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mechanisms are necessary if we are to avoid a world in which only the strong and rich get a share of the cake.

The Eurozone crisis, too, has been characterised by uncertainty. Over the past three years the development and handling of the sovereign-debt crisis in the EU has displayed a troubling lack of political leadership. Countless emergency summits have been convened to try to find the elusive silver bullet able to restore confidence in the financial markets. Every time, including after the dramatic 9 December summit where the ‘fiscal compact’ was agreed, European leaders have typically departed Brussels with legalistic compromises that leave some, if not many, unsatisfied. Uncertainty in the EU seems to be characterised by the emergence of a multipolar order of its own, with national capitals, the European Commission, the Parliament and the European Central Bank acting as autonomous centres of power and often pulling in different directions. Overall uncertainty about the diagnosis of and prescriptions for the crisis does not bode well for the much greater challenge awaiting the EU if and when the current emergency subsides: that of how to restore growth in Europe’s sclerotic economies.

Likewise, the global economy continues to be uncertain. In an essay, one of DIIS’s researchers has pointed out that we need a serious transformation of capitalism, includ-
ing a fundamental rethink of the creation of credit and how this may best be governed to serve the interests of citizens – and, indeed, the interests of capitalism itself – in a sustainable economic system. Only by wisely and decisively governing the creation of credit can a great transformation of capitalism be achieved – and only then may the global economy take a new direction, towards green and socially inclusive economic growth and prosperity.

And meanwhile, the so-called Arab Spring came as a surprise to almost everyone. Although many were aware of the new generation’s use of social media and the popularity of new Arab satellite networks like Al Jazeera, most expected that political apathy was predominant among the youth. The popular demonstrations in Tunisia (December 2010) and Egypt (January–February 2011) were met with surprise and enthusiasm: old regimes were toppled and younger generations showed that a peaceful call for reform could work. The Arab Spring also created new uncertainties: Israel was worried, seeing their loyal partner Hosni Mubarak put out of office and was, moreover, frightened about the risk of letting Iran onto the Middle Eastern scene and about the new Egyptian support for political Islam, including Hamas. The Arab Gulf States which supported Mubarak, Israel and the US in fighting the militant Islamists and Iran saw their alliance dissolve. They did not like to see Obama supporting the toppling of a long-loyal partner. Shortly after the popular uprisings a split became apparent between the traditionalist, Islamist-orientated, majority of the populations and a minority elite demanding reforms. This has been manifested in the election victories of the Islamist parties and created uncertainty about the future: would the Arab Spring lead to liberal democracy or to new Islamist regimes taking power through the ballot box?

Times of crisis are times of opportunity and perhaps they are a prerequisite for change. There seems to be a historical precedent that international institutions and the international system have to go through crisis in order to change. The challenge today is the systemic nature of uncertainty. Within the humanitarian sphere a terminology has developed about resilience and risk management. This discourse has entered other policy arenas most obviously related to the economy and the climate. However in the field of international politics a feeling of uncertainty is also growing. Do old partnerships still make sense and will new actors exert influence in recognisable ways? What is the room for manoeuvring in a world where alliances may be formed and dissolved accordingly? These sorts of questions will be at the core of research in international relations in the future. The aim is not to get away with uncertainty and unpredictability since it will continue to be a feature of our lives, but to find ways to minimise risks and make societies more robust in a more turbulent and non-linear world.

I am delighted that in all these areas DIIS researchers are providing research, advice and policy recommendations and my hope is that they are laying down some of the many stepping stones that will lead to solutions and new forms of organisation.

Nanna Hvidt
Director
In the course of the last decade the Danish Institute for International Studies has developed into a major international think tank. According to the *Global Go To Think Tank Report 2011*, which is based on an annual global peer and expert survey of close to 1,500 scholars, policymakers, journalists and specialists worldwide, DIIS is ranked at number 23 in the top 50 non-US think tanks. Moreover, DIIS is ranked number 15 in the list of the top 30 international development think tanks.

Think tanks are organisations that conduct research and engage in policy advice. They help to bridge gaps between knowledge and policy and these are certainly tasks DIIS sets itself as it conducts research and analysis on a wide range of issues within the areas of globalisation, security and development. One can hardly avoid coming across a DIIS researcher when opening the daily newspapers or switching on to one of the major Danish TV channels. This is no coincidence; last year DIIS researchers produced no fewer than 1,100 interviews, comments and letters to editors.

