



DIIS REPORT

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

THE LIMITS OF CONVENTIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY TEMPLATES

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Acronyms

BCSSAS	Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control
CAAFF	Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
GIZ	German International Cooperation Services
GOS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICRS	Information, Counselling and Referral Services
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MoDVA	Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs
NDDRC	National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Council
NDDRP	National DDR Programme
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NSDDRC	North Sudan DDDR Commission
OAG	Other Armed Groups
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSAF	South Sudan Armed Forces
SSDDRC	South Sudan DDR Commission
SSDDT	Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Programme
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSDM	South Sudan Democratic Movement
SSLA	South Sudan Liberation Army
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
SSR	Security Sector Reform

SSUM/A	South Sudan Unity Movement/Army
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAFF	Women associated with armed forces/groups

Abstract

This report explores the DDR programme in South Sudan; in particular how it has evolved, what the major challenges have been to its implementation and, finally, what can realistically be expected from renewed efforts to disarm and reintegrate fighters vis-à-vis security imperatives on the ground. DDR has been identified as a main priority in the Republic of South Sudan and a prerequisite to pave the way for future stability and development. The basic argument presented here is that standard DDR programmes – or rather the conventional peace and security templates that characterise them – are not fit for purpose in a context like South Sudan. This is so because achieving security in the country goes beyond DDR and is not related to the ‘rightsizing’ of the South Sudanese Armed Forces/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army nor to the ‘reintegration’ of combatants. Rather, as the report argues, it will depend on a serious engagement with the following twofold task: firstly, to comprehend and eventually change the basic structures and mechanisms of armed mobilisation prevalent in South Sudan and, secondly, to understand and adapt security sector reform to a political environment that is constructed in terms of potential for violence and threats of destabilisation.

Introduction and background

Following decades of civil war Southern Sudan achieved independence from Sudan in mid-2011 as the culmination of a long peace process.¹ Both the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and international donors consider a successful Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme a prerequisite for successful stabilisation, peace and development in Africa's newest nation state. With a projected caseload of some 150,000 participants South Sudan's DDR will be the world's largest planned DDR programme. It will be a follow-up to the widely criticised first phase of DDR launched after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (SAS 2011; STHLM 2010).

Negotiations to end the war began already in May 2002 and culminated with the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005. The CPA consisted of various protocols, agreements, arrangements and modalities including the 'Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements', which mandated a sustainable ceasefire and the disengagement of members of the armed forces and the implementation of a DDR programme. According to the 2005 CPA, the main adversaries, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) from the north and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from the south, should demobilise and reintegrate a considerable percentage of their forces. To this purpose the DDR programme offered financial incentives, vocational and skills training and family assistance to the participants. The DDR programme was an integral part of the CPA and envisaged as an interim *security measure facilitating the core challenge of proportional force downsizing, rationalisation and standardisation in the creation/formation of a new 'unitarian' national Sudanese Army including both members of the SAF and the SPLA*. Furthermore, the CPA granted Southern Sudan greater levels of autonomy and political autonomy within the Republic of Sudan

However, the relation between the parties continued to be tense – maybe best described as a no peace–no war environment – and in spite of the importance ascribed to DDR in the CPA the actual implementation faced serious delays, mainly due to a combination of unwillingness by the key actors to begin downsizing their active duty forces and the perils of designing and implementing such a complex exercise. The SPLA was deeply reluctant to reduce its ranks due to a perception that the CPA was merely a ceasefire

¹ For purposes of clarification, Southern Sudan is used here as the name of the autonomous territory prior to independence in July 2011.

rather than a peace agreement. In Southern Sudan this first phase of DDR did not start before 2009 and the pace was slow and the results meagre. By April 2012 only 12,525 combatants had demobilised and even fewer had been supported by sporadic reintegration services. After the acquisition of independence the position of SPLA has changed dramatically and it is seemingly now taking a leading role in planning for a second phase of DDR in the newly independent South Sudan.

This report explores the first and the planned second phase of DDR in South Sudan and asks three basic questions: How did the first phase evolve (2005–2012)? What were the major challenges to its implementation? – and finally, what can realistically be expected from the future, second, phase of renewed efforts at disarming and reintegrating fighters vis-à-vis the security imperatives of the SPLA and extremely difficult socio-economic realities on the ground?

The basic argument put forward here is that standard DDR programmes, or rather the standard templates that characterise them, are not fit for purpose in a context like South Sudan. This is mainly due to three reasons. Firstly, different perceptions among national power holders, in this case the SPLA, and international actors and donors about what the programme is supposed to achieve amidst continued armed insurrections, inter-communal violence, widespread insecurity and border clashes with Sudan. Secondly, the difficulties in independently verifying and distinguishing combatants from civilians and, thirdly, the politics of patronage and wealth that are central for the survival of the new state and the mobilisation of recruits into the SPLA and other armed groups (both legal and illegal).² In South Sudanese politics, violence or threats of violence are central to solving political grievances among conflicting parties, and strongmen (ethnic) militias and armed groups are constantly mobilised for political purposes (LeRiche & Arnold 2012; Schomerus & Allen 2010; Young 2012).

In spite of the challenges encountered during the first phase of DDR and the meagre results, a second phase DDR for some 150,000 personnel has been planned as a joint exercise between the South Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Originally expected to start in 2012 and run for eight years, it has been postponed several times due

² This report follows the common practice of using the designation SPLA for both the pre-2005 movement, and that during the CPA phase 2005–2011 as well as in the post-independence period (here interchangeably with South Sudan Armed Forces/SSAF).

to financial constraints and logistical challenges. The launch of a pilot phase with approximately 500 participants will take place on April 2013 (UNSG 20013).³

The report is based on an extensive desk study of available evaluations, reviews and reports on the CPA–DDR programme 2005–2012. Ethnographic fieldwork was also undertaken in Juba and Torit, Eastern Equatoria, in April and May 2012. Data was gathered from participants in the DDR by the author through life story interviews and focus group discussions with over 70 beneficiaries of the DDR programme while receiving their reintegration training. Furthermore the author interviewed SPLA security advisors, UNMISS DDR officials, UN implementing agencies and the South Sudan DDR Commission.

The report falls into four sections. After the introduction, the first section presents South Sudan’s volatile economic and security context. The second section describes and analyses the main elements of the DDR programme under the CPA and outlines major challenges and obstacles to its implementation. The third section, based on ethnographic fieldwork during 2012 at one of the reintegration sites, describes in detail the implementation of the programme. In the last section of this report the second phase DDR programme is briefly described, and it is argued that it might face similar problems to its predecessor. Particularly worrying is the lack of any link between the DDR and future efforts to reform the security sector.

The conclusion is that the fundamental ‘enabling’ conditions for effective DDR are not present in South Sudan at the moment and therefore new thinking is required if the objective of enhancing security, peace and stability shall be achieved. Multiple drivers of conflict and insecurity persist. The context for DDR and security sector transformation in general is likely to remain difficult and unpredictable. Obtaining security in South Sudan surpasses any DDR exercise and is not only related to ‘rightsizing’ the SPLA – even if this is an economic imperative – nor to the ‘reintegration’ of combatants, as will be argued in the following pages.

³ See <http://www.ssddrc.org/informing-communities/other-resources/engine-of-transformation.html>, accessed 1 March 2013.

