EU’s NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
A QUESTION OF SPACE AND SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism and immigration stemming from the Southern Mediterranean have made it to the top of the European security agenda since 11 September 2001. This paper analyses the European Neighbourhood Policy in the light of European security perceptions. It suggests that the reason why the EU has difficulties in coming up with a coherent policy towards the Southern neighbours are due to fact that the EU and its member states are in an immense internal and external crisis of identity. This crisis has been further aggravated after the French and Dutch ‘no’ to the European Constitution. The paper makes the argument that the tension between modernity and post-modernity, between the European model of export of universalism and the increasing tendency to close the borders towards the ‘others’ further aggravates the identity crisis. The paper concludes that these tensions are increasing thus making it still more difficult for the EU to behave as an exporter of European values.
INTRODUCTION

In March 2003, the EU Commission launched the proposal for a ‘New Neighbourhood Policy’ entitled: ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. The aim of this new policy was to enhance stability and security at its borders, by promoting political and economic development and regional cooperation among its new neighbours of the Southern Mediterranean and the Eastern Europe. The EU document states that the neighbours are not going to become members of the EU institutions. They will be drawn closer to the EU but how close and in which way is the important question which will be analyzed but only with regard to the neighbours of the Southern Mediterranean.

The Neighbourhood policy represents simultaneously an institutional closure to the ‘Others’ - not the ‘radical’ Other, but the ‘different’ neighbour - and an openness to the extent that the ‘different’ neighbour behaves like the Europeans but without being a cultural carbon copy of the Europeans.

The closeness and openness of borders and the Eurocentric conceptualization of what it is to be a good neighbour, these notions point to different conceptualizations of space and time in relationship to the EU. The balancing between closeness and openness is due to the increasing fear of enlargement and of terrorism. Thus with regard to space, different kinds of bordering and different ways of drawing closer the neighbours and/or keeping them outside are conceived as security strategies. As for the question of time they are considered as lacking behind the Europeans. The EU makes the argument that only if they are well educated (by the EU), they will be able to enter the European time. In this self-representation, the EU becomes the good teacher that knows how to export knowledge to the Southern Mediterranean.

1 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia; Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
2 The chapter does not distinguish between ‘Europe’ and the EU because in order to be a member of the EU a country has to testify its European-ness. The EU is the institutional and political manifestation of the concept of ‘Europe’, which is a ‘floating signifier’ i.e. it is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses (Laclau, 1990: 287). The meaning of Europe therefore changes over time and in time and there are at the same time many meanings attached to the concept of ‘Europe’ (Den Boer, 1991; Pagden, 2002). The shifting and competing discourses on the content of the concept of Europe are mirrored in the discourses on the EU integration and vice versa.
In this chapter, the EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean are analyzed as discursive practices that are rooted in rather sedimented representations of the Southern Mediterranean. These discourses are difficult to change because they are meaning producers. They tell stories about ‘who we European want to represent us self at a given time, where we are heading, whom our neighbours are and how we ought to conduct policies’ (Holm, 2000). New narratives about who we European are in relationship to the neighbours can of cause be told but if they totally break up hitherto constructions of meaning they will have difficulties in getting public support.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the Southern Mediterranean and which parts of the Southern Mediterranean are discursively drawn closer to the EU. The paper concentrates upon analysis of the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) but draw also upon prior EU discourses on the Mediterranean in order to analyze how security, space and boundary are discursively linked.

I will make the argument that the different conceptualizations of bordering pertain to how the EU discursively represents the Southern Mediterranean. The representations are embedded in two simultaneous discourses that result in contradictory EU border policy towards the Southern Mediterranean. One is about the Mediterranean as the cradle of great civilizations that fertilize each other, and the other is about the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone. The EU’s self-representation as an exporter of political and economic liberalism to the neighbours and the EU fear of organized crime, Islamist fundamentalism, terror, immigration are embedded in these two discourses.

In analyzing sources representative of EU neighbourhood policy I draw especially on European Council directives and conclusions, and the EU Commission’s proposals in order to find the EU’s dominating discourses.

The paper is divided into five sections. Firstly, I outline how post-modern Europe/EU frightens large parts of the European populations and how they react to the EU enlargements. Secondly, I demonstrate how the denominations of spaces of the Southern Mediterranean are expressions of different kinds of security bordering. Thirdly, I analyze how the two discourses on the Southern Mediterranean in the ENP document contradict each other with regard to conceptualizations of borders. Subsequently, I explore how the relationship between the ENP and fear of terrorism tends to strengthen bordering thereby putting into question the EU’s self-representation as an exporter of democratic pluralism. Finally, I discuss to which extent the ENP is an expression of a security discourse embedded in the territorial bordering of
modernity or whether modernity and post-modernity or are living together in an uneasy combination with regard to how the EU conceives of security.

MODERNITY, POST-MODERNITY, SPACE AND TIME

Since the crumbling of the Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union it has often been claimed that the actual EU is qualitatively different from modern European political communities, i.e. territorial, sovereign states. Researchers have analyzed the EU as a flexible entity that has become multi-perspectival (Ruggie, 1993) by the mergence of a variety of intermediate spaces, used for a kind of ‘policy export’ at the Union’s fringes. These spaces are, however, not to be seen as purely exogenous in nature. They are to a large degree influenced by the polices of the EU but contain some endogenous features as well – or to put it differently, they are not just constructed in an ‘outside-in’ fashion; they also reflect processes that have the nature of ‘inside-out’ (Neumann, 1994). This implies that ‘Fortress Europe’, a metaphor denoting a rather centralized EU with recognizable and impregnable external borders, is challenged by ‘fuzzy’ borders (Christiansen, 1999). The door is opened for a variety of spaces on the brink between the inside and the outside and with these spaces linking members and non-members, the figure of the Union gets blurred (Holm, Joenniemi, 2001).