Dissemination of research as well as bridging between knowledge and policy both take place via the institute’s home page and through public seminars. During 2011 DIIS had almost 300,000 visits to its home page and almost 50,000 downloads. Throughout the year DIIS arranges well-attended seminars which attract scholars, students and practitioners from the private, public and NGO sectors. Last year DIIS held an impressive 70 public seminars and 30 research-based conferences or workshops. Moreover, there were high and increasing numbers of participants. The activities were both topical and diverse in nature (see the list on page 74).

Furthermore, DIIS is also involved in research-based consultancies and commissioned work. Commissioned policy work is most often requested by the Danish parliament and ministries among other clients and DIIS typically conducts about 25 such activities per year. Last year, for example, DIIS researchers were involved in analysing or reviewing: Wahhabi Islam, actors in a changing Egypt, reforms in Morocco, trade-related quality management systems, environmental programs in Kenya and alternative access to asylum among other topics.

However, none of the activities mentioned above could take place if DIIS were not conducting independent and high-quality research. At DIIS research is partly financed through the core financing but the institute has been highly successful in attracting external funds, not least from research councils. While the national rate for successful applications is around 10–15 per cent, across the period from 2006–2011 DIIS has demonstrated a success
rate of 34 per cent – this is impressive. With a full-time equivalent of 45–50 researchers, DIIS publishes on a yearly basis almost 30 peer reviewed articles, around 25 peer reviewed book chapters, four or five peer reviewed books and three or four peer reviewed edited books through international publishers plus a range of other publications, including about 35–40 DIIS working papers and around 15 DIIS Reports.

Altogether, it is not surprising that DIIS has located itself as a major European think tank. The board is of course pleased to head a well-managed and well performing institute. The board also looks forward to the final version and full implementation of a new law on the formation of the Danish Institute for International Studies. The law will bring together the professional, administrative and economic responsibilities and give DIIS a more independent status within the ambit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Laurids S. Lauridsen
Chairman of the Board
At the time of this writing, there are encouraging signs that the fragile treasuries of the eurozone periphery might survive this loop of bloated expectations and underwhelming responses. But the ongoing developments in the Eurozone raise the more profound question of whether an imperfect organisation based on accommodating differences and allowing exemptions is suited to bring Europe out of the crisis.

A good answer comes from Denmark, which held the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2012. Like other Northern European members, Denmark has kept at arm’s length from some of the more ambitious experiments of supranational integration. The current quagmire would seem to vindicate this position. Unsurprisingly, recent polls suggest that over 60 per cent of the Danish population would vote against their entry into the eurozone. Whilst the government has promised to hold popular referenda on the defence and justice opt-outs, it has no intention of putting the euro opt-out to a vote. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that Denmark has benefited from being in the EU. For a small and open economy, which directs 70 per cent of its foreign trade to the EU and EU accession countries, the Union’s huge market is vital. Moreover, the EU’s imperfect construction has made it possible for Copenhagen to customise its membership.

Tony Judt, the British historian of Europe, wrote before his untimely death last year that, “if we have learned nothing else from the 20th century, we should at least have grasped that the more perfect the answer, the more terrifying its consequences.”

In its desperate search for solutions to the sovereign debt crisis Europe has turned this logic on its head. Consensus seeking has rounded Europe’s sharper edges and has prevented any of the more powerful players from hijacking the political process. Compromises have been the most common way for the EU to advance. However, imperfection also means that the EU has primarily advanced thanks to a long series of compromises.

The ‘new fiscal compact’ first agreed in December 2011, would, in the old days, have been hailed as a major leap towards a more integrated Europe. British and Czech defections veto notwithstanding, a deal on automatic sanctions and binding rules on public finances would have been the toast of Europhiles for weeks to follow. Well, no longer so. Few independent voices today claim that this deal was decisive; even fewer dare to predict that the EU will come out of this crisis stronger than it was before. Instead, the EU is routinely blamed for producing half-baked and half-hearted solutions.

At the time of this writing, there are encouraging signs that the fragile treasuries of the eurozone periphery might survive this loop of bloated expectations and underwhelming responses. But the ongoing developments in the Eurozone raise the more profound question of whether an imperfect organisation based on accommodating differences and allowing exemptions is suited to bring Europe out of the crisis.
The British veto on financial regulation is but the latest example of a government persuaded that it is better off with less, or even without any, Europe. Denmark, more than any other country, appreciates the perils of taking this customisation too far. Only last spring the previous Danish government decided to reinstate customs controls at its borders. Irrespective of whether or not it was in breach of EU legislation on the free movement of people, the measure made Denmark the object of an international outcry.