South Sudan's economic and political context

Overview of the economy and the burden of military expenditure

Historically, oil and the public sector have dominated South Sudan's formal economy (GoSS 2012a). Oil exports previously accounted for the majority of government revenues, financing 98% of the 2011/12 budget. A significant share of successive annual government budgets has been allocated to the security sector since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Security spending was at the top of the government priorities that aimed to "develop an efficient and effective armed forces, to safeguard security and implement the CPA" (GoSS 2010: 1). In 2012, 41% of GoSS expenditure was allocated to security – mainly as salaries to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) (See Table 1).⁴

Table 1. GoSS sectoral shares of expenditure 2012/13

Sector	GOSS–SSP	%
Accountability	161644768	2%
Economic Functions	261903485	4%
Education	454109968	7%
Health	192057566	3%
Infrastructure	160216284	2%
Natural Resources	343031463	5%
Public Administration	525724802	8%
Rule of Law	1109812979	17%
Security	2730403408	41%
Social and Humanitarian	75192812	1%
Block transfers to States	650064501	10%
Contingencies	0	0%
<i>Total</i>	<i>6664162036</i>	<i>100%</i>

GoSS 2012.

⁴ The Ministry of Defence exceeded its budget by 20% in 2011, primarily because of salary increases approved just before the vote for independence and not reflected in the budget. See GoSS 2012b: 8.

Between 2005 and 2011 SPLA costs have actually increased by 33.6% (Lamb et al: 52). As a result a new class division is emerging between people working for the security forces on the GoSS payroll system and the rest of the population. And the gap between these groups is likely to increase in the coming years. External support for the security sector aims partly at reducing the size of the security forces and redirecting military expenditure to other sectors such as health and education. Some observers view this as emblematic of patronage to a bloated military at the expense of development priorities (Young 2012). Others in GoSS, however, argue that maintaining SPLA's morale and loyalty to the government is central to securing the state's short-term stability.⁵

The domestic political and security agenda is intertwined with a number of unresolved issues with Sudan. These include, among others, oil pipeline charges, demarcation of the border between the two countries and the status of the border region Abyei. Sudan faces severe economic challenges due to the loss of oil revenue in December 2011 and South Sudan's shutdown of oil production in January 2012 as part of the negotiation process over pipeline charges. South Sudan's government halted oil production in protest at what it said was massive cheating by the Khartoum regime on arrangements to share oil revenue and at the charges that Juba had to pay to export its oil via Port Sudan.

The oil shutdown implied that significant economic austerity measures were required. A budget cut of 650 million South Sudanese Pounds (SSP) per month, equal to a 24% cut of the total budget, has been prescribed though not fully implemented. These cuts, however, were not the same across government agencies. The Ministry of Defence was cut 10%; other organised forces, and the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, Petroleum & Mining were cut 20%; South Sudan Reconstruction & Development Fund, Local Government Board, and the Employees Justice and Public Grievance Chambers were cut by 85% (GoSS 2012b: 3). The actual spending has oscillated at around SSP 850 million per month, surpassing SSP 1 billion in April 2012.⁶ Security operations along the borders with Sudan, disarmament in Jonglei state and settlement of outstanding contractual obligations account for much of the over-expenditure according to the GoSS annual government budget (GoSS 2012a: 10). The austerity measures have implied reductions in capital and operational costs,

⁵ Interviews with GoSS officials, 25.03.2012, Juba.

⁶ The short supply of foreign currency led the South Sudanese pound, officially fixed at 2.95 to the US dollar, to depreciate to a low of 5.60 to the dollar between April and July 2012, losing approximately 40% of its value against the US dollar. See GoSS 2012b.

while salaries have been left untouched.⁷ On the bright side, non-oil revenues, which accounted for two per cent of overall income in 2011, have doubled and spending controls have been tightened (ibid. 10).

In September several agreements were signed by Juba and Khartoum, which stipulate a commitment to resume oil production in South Sudan. Expectations are high, but the two countries remain on a war footing. The latest security agreements introduce a demilitarised buffer zone along the still undefined border. However, no agreement was reached on the disputed border areas, including Heglig/Pan Thou and Abyei.⁸

The 12th of March 2013 and with the mediation of the African Union both countries have adopted an integrated matrix to facilitate the implementation of their commitments as reflected in the agreements. The signing of implementation matrix paves the way for the resumption of oil production and the transit of South Sudan's oil through Sudan. They also agreed to withdraw troops from their border area.⁹

Furthermore, and arguably just as important for the current security situation in South Sudan as the North–South tensions, are the numerous armed groups and tribal militias led by strongmen, and the mobilised and heavily armed civilian population which constitute visible reminders of the decades of civil war.¹⁰

Sovereign warriors, violence and politics 2005–2012

Integration of other armed groups, state power and benefits

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South did not end South Sudan's numerous internal conflicts. After the CPA, one of the major challenges was to reconcile so-called Other Armed Groups (OAG) in the South that were not party to the agreement. In 2005 there were no fewer than 18 armed groups in the South that had to be integrated into a single force. The agreement failed to address other conflicts waged by proxy

⁷ This is clearly a security issue for the GoSS, since it could lead to an explosion of violence. See <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44334>; accessed 1 November 2012.

⁸ To read the agreements reached by Sudan and South Sudan see: <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/09/27/sudan-and-south-sudan-full-text-of-agreements/>, accessed 1 November 2012.

⁹ To read the “implementation matrix” between both governments see: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/implementation-matrix-on-cooperation-agreements-120313.pdf>, accessed 13 March 2013.

¹⁰ For a recent review of arms flows and holdings in South Sudan see: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-19-Arms-flows-and-holdings-South-Sudan.pdf>, accessed 1 November 2012.

militia groups that were aligned, funded and supported by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The most important of these Khartoum allies was the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) led by Paulino Matiep. The SPLA and the SSDF negotiated the Juba declaration in 2006 that led to the integration of a large part of the militia into SPLA. The command structure of the SPLA was reviewed and Matiep was named Deputy Commander in Chief.¹¹

Such integration or absorption of former enemies is indeed a recurrent phenomenon in South Sudanese politics after the CPA and even more so after independence. The strategy consists of dispensing benefits like positions and salaries to ‘pacify’ proxy armies and gain support for the SPLA and the GoSS in general. To manage instability and the danger of armed insurgencies, the prerogatives given by Southern autonomy and then sovereign state power, the SPLA became a “locomotive for political wrangling” (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:147). But the strategy of integrating Organised Armed Groups also implies a risk for the SPLA, which had to accommodate these former enemy structures while other long serving SPLA soldiers were being demobilised. The SPLA has suffered internal fractures as a consequence of these large integrations, but the security costs of *not* integrating these groups would have been so high that this was a necessary offer to make (ibid. 164).

Violence, politics and rightsizing the SPLA

South Sudanese politics are interwoven with low intensity warfare, inter-ethnic violence and, most predominantly, forms of authority grounded in violence – a violence that is performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear and legitimacy within a region or an ethnic group vis-à-vis those in power. In this sense military entrepreneurs can be conceptualised as informal sovereigns (Hansen & Stepputat 2006), and South Sudan is a vivid example of a zone of unsettled sovereignties and loyalties. Rightsizing the army, disarming and reintegrating soldiers and reforming the security sector, and addressing human security concerns in general are then as much an element of politics as an element of well-designed technocratic policies. Le Riche and Arnold put it this way:

A gradual process of change that appreciates the importance of the army and the police being a space for politics is needed. Kiir and his government face a strikingly difficult balance between reforming the security sector in line with best practice and dealing with a political environment that remains deeply construed in terms of potential for armed force and threat of destabilization. (LeRiche & Arnold 2012: 159–160).

