased agricultural production particularly encouraged the migration of low-skilled Burkinabe citizens – as well as Ghanaians, Liberians and Malians – who found employment in cocoa plantations. Houphouet-Boigny’s famous slogan of ‘the land belongs to those who cultivates it’ accelerated labor migration into the cocoa growing regions (Boone, 1998). Between 1960 and 1989, the Ivorian cocoa production grew thirteen fold, making Côte d’Ivoire the leading producer of cocoa (Mitchell, 2011). While in 1960, 56.6 percent of the emigrants from Burkina Faso moved to Côte d’Ivoire (and 31.3% to Ghana, 3.9% to Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam

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to Mali) (Somé, 1991), it is estimated that Côte d'Ivoire was the destination for 90% of international Burkinabe migrations between 1970 and 2000 (Broekhuis, 2007).

During the period where immigration was welcomed by the Ivorian state, migration was ‘high politics’ in Burkina Faso. The country attempted through two opposite methods to manage migration for the benefit of its migrants, however they were both similarly unsuccessful.

Following independence in 1960, Burkina Faso was one of the first Sub-Saharan African states that attempted to pursue a proactive policy on labor mobility in order to ensure the link between migration and development. The Burkinabe government tried to regulate labor mobility by bilateral conventions and multilateral agreements. An agreement with Côte d’Ivoire on migration was signed at a meeting of the Council of the Entente in Bobo-Dioulasso on 9 March 1960\(^4\) (Dabire et al, 2009). An accord with Mali was signed on September 30, 1969, however the two wars (1974 and 1985) between Burkina Faso and Mali contributed to the non-application of this agreement. Upper Volta subsequently signed an agreement with Gabon on August 13th 1973\(^5\) (Dabire et al, 2009). These initiatives were set in a south-south context, as opposed to the similar efforts of managing south-north migration that for example spurred in the Philippines during the same period (Martin et al, 2004). None of the Burkinabe agreements were ratified by national parliaments or translated into national laws in the neighboring African countries (Soulama, 2005).

Later on, regional integration initiatives under the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) largely substituted bilateral agreements for labor mobility. In the 1975 treaty of the regional body of ECOWAS, rules for free movement and residence of nationals between their member states were introduced, while not immediately implemented. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement was similarly violated on several occasions by member countries, for example through expulsions (Olsen, 2011).

Migration was also high on the political agenda in the 1980’s and during the Presidency of Thomas Sankara when the country instead attempted to establish an ‘anti-migration policy’ (Broekhuis, 2007). For Sankara, who was a marxist, poverty was essentially a consequence of two factors: The state system and bureaucracy brought by the French and the forced-labor phenomenon which he perceived as draining the country’s work-force to Côte d’Ivoire and other more prosperous nations (Wilkins, 1989). He was of the general belief that migration led to more inequality. Such views are shared by theoretical “structuralist” of social theory, neo-Marxists, and believers in dependency and World Systems Theory (Frank, 1966; 1969; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980). Sankara believed that unequal access to resources was reinforced by migration and that the exploitative labor migration to Côte d’Ivoire was at the very root of poverty. With the majority

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\(^4\) By this agreement, only the Upper Volta authorities should recruit and that the transportation, accommodation, food and other amenities (soap, blankets, etc.) were paid by the employer. It was also stated that a deduction from the wages of the workers should be returned to Upper Volta. This agreement was never implemented by the Ivorian authorities.

\(^5\) This new agreement was substantially identical to the previous, while it also considering medical care for workers and their families as well as centralization of applications and recruitment. Like the previous agreement, the equality of workers’ rights between the two countries was discussed. This cooperation also led to mixed results mainly due to the violation of the terms of the convention by Gabon through the recruitment of illegal immigrants.
of emigrants providing low-skilled labor in the plantations in Côte d'Ivoire, one might compare these efforts to the restrictions imposed by the Italian government on emigration to the coffee plantations in Brazil in 1902 and toward Belgian mines in 1956 as a response to poor treatment and low wages (Cometti, 1958). A similar suspension was used by the Philippines for domestic workers directed towards Singapore in the 1990s (Hugo and Stahl, 2004).