Fluidity of borders and multiple identities are features that in international relation theory and sociology characterize post-modernity. Post-modernity is not something that is detached from modernity. ‘It is modernity coming to age’ as the sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, writes. Still according to him:

“post-modernity is constituted by the implosion of the dream of order, of mastering chaos. This implosion consists of a liberation of modernity from its false consciousness: the struggle for universality, homogeneity, monotony, clarity has given way to pluralism, variety, contingency, ambivalence” (Bauman, 1991: 187-188).

The two modes of understanding life and politics, i.e. order and dis-order, exist together in an uneasy balance where modernity still tends to aspire to a hegemonic position which results in a discursive battle against post-modern forms of dis-ordering life (Huysmans, 1996: 176).

The battle between these two modes is encapsulated in the ‘territorial field of tension: the state’ (Jönsson, Tägil, Törnquist, 2000: 187). Still more state functions are lifted up to the EU
level but the idea of especially a social state is still very much alive. The longing for more social state was a very important reason to the French ‘no’ to the European Constitution on 29 May 2005. The ‘no’ was primarily a protest against the waning away of the territorial state and the lack of a social state on the European level. If one cannot have a territorial state one must at least have a copy of one’s state at the European level. This was the no-voters’ main message to the French government. Another important reason for the French ‘no’ was opposition to future Turkish membership of the EU. Hence, the no-voters asked for a border to ‘the outside-Other’.

The Dutch ‘no’ was especially caused by increasing fear of the internal ‘Other’ i.e. the other living at the national Dutch territory and inside the EU. This ‘no’ was a request for a border to the ‘inside-Other’. In sum, it was the supposed order of modernity that was asked for. It was a ‘no’ to the dis-ordering of modernity coming into age, i.e. post-modernity. This request for order implies that boundary is seen as a means to bringing about stability by separating the EU of order and prosperity from conflict and insecurity internally and externally.

The request for (symbolic) internal and external bordering to especially the ‘Muslim Other’ has arisen in the aftermath of 11th September and the ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004 that brought ten states into the EU at once.

After the ‘big-bang’ enlargement an ‘enlargement fatigue’ was setting in (Smith, 2005: 758). Several EU member states and their populations become still more opposed to further enlargement. This opposition is strong in particular with regard to Turkey which by large parts of the European populations are considered non-European – because of the Muslim faith – even if the Turkish state is secular.

This perception contrasts the European representation of the Bosnian Muslims as Europeans. During the ‘Balkan’ wars until the conclusion of the Dayton Accord in 1995, two dominating European discourses structured the representation of the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs. The one represented Bosnian Muslims as belonging to ‘Balkan’ that is to say that

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3 The possibility of Turkey being a member of the EU has nothing to do with the European Constitutional Treaty. But right-wing and left-wing French parties linked the question of Turkish membership to rejection of the Treaty.

4 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro were recognized in June 2000 as potential candidates for accession.
they were considered barbarians. The other one constructed Bosnian Muslims as representatives of Western values – as the ‘Western Self’ – that the West should support whereas the Serbs were represented as ‘the radical Others’ due to their genocidal campaign in Bosnia.

In spite of the binary representation of Muslim Bosnians and Serbs during the wars, the EU has promised Serbia – in a far future – to become an EU member because Serbia is considered capable of being ‘educated’ due to its inherent European-ness that only has to be liberated from the radical nationalist discourse (Hansen, 1998).

The spatial bordering and de-bordering has thus very much to do with how the EU represents the ‘others’ as being capable of liberation from religion as an marker of identity and from radical nationalism that results in war. Fear of the ‘spatial other’ not being capable of being educated by the EU is linked to fear of the return of the past because wars at the periphery of the EU is represented as caused by malign nationalism that reminds the EU of its proper past and therefore has to be either combated by military intervention or by keeping the ‘radical nationalist other’ out of the EU.

Especially the German and French political leaders have constantly warned against the return of extreme nationalism that fostered the Second World War. In the big speeches of 2000 – 2001, the French President, Jacques Chirac, and the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, made the obligatory references to the fear of Europe’s future becoming like Europe’s past. They all pleaded for European integration as the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on the Continent, which have resulted in terrible wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. But the so-called hereditary enemies – France and Germany – have become friends, and nobody believes that they will turn into enemies any more.

The reference to the European past is still alive especially amongst the old European political leaders and it is revitalized by connecting the fear of terrorism to the return of Nazi horrors (see p. 24). However, it is slowly waning away. This was for example evident in the speech of the young French Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, to his Gaullist party’s (UMP= Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) convention on September 24, 2005. At this occasion he ascertained that a large section of the French young generation had said ‘no’ to the European Constitution because they did not care about the ‘old’ integration that was based upon peace and liberation. Instead they asked for a new project pointing to a future secure Europe with borders towards the periphery (Sarkozy, Septembre 24, 2005).
‘The temporal Othering’ represented in the fear of the return of the past (Waever, 1998) is supplemented with fear of the future that is represented in fear of spaces of permanent enlargement. This fear of the ‘the geographical Other’ has resulted in the use of cultural and religious arguments in order to exclude ‘the Other’ from the EU.\(^5\) (Holm, 2000; Diez, 2004). The cultural and religious discourse is particularly evident with regard to the question of Turkish EU membership. All over in the EU member states, voices raise against the inclusion of Turkey. The first prominent leader to oppose possible future Turkish membership protest was the former French president and the former president of ‘the Convention on the Future of Europe’, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who declared in 2002:

“If Turkey is going to be a member of the EU, it will result in the end of the EU because certain discussions cannot be expanded to countries that have another culture, another way of living” (BBC News, 8 November 2002).

Giscard d’Estaing added that if Turkey was promised full membership, it would open the door for Morocco’s application for EU membership. Giscard d’Estaing avoided referring to Islam as a criterion for exclusion. Instead he spoke about the importance of culture. But since Giscard d’Estaing has been a promoter of inscribing Christian values into the European Constitution thereby creating a border to Muslim countries, culture and religion is fused in his definition of Europe/EU.