¹¹ For a description of the SSDF and the process leading to the Juba declaration see Young 2006.

Table 2. Estimated force strength and arms holdings among South Sudanese forces

Category	Strength	Estimated small arms holdings
SPLA	210000	250000
SSPS	50000	50000
Prison services	22000	6000
Wildlife services	14000	9000
Fire brigade	4000	2000
Customs	unconfirmed	200
<i>Total</i>	<i>300000</i>	<i>317200</i>

Small Arms Survey 2012

The 2009 SPLA White Paper on Defence defines its strategic defence policy and capability requirements. The White Paper estimates that SPLA has around 160,000 fighters, many of who at that time were militarily ineffective. Since then the SPLA ranks have continued to grow (See table 2 for the estimated force strength among South Sudanese Forces).

SPLA units have engaged in continuous local recruitment and, in combination with the above-described integration of militia forces, the result has been a net increase of soldiers across the country. A number of divisions of the SPLA have consciously recruited disaffected youths, providing them with salaries in order to deprive contending militia groups of potential recruits. For example in Unity state, the 4th Division conscripted some 7,000 youths to reinforce the SPLA and to deter militia recruitment in 2011 (Snowden 2012: 18). During the recent security crisis and armed clashes with Sudan young men were mobilised into the army and the new youth recruits underwent intensive basic military training at different military bases, mostly at the border.¹²

Defections and the resurgence of 'new' armed groups after independence

Since independence the SPLA has been confronted with various local rebellions, initially in response to the 2010 elections, which were won overwhelmingly by its

¹² See "South Sudan Army continues border recruitment" at: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42539>; South Sudan: Central Equatoria Government Encourages Youth for Military Recruitment: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201205311224.html>; accessed 10th November 2012.

political wing, the SPLM movement. While the GoSS and the SPLA depict external threats as the most significant, the government had yet to secure a monopoly over violence within its territory; many individuals and groups have continued to use violence to further their political agendas (ICG 2011; SAS 2012a).

The list of non-state armed actors presently acting and their strength in terms of members and small arms holdings in South Sudan is shown in table 3 below.

However the strategy of reintegrating opponents into the SPLA has proven to have weaknesses and disadvantages. Internal factionalism and defections have marked SPLA in recent years. Commanders, particularly those from other armed groups integrated into the SPLA (most notably from the SSDF), have reacted to a perceived lack of integration and authority, power and military command. One notable case is that of Peter Gadet, Matip's former deputy in the SSDF, which embodies a long history of changing allies and insurrections (See box 1).

Recently, several SPLA generals have defected and subsequently re-mobilized or formed new militias. One example is David Yau Yau, who had joined the SPLA in 2011. In April 2012 Yau Yau took advantage of local grievances, e.g. the ethnic Murle contempt for the SPLA's civilian disarmament practices in Pibor County and formed his own militia (SAS 2012b; UNSG 2012b; Young 2012). Yau Yau is estimated to command 3,000 fighters, and his forces have struck SPLA installations several times, killing at least 100 soldiers.

Table 3. Estimated force, strength and arms holding among non-state armed actors

<i>Category</i>	<i>Estimated strength</i>	<i>Estimated small arms inventories</i>
SSLM/A	2500	2500
SSDM/A	2600	2600
LRA	50	50
Nuer White Army	4000	4000
Others	1000	700
<i>Totals</i>	<i>10150</i>	<i>9850</i>

Small Arms Survey 2012

Box I. Peter Gadet – a case study example of changing alliances

Peter Gadet is a militia leader who fought against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during the civil war. Gadet played a leading role in the South Sudan Unity Movement/Army (SSUM/A), a militia founded and led by Paulino Matiep in Bentiu that merged with the Khartoum-supported South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) following the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, Peter Gadet obtained the opportunity to integrate into the SPLA with thousands of his men, and acquired a high-ranking post as a major general.

Gadet however, defected after he was moved from one army position to another and declared an armed revolt against the SPLM/A. He enjoys popular support in his home area and from his former soldiers and was able to found the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) in April 2011. The insurrection left hundreds of civilian and SPLA soldiers killed and spurred a new wave of recruitment by the SPLA. The SSLA accused Juba of corruption, mismanagement and tribal nepotism, calling it a 'party militia'. A few months later and after independence Gadet was offered an amnesty by President Salva Kiir for a combination of financial rewards and a return to the position of general in the army. He re-joined the SPLA in August 2011, but many of his comrades were left out of the negotiations and the SSLA is still active in Unity state.¹³

This was actually Yau Yau's second rebellion. In the first incident he took up arms against South Sudan's ruling party – the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) after the April 2010 elections. Yau Yau ran as an independent candidate, but lost his campaign to represent the Gumuruk–Boma constituency in Pibor County at the Jonglei State Assembly. Unlike other figures who led insurrections after the 2010 elections, Yau Yau was a civilian and not a member of the army before his rebellion. When he reconciled with Juba in 2011 he was awarded the rank of general in the SPLA.

¹³ Recently the SSLA has made claims about defections of thousands of SPLA soldiers into their ranks. See: "South Sudan army denies new rebellions in Upper Nile and Ramciel" at: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=43907 accessed 2 November 2012.

What these internal fractions and defections show is that the leadership of the SPLA and contending rebel militias alike continue to be deeply attached to ethnic and tribal identities, as well as patronage relations. Anyone connected to top army officers through family, clan or ethnicity has ready access to influence and benefits. In other words, the SPLA is still in the process of transformation from a conglomerate of several armed groups loyal to specific commanders into a professional, non-partisan, national army.

The direct challenges to its power that the SPLM has had to confront in the post-independence period have roots in earlier processes of factionalisation, linked with the rise of the SPLA/M as the dominant Southern political and military actor. They were exacerbated in the run-up to, and after, independence as the SPLM began to consolidate its grip on the institutions of the new South Sudanese state (Madut Jok 2012: 59).

Ethnicity and mobilisation into armed groups

Arguably, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement has never been able to substantively move beyond existing tribal divisions and construct a national Southern Sudanese identity. The main reason for this is that political and military support has overwhelmingly been drawn from one particular ethnic group, the Dinka (Young 2003; Roque 2012). South Sudan is divided along tribal (and clan), linguistic and religious lines. The Dinka is the largest ethnic group making up approximately 35% of the population. The Nuer comprise 15% and the Shilluk, Azande and Bari around 8% each. Political and military domination by the Dinka has produced animosity among other ethnic groups. This is especially the case in the greater Equatoria states where the difficulty of recruiting rural youth to the rebellion meant that the SPLA resorted to forced abductions. The relationship with the SPLA in the Equatorias has always been problematic, where it was seen (and still is) as a 'Dinka army'.¹⁴

During the liberation war this resentment was tactically manipulated by Khartoum and led to the emergence of various armed groups over the course of the conflict that bitterly fought the SPLA (Young 2003). Competing interests of different ethnic groups 'survived' the CPA interim period.

Due to its predominantly Dinka composition, SPLM's political and military pre-eminence has also created a degree of ethnic dominance. John Young, an

¹⁴ See Johnson 2003: 85–87 for an introduction to the Dinka–Equatorian power struggles.

academic who has followed South Sudanese politics for several years, puts it this way:

The SPLA had never succeeded in overcoming the tribal identities of its soldiers and developing a national ethos, as a result the army often operated as a collection of militias and warring factions whose members were more loyal to their tribe or individual leaders than to the SPLA hierarchy (Young 2012: 323).