These policy measures – of both increasing exit control combined with rural development efforts – were nonetheless unable to eliminate migration to Côte d'Ivoire, and instead developed a form of illegal migration whose magnitude is difficult to measure due to lack of statistical data. In 1985, it was estimated that 91 percent of migrants went to Côte d'Ivoire and 8.8 percent to Ghana (Zourkaléni, 2005).

**Ivoirité, and the introduction of restrictive immigration policies in Côte d’Ivoire**

Immigration moved from low politics to high politics in Côte d’Ivoire after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 and the decline of the country’s cocoa industry on which the economy was built (Crook, 1997 and 2001). The vibrant economy of Côte d’Ivoire until the 1990’s had partially concealed the fractious relations that existed between so-called étrangères, typically of Burkinabe and Malian heritage, and those of ‘pure-blooded’ Ivoirien, beyond societal friction based on class, religion and region of origin (Mitchell, 2011; Toungara, 2001). Following the death of Houphouët-Boigny, the succeeding president Henri Konan Bedié largely politicized the concept of Ivoirité, and the subsequent redrafting of the electoral code in 1994 made it obligatory that a presidential candidate be Ivoirian of birth and that his/her parents should be Ivoirian of birth as well (Crook, 1997). This was an attempt to block the candidature of the North’s most viable candidate, the current President Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was originally from Burkina Faso.

In 1998, 56 % of foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire were Burkinabe, representing 14% of the total population (Broekhuis, 2007), and was therefore a group that was difficult to politically marginalize (Kirwin, 2006). The introduction of the concept of Ivoirité became a powerful discourse for asserting the primordial form of belonging to the land (Berry, 2002; Yéré, 2007) by taking away the rights of migrants (Boas, 2009; Dunn, 2009; Geschiere, 2009). Furthermore, in November 1999, in the region of Tabou, violence erupted between the Baoulés et Burkinabe. Almost 20,000 Burkinabe workers and their families were chased out of the before mentioned region within the period of one week (Kirwin, 2006).

While these changes were to some extent taken under consideration in Burkina Faso’s revised Politique Nationale Population (PNP) from 2000 (Ministere de l’économie, 2000), Côte d’Ivoire was still the main preoccupation in terms of international migration: « Comme de par le passé, le Burkina Faso continue d’être ce “réservoir de main d’œuvre” pour les pays voisins notamment la Côte d’Ivoire. » Migration was conceived as a ‘problem’, both in terms of family relations and social cohesion related to returns. One of the intermediate objectives of the PNP was thus to promote a better consideration of migration problems, underlining the urgency of better linking migration and development through sub-regional collaboration.
In September 2002, the largest organized return movement in the history of Burkinabe migrants in Côte d’Ivoire occurred due to the outbreak of civil war (Broekhuis, 2007). The local consequences of this separation-process, mainly through massive returns, have to a large extent dominated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade (Broekhuis, 2007). Former Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore was appointed regional mediator to the Ivorian crisis by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and consequently led a reduced diplomacy of influence in terms of migration, which had become a highly controversial topic. This might be explained by the fact that the political dimensions of international migration are blurring the boundaries between internal and international political order (Zolberg et al, 1989): “In order not to strain bilateral relations or, indeed, put their nationals abroad in a vulnerable position, sending countries may hold back on their mobilizing efforts” (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003:220).

In 2006 – four years after the violent events in 2002 that led to a ‘divorce’ between Presidents Laurent Gbagbo and Blaise Compaore (Jeune Afrique, 2011) as well as a so-called separation between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire in terms of migration – the policy agenda for international migration in Burkina Faso was still dominated by the southern neighbor without a global view on emigration (Broekhuis, 2007). Not much had changed in 2010, where the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from 2010-2015 was presented (Ministere de l’économie, 2010). Migration patterns are described as ‘turbulent’ in the period from 2000 till 2009 due to the political-military crises in Côte d’Ivoire and the development axis for consolidating human capital and social protection are confined to ‘curbing the migration crisis’. The perception of being at the mercy of Côte d’Ivoire was thus still present.