In one of its very first moves following election in September 2011, Denmark’s new centre-left government performed a U-turn on the border control decision. Moreover, as the government has stated several times, Copenhagen aims to act as a bridge-builder in Europe. Copenhagen’s experienced civil servants make bridge-building a natural task for them to adopt when dealing with the other nine member states outside the eurozone, and when implementing technical policy tasks such as advancing negotiations on the next EU budget.

However any such bridge is needed if it takes Europe somewhere. Denmark’s social and economic ‘model’ is frequently advocated by the crisis-stricken governments of Southern Europe, as they slowly move from implementing austerity measures towards putting together a growth agenda. More broadly, until the financial markets started to interfere with Europe’s destiny, the dominant narrative had been that ‘more Europe’ was beneficial for the prosperity and well-being of individual European countries. As Professor Judt implies above, anybody arguing in favour of closing borders or erecting trade barriers would have been confronted with the spectres of 20th century Europe.

Today, the tables have turned. If an unexpected influx of migrants crowds our borders, some governments, most recently the French, think they are better off closing them. Similarly, it would seem an obvious course of action to most people were Germany to opt to consolidate a smaller, virtuous eurozone and then choose to go it global on its own, backed by its commercial powerhouse.

It is a tough challenge for anyone to explain how an imperfect Europe is suited to solve the present crisis. It is even harder to explain why it is better to be inside rather than outside the EU. Denmark is a good candidate to take up this fundamental challenge, both at home and abroad.

Fabrizio Tassinari
ACROSS THE DEVELOPING WORLD THOUSANDS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RETURN HOME FROM WORK FRUSTRATED EVERY DAY. FORESTS ARE BEING CLEARED ILLEGALLY. BANNED AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS STILL ABOUND AND EVENTUALLY END UP IN FOOD PRODUCTS AND LOCAL WATER SOURCES. VILLAGES AND FORESTS ARE BEING PUT AT RISK EACH YEAR AS GRAZING AREAS ARE OPENED UP OR REJUVENATED THROUGH BURNING. OFTEN ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES ESCAPE FROM BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE WHILE OTHER, LESS POWERFUL OFFENDERS, USUALLY ONLY COMMITTING MINOR ENVIRONMENTAL MISDEMEANOURS, ARE BEING FINED. THIS IS THE PICTURE WHICH HAS EMERGED REPEATEDLY FROM THE VARIOUS RESEARCH ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY RESEARCHERS FROM DIIS’S RESEARCH UNIT ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND POVERTY, IN COLLABORATION WITH PARTNERS IN THE SOUTH.

WITH ONLY LIMITED LEGAL, TECHNICAL, POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL BACKING FROM THE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT ‘ABOVE’ THEM, IT IS HARD – IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE – FOR THE THOUSANDS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MINISTRY OFFICERS DELEGATED TO THE FRONTLINE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO FULFIL THEIR MANDATES. THIS IS THE SITUATION OF LOCAL LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.


DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS PROCESS. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF) WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1991 AND HAS CHANNELED FUNDING TO ASSIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN MEETING THE OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS, INCLUDING THE THREE RIO CON-
hardly benefit local government, and when staff salaries hardly meet daily living expenditures, then perverse incentives are easily created for officials to pursue alternative income opportunities which conflict with national legislation. Altogether, this generates an unclosed gap between, on the one hand, the intentions written into multilateral environmental agreements and national environmental legislation and, on the other hand, their actual implementation and enforcement.

Effective local level environmental governance is essential to closing this gap. Besides the ubiquitous need for a deepening of democracy, it requires at least three types of effort. First it requires that ‘funds follow mandates’ and that ministries as well as associations of local governments join forces to make that happen. Second, it requires that legal authorities both at national and local level possess the necessary skills to deal with environmental issues. Third, rather than relying on development assistance which only reluctantly contributes to covering personnel costs, it requires improved capacity, willingness and efforts in developing countries to generate the tax revenues necessary to ensure the financial sustainability of environmental governance.

Hopefully, the outcome of the Rio+20 conference will bring us closer to the sustainable use of the planet’s natural resources and the equitable distribution of the associated costs and benefits within and between nations by closing this gap and by putting the institutional framework for environmental governance developed in the wake of the first Rio conference to work.

Helle Munk Ravnborg
GLOBALITY AND PLANETARY SECURITY

NUCLEAR REALISM
On 6 August 1945, the apocalypse presented itself to humankind in the form of a mushroom cloud. On that fateful day, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Unveiling its destructive potential to Japan and, indeed, the entire world, the bomb, small and primitive by today’s technological standards, destroyed twelve square kilometres of the city and released a 4000°C fireball of 370 metres in diameter. Between 90,000 and 160,000 people were killed. Three days later the United States dropped a second bomb – on the town of Nagasaki.