His analysis can be extended to the SPLA's post-independence situation. This is also the case with other security institutions like the South Sudanese Police Services (SSPS). According to a report from the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, the command structure of the SSPS during 2011 included an Inspector General of Police (IGP), reporting to the minister of interior, and a deputy—both lieutenant generals; three assistant IGPs in social welfare, administration, and railway and river transport, and a spokesperson—major generals; and 14 directors, nine of whom are major generals. Of these high-ranking officers, 70% were Dinka (Snowden 2012). As of December 2011, this trend was maintained in the states; nine of ten commissioners of police (all major generals) were Dinka (*ibid.* 28). After independence, the GoSS succeeded in convincing significant numbers of leaders and rank and file members of four militia groups – those led by Peter Gadet (a Bul Nuer), Gatluak Gai (a Jagei Nuer), David Yau Yau (a Murle) and Gabriel Tanginya (a Nuer) – to accept an offer of amnesty and integration into the South Sudanese armed forces.

As noted previously, it is not always easy to distinguish clearly between inter-communal conflict, and ethnic struggles and insurgencies, especially when the conflicts involve members of the politically dominant Dinka group. Throughout 2011, ethnic violence persisted between Dinka and Nuer groups in the border area of Unity, Warrap, and Lakes States, resulting both in casualties and displacement. The worst of the violence in the first year of Southern independence, however, took place between Lou Nuer and Murle groups in Jonglei State in December 2011 and January 2012, affecting a total of 170,000 people in the state, killing hundreds and adding over 60,000 displaced persons to some 50,000 resulting from prior inter-communal conflict and insurgent violence (UNSG 2012a: 6–7). The worst of the attacks were inflicted on Murle civilians. As a reaction, Murle in the SPLA and South Sudan's Police Force began defecting, joining Yau Yau militia (predominantly Murle) and launching revenge attacks on Lou civilians. The scale of Murle armed mobilisation by the Yau Yau is an indicator that the rebellion has successfully tapped the feelings

of insecurity, distrust and marginalisation among the Murle population towards the SPLA (SAS 2012b; UNSG 2012b; Young 2012).

As the Jonglei incident clearly reveals, insurgent violence is frequent and partly overlapped with inter-communal violence (UNSG 2012b: 6). In Jonglei there is a significant risk that the recent increase in cattle raiding attributed to the Yau Yau militia against communities bordering Pibor County, as well as fear of attacks by Murle youth against other communities, could result in rearmament and the resumption of deadly inter-communal violence (ibid).

In sum insurgent violence is rooted in rivalries among top military officers, triggered by the perception that a few ethnic groups dominate the political power in Juba. Rebellions often take on an ethnic character, as their leaders mobilise fighters in the name of ethnicity and belonging.¹⁵

¹⁵ These tensions are not only experienced in South Sudan's periphery but also in Juba. Here ethnic relations are volatile due to accusations that the Dinka have dominated the government and the army, and suspicions of land grabbing by 'outsiders', not indigenous residents of the town.

CPA– DDR: 2005–2012

Disarming and reintegrating ‘non-essentials’.

In Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) figured as an integral part, and the main objective of DDR in Sudan (both North and South) was, according to the National Strategic Plan, to “*contribute to creating an enabling environment for human security and provide support to post-peace agreement social stabilization across Sudan, particularly in war-affected areas.*” (GOS 2007: 5). The signatory parties were further committed to ‘proportionate downsizing’ of their forces and pledged to engage in DDR processes assisted by the international community.¹⁶ The CPA states as follows:

After the Completion of SAF redeployment to the North the parties shall begin the negotiations on proportionate downsizing. Nonetheless, the parties shall allow voluntary demobilization, demobilization of non-essentials (child soldiers and elderly, disabled) during the first year of the Interim Period. (CPA, Appendix I: 19)

The CPA laid out the frame for the DDR process, but did not stipulate implementation issues in detail. The parties had agreed upon voluntary and immediate demobilisation of ‘non-essentials’, i.e. elderly, disabled and child soldiers. Besides this the CPA was mainly concerned with laying down the administrative arrangements for developing a DDR process during the pre-interim and interim period. It mandated the establishment of a National DDR Commission with joint representation from both parties, which would hold final responsibility for all DDR policy decision making. In addition, one DDR Commission for Southern Sudan and one for Sudan were established.

During the years following the CPA an Interim DDR programme was established, guided by a National DDR Strategic Plan (2007). This plan also identified the target beneficiaries: disabled and elderly combatants; child combatants and children associated with the armed forces and groups; and women associated with the armed forces and groups (WAFF) (GOS 2007: 5). The interim programme did not progress beyond conceptualising and strategising DDR and lacked implementation (STHLM

¹⁶ CPA agreement at <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>; accessed 20 December 2012.

2010; SAS 2011; Lamb et al. 2012: 57). Inertia and bureaucratic disengagement have been identified as the main causes of poor performance (STHLM 2010). In addition, and partly as a result of the former, there was hesitation on the part of donors to commit to funding the DDR programme. Lack of interest from national actors (notably the SPLA), donors and the UN led to overall sidetracking of the DDR process, resulting in serious delays in the implementation.

In a joint effort by the DDR Commissions in Sudan and Southern Sudan the interim DDR programme was replaced by the multi-year DDR programme in June 2009. The multi-year DDR exercise received financial and technical support from the UN. In Southern Sudan the programme targeted 90,000 ex-combatants. In the period preceding the 2011 referendum the Southern Sudan DDR Commission focused on demobilising a first batch of 34,000 candidates, predominantly the above-mentioned specific groups, while a second batch comprised 53,400 active SPLA soldiers.

In the following lines the report takes a closer look at the practical implementation of the CPA–DDR and the particular challenges it faced on the ground.

DDR in praxis: reality bites

It is important to note, that the discharge and disarmament processes agreed upon by SAF and SPLA did not include any arms reduction component. The SAF and SPLA ensured that ‘combatants’ reported for demobilisation and collected weapons. However, the weapons were not destroyed, but stored under control of each army. The United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) issued photo ID cards to ex-combatants at the demobilisation sites to prevent ‘double dipping’, that is participation in the programme in different locations.

A key drawback of the DDR process was the time span from the conclusion of the CPA to when the practical DDR process took off. Close to three years had passed and a significant number of the potential DDR beneficiaries had already ‘self-demobilised’ and returned to their home communities. SPLA called upon some of these individuals to report to demobilisation sites or assembly areas in order to enter the DDR. However, significant numbers did not report for disarmament and demobilisation registration, and among those who did apply for DDR benefits, some were categorised as ineligible (Lamb et al. 2012: 58). The ‘credibility’ of the caseload, as one review of the programme puts it, was almost always dubious (STHLM 2010: 22).

The reinsertion phase is the transitional phase in which ex-combatants return to their home areas or wherever they choose to resettle. Reinsertion support during the CPA–DDR was provided through a package that contained both cash and in-kind items. After verification, briefing, orientation and counselling, ex-combatants received a reinsertion grant of 860 Sudanese Pounds (about US\$290). The cash grant, handed over by UNMIS officials at the demobilisation sites, was intended to assist ex-combatants to pay for immediate needs, including transport to resettlement areas and food items.