Today, more than ten years after the crisis, Côte d’Ivoire has remained the main destination country for the Burkinabe, while this migration has reduced (Ratha et al, 2011). Nonetheless, on November 18th 2011, Presidents Blaise Compaore and Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara led a joint Council of Ministers with the hope of restoring ‘business as usual’, mainly focusing on diplomacy, security, infrastructure, mining, energy and rural land. Migration was not on the agenda.

**THE CONTEXT OF THE ELABORATION OF A MIGRATION POLICY IN BURKINA FASO**

One can conclude that while migration is a key livelihood strategy for the Burkinabe, policies and projects have not kept pace supporting its developmental effects. However, since 2013, Burkina Faso has begun elaborating a migration policy, similar to the process engaged in several other neighboring countries, in order to support developmental effects of the social practice of migration. Currently, the Population division of the Ministry of Finance – in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – is in charge of developing the draft policy that encompasses both immigration and emigration. At present, a first draft is being developed, and a proposal has been made for the establishment of a High Commission for Migration, attached to a relevant ministry. The fact that the migration policy is jointly housed in the Ministry of Finance – which is different from the approach of the neighboring countries – could
portray a renewed interest in improving migration management and facilitate the implementation of such a policy.

However, one should not limit the analysis of emigration policies to the document itself and the ‘capability’ of the sending state to implement it. A more in depth analysis on the relationship between the ‘aspirations’ (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011) and the stated goals of sending countries must also be conducted in order for research to guide and influence policy making, and understand possible ‘failures’ or implementation gaps of migration policies. The question therefore remains what is driving the elaboration of this policy? Is the process led by internal factors in alignment with development policies and employment strategies that aim to capitalize on the change in migration patterns of the large amount of Burkina youth that migrate, or is it rather a process led by external factors as a response to the increasing international pressure towards devising policies?

The following will explore the two factors in more detail: First, Burkina Faso is experiencing a change in migration flows – both with increasing immigration (and return) – but also a dispersion and change in emigration flows. Since the massive return movement from Côte d’Ivoire following the military-political crisis in 2001, Côte d’Ivoire no longer absorbs 90% of the Burkinabe migrants. With the continued recession of this traditional receiving country of Burkinabe migrants, finding alternative solutions for occupation of the large number of unemployed Burkinabe youth has become a priority. This change also implies an alternative list of countries to negotiate with. Those are (in order of total numbers of migrants) Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, France, Benin, Nigeria, Italy, Gabon, Germany and finally the United States (Ratha & Xu, 2008). Burkina Faso is to a lesser extent dependent on immigration policy in Côte d’Ivoire, which enhances the ‘capabilities’ of the Burkinabe state that have been limited by legal, economic and economic constraints. “Although sending countries may continue to measure the potential costs of their policies vis-a-vis responses from host states, they can explore possibilities for action within this generally asymmetrical structure as the dynamic of the bilateral relationship evolves, particularly in a context of economic or regional integration.” (Délano, 2009:807)

One could argue that one of the consequences of migration becoming more present on the political agenda in Burkina Faso has been the positive trend in diaspora initiatives in Burkina Faso during the last decade. It should be noted that except for during the revolution and the rule of iconic President Thomas Sankara, the Burkinabe diaspora has traditionally been mobilized against the regime since Blaise Compaore came to power in 1987 (after a coup that would kill Thomas Sankara), while today the diaspora is increasingly getting involved in the national development of Burkina Faso. However, when taking a closer look, these initiatives have mainly been concentrated in the global north with a focus on high skilled migrants (which represents a small majority). Furthermore, these initiatives are mainly led by the diaspora itself, through voluntary participation in the High Counsel of Burkinabe abroad.

One might also question why a migration policy was not developed a decade ago, when the migration changes arose and which coincided with the resurgence of optimism in the international community regarding the benefits of migration on development, mainly based on remittances and diaspora involvement (de Haas, 2012).