The arrival of the atomic bomb had an enormous impact upon post-war thought and culture. Across economic, ideological and geographical divides, people sought to understand the deep impact of the nuclear revolution on social and political life. Although reactions ranged from utopian glee to the darkest gloom, an eclectic group of thinkers – including Günther Anders, John Herz, Karl Jaspers, Hans Morgenthau, Lewis Mumford and Bertrand Russell – realised that with the development of the hydrogen bomb and the intercontinental ballistic missile, the world essentially became one entity inhabited by a single humanity. For them, the new nuclear reality added to an already existing sense of outrage produced by total warfare and the Holocaust and triggered tricky political questions about the nature and availability of military force, global reform and world government, individual liberty, technology and sustainability. The nuclear revolution required a political revolution: global reform was no longer a utopian ideal, but a necessity for securing survival.

Revisiting the radical tradition of this nuclear realism is particularly relevant for our time, where the impact of globalisation on human lives emerges in ever clearer light. Nuclear threats, climate change, overpopulation, the global economic crisis and a deepening inequality between North and South all point to the need for far-reaching global reform. For this we need reflexivity and inspiration. Engaging the post-war thought of these authors and their calls for world government can help us to avoid the pitfalls and failures to which global visions are prone. Yet, it can also speak to the challenges of the 21st century, to principles that are worth defending and to a political imagination we so direly need.

LIVING WITH THE BOMB
Nuclear weapons have defined global politics ever since their use in World War II. They raised the stakes of international conflict to new heights and turned all established truths about force on their heads. If, historically, war had been seen as the continuation of politics
by other means, the possibility of total destruction rad-
cally undercut the idea of war as a rational means
towards an end. Thomas Schelling, a famous nuclear
strategist and the winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in
economics, suggested that what is unique about nuclear
weapons is ‘not overkill, but mutual kill.’ In a nuclear
war, even victory would be meaningless.

Intellectuals, campaigners and political leaders came to
realise that the key political question was no longer
restricted to how we would live as citizens, nations and
states, but whether we, the human race, would live at all.
US President John F. Kennedy perfectly captured the
mood of the moment when he claimed, “our most basic
common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We
all breathe the same air ... and we are all mortal.”

In the 21st century, the image of a nuclear war that ends
all life in one flash of light has lost some of its force.
Because nuclear weapons have not been used in actual
warfare since World War II, we have perhaps (to tweak
Stanley Kubrick’s memorable phrase from Dr. Strange-
love) learned to stop worrying and live with the bomb.
Yet, the spectre of nuclear conflict continues to haunt
the world and the risk of nuclear attack today may be
higher than ever before.

First of all, thousands of nuclear warheads continue to
cast their destructive shadow over our time. As long as
states continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for their
defence, survival seems more a matter of fortune than
rational design. Indeed, the effectiveness of deterrence is
debatable. Looking back at the Cuban Missile Crisis,
former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara con-
fessed that “we lucked out. It was luck that prevented
nuclear wars ... the major lesson of the Cuban Crisis is
this: the indefinite combination of human fallibility
and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.” As the cur-
tent situation of nine nuclear powers is obviously more
difficult to manage than the bipolar Cold War order, we
would do well to pay attention to McNamara’s warning
that rationality will not save us.

Nuclear technology has spread to new states, which have
already joined or are seeking to join the ranks of the
nuclear powers. These states – India, Israel, Pakistan,
North Korea, and soon probably Iran – are all involved in
regional conflicts, which means that nuclear escalation
remains a real possibility. As Obama notes, “one nuclear
weapon exploded in one city – be it New York or Moscow,
Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague
– could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no
matter where it happens, there is no end to what the
consequences might be – for our global safety, our secu-

Finally, Western states increasingly focus on the possi-
bility that terrorist networks may acquire nuclear secrets
and materials through black market trade. If deterrence
is a questionable logic in the context of inter-state con-

All in all, John F. Kennedy’s view that “every man, wom-
an, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles,
hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being
cut at any moment, by accident, or miscalculation, or by
madness”, rings as true today as it did then.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Nuclear realists convincingly showed that in the thermonuclear age the utopian dream of a world government had become a compelling strategic and political necessity. Although strictly committed to global reform, they were also well aware of the imperial and authoritarian danger of establishing such a global authority. Therefore, they also looked for ways to serve individual liberty in a broader sense. For them, the conflict between individual freedom and global organisation was also a spiritual conflict, because of the dehumanising effects of technology. Nuclear weaponry was only the most extreme element in a larger process of human estrangement and loss of authenticity. The highly centralised organisation and specialisation of technological development made it increasingly difficult for individuals to grasp the political and/or moral significance of their actions; Dresden, Auschwitz and Hiroshima had made it clear that grand scale technological or industrial processes can lead to a form of moral barbarism.