DDR participants also received a food ration voucher, which entitled them to the following: 202.5 kg of Durra sorghum, 22.5 kg of beans, 13.5 kg of oil, and 4.5 kg of salt. The World Food Programme provided the food rations, which were expected to feed a five-member household for 90 days. The ex-combatants also received a package of 21 non-food items provided by UNMIS, including: curtain material, a radio, sandals, plastic sheet, soap, mosquito net, blanket, torch, cup, plate and saucepans. The three components together (cash, food and non-food items) constitute the so-called ‘transitional safety net’ package. When the ex-combatants accessed or received a service, the ID cards provided by the programme were marked by a punch. Finally, several types of support were provided under the reintegration rubric of the DDR; this was economically the most significant programme element.

The reintegration support was provided through implementing partner (IP) organisations selected and contracted for this work through a bidding process. Many local organisations submitted bids but none had the capacity levels that the Southern Sudan DDR Commission and UNDP solicited.¹⁷ The following organisations were selected to support the reintegration of ex-combatants: International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Bangladeshi Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC).

The first ex-combatant reintegration training undertaken in Southern Sudan was carried out between June and December 2009 with support from donors. The programme participants were allowed to choose from one of the following reintegration options: (1) agriculture and livestock (which also included fishery and forestry); (2) small business development; (3) vocational training and; (4) adult education (i.e. accelerated learning). In addition, ex-combatants benefitted from adult literacy

¹⁷ Interview with William Deng, SSDDRC chairman, 20.04.2012, Juba.

and numeracy, as well as a civilian training programme for life skills. However, the available programmes varied across regions and areas.

As part of the reintegration counselling, which was jointly undertaken by UNDP caseworkers and the implementing partners, ex-combatants were assisted to identify an economic reintegration option. The South Sudan DDR Commission's representatives had the ex-combatants sign an agreement indicating their preferred reintegration activity and the region selected for resettlement. Within three months the ex-combatants had to bring the referral slip to the commission's state office in the region chosen for reintegration. At this point they were linked to an IP where the reintegration activity would take place. The individual economic reintegration support, in-kind material and training, had a total value of US\$ 1,750, of which the international community contributed US\$ 1,500 and the Government of Southern Sudan US\$ 250, however the Southern Sudan government did not live up to its part of the commitment (STHLM 2010: 39). Like the economic reintegration options, the specific content of the training kits distributed after completion of the different reintegration training options varied - not only between the selected activities and over time, but also between implementing partners and across the different states. Numbers from the CPA-DDR programme by April 2012 show that: 12,525 ex-combatants demobilised; 10,979 registered for reintegration training by implementing partners; 1,320 ex-combatants in reintegration support training; 8,432 had completed reintegration support training; 7,087 had received first follow-up visits after completion of reintegration support training; 6,022 had received second follow-up visits after completion of reintegration support training (SSDDRC 2012a: 23). Recently the UNDP through implementing partners is targeting the rest of ex-combatants (2,827) from the CPA-DDR who had not yet entered any reintegration programme.¹⁸ The CPA-DDR closed by the end of 2012.

The biggest obstacle to the successful implementation of the CPA-DDR was the lack of ownership by the Southern Sudanese government. For the SPLA and the Southern Sudan government, the National DDR Strategic Plan, its inception, implementation and in particular, the execution, management and policy development, were not CPA compliant as it failed to accommodate the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle that was the bedrock of the peace agreement. In particular, with regard to its management structure and operational procedures which required the Southern Sudan DDR Commission and the supporting UN agencies (UNDP/UNMIS) DDR structures

¹⁸ Interview with SSDDRC officials, 19.03.2012, Torit.

to defer to Khartoum for policy, management and funding issues (STHLM 2010: 7–8). The government of Southern Sudan was suspicious of the process, since it was directed and implemented from Khartoum. With independence from the North in July 2011, the SPLA had a new perspective on DDR: as a way to attract donor funding and at the same time rightsize the army. Likewise donors were not obliged to continue with the (already failed) programme, since the CPA expired with the holding of the referendum and thereby their commitment to activities under the peace agreement.

In the next section I present a case study of the challenges facing a conventional DDR in the environment of South Sudan. It falls into three areas: firstly the different perceptions as to what the objectives of the programme are; secondly the difficulties in verifying and distinguishing the combatants and special needs groups associated with an armed group from civilians and, finally, the multifarious sources of insecurity not linked in any sense to a successful reintegration of combatants.

Case study: reintegration in Eastern Equatoria state

Eastern Equatoria State (EES) is one of the Republic of South Sudan's ten states. It has an estimated area of 82,540 km² and lies strategically at the southeastern corner. It borders Uganda to the south, Kenya to the southeast and Ethiopia to the east. The state has a population of close to 1 million and 86% of them depend on agriculture and animal husbandry for their livelihood. EES's limited social services and infrastructure were largely destroyed during the 21-year civil war and the state suffered mass displacement of population. In recent years large numbers of IDP's have returned to the state, putting pressure on meagre social services and exacerbating tensions over land and resources (BCSSAS et al. 2012).

Eastern Equatoria State is one of the most volatile and conflict-prone areas in South Sudan. Sudan's civil war is said to have begun in Torit, the EES county capital and the state was the epicentre of the civil war from 1983–2005.¹⁹ Intense fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), as well as a number of other armed groups supported by both sides, unfolded here. A wartime legacy of land mines and unexploded ordinance has made basic transport and access to land difficult. There are high rates of possession of light weapons by civilians, resource competition, and erosion of community structures has led to volatile relations among and between communities. The main sources of insecurity are inter-community cattle raiding, especially during migrations in the dry season, the high incidence of homicide and violence, and competition over land and access to water (BCSSAS et al. 2012).

The DDR process in Torit vividly exemplifies some of the paradoxes and difficulties of carrying out a conventional DDR process in an unstable setting. Firstly, it proved difficult for programme managers on the ground to identify who was a genuine combatant or affiliated with the SPLA, e.g. the 'non-essentials'. The military power brokers who drew up the 'master lists' determining who should be granted access to the DDR programme exerted important power through a politics of patronage. In this regard even relatives of deceased SPLA veterans could make it onto the programme upon approval by the SPLA commander in charge of the exercise. Secondly, the main causes and dynamics of insecurity in EES have not been addressed by the disarmament and reintegration because the caseload that was demobilised did not, in fact, constitute any security threat whatsoever.

¹⁹ For a breathtaking description of the outbreak of the war see Johnson 2003, 21-37.