When examining the efforts of neighboring countries in regards to brain drain, the efforts of Burkina Faso are also lagging behind.
Neighboring Ghana has for example been instituting measures to fill the skills gap in the health industry, which is largely attributed to the high emigration rates of its high skilled workers (Sagoe, 2005). In the case of Burkina Faso, nonetheless, there has been no ‘tug-of-war’ (Zolberg, 2007) between Burkina Faso and the receiving destination countries for Burkinabe emigrants, neither in regards to the prevention of migration of highly skilled workers or encouragement of low-skilled workers from the sending perspective and vice versa from the receiving perspective. So far, the initiatives undertaken by the Burkinabe government thus hardly signify a shift towards migration becoming ‘high’ politics. This is especially blatant when reviewing the initiatives related to remittances:

It is troubling that official remittances to Burkina Faso are declining, and have been since 2000, while the government has not taken any steps to address the underdeveloped financial infrastructure and a weak regulatory environment\(^7\) nor to eliminate exclusive partnerships between banks and international money transfer companies that keep the costs of formal remittances excessively high (Bambio, 2011; IFAD 2009; Irving et al, 2010). Annual remittance flows into Burkina Faso from 1974 to 2010 reached a maximum of $192 million in 1986 and subsequently declined gradually after 2000, to about $43 million in 2010\(^8\). This was mainly related to the large return movements and declining economy in Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, the costs of sending 200 dollars are 16% between Burkina Faso and Ghana, while 9% between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (Ratha et al, 2011), which are some of the highest in the world, thereby limiting the impact of remittances (Ratha and Riedberg 2005; World Bank 2006). There is increasing international awareness and pressure on the individual states to address these high costs of remittances (for example by the World Bank – Bambio, 2011; Ratha et al, 2011).

This brings us to the second point: The elaboration of a migration policy could be the response to the fact that migration is increasingly present on the political agenda at the international, regional and sub-regional level. The African Union Common framework for migration is currently being implemented, while in 2012 the Global Forum for Migration and Development was for the first time hosted by an African country; Mauritius. As a building block of the African Union initiatives on regional integration, ECOWAS is currently revising its Protocol on Free Movement from 1979, and drafting a common migration policy.

There is also increasing awareness among the West African states that funding is available for migration issues with development partners. However, Burkina Faso has so far hardly benefitted from bilateral agreements or project support\(^9\). Indeed, countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions both in terms of access to northern countries as well as to funding (Adepoju, 2007). This is proliferated

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\(^7\) A World Bank study of the Burkinabe money transfer sector shows that the entry barriers in the formal sector and the obstacles to increasing the supply of formal remittance services are likely to support the emergence and the development of informal remittances (Bambio, 2011)

\(^8\) [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

\(^9\) This includes projects such as TOKTEN and MIDA as well as French co-development. Burkina Faso has only been subject to funding of one migration project from IOM for ‘Mobilizing the Diaspora of Burkina Faso and Identifying Priority Needs of Burkina Faso’. Due to its diaspora in Italy, Burkina Faso was additionally one of the target countries along with Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali and Senegal of the programme ‘Migrant Women for Development in Africa (WMI-DA)’. Two additional regional projects including Burkina Faso focus on respectively trafficking and document fraud.
by the fact that migration and development projects, including EU mobility partnerships and bilateral labor or temporary work agreements, are often highly concentrated in South-North migration countries such as neighboring Mali and Senegal. Burkina Faso’s only migration agreement with the EU to speak of is; the “Accord relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire” with France, which is also based on facilitating return migration.

One can therefore conclude that the process of the elaboration of national migration policies in Africa is to some extent also dictated by EU priorities through an increasing trend of tying aid to migration management (as well as return and expulsion). The research under the Global Migration Governance (Betts, 2011) has underlined the emerging formal and informal mechanisms through which Europe and others increasingly structuring the norms and practices of migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2000, remittances and the benefits of diaspora have moved to the top of the policy agendas of organizations and development agencies such as the European Union, the United Nations as well as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It should in that regard be noted that during a meeting on Migration for Development in West Africa (MIDWA) financed by IOM – which gathered all member states’ migration policy makers in Dakar in September 2012 – all countries were strongly encouraged to develop their respective policies.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Managing migration has become a key policy agenda for countries around the world, in the aim of respectively filling labor shortages in receiving countries and improving life conditions for people in sending countries. However, there is a contention between the objectives of immigration and emigration policies. Immigration policies generally aim to control movement according to categories of migrants needed on the national labor markets, which has led to increasing restrictions for low-skilled workers through efforts such as an externalization of border management. The objectives of sending country policies conversely generally aim to find solutions for unemployment and poverty alleviation for their populations abroad. For the government of the Philippines, for example, emigration is a national development strategy (Asis, 2008), and there has been a proactive negotiation with receiving countries through labor export schemes and bilateral agreements.