The cultural and religious criteria for defining, who are the Europeans, are not at all included in the so-called Copenhagen criteria. At the EU Council meeting in Copenhagen 1993, the EU member states agreed that enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe required that the candidate countries had achieved stability of institutions, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and existence of market economy before being a member. These criteria are thus unequivocally political. Any country that fulfils these criteria might become a member. In principle, the EU may expand to the other side of the Mediterranean – to Muslim Countries if they fulfil the political criteria.

\(^5\) The question whether religion plays a role in defining where the European borders have to be drawn was vehemently discussed during the working out of the European Constitutional Treaty. The compromise between the members of the Convention on the Future of Europe was a reference in the preamble to Europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance.’ (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/objectives_en.htm). 22-09-2005.
This political conceptualization of Europe/EU indicates that European values are universal and therefore not bound to a specific territory whereas the conceptualization of Europe/EU as a religiously and culturally defined entity implies that European values are essentialized because an individual cannot become a ‘good’ European if she/he has not been ‘rooted’ forever to the European religious and cultural soil.

This conceptualization of Europe/EU challenges the concept of a political Europe/EU that has hitherto been represented as an indicator of European uniqueness in comparison to other regional entities. The cultural and religious conceptualization has been sparked off by the enlargement but also by the fear of terrorism from Arab countries and from Muslims living in EU member states. Hence, what is represented as a threat to the individual or to nations and the EU is linked to the question where Europe/EU has to end - to the question of boundary. Modern ordering of space – at the national territorial and the European level - is thus in opposition to the dis-ordering of space, i.e. further enlargement and construction of fuzzy borders.

What we have been witnessing since the crumble of the Wall is a longing for spatial modern ordering but at the same time a spatial construction of ‘modernity coming into age’ is going on. The ordering and disordering of space are ‘living’ together in the uneasy and ambiguous EU politics towards the Southern Mediterranean.

DENOMINATIONS OF SPACE: SECURITY AND BOUNDARY

“The anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time. Time probably appears to us only as one of the various distributive operations that are possible for the elements that are spread out in space”. (Michel Foucault, 1967)

Spatial boundaries play a crucial role in the construction of national and regional consciousness in that they attach the social distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to the spatial ones between ‘here’ and ‘there’. Boundaries are not objective geographical terms but geopolitical inventions and in essence uncertain (Balibar, 1998: 226; Paasi, 2001: 13). The content of the various conceptualizations of space is unstable, always subject to political struggles for definition. Space and content of space can be based on a variety of contradictory arguments rooted in different constructions of history and in different perceptions of security
problems. The struggle over meanings with regard to denominations of space is reflected in the choice of different geographical concepts that reflect the EU’s representation of its security relationship to the Southern Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean, the Maghreb/North Africa, the Machrek/the Middle East, and the Wider Europe – European Neighbourhood Policy are simultaneous competing concepts that define space.

Some of the geographical terms are not used by the EU but by the southern European countries and by the Arab states. This goes for the Arab terms ‘Maghreb’ and ‘Machrek’, which have been imported to Europe by France. These terms are originally medieval Arab geopolitical concepts that put Egypt into the centre of the Arab world. Seen from Egypt, the countries to the west of Egypt are called the Maghreb – meaning the place of sunset. East of Egypt, the Arab countries are the place of the sunrise, the Machrek. Egypt is thus considered the pivotal place from where all politics to the Arab world radiates. Since World War II, Egypt has perceived itself as the bridge and as the mediator between the Maghreb and the Machrek as well as in the Palestinian – Israeli conflict.

The invention of the term ‘Middle East’ is ascribed to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US naval officer and author of key works on naval strategy in the 1890s. The term ‘Middle East’ covered the geographical area stretching from China to the Mediterranean comprising the Asian region south of the Black Sea between the Mediterranean to the West and British India to the East. It was a geopolitical security term with concern for securing the routes to the Persian Gulf in order to secure the route to British India.

Since the beginning of the 20th century the term ‘Middle East’ became commonly used, but the definition of the region changed in tandem with the security conceptions and practices of the British policy-makers (Pinar, 2000: 17). After World War I the geopolitical scope of the term ‘Middle East’ shifted. It no longer pointed to British India but to Cairo as the centre of gravity. During World War II the British began to use the term ‘Middle East’ with reference to all Asian and North African lands to the west of India. No definite boundaries were ever set to the term. (Dietl, 2001: 56). After World War II where the U.S. entered the Middle East alongside Great Britain, the U.S. took over the term ‘Middle East’. In 1957, some years after the Nasser coup d’état in Egypt (1952) and one year after the Soviet repression of Hungary (1956), the U.S. proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) promising to provide American military and economic aid to any nation or group of nations in the area of the Middle East. In this doctrine, the Middle East only encompassed Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms. A year after the U.S. State Department adopted yet another
definition of the Middle East that covered Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Pinar, 2000; Dietl, 2001).

After 9/11 both the U.S.A. and the EU have come up with various kinds of geopolitical designs in order to address perceived threats stemming from the Southern Mediterranean. In 2003, the U.S. launched its ‘Middle East initiative’ whose purpose was to bring about freedom and democracy in an area stretching from Morocco to India including the Gulf States. After the war against Iraq, George W. Bush launched the idea of a ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ whose intention was to bring together the U.S., the EU, and the ‘Greater Middle East’. The term ‘Greater Middle East’ comprises the land between Gibraltar and India, including Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Central Asia Kühnhardt, 2003).

Some European countries (France) and many Arab states in the region objected to the concept ‘greater’ because for France it connoted British and American world dominance, and for the Arab states it connoted former imperial and colonial power. The critics resulted in a compromise renamed: ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’ (BMEI) that was launched at the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on 8-10 June 2004 and then expanded upon at the EU and NATO summits later in the month.

The delineation of the Middle East region stops at India just as did Mahan’s strategic conceptualization of the Middle East. But whereas Mahan’s concept was invented in order to secure the route to British India, to control British India, the new term points to the security of the area in itself in order to secure the U.S. from terrorism.