DDR began in EES in 2010 with the first batch of 448 ex-combatants. The German International Cooperation Services (GIZ) contracted by the UNDP implemented the reintegration component, and upon completion of the training course participants were awarded reintegration graduation certificates in 2011. In November 2011 a second batch of 507 ex-combatants began, this time with IOM as the implementing partner, but the programme logic remained unchanged. At the registration day the ex-combatants were informed about the organisation, the reintegration programme, the rules and regulations of the training and a contract was signed between each participant and the organisation. The ex-combatants were shown the toolkits they would receive if successfully completing the programme, and tested, or rather, ‘asked’ about their literacy, numeracy and language skills. Furthermore a counsellor identified the ex-combatants’ training and special needs. Based on this skills and needs review, the participants were advised by IOM on their final reintegration option (small business, vocational training or agriculture). At the end of the registration day they received a per diem payment of roughly US\$30 to cover transport and other expenses. According to the project officers the rationale behind this was to generate a positive visibility of the project.²⁰ There were 237 male and 270 female ex-combatants registered. Data on reintegration options and gender is shown in table 4 below. The

Table 4. Reintegration Data Torit

<i>Reintegration Options</i>	<i>XCs Registered</i>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
Tailoring	28	85	113
Driving	77	27	104
Agriculture	28	55	83
Phone Charging	12	4	16
Kiosk Vendor	32	37	69
Food processing	7	40	47
Auto-mechanic	18	2	20
Carpentry	11	0	11
IT skills	24	20	44
<i>Total</i>	<i>237</i>	<i>270</i>	<i>507</i>

Source: IOM consolidated figures 2012

²⁰ Interview IOM project officer, 01.05.2012, Torit.

programme ran for four months and the following courses were offered: a) basic knowledge in literacy and numeracy, b) basic economic reintegration courses, and c) life skills education and practical start-up support (e.g. in the case of wanting to become a driver, acquiring a driver's license).

During fieldwork in South Sudan in 2012, I followed the programme for six weeks running up to the ex-combatants' graduation and carried out interviews with participants, stakeholders and the officers in charge. Most agreed that very few of the beneficiaries in this caseload had ever been active soldiers or had left the SPLA several years before the programme started. This is perhaps not so surprising considering that Phase I specifically targeted the 'non-essentials' and was thus earmarked for the least important combatants. The much-respected group of 'war veterans and wounded heroes and heroines' was not targeted for DDR benefits (SAS 2011; Lamb et al. 2012). Instead the SPLA runs its own programme for wounded war heroes which provides economic assistance that is more highly valued than the one offered by the DDR.²¹

There was also a large proportion of people that had made their way into the programme due to good contacts with the local SPLA commanders in charge of drafting the 'master lists' of who was entitled to disarmament and demobilisation. One ex-combatant male, for instance, had his four wives enrolled in the reintegration programme; one was a WAFF and the rest had lived in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya during the war and only recently returned.²²

Patronage relations leading to inflated numbers of DDR participants and misuse of DDR programmes are nothing new (see Munive & Jakobsen 2012; Paes 2005). What appears new is the institutionalised use of the 'proxy' figure. It was generally accepted that in cases where the beneficiary ex-combatant suffered from disability, old age, ill health or was dead, a proxy could attend the reintegration support. The ex-combatant (or his/her relatives in case the person had passed away) simply had to sign an agreement declaring that: *"I am willing to nominate the person below as my proxy on the understanding that she will receive the reintegration package on my behalf...and undertake the below responsibilities in relation to me"* (SSDDRC/IOM 2012). Of the 507 participants in Torit, 180 – mostly women or younger relatives – were proxies (IOM 2012). Thus the DDR programme was used by older ex-

²¹ Interview ex-combatant, 10.05.2012, Torit.

²² Interview ex-combatant, 05.05.2012, Torit.

combatants/participants of the programme to facilitate training for younger members of their families. This was the case, for instance, of the ex-combatants participating in the IT training, who were almost all young proxies.

Under these conditions it is evident that, contrary to what might be expected, there are virtually no links between achieving a successful DDR and improving the security situation of the area. The 'ex-combatants' participating in the programme pose no threat to the security of EES which, rather, is jeopardised by random criminal violence and human rights violations of the civilian population carried out by active members of the SPLA. This is illustrated by the following recent episode, which unfolded in relation to a disarmament exercise that took place in the village of Hiyala in Torit County in March 2012. It illustrates that security in the area is unrelated to the DDR programme.

Local security threats

Since the 1950s Hiyala and neighbouring village Iloli have been in a conflict over cattle raiding.²³ On repeated occasions villagers from the two villages have attacked each others' cattle camps armed with traditional weapons like spears and bows and arrows in order to raid cattle. With the availability of small arms the intensity of the clashes in EES has escalated. Then in 2012 the government of Eastern Equatorial State ordered that the villagers return raided cows to the rightful owners in the other village. When this did not happen the EES Governor ordered SPLA to intervene in the dispute. SPLA raided Hiyala village and demanded that villagers hand over their weapons; a civilian disarmament exercise, which led to an escalation of violence. Residents of Hiyala accuse SPLA soldiers of threatening civilians, forcibly removing them from their homes, indiscriminately beating men, women and children, raping one woman, and beating an elderly man to death.²⁴ In late April the Governor issued an apology and an investigation committee was formed. Villagers however pointed out that in the 2010 general elections, Hiyala did not vote for the current governor but for his rival and they therefore expect no support from the governor. But they also point out that they did vote for the separation of South Sudan and therefore deserve the protection of the central state.

Generally, the public in Torit was silent about the incident as if it had never happened due to fear of retaliation by the SPLA.²⁵ The SPLA and the police categorically

²³ Interview villagers, 12.05.2012, Hiyala.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Interview, radio station manager, 14.05.2012, Torit.

denied that any violations took place. The UNMISS only registered the incident and is awaiting the results of the investigation carried out by the local government (UNSG 2012a).²⁶ This incident clearly shows that in spite of peace agreements and independence, conflict and imminent threats of violence continue to be a damaging hazard for lives and livelihoods in South Sudan.

South Sudan has embarked on a programme to transform the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) into a professional, conventional force by 2017. In the following lines, the report briefly describes the elements of the second phase of DDR in South Sudan, which is central to the transformation efforts. The DDR takes a new perspective: one that is connected to the possibility of reducing the SPLA's defence costs and salary bill.

²⁶ This is a critical issue for the mission in South Sudan: How to commit itself to help building the capacities of the new state while at the same time establish a more profound political dialogue on human rights issues with the GoSS. As of recent one of its Human Rights Officers was expelled from the Country for after pinpointing in a report a serious of human rights violations against civilians by the SPLA. See UNSG 2012b and UNSG 2013. Clearly Human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting by the mission are yet to be fulfilled and are secondary to the daunting task of stabilising the new state.

Second phase DDR: downsizing the SPLA.

The second phase of the South Sudan DDR programme is to be launched in the near future, probably during 2013, and is set to target 150,000 former combatants. This would make it the largest and the most ambitious DDR programme worldwide. However, in view of the deterioration of the security environment on the border with Sudan, and the austerity measures owing to the oil shutdown, the ambitions for phase two of the DDR have been reduced. The pilot phase will now target 500 ex-combatants down from an original 4,500. The Government is committed to cover 64% of the total DDR budget of \$1.2 billion. Donor funding is expected for the reintegration component (UNSG 2012b). So far, however, the GoSS has yet to commit the resources—a signal that does not encourage the international community to offer support.

The second phase DDR policy paper was finalised and approved by the Council of Ministries in September 2011. The overall objective of the South Sudanese DDR policy and programme is to reduce the size of the SPLA and other state armed forces, and assist the ex-combatants in returning to civilian life and creating sustainable livelihoods. Specific objectives are: a) To reduce the size of the SPLA/South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) and the other organised services and thereby reduce military spending; b) To assist the ex-combatants to return to civilian life in their host communities; c) To help ex-combatants secure sustainable livelihoods through non-military means; d) To release all persons below 18 years of age from the armed forces and support their successful reintegration into civilian life (GoSS 2011a: 7).