Before asserting the ‘failure’ of emigration policies, we need to close the ‘sending-country gap’ in migration policy research, which has tended to focus largely on controlling migration. Scholars should look further into the ‘capabilities’ of sending states in leveraging migration for development. In this ‘age of migration’, it is striking that we don’t know more about how policies can best be used by sending states as a tool for poverty alleviation, human capital development and labor market integration – even in the face of restrictive immigration policies on the other side of the border. International organizations, donors and policy makers are currently navigating in this area without the support of migration policy research. Evaluating the effectiveness of policies (or the implementa-
tion of stated goals) also implies looking into the ‘aspirations’ of the sending state.

Migration has, so far, to a lesser extent been represented in the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of Sub-Saharan African countries (Black & Sward, 2009). While migration and mobility is, for example, mentioned in the PRSPs of Senegal and Mali, the topic was not integrated in the broader developmental approach of the latest PRSP of Burkina Faso for 2010-2015. There is thus a gap between the UN Secretary General’s statement at the 2010 Global Forum for Migration and Development, underlining that: “…international migration can spread prosperity if nurtured with the right policies” to the 2010-2015 development plan of Burkina Faso that merely attempts to control migration by: « mettre en place un mécanisme en vue de juguler la crise migratoire ».

In Burkina Faso, there is a long way from the elaboration of a migration policy to migration being ‘high’ politics as it was from independence in 1960 to the outbreak of civil war in Cote d’Ivoire in 2001. Even though migrants are increasingly reaching new destinations (Ratha et al, 2011), the relationship with Côte d’Ivoire has to a large extent dominated migration policy initiatives from Burkina Faso during the last decade, and has created a delay in placing international migration on the development agenda in Burkina Faso (Broekhuis, 2007). This is reflected in the low number of bilateral agreements, while simultaneously low donor implications and migration project support, with aid generally directed towards south-north issues. Burkinabe migrants thus fare into the world without much support and protection from the state in which they were born, which hinders the development potential from migration. Migration might be “at the heart of the nation” (Carling & Åkesson, 2009:123), but is currently not at the hearth of development policy in Burkina Faso. A possible ‘failure’ could be related to internal politics and elite interests in Burkina Faso (Olsen, 2014), since intercontinental migration represents a resource for the wealthier sections of society to maintain a limited access order (North, 2007).

In the case of Burkina Faso, the relationship between politics and policy is crucial to understand why a gap between stated objective and actual implementation might surge in regards to the upcoming emigration policy. For example, the former Burkinabe President was criticized for paying more attention to foreign relations then national development (such as supporting the rights for migrants in neighboring countries), and some critics underline that this strong foreign political stance has been part of legitimizing his long regime. In late October 2014, a popular uprising led to the fall of President Blaise Compaore and the instauration of a transitional government. This was caused by Blaise Compaore’s attempt to – once again – amend the constitution in order to allow for another term. Paradoxically, the final communication of Blaise Compaore while he was still in office, on October 29th 2014, was an outreach to the Burkinabe diaspora, which according to his statement “supported his presidency”. The President that had during the majority of his 27 year reign considered migration as ‘low politics’, – especially since the diaspora was generally opposed to his regime – now reached out to the group that was finally beginning to be heard. Migration policy, migrants rights and opportunities, has since the 1990’s been considered as little more than a card to play on the international arena in order to legitimize national politics. The diaspora, on November 2nd 2014, made an official statement supporting the peaceful transition in Burkina Faso. Unfortunately, the development of a migration
policy – as in the case of Mali’s migration policy developed in 2012 (before the civil unrest) – will most likely be put on hold indefinitely until the transition is fulfilled, peace is established and reforms are commenced in Burkina Faso following the reign of Blaise Compaore.
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