In March 2004 the EU interim Report ‘An EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ was published (European Council, 19 March 2004). This report is a challenge to the American ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’. The EU uses the concept ‘the Mediterranean’ in the title of its report whereas the American initiative coined the geographical concept ‘North Africa’. This conceptual difference results from the fact that ever since the 1970s the EU has represented the area that embraces the Southern European countries, Israel and the Arab countries in the Southern Mediterranean, as the ‘European-Mediterranean’ area in order to demonstrate that the Southern Mediterranean is part of Europe. This conceptualization is due to French, Spanish and British colonial past in the Southern Mediterranean. But it is especially the French governments – but also the Spanish
governments since 1989 - who have insisted in attaching the Southern Mediterranean to the European Community.

In the EU report, the term ‘Mediterranean’ is linked to that of ‘the Middle East’. Before the publication of the report, the EU documents either referred to the Mediterranean including the Middle East, or the Middle East referring to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the neighbours involved in the conflict. The construction of the two terms on an equal footing represents a division of the Mediterranean and the Middle East into two equally important parts. This division makes it easier to embrace more countries into the concept of the Middle East. Thus, the Gulf countries have to be drawn closer to the Middle East as the report states. At the same time, the report states, that the North Africa and the Middle East have to be divided:

“The resolution of the Middle East conflict cannot be a pre-condition for confronting the urgent reform challenges facing the countries of the region, nor vice versa…the primary focus of the strategic partnership will be the countries of North Africa and the Middle East” (Euromed report, 23 March 2004).

Division of the Mediterranean into two regional security parts, and the linking of the Middle East to the Gulf - states are dictated by security concerns.

Since 9/11 the concepts of North Africa and the Middle East have been used still more in the EU documents because of the EU’s threat perceptions. But that does not mean the concept of the Mediterranean has disappeared from the EU documents. The Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa are present at the same time. The Mediterranean is the overarching concept that points to the construction of one space that has to be dealt with as a whole by the EU, whereas the two spatial sub-concepts: North Africa and the Middle East are represented as two separate entities because the EU represents threats stemming from the North Africa as more vital for European security than those of the Middle East. Immigration,

6 Until 1962, Algeria formed part of France and was therefore attached to the European Community. France has ever since the independence of its former colonies (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) considered especially North Africa as its ‘chasse gardée’. The former protectorates, Syria and Lebanon are included in the spatial concept of the ‘Middle East’.

7 The reference to the Gulf countries appeared already in the Commission’s report from 1999. //C:/WIN/TEMP/SYRIAFAR.HTM DG1B A4, April. But it was only after the war against Iraq, that the linkage between the Middle East and the Gulf countries was constructed strategically.
terrorism and geographical proximity of the North Africa to the EU makes the EU decouple North Africa from the Middle East.

THE EU DISCOURSES ON THE MEDITERRANEAN

“The Barcelona conference (1995) takes place at the exact same day when Pope Urban II, 900 years ago in the French town, Clermont, launched the first crusade. There is nine centuries between Clermont and this day that will be a symbol of a new era. The remote day, 27th of November 1095, was a disastrous example of intolerance. It was the beginning of a long history of wars and misunderstandings between cultures. But at the same time history has donated us with a picture of the Mediterranean as a cultural melting pot, as a symbol of fertile cultural interplay. This cultural and historical inheritance that is shared by parts of the Mediterranean populations, is a means to confirm identity but also to demonstrate mutual understanding” (Manuel Marin, former Vice-President of the EU Commission, November 1995).

The EU’s self-representation, i.e. the question of identity, and its threat perceptions of the Southern Mediterranean are embedded in two discourses with regard to the concept of the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean is represented either as a conflict-ridden zone (Lia, 1999: 39) or as a common sphere of shared identity (Lia, 1999: 22) - a cradle of great civilizations, which fertilize each other, and which needs each other because of shared history and geography.

The two discourses are so sedimented that they come to appear ‘natural’ in important EU documents on the Mediterranean. They are the ‘discursive deep structure’ that all EU politics relate to whenever a new concept of the space, to the south of Europe/EU, appears in the EU documents. It goes for the concept of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ (1995)*, ‘the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2003), ‘A Secure Europe in a better World’ (2003), ‘the

*The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27 - 28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the EU and partners of the Southern Mediterranean. The aim was to create a ‘common area of peace and stability’. This Partnership has turned out to be a deception because none of the conflicts of the area have been resolved and no political, economic or social relations have been ameliorated.
Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures’ (2004), and the interim report on ‘an EU strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ (2004).

The two discourses are always interrelated in the EU documents. They refer implicitly to each other. In ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, which is the first European strategic paper to outline EU policy priorities towards the ‘outsiders’ (Biscop, 2003), the discourse on a conflict-ridden Mediterranean is the dominating discourse. ‘The Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures’ is on its side marked by the discourse on a common sphere of shared identity, i.e. as the cradle of civilizations.

The discourse on the Mediterranean as the cradle of great civilizations refers implicitly to the French historian Braudel’s definition of the Mediterranean as the cradle of three grand civilizations – as a crossroad – that creates a beautiful melting pot (Braudel, 1949). Manuel Marin implicitly referred to Braudel’s conceptualization of the Mediterranean by pointing to peaceful times before the crusades, to ‘the Mare nostrum’. 600 years of Roman history is thus represented as an ideal for future imitation in comparison to 900 years of conflicts and wars. The past is thus constructed in order to make sense of the presence and to be a representation of the future. Thus civilizational intermingling is represented as the means to overcome conflicts. The discourse might be labelled the discourse on ‘unity in diversity’, because these words are keywords in the EU documents. They point to the vision of the EU as a promoter of multiculturalism.

This discourse on ‘unity in diversity’ is reiterated in the EU report published in 2004 entitled ‘Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area’. But in this text Manuel Marin’s metaphor ‘cultural melting pot’ has been replaced by the concept of ‘complementarities between the two halves of the Mediterranean’:

“Why should this relationship be made a priority between the two shores of the Mediterranean? Certainly not to prevent a very hypothetical clash of civilizations, but rather in the certainty that the principal complementarities of the two halves of the Euro-Mediterranean area will—be integrated in the next half century….