The policy document briefly states that the DDR exercise “shall also contribute to the prevention of further violent conflict in South Sudan as well as the creation of an enabling environment for human security and socio-economic development” (ibid. 7). The current programme is nevertheless heavily focused on DDR as the key and most important component in the implementation of a broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. Commonly referred as the ‘4 A’s’ the idea is to support the SPLA in delivering a transformation strategy for an ‘adequate’, ‘appropriate’, ‘affordable’ and ‘accountable’ armed force.²⁷ This is by any measure a minimalist understanding of SSR, and one that has very few links to any improvement in

²⁷ Interview SPLA security advisor, 20.05.2012, Juba.

human security amidst myriad domestic conflicts, as have been described in the previous pages.

Conscious of the harsh critique of previous eligibility criteria, in this new phase the target groups of the DDR will be as follows: a) combatants released from active duty in the SPLA. These individuals must be listed on the SPLA payroll. They may include combatants from Other Armed Groups (OAGs) that have been integrated into the SPLA, as well as police officers and members of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) who are returning to the South; b) Ex-SPLA members who were absorbed into the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS), the Wildlife Service, Prison Service and Fire Brigade and, finally, c) South Sudanese combatants in foreign armed groups, such as Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) abductees (GoSS 2011a: 9).

The new DDR policy paper states that twelve months in advance the SPLA/SSAF will draft an annual master list of combatants on payroll who should be targeted for demobilisation. The Ministry of Defence holds responsibility for the overall guidance. The list of combatants to be included in the programme must be drawn up with *transparency* – which is a widely used word in the document. With regard to the other organised services, their respective leaderships under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will provide their eligibility criteria and master lists.

Perhaps the most notorious contrast with the CPA–DDR is that women who are or have been associated with armed forces or armed groups (WAAF/G) and who are not on the forces payroll are recognised as needing support in their reintegration process, but such support will not be managed through the DDR process. They will be supported through a separate programme. Likewise, as opposed to phase I, the post-independence DDR programme will only target combatants who are able-bodied and who are not severely wounded.

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan is committed to pay ex-combatants' salaries for up to 12 months from demobilisation. Ex-combatants will initially be processed and supported in a series of transition facilities (TF) where they will spend up to three months. At the facilities individuals will be formally demobilised and debriefed and will be provided with intensive support and training in literacy, life skills and livelihood opportunities/options of their choice. It is intended that three facilities will be established initially and eventually expanded to up to ten (one for each state in South Sudan). The transition facilities will be capable of handling up

to 500 ex-combatants each in batches at any one time for a three-month period. After passing through the facilities, ex-combatants are expected to reintegrate into communities of their choice within South Sudan, but will be provided with ongoing support by the SSDDRC through state offices, and through the provision of specific projects operated by line ministries with implementing partners.

The open question is whether the new DDR plans will be implemented in the near future and whether the economic benefits of downsizing will be reached. Second it is not clear how a reduction in force will allow for a reduction in the SPLA's budget so that resources could be allocated elsewhere, building the capacity of the state and of the GoSS institutions to deliver services.

There has been no fundamental discussion on whether the DDR is at all feasible under present political and military realities. Moreover, the plan to start with a modest pilot project for 500 beneficiaries indicates a pace where it may take several years to demobilise the estimated caseload of 150,000! The current second phase DDR strategy addresses structural flaws in design, execution and implementation, and national ownership is high on the agenda as opposed to the CPA-DDR. However, DDR is still conceptualised by locals and internationals alike as a technical programmatic exercise, rather than a political endeavour. There is a need for a more contextually driven approach to DDR, one that takes into account security and political and economic issues that have an effect on the technically driven DDR. There is also a need to mainstream DDR within GoSS line ministries.

This is happening at a slow pace with the establishment by President Salva Kiir Mayardit of a National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Council (NDDRC) by Presidential Order No. 31/2102 of 12th October 2012. Chaired by the Vice President, the council is mandated to mobilise and coordinate the government's ministries and organisations to ensure the highest level of political alignment and support for the overall DDR programme.

Notwithstanding South Sudan's low economic base, the low skills profile of most ex-combatants and the limited capacity of the economy to absorb ex-combatants are challenges which the new programme will have to address. The Government has committed itself to paying ex-combatants during the year-long process of demobilisation and reintegration. The issue of DDR has been recognised as a cross-government priority and this was reflected in the South Sudan Development Plan. However the capacity of South Sudanese ministries and international agencies to support the process poses

significant logistical and operational challenges.²⁸ Generally donors commit their support to the programme to it meeting rigorous design standards. Context in other words, seems not to be as important as the design of a rigorous programme.

Paradoxically, different evaluations of the first phase pointed out that the programme was not achieving the results because it did not address the specific context of South Sudan and they called for a redesign of the programme. This, it is argued here, is also a problem for the second phase DDR: context is secondary to the imperative of downsizing the SPLA. The DDR is not departing from a comprehensive assessment of the security sector. Furthermore, and judging from the myriads of press releases by GoSS and publications by the SSDDR Commission, it is clear that the DDR programme in south Sudan is perceived as being different from a traditional DDR programme (SSDDRC 2012b). The Vice President's press secretary puts it this way: "the country needed to generate new ideas to move away from the classical DDR which only provides a one-time package of assistance to ex-combatants, to a more productive and sustainable programme which will continue to benefit the ex-combatants in their new life outside the organised forces".²⁹ However the programme as it is designed so far follows the standard DDR templates, which have combatants assembled and processed through transition facilities as their centrepiece.

Another conundrum is the small amount of support the DDR programme has among the public and the SPLA in light of the security challenges facing the new state. Furthermore there is little support for the programme in other security services like, for instance, the Ministry of Wildlife services which never attended the DDR programme planning exercises.³⁰

Notwithstanding the widespread consensus about the centrality of DDR in South Sudan, there is less awareness of the ways in which DDR could eventually have an impact on the security situation at the national, state (provincial) and local level. Table 5 captures South Sudan's security challenges, the main actors involved and the eventual impact (or lack of impact) of a DDR process on these security challenges.

²⁸ As an example the approved budget for UNMISS's second year is US\$839,490,000 million. Over half this amount will be spent on operational requirements (air transportation, facilities and infrastructure). See UN General Assembly, Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, A/C.5/66/18 accessed at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/66/18, 20 December 2012. Also recently, two power generators for the first transitional facility had to be transported from Juba to Mapel a distance of about 450 Km. The transport price: an astonishing US\$800,000!

²⁹ *South Sudan to transform ex-combatants into productive work brigades*. Sudan Tribune, 7 December 2012, accessed 14 December 2012 at: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44769>

³⁰ Interview SPLA security advisor, 20.05.2012, Juba.

Table 5. Dynamics of insecurity and second phase DDR in South Sudan

	<i>Security Challenges</i>	<i>Actors</i>	<i>DDR</i>
<i>National</i>	North–South Disputes over the status of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.	Sudan (SAF) and South Sudan (SPLA)	<i>Impact:</i> Down-sizing the SPLA <i>Solution:</i> – A need for joint confidence building measures. – Simultaneous DDR in both countries.
<i>State (provincial)</i>	Armed insurgencies along the North–South border, stretching from South Sudan’s eastern border with Ethiopia along the now northern, conflict-prone states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan across to the border with the Central African Republic in the west, bordering Darfur. Insurgent violence thus particularly affected the Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States.	South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM) South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM) Yau Yau militia (ethnic Murle)	<i>Impact:</i> None <i>Solution:</i> A need for national dialogue with ‘ethnic strong men’.
<i>Local</i>	Inter-communal conflict and cattle raiding. Linked to armed insurgencies (in terms of ethnic mobilisation and provision of weaponry).	Dinka vs. Nuer in Unity, Warrap and Lakes Lou Nuer vs. Murle groups in Jonglei	<i>Impact:</i> DDR has no links to civilian disarmament. <i>Solution:</i> DDR is not intended to solve ‘root’ causes of conflict. A need for understanding armed mobilisation.