The continuing possibility of mutual suicide on a planetary scale therefore calls for global reform and a new organisation of social life that is more in line with acceptable moral reasoning and, crucially, supports the survival of human life. As the nuclear threat has been joined by other planetary threats such as climate change and resource depletion, revisiting the thought of nuclear realism also provides a useful guide for future action in these areas. In fact, nuclear realists were among the first to realise the environmental problems involved in the kind of technical civilisation that nuclear weaponry embodied. Not only were nuclear weapons themselves hazardous for the environment, but the 1950s and 1960s witnessed other, more direct, environmental costs. Industrial capitalism and modern consumerism gradually emerged as unsustainable practices, viewed from a global perspective. In a world that is increasingly interconnected, nuclear realism urges us to think about threats to global security and sustainability as potential harbingers of global reform.

Engaging their work is therefore instrumental in crafting a new global consciousness that can encourage politicians and policymakers to embark on the difficult and daunting task of taking resolute political action to counter global problems. As the climate summit in Copenhagen made painfully clear, real global change can only happen when all states feel secure that other states will not exploit global arrangements to their own advantage. Despite the obligation to our common humanity, such dilemmas are difficult to transcend. Even so, if history has taught us one thing, it is that moral leadership can be more powerful than any weapon.

Rens van Munster
In September 2011 the European Commission issued a proposal for a directive in order to create a general tax on financial transactions set by member states at a minimum rate of 0.01 per cent. The commission had three reasons for this directive: firstly, to pre-empt national regulation inhibiting internal markets; secondly, to collect revenue from the financial sector thereby putting it on equal terms with the rest of the economy (presently there are VAT exemptions on financial services), and to make the sector pay some of the costs of the financial crisis. Thirdly, it would “create appropriate disincentives for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of financial markets thereby complementing regulatory measures aimed at avoiding future financial crisis” or, in plain English, curb speculation, or more precisely curb speculation that relies on trading at high speeds and volumes.

THE DANGERS OF LIQUIDITY
The present European Commission concern over the impact of speculative transactions on society is not, however, news in economic debates. Excess liquidity in markets has often been seen as connected to the bubbles and crashes which have been so common throughout financial history. This concern has a long history in economics going back at least to Adam Smith. Moreover, the idea of using taxation to limit speculative transactions was first suggested by the British economist John Maynard Keynes in 1936 as a cure for what he perceived to be excess speculation in the American stock market. Keynes, himself an active participant in the stock markets, was of the opinion that advanced financial markets – in his time the New York stock market – were prone to being driven by speculation whereby speculators tried to earn a profit by outguessing their competitors about the mood of the market now or in the near future – rather than by investors who made guesses about what profits could arise from an investment over its full lifetime. Keynes saw the social purpose of the stock market as being to direct new investment to its most profitable use, and he believed that a market driven primarily by speculative trading would only achieve this outcome by accident. Keynes vociferously opposed the argument that the greater the liquidity of the market, the more solid its stability and efficiency. Using a similar logic, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 prompted James Tobin to suggest a small tax on currency transactions to stabilise the international monetary system by making short-term speculative currency transactions more costly and thereby “throw some sand into the well greased wheels”.

WHO IS DEALING?
‘The speculator’ of the times of both Tobin and Keynes can be personified in the shape of the stock market or
currency trader taking risks with his own and other people’s money to outsmart the market. This image of ‘the speculator’ still dominates the public imagination – he is visualised either as a heroic risk-taker or as a greedy opportunist, depending on the political inclinations of the onlooker. In both cases he is seen as a man in a brightly coloured jacket, juggling buy and sell orders in the pit of the stock exchange or hunched over his trading desk. Notably, he is definitely seen as a human being made of flesh and blood.

But the world of today is not like the one of Keynes and Tobin, although they might not have been surprised at the direction it has taken. The impact of the telecommunications and computing revolution on financial markets has been massive. In 2010 the gross value of global financial transactions was 67 times global GDP, whilst in 1990 it was only 15 times global GDP. In Europe financial transactions were over 100 times GDP, which was higher than in the United States. Almost all of this explosive growth has been in derivatives; that is in securities whose value is derived from the price of another security. Such high volumes of trade would not have been possible without the advances in telecommunications and computing. Computers are not just running the exchanges and the programs used by traders – computers are doing the trading.

THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF EVER-FASTER TRADING

On 6 May 2010, between 14:42 and 14:45 the largest ever intraday point drop to occur in New York, the world’s largest stock market, took place. The Dow Jones industrial average lost $1 trillion in valuation within three minutes and dropped over 600 points. By just after 15:00 the market had regained its losses, but fortunes changed hands during the preceding twenty minutes. The New York Stock Exchange subsequently cancelled all trades made between 14:00 and 15:00 that afternoon to undo the damage. Strange things happen in markets, but this was unprecedented, particularly because it was not just a general drop in the index – the trading in individual stocks was also highly peculiar. For example, the consulting firm Accenture was trading at around $40 per share when its price all of a sudden collapsed to $0.01 — while the stock price of the auction house Sotheby’s went from $34 to $99,999.99. Someone was trading – selling and buying – at these levels. Or, to be more precise, something was trading at these levels.

Regulators and academics linked the event to the practice of high-speed trading. High-speed traders trade literally faster than the blink of an eye. They do this because they have adopted market strategies that require them to trade much faster than other market participants such as brokers or fund managers who want to buy or sell assets for their clients or beneficiaries. Since any direct human involvement in high-speed trading is impossible – human minds and reflexes are simply too slow – it has got to be ‘planned’ and executed by computers. And since computers do not actually think, but just follow their program, they will not question that the programmer has forgotten to put in a block on buying Sotheby’s stock at $99,999.99 or selling Accenture at $0.01. In this sense they are the purest form of ‘speculator’ as they react solely to information about the market and cannot hold more fuzzy notions
on what a certain development in an industry could mean for the future profitability of an investment.

One example of this type of trading is called ‘flash trading’. A flash trader’s business model is based on having enhanced access to information from the markets. The flash trader will receive information about orders approximately 30 milliseconds before they are known in public. Using this information, his computer system will sweep up all buy (or sell) orders that are priced higher (or lower) than the incoming order and then fill the order as it comes onto the market. A profit can then be made on the tiny difference between the price of the buy (or sell) order and the orders the trader has just bought.

The problem is that someone has to pay the profit of the flash traders. In speculative games one person’s financial gains are somebody else’s financial losses. If an activity gives a trader something besides money – for instance valuable hedging of risk – the trade can still be a win-win. But one has to ask what old-style, slow traders gain from having their orders sell or buy milliseconds faster in exchange for a small cut in their profit? They do not, however, have a choice when it comes to paying this small ‘fee’.

But overall, is high-speed trading really that important? Yes, in terms of volume it undoubtedly is. In the US stock market high speed trading has been estimated to account for around 60 per cent of all trades. Traders make enormous investments in computer systems as well as in employing expensive programmers to program the computers as well as physicists and mathema-
ticians to build the trading models underlying the programming – all to enable ever-faster trades. Investments in large-scale physical assets are also made to support this activity. In 2011, for instance, one company hoping to serve high-speed traders invested $300 million in a dedicated submarine cable between New York and London to shave 6 milliseconds off the time of communication between the two stock exchanges. High-speed traders have also invested in high-end equipment and dedicated colocation in the stock exchange; for when speed is your business, every millisecond counts.

The systemic risks involved in these kinds of trading practices are unknown and the negative effects are difficult to predict. Analysing the period between 2006 and 2010 a group of researchers identified around 18,500 abnormal up or downward swings in prices, which they termed ‘black swan events’ – and which all happened within 1.5 second time spans. The current crisis was not caused by these trading practices, but it does seem that they have the potential to cause systemic breakdowns in the market, as seen in the flash crash of 6 May 2010, and also potential to make future crashes go much faster, since the liquidity they provide in markets can dry up very quickly and create losses in financial institutions that might not be able to bear them.

THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT?
‘The European Commission’s proposal for a financial transaction tax, if accompanied with other regulatory changes, would probably make high-speed trading practices unprofitable in European markets since the profit per trade is tiny and the volume of trades is huge.

How great a loss or gain would this be for society? The answer is a matter of conviction – of whether you believe that greater liquidity in markets always makes them better at promoting good investments or whether, on the contrary, you are of the opinion that there can be a dangerous excess of liquidity created by speculation that impacts on investment in a negative way? Given what we have learned about financial markets since 2008, the burden of proof should be on the believers in the benefits of ever-more liquidity and speed in markets.

Tomas Skov Lauridsen
One year on from the Arab Spring Islamists in the Arab countries of the Middle East are gaining power. They have won parliamentary elections in Tunisia, Egypt and, most recently, in early February in Kuwait where Saudi Arabia can now take pleasure in the victory of their fundamentalist friends. The most striking characteristic of the Arab Spring is the fact that where it has been allowed to unfold it has led to a noticeable Islamist revival and that where regimes have brutally cracked down on the protestors it has led to considerable violence.