Two conditions must be present. First, a readiness to seek in the dialogue with the ‘Other’ new reference points for oneself and, second, general agreement on the aim of constructing a ‘common civilization’ beyond the legitimate diversity of the culture” (The Commission, May 2004).
The discourse thus constructs commonality (common civilization) with regard to political values whereas cultural diversity becomes identical to complementarity. The concept of ‘complementarity’ does not create a frontier between the two halves of the Mediterranean, i.e. the Christians and the Muslims halves. European and Arab culture and religion can live together. The two cultures are represented as two sets of values, which together become more valuable than if they were separated into bordered zones. The Braudelian metaphor ‘the Mediterranean as a cross-road’ might be interpreted either as a place where people cross without fusing their cultures or as a place where they exist in harmony but without fusion. The latter interpretation, which is at work in Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures, points to the EU shying away from being a cultural imperial power. ‘Complementarity’ indicates that ‘the Other’ has the right to exist as a ‘cultural and religious Other’, but it does not exist in the form of the ‘radical Other’ (Todorov, 1982), because it is not represented as a threat to European identity.

The ‘Arab Other’, as the ‘radical Arab Other’, exists in the discourse of the European Extreme Right parties. The discourse on the ‘radical Arab Other’ has been visible since the mid-1980s. It is a ‘bordering discourse’, which emphasizes the fundamental difference between the European and the Muslim civilizations. The ‘clash of civilization’ is at the core of this discourse. It constructs clear-cut cultural and political lines of demarcations, linking the Northern Mediterranean to the EU whereas the Arab and Muslim Mediterranean paddle their own canoe (Holm, 2000) close to their own Mediterranean coastline. It is a ‘bordering discourse’, which lifts the suspension bridge between the Northern and the Southern Mediterranean not allowing for any kind of immigration from the Southern Mediterranean, because the Arab is represented as a virus that might spread his/her culture and religion to a supposed healthy European community.

This ‘bordering discourse’ is not at all present in the EU documents, but fear of threats stemming from the Southern Mediterranean is present in the EU discourse on a conflict–ridden zone. But if the Extreme Right’s bordering discourse becomes closely linked with the EU discourse on the Southern Mediterranean as a conflict–ridden zone, the European Extreme Rights have won the struggle with regard to the definition of the Mediterranean. The ‘bordering discourse’ will thus be the only marker of the Mediterranean space. This is very difficult to conceive of, because the EU self-representation is about exporting and sharing

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9 T. Todorov makes a useful distinction between ‘radical Other’ and ‘different Other’ and the problematics of alterity (1982).
values. This self-representation does not allow for completely closed borders. Up to now the discourse on ‘unity in diversity’ as a common sphere of shared identities - built upon complementarity – has ‘lived’ together with the discourse on a conflict-ridden Mediterranean space. This is also the case of the content of ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ that balances between the two discourses that are embedded in the notions of modernity and post-modernity.

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY (ENP): THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ‘EU EMPIRE’ AND ITS PERIPHERY

“The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations...To this end, Russia, the countries of Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)...The Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development for its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours” (Communication from the Commission, 2003)

The ‘big bang’ enlargement in May 2004 brought new Eastern neighbours into the periphery of the EU. In order to cope with this new situation, the EU launched in March 2003 ‘The new neighbourhood policy’ in order to “define EU’s new outer edges” (Emerson, 2003). The geographical scope of this policy embraces Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and The Palestinian Authorities. 10 The Southern Mediterranean countries are ‘old’ neighbours –becoming neighbours after the entry of Greece,

10 Libya is not yet involved in this policy. But it is mentioned in the ENP as a member. But because it is not formally linked to the EU by any agreement and has in fact been the subject of EU sanctions, it is in a kind of waiting position. (Smith, 2005: 759). The same goes for Belarus.
Spain and Portugal into the EEC in the 1980’s - but they are nevertheless considered as ‘new’ neighbours in order to bring them conceptually on a par with the new Eastern neighbours.\footnote{This attempt at drawing the Southern Mediterranean countries closer to the EU is parallel to the launch of the so-called Euro-Med Partnership in Barcelona November 1995 in order to signal to the ‘South’ that they would not be forgotten during the Eastern enlargement.}

The original EU document on neighbourhood policy from 2003 was entitled ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (COM(2003)104final). The proposal was endorsed by the European Council in June 2003 in Thessaloniki. Later on, the name of the initiative was changed into ‘The new neighbourhood policy’ and finally to ‘European neighbourhood policy’ (ENP), May 2004.

The aim of the ENP is to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between Europe/the EU and the neighbours. But the change from the concept of ‘Wider Europe’ to that of ‘European neighbourhood’ is very telling with regard to bordering. The first document indicated inclusion of new countries into Europe thus referring to a perspective of future membership. The second and the third document excluded the countries by constructing a kind of hedge between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the latter not being European but good neighbours if they behave like ‘us’ in Europe even if they are not to be considered Europeans. A dialogue across the hedge can be established but the hedge will always be there and it is the EU that decides whether and how the hedge is going to be trimmed. This is very clear in the EU Commission’s strategy paper on ENP where it is written:

“This objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries … It is designed … to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities … The privileged relationship will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of laws, good governance, their respect for human rights, the principle of market economy and sustainable development” (COM 2004 373 final).