DDR: the ‘missing link’ in security sector reform efforts

Security sector reform is a process aiming at the transformation of ineffective, unprofessional and unaccountable security institutions into effective and democratic ones. Ideally both processes can and should be linked (Mc. Fate 2010; IDDRS 2006). According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee handbook on SSR, DDR and SSR “are often best considered together as part of a comprehensive security and justice development program” (OECD 2007). However, this is far from so in the case of South Sudan and perhaps will remain largely unconnected in the near future. As stated before, the new DDR programme aims to contribute to the transformation of South Sudan’s security sector through enabling rightsizing of the national organised forces or, as the SSDDRC bluntly puts it, the “SPLA will turn around its reputation as a ‘welfare army’ to being ‘fit-for-purpose’” (SSDDRC 2012b). However DDR efforts in South Sudan are completely detached from SSR interventions that, in reality, are parallel programmes supported by the international community.

The current security climate, coupled with the continued failure of UNMISS, UNDP and the SSDDR Commission to advance the process is one of the biggest risks to the progress of the SPLA transformation process. DDR is slowly developing parallel to SSR efforts, and there appears to be little evidence of progress in the last year. In fact, the start of the second phase has been postponed several times as a result of the oil shutdown and operational challenges. A key concern is that DDR remains the almost exclusive terrain of the SSDDR Commission.

Various international actors have a stake in SSR efforts, including UNMISS and bilateral donors, especially the UK and USA. The GoSS launched the national security policy drafting process, which includes consultations in all states. UNMISS contributed to training the drafting committee and is supporting the development of national security institutions and policies. It also provided technical advice to six state security committees and supported South Sudanese security sector oversight (UNSG 2012b/2013). UNMISS’ role in SSR is nevertheless limited and arguably insignificant in the transformation of the SPLA.³¹

This is in sharp contrast to the support provided by UNMISS to the DDR process that includes building the transition facilities by various military contingents. UNMISS DDR currently has over 100 staff in South Sudan, with a presence in all

³¹ See also Rands & LeRiche 2012.

ten states. Some of these staff are co-located with UNDP DDR colleagues, alongside the SSDDRC as recommended in UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011). Both UNMISS and UNDP are jointly supporting the capacity building of SSDDRC at headquarter and state levels.

DFID, through its Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Programme (SSDDT), is one of the major international donors besides the US and Switzerland, working in the security sector. A team of 26 advisers (1 x Team Leader, 1 x Operations Manager and 24 specialist advisory positions) deliver the programme through Adam Smith International (ASI), a contracted service provider. The SSDDT consists of six work streams: strengthening GoSS security decision-making architecture, SPLA transformation, transformation of the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs (MoDVA), strengthening legislative assembly oversight of defence and security actors, strengthening civil society capacity to contribute to security sector governance and strengthening GoSS state security decision making (White et al. 2012).

In the latest annual review of the SSDDT, the difficult or non-existent linkage between DDR and SSR is pinpointed as the most serious cause for concern about the success of the programme and SPLA transformation: *“Probably the biggest risk to progress with SPLA transformation, and the South Sudan Police Service transformation, is the lack of an endorsed DDR strategy, programme and plan, which must be taken forward by GoSS”*, and further calls for *“a coordinated effort by the International Community and UNMISS to assist GOSS in driving the DDR programme forward”* (ibid. 8–11).

To date the SSDDT programme has received US\$19.6 million since its inception in 2009. It came to an end in 2012 and the annual review is prudently critical of its outputs. The programme was rated as “moderately did not meeting expectations” (White et al: 31). The review points to the SSDDT programme as driven by supply rather than demand, and is based on little demonstrable evidence regarding the security demands of the population (ibid. 36). Furthermore it states that it has yet to undertake perception surveys, and that consultation is limited to a small number of security actors and institutions. It recommends the expansion of its focus from national level to state level, where insecurity is felt the most. In my reading, the report attempts to ‘democratise’ and expand security sector transformation to the South Sudanese population. To quote at length from the report:

We are supportive of the proposal that the programme engages more at state level and below, but would recommend the commissioning of a demand side assessment before determining how, where and to what end SSDDT state focused support should be focused. This should ensure that the capacity building activity delivers beneficial outcomes for the wider population there is a need to better understand existing security provision in country and the populations' expectations from the security sector (White et al: 36).

In spite of the critical review a new phase of the programme has recently been approved.

Conclusion

This report explores the DDR programme in South Sudan and asks three basic questions: How has it evolved? What have been the major challenges towards its implementation and, finally, what realistically can be expected from renewed efforts at disarming and reintegrating fighters vis-à-vis security imperatives on the ground?

An important driver for the planned large-scale nationally-owned disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process is the ambition to reduce South Sudan's security-related spending (and particularly salary costs). However the continuous recruitment of new and fresh soldiers appears to outpace any process intended to downsize the SPLA. Therefore, in addition to a nationally-owned DDR, the task ahead may be to comprehend and eventually change how the South Sudanese population continues to be mobilised to fight, whether into the SPLA or into militia groups and proxy armies used in politics and power struggles in the newly independent country.

The basic argument presented here is that standard DDR programmes, or rather the standard templates that characterise them, are not fit for purpose in a context like South Sudan due to the security imperatives of the new state. These are: continuing tensions in key areas along the border with Sudan; incessant rebel militia activities in different states; sporadic cattle raids; the ever-present threat of the emergence of new security challenges such as the influx of armed pastoralists with large numbers of cattle. There are, in other words, enormous uncertainties that may seriously compromise the commitment to disarmament. Even if the second phase of the DDR programme starts as planned, the SPLA and the rest of the South Sudanese forces will without doubt process their 'weakest' and most dispensable elements. The SPLA wants to prioritise who is demobilised, but this raises the dilemma of whether the chosen individuals are relevant from a policy perspective? Behind the scenes the underlying unresolved disputes between Sudan and South Sudan will likely continue de-incentivising both parties to completely commit to a demobilisation process.

In a best case scenario the programme proceeds as scheduled and salary cuts enable spending on the much-needed hardware, e.g. anti-aircraft missiles and possibly fighter jets, to deter Sudan from aerial bombings. Of course this is hypothetical, but it is not an unthinkable future scenario and may be debated. GoSS is currently working to develop a national security policy and, at least on paper, remains focused

on the economic imperative to downsize its army. Besides rightsizing the army, the international community expects that DDR will improve security for civilians.

But security in the country goes beyond DDR, even if it is a necessary step towards Security Sector Transformation, and is not only related exclusively to the 'rightsizing' of the South Sudanese Armed Forces/Sudan People's Liberation Army or 'reintegration' of combatants. The task ahead, as argued in this report, is to understand, comprehend and eventually change the basic structures and mechanisms of armed mobilisation. Another fault line is the absence of long-term plans that address all the destabilising factors briefly described in this report, especially violence as a political tool of empowerment and advancement and the limited livelihood opportunities for South Sudanese citizens, combatants and civilians alike.

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