Syria is not the only country where activists demanding political reforms are being met with the brutality of security forces. The same can be seen in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The Bahrain government responded to the first anniversary of the 14 February 2011 protests with a massive show of security forces in the streets.

No matter how much the Bahraini royal family, with backing from Saudi Arabia, mobilises its security forces and tries to keep the protestors at home in their villages, the latter are grimly determined to continue their struggle, even if it means risking their lives. The uprising in Bahrain will continue until the protestors have been killed or the regime makes concessions. No matter which opposition representatives I talked to in Bahrain in the days leading up to the one-year anniversary, including those of the so-called moderate and legal groups or parties, they all insisted that their struggle will continue. “We have nothing to lose – apart from our lives. The regime has taken away our jobs and our political representation, and paramilitary units are bombing our homes”. This was only confirmed when I met with a highly respected, politically active and well-known Sunni woman, who I met at her home just outside the capital Manama. Secular and left wing, she has fought for political rights and gender equality for many years. When demonstrators were able to regroup and gather again at Pearl Roundabout in March 2011, she had given a speech and advised the young people of the ‘14 February Movement’, which had organised the original protests, to enter into a dialogue with the crown prince, even though it was widely acknowledged that such a dialogue would largely be a charade. She warned the protestors to be patient and moderate. She too, nevertheless, has since had a response from the regime: her home has been shelled twice. When I ask whether she is scared she replies, “No, but I stow my carpets away on the first floor when I’m travelling because I really don’t need those to go up in smoke too.” When, as we talk, I cough and my eyes start to water, she remarks tersely, “It’s the tear gas – the air is full of it because it’s used in the villages almost every night”. I know that my cough is due to a virus I caught on my way to the Gulf.
But I do also know that what she says is true – the night air is often polluted with tear gas.

And it is also tainted with fear – not that of the protesters, but that of the regime. In the weeks leading up to 14 February it was preparing for protests and unrest. The activists had long been driven away from Pearl Roundabout and its monument – the security forces cleared it with the support of the Saudi military in March last year. Then, with the Pearl monument razed to the ground, the space was filled with a four-lane motorway. Even though the new motorway looks ready for use, it is blocked off and the military has set up reinforced positions all around the former roundabout, which is self fenced off with double barbed wire. The old city quarters are deserted. Cars are barred from entry into the Old Town, which is guarded by security forces, mostly Pakistani mercenaries. Activists have been detained, some of them jailed; foreigners considered to be protesters are arrested and deported and, to maximise security, Saudi Arabia sent huge numbers of military vehicles into Bahrain on 8 February. The Financial Harbour, owned by the prime minister and originally Bahrain’s pride and joy, is deserted – the entrance blocked, the businesses inside the grandiose shopping mall either closed or eerily empty, with just two visitors – my colleague and myself – to be seen wandering around a swish art exhibition of modernist works by one of the sheikhs.

The activists I talked to just under a year ago, when they still believed in political reform and democracy, are now dispirited (and some of them are even dead as a result of their encounter with the regime). However, the survivors maintain fatalistically that there is no going back.
Their low spirits are due chiefly to the fact that Saudi Arabia, whose King Abdullah had appeared so empathetic and humane when he criticised Russia and China for vetoing a UN resolution on Syria, is refusing to allow the Bahraini royal family to make any concessions. Even though Bahrain’s ‘wise leaders’ – as they are called in these parts – are vastly wealthy, the country’s economy is in a deplorable state and with each day of political unrest it deteriorates further. If the royal family wants to stay in power and have money in the bank and to share with the people, it must follow instructions from Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and these instructions are clear: the highly unpopular prime minister (who is loyal to the Saudis) must remain in power, there are to be no concessions to the opposition and there must be absolute loyalty to Saudi Arabia.

Although King Abdullah, disappointed at the Russian and Chinese veto in the UN Security Council, may have spoken about the need to act humanely with moral integrity and to comply with international law, and despite his criticism of China and Russia for undermining confidence in the UN through their veto, he nevertheless has no scruples in breaking international law himself by behaving completely immorally and hypocritically, and abandoning all considerations of humanism when it comes to Bahrain. If you are in Bahrain, where there are even large placards along the roadsides calling for donations for support to democratisation in Syria, it is utterly surreal to hear King Abdullah and the other Gulf leaders talk about humanism, morals and support for the Arab Spring and it is mightily strange that they can do so without their hypocrisy being noticed or discussed in Western democracies. But of course, we all need Gulf oil – especially now, at a time when we do not want oil from Iran, and when we are particularly delighted that the Gulf Arabs are allowing US military bases on their territory.