The EU thus pleads for sharing and offering its values to the ‘outsiders’. This gesture is seen as a gift, which the neighbours have an interest in receiving. The relationship between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ is thus characterized by the existence of a benefactor and a grateful beneficiary. This binarity is apparently diluted by constant use of the term: ‘mutual commitment to common values’. But the common values are defined by the EU. This is due
to the fact that the EU represents itself as responsible for inner stability in the EU and for the outer stability in the neighbourhood. This stability can only be achieved by means of responsible export of European values. The term ‘responsible’ runs through the most important speeches by the Presidents of the EU, the various Commissioners for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the declarations of the Council of the European Union. In December 2002, former President of the EU, Romano Prodi, declared in his speech on the necessity of the launch of the Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability that

“We are aware of the great responsibility represented by the half a billion people who will be living in the EU after 2007 … We have to become a real global player … It is a question of responsibility … The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union … We are tolerant and open to dialogue, to coexistence and to cooperation” (Prodi, 5-6 December 2002) (my added italics).

The notion of responsibility refers to a father’s responsibility for the education of his kids. The EU thus constructs a structure of asymmetry but being aware of being accused of behaving as a colonizer, Prodi simultaneously declares that the EU is open to coexistence on equal footing with the neighbours that have mutual commitment to common values. The principle of egalitarianism between the EU and the neighbours is thus established but it is countered by the construction of the asymmetry between the teacher and the pupil. In the EU’s self-representation, universalism and egalitarianism are both constitutive for its identity. The egalitarianism points to a mutual responsibility between the EU and the Southern Neighbours. On the contrary, universalism might point to the relationship between the father and the kid. At the political level, this is rendered visible by the EU’s request for punishing the neighbours if they do not behave as the EU wants them to behave. The neighbours get EU money if they fulfil the criteria for good behaviour that is defined by the EU. If not, they have to wait for money until they understand the content of the common values. This policy is called ‘positive conditional policy’ by the EU.

In return for concrete progress demonstrating the effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms (economic and political liberalism), all these neighbouring countries will be

“offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market, as well as other advance forms of cooperation in key fields of mutual interests” (id.cit).
This positive conditionality is supplemented with the notion of ‘differentiation’. The EU’s Action Plans for the neighbours operate with

“a common set of principles but they will be differentiated, reflecting the existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities” (COM (2004) 373 final).

The ENP thereby creates different levels of relations between the EU and the state in question that depends on its progress in reaching agreed benchmarks of reform. The ENP clearly states, that it is necessary to differentiate between the Southern Mediterranean countries (Kaczynski et al, 2005). A kind of variable geometry is thus introduced. This will result in drawing some Arab states closer to the EU than others. The neighbours that constitute a ‘ring of friends’ are thus divided into different kinds of friends that turn the conceptualization of the ‘ring’ into a ‘twisted ring’. Some friends will be very good friends. Other friends might turn into less good friends and, finally, some friends are not at all friends but very bad neighbours if they do not comply with the EU norms. The ENP thus constructs different kinds of ‘geographical Others’. The more close to EU norms, the less ‘geographical Othering’; the less close to the norms, the more ‘geographical Othering’. Symbolical variable distance and variable ‘Othering’ thus define the relationship between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean.

Institutionally, ‘the ring of friends’ is further away than the Balkans and Turkey. The ENP is not an enlargement policy but a post-enlargement strategy. They are not to become members of a new round of enlargement. Prodi made it very clear that

“We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area” … the neighbours will share everything with the Union but institutions” (Prodi, 6 December 2002).

The actual Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, repeated in 2005 what Prodi declared in 2002

“Let’s be clear about what the ENP is, and what it is not. It is not an Enlargement policy. It is an offer of much deeper cooperation and progressive integration into certain EU policies” (Ferrero-Waldner, 20 July 2005).
The neighbours are posited in ‘the backyard of the EU’ as Prodi stated in 2002. They are posited on the outer edges of the EU (Emerson, id.cit.) where, to a certain extent, they are object to the ordering policy of the EU. There is thus constructed a core-periphery relationship, which might qualify for the construction of a kind of an EU Empire. The Imperial metaphor is used by Ole Wæver to analyze the relationship between the EU core and the ‘near’ and ‘further away abroad’

“The concentric circles feature the radial nature and they are the defining criteria of empires … the EU Empire can establish its rule in a radial manner through differing zones of order” (Wæver, 1997: 65).

Empire is thus about ordering space but it is an order that is gradated because still less power radiates, the more countries are geographically and symbolically distant to the core. This concept of concentric circles has been applied to the enlargement of the EU and duplicated to comprise the neighbours. But the difference between the enlargement process and the construction of neighbourhood spaces is that the neighbours have no possibility of becoming EU members. They will always stay on the outer edge.

The concept of an empire works also with regard to the construction of the borders of an empire.

Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petito and Ben Tonra refer to the imperial metaphor in order to characterize the borders of the empire:

“the borders of the EU – the near abroad – are fuzzy because they produce interfaces or intermediate spaces between the inside and the outside of the policy” (Christiansen et al, 2000: 393).

In their article they recognize that

12 Maybe the countries of the Eastern outer periphery will become members of the EU in the far future. But it is difficult to imagine an EU membership for Arab states. The Southern Mediterranean Arab countries are considered more ‘Other’ than Belarus and Ukraine because they are Arab Muslims. Former President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, has stated that the ENP will not start with the promise of membership, and it would not exclude eventual membership (Prodi, 2002). But the reference to a possible inclusion only goes for the countries of the Continent.
“the degree of fuzziness around the border of the EU does not imply that borders are vanishing or becoming meaningless” (op. cit. 393).

This makes them state that the notion of ‘Roman limes’ might be an adequate term for characterizing the current construction of EU bordering.

In the Roman Empire, the concept of limes was originally a surveyor’s term, adopted for military purposes to mean a road, a path. It was a military road that linked camps on the fringes of an empire, often lined with watchtowers and staging posts. Not only roads, but also rivers could constitute a kind of limes because the rivers and also the sea (the Mediterranean) were used as a means of transport to camps. According to the British Antic Historian, C. R. Whittaker

“the term limes seems to have been used to describe a region within which military buildings are constructed both in advance of and behind the line of administered frontiers. But these limes were, however, permeable border zones” (Whittaker, 1994: 201).

The Romans thus did not consider limes as fixed lines in the landscape. They constituted rather fluid zones – sphere of influence where both the Romans and the ‘outsiders’ intermingled in a kind of creolization/ hybridization of culture. The outsiders could come and go if they did not contest the Roman political and military dominance of the core.

Russell King interprets the concept of limes as a line of defence erected by the rich against the danger of invasion by primitive yet warlike peoples, who would destroy with their poverty the wealth and civilization of the Romans (King, 1998: 111). Thus he underlines the definition of ‘limes’ as a dividing line whereas C. R. Whittaker modifies the usual understanding of limes by underlining the flexibility of the concept of limes. However, Russell King softens his definition by also underlining the concept of flexibility. Still according to Russell King, this flexibility is characterized by zones of exchange and buffers (marches) surrounding the EU Empire (id. cit. 111). Yet another researcher suggests that the interacting process can be captured by the notion of ‘variable permeability of borders’ (Wilson, 2003: 9)13. The reference

13 Missiroli, like the other mentioned researchers, suggests the use of the term ‘limes’ in order to delineate the outsiders from the insiders. Limes are the ultimate conceivable borders of the EU. Thus, limes in his interpretation are about strictly delimited geographical borders (Missiroli, 2003).
to the concept of limes is thus an attempt at defining the fluid relationship between the different circles and their relationship to the core.

In modern conceptualization, the symbolic construction of space and boundaries has been based on the dialectics between two ‘languages’, the language of integration and the language of difference. The use of two languages involves the construction of a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and a spatial distinction between inside/outside and here/there. This thinking in terms of dichotomy often results in the use of the metaphors: ‘fortress Europe’ and ‘the European sieve’. But this modern distinction between the concept of a totally protected inside – ‘fortress Europe’ and that of ‘the European sieve’, completely open to the outsiders, conceals a complex post-modern process of dilution of some borders and strengthening of other borders. Both re-bordering and de-bordering are at work at the same time. The differentiation of the way of perceiving the borders (Foucher, 1998) points to a process of a mixture of closeness and openness – to variable permeability of borders. As a result, integration of the neighbours (as opposed to membership of the EU) is not a binary distinction between everything and nothing, of ‘in’ and ‘out’, but rather a question of more or less involvement in the EU policy-making towards the neighbours (Christiansen, 2005: 77). In the case of the relationship between the EU and its southern neighbours the borders are open as to culture and to a certain extent to trade communication across the barriers but nearly closed to immigrants from outside the limes.

The neighbours are promised a selective opening of the economic borders and open cultural trans-border co-operation. But only if the neighbours behave as the EU wants them to behave. Hence, the EU-reluctant Empire (Haukkala, 2003: 2) balances between the liberal concept of openness and the Hobbesian concept of a border as a closed border in order to establish order in the European periphery and inside the EU.

Fear of especially the ‘Muslim Other’ tends to further the modernity security discourse that constructs borders in order to create order. Still, there exists another representation of the concept ‘modernity coin’ which is that of an open and pluralist society. This conceptualization opens up for fluidity and transgression of borders – of dis-ordering. The notion of dis-ordering has often been represented as a total rupture as for the content of the concept of modernity. But the definition of the content of the concept of modernity is inherently unstable – always subject to different interpretations. Instead of declaring that post-modernity is something that marks a rupture from modernity – as something which is coming after modernity, one might follow Zygmunt Bauman’s definition of post-modernity as ‘modernity coming into age’. This is to say that post-modernity is the ‘real’ modernity. This means that
modernity as post-modernity has become ‘mature’ – not in the sense, that it expresses the end of history, – but in the sense that the ‘real’ modernity, e.g. post-modernity, is a floating signifier – a signifier that is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses. If one follows this line of argumentation, one has to analyse how the EU-documents represent themselves as carrier of modernity – e.g. as ordering principle around a core – or as carrier of ‘real’ modernity – e.g. as carrier of openness to different constellations of borders, culture, religion and politics. The concept of modernity is represented in the EU discourse on the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone that necessitates closure of borders whereas the ‘real’ modernity, e.g. post-modernity, is represented in the discourse on the Mediterranean as a common sphere of shared identity where the three great civilizations fertilize each other without constructing borders between each other. Instead, they are always open for different constellations and interpretations.

TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: NEIGHBOUR OR/AND THE ‘OTHER?'

In the wake of the terrorist attack in Madrid, March 2004, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared:

“The Southern Mediterranean and those countries whose co-operation is deemed insufficient to tackle terrorism will risk a loss of aid and trade” (European Council, 19 June 2004).

8 months later, the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated:

“Our neighbours are not just citizens of ‘third countries’, they are our close partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals, and aspirations and we face common challenges to our security … we want to cooperate more closely in promoting our common foreign policy priorities, … in addressing our common security threats, like the fight against terrorism …” (22 April 2005).

“the strategy entails close cooperation with third countries, including assistance in funding counter-terrorism and capacity-building projects” (Brussels, 13 December 2004).

The above mentioned three declarations are telling examples of the ambiguous policy the EU conducts towards its neighbours. In the declaration on terrorism, the peripheral countries are defined in a neutral way as ‘Southern Mediterranean countries’ whereas, due to her position as Commissioner for the ENP, Ferrero-Waldner of course calls them neighbours. The former expression signals that the mentioned countries do not possess any specific qualities that turn them into friends. They are only characterized by their will or unwillingness to comply with the EU’s fight against terrorism. All at once, a neighbour might turn into ‘the Other’ if it does not co-operate with the EU on its premises. The neighbours are furthermore called ‘third countries’ in ‘the Hague programme’. This denomination indicates that they are posited on the outer edge of the EU – absolutely far away from the core and the potential EU member states. This is partly in opposition to Ferraro-Waldner’s statement. She declared that the neighbours have to be called ‘close friends. They are not just third countries’. Thus, she tries to strike a balance between the neighbours considered as belonging to the third countries – on the other side of the line of the European demarcation – and the neighbours considered as belonging to a symbolic geopolitical space that is close to the EU core.

When in February 2004, Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke about the ENP to the European Parliament, she did not mention anything about threats. Instead she declared that the EU and the neighbours have common bonds of geography, history, trade, migration and culture. Her discourse is about the Mediterranean as a common sphere of shared identities. When the European Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs deliver their speeches, their discourse is that of a conflict-ridden Mediterranean. The different discourses always implicitly refer to each others by relating to the ‘discursive deep structure’ that is represented in the two discourses on the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone and that of a ‘Mediterranean as a common sphere of shared identities’.

The tension between the two discourses has been evident ever since the attack on World Trade Center, 9/11 2001. This is due to the representation of terrorism as being able to destroying the very building blocks of European values: democracy, rule of law and human rights:

“The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States …Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of those principles” (The European Council, 6 December 2001).

“Terrorism is not just undemocratic. It is anti-democratic. It is not just inhuman. It is an affront to humanity. It runs counter to all the values on which the European Union is founded” (Former President of the European Council, Mr. Bertie Ahern, March 25, 2004).

Terrorism is thus seen as something dramatically exceptional, as something that totally changes ‘our lives’. This is evident in the document entitled ‘the Hague programme’: Here it is declared that

“the security of the European Union and its member states has acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004” (Brussels, 13 December 2004) (my italics).

This dramatization is due to the perception of terrorism being a threat to European values and to humanity, i.e. an attack against the universalism of European values. Humanism and universalism are thus represented as concepts that define European values. Logically, terrorism on the contrary is defined by anti-democracy and destruction of humanity. This definition of terrorism constructs implicitly a reference to the European past – to Nazism. Hence, terrorism has to be combated by all means in order to avoid the return of the past. Therefore the EU makes it plain to the neighbours that they have to fight together with the EU against terrorism. If they are reluctant, the EU imposes its order on them, thereby risking being considered a new edition of colonialism. The European fear of the return of the past in the form of the destruction of European values by terrorism gives thus rise to the Southern Mediterranean countries’ fear of the return of the colonial past.

This ‘mutual Othering’ might be furthered because terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration are fused in the representation of whom and what threaten the European populations. In the ENP document it is declared that it is highly important to:

“prevent organized crime and immigration. (Therefore) efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect the shared borders and to
facilitate legitimate trade and passage, while securing European borders against smuggling, trafficking, organized crime (including terrorist threats) and illegal immigration (including transit migration) will be of crucial importance” (COM(2003)393final) (my italics).

Securing the European borders is presented as being of crucial importance. It is thus stated that we Europeans cannot survive if we do not prevent the illegal immigrant that might also be a terrorist from transgressing the border. The ‘outside illegal immigrant’ is thus fenced off. He/she is no more considered a good neighbour if he/she immigrates. The same applies to the ‘inside illegal immigrant. He/she is an object of return and re-admission policy. ‘The Hague programme’ calls for

“the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity” (13 December 2004).

Hence ‘the inside illegal immigrant’ has to be ‘removed’ to his/her native country. If the native countries do not consent to take back its immigrants, they will have difficulties in receiving EU money. The tendency to constructing ‘barricaded borders’ (Andreas, 2001: 3) internally in the EU towards ‘the Others’ and externally towards the Southern Mediterranean neighbours might provoke a mutual suspicion. The neighbours will recall the colonial past where the colonial power imposed its order on the ‘natives’ considering them less educated than the European population, and therefore they had to be ‘educated’ by the European powers. The EU member states fear that European values will not survive an imagined encounter with especially the Muslim Arabs. In this representation, the construction of identity and of bordering spaces is fused. However, for the neighbours it is ‘the temporal Othering’, e.g. the former European colonizers, that is at play, whereas for the EU member states it is especially the ‘geographical Othering’ that is considered a potential threat.

Time and space are thus interlinked in a malign combination, but it is balanced by the EU’s representation of itself as a promoter of political pluralism, as a ‘norm exporter’ of democracy: i.e. political and economic liberalism (Manners, 2002). The self-representation is embedded in the discourse on the Mediterranean as a common space of shared identity, whereas the EU discourse with regard to the fear of terrorism and immigration is embedded in the discourse on the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone.
CONCLUSION

The EU intends to draw closer to its core the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. This policy strategy involves the creation of all kinds of borders and constellations of distance, time and space. *Limes*, fuzzy borders, barricaded borders, variable geometry, concentric circles are concepts that characterize the construction of the EU’s borders beyond enlargement. They all make sense at the political level because they are derived from the two competing EU discourses on the Southern Mediterranean.

There are many policies available at the political level as long as they do not destroy the ‘deep structure’, e.g. the existence of the two simultaneous discourses on the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone and as a common space of shared identity. The deep sedimented structure can of course be changed. But a change of this structure demands interior and exterior ‘shocks’. The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London were such exterior ‘shocks’, but they did not change the deep structure. They certainly intensified the struggle between the two discourses, because the discourse on the Mediterranean as a conflict-ridden zone penetrated the discourse on how to conduct policy towards the Southern Mediterranean neighbours. This fact is mirrored at the political level – in the ENP - that differentiates EU policy towards the neighbours according to the neighbours’ willingness to adapt the EU rules that, in the EU perspective, should reduce threats from the South. But still the neighbours are considered neighbours and not enemies. There is a process of ‘geographical and temporal Othering’ going on in the EU member states. However, this process is countered by the EU discourse on the Mediterranean as a common space of shared identities as a space of ‘unity in diversity’. But still more migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and from North Africa are knocking on the EU-door. This might result in an increasing attempt at barricading the borders. This will mean a return to the ordering principle of modernity thus putting into question the construction of ‘real’ modernity, e.g. fluidity of borders, recognition of the ‘others’ as close friends and recognition of space and time as ever unstable notions that are subject to different interpretations. Hence the future discursive struggle inside the EU-member states at the EU-level will be a struggle between those who want to order space and time and those who accept that it is impossible to define space and time in terms of geographical linearity and of a distinct history in and of time.
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