As Saudi Arabia and the Arab League suddenly bill themselves as advocates of the oppressed Syrians, Bahrain meanwhile is relentlessly steering head-on towards collapse, confrontation, brutality and radicalisation. It may be that King Abdullah believes that Saudi Arabia can manage the situation and he may be willing, ultimately, to incorporate Bahrain into his kingdom. However, given the huge numbers of activists, this will not stop the unrest but rather, likely increase the number of fatalities. For as long as neither the US nor the EU feel the need to be concerned by this fight for human rights and democracy, the oppression can continue unheeded in the free world. The highest price for all this is that which is being paid by the many dissenters in Bahrain. However, it is also truly sad to bear witness to the fact that the free world does not always exercise those very same values which it sometimes claims to go to war to defend.

*Lars Erslev Andersen*
Migration has become business, big business. Over the last few decades a host of new opportunities have emerged that capitalise on migrants’ desire to move as well as on governments’ attempts to manage migratory flows. Specialised transportation companies, visa facilitation agencies, labour recruiters, security contractors, human smugglers and NGOs – across the globe we are witnessing a wide assembly of actors whose existence depends on being paid to either facilitate or to constrain migration mobility. The businesses involved in this migration industry range from small migrant entrepreneurs using their own experience to assist others making the journey, to big multinational companies who compete in the booming market of government contracts to carry out migration management. The commercialisation of international migration is evident at every step of the migratory process and takes place in virtually every country of emigration, transit and immigration. As such, the migration industry is not only an important phenomenon in and of itself; it also fundamentally impacts migratory flows and governments’ attempts to manage or regulate migration.

THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY

The commercialisation of international migration means that it has become impossible to speak of human mobility without also speaking of the migration industry. Yet, acknowledging the role that the migration industry plays prompts a number of questions that have so far received only limited attention.

What determines the emergence and disappearance of particular markets and migration industry actors? What is the impact of different parts of the migration industry on migration patterns and networks? And what is the significance of the migration industry in regard to government policies and attempts to regulate migration?

Understanding the dynamics at play is by no means straightforward and the different components of the migration industry equally create a mobility regime. An increasing number of businesses are working to secure highly skilled as well as unskilled migrants access to travel and work abroad. At the other end of the spectrum private security companies and airlines are key actors in Manning border checkpoints and preventing unwanted migrants from entering. Yet, the facilitation industry and the control industry are interlinked as tightened immigration policies and hardened migration control are likely to drive up the profitability of human smuggling and of corruption among border guards and agencies with the know-how to ensure visas or other means of legal migration.
WHAT'S OLD, WHAT'S NEW?
The migration industry as such is not a new phenomenon. For centuries migrants have encountered both facilitation and control actors as well as exploiters and rescuers during their voyages. However, today’s migration industry has become more deeply embedded in the current migration regimes. Social networks and transnational linkages mean that the contemporary migration industry inevitably emerges as part of any established migratory movement. At the same time complex immigration legislation, barriers to legal immigration and restrictive asylum policies continue to fuel both agencies facilitating legal immigration and human smugglers. In addition, the pervasiveness of neoliberal governance has resulted in outsourcing and privatisation of anything from guest worker schemes to running asylum centres and the carrying out of forced deportations to NGOs and private contractors. In both senses governments thus actively sustain and fund large parts of the migration industry.

MULTIPLE ACTORS
Scholars and policy-makers have for quite some time acknowledged the existence of the migration industry, but mainly focused on the part that facilitates migration – in particular irregular migration. These include labour recruiters and contractors, money lenders, travel agents, transportation providers, legitimate and false paper providers, smugglers, formal and informal remittance and courier service owners, and lawyers and notaries involved in legal and paralegal counselling. All offer services for profit and all have, at one point or another, been regarded by the authorities as actors that disturb the orderly management of migration.

However, other migration industry actors work in very close connection with governments actively outsourcing migration management functions and may be linked to functions carried out entirely within one country, such as operating detention centres. In addition, yet other non-state actors may become involved in the migration industry for reasons other than (solely) financial gain. A growing number of NGOs, social movements, faith-based organisations and migrant networks may thus be seen to engage in what has been termed ‘the rescue industry’, e.g. running information centres focusing on the risks involved in irregular migration; philanthropy and social projects rescuing trafficked women and minors; providing religious sanctuary or taking up government contracts to run asylum centres or provide counselling to deportees. All this taken together suggests that the migration industry includes a wide array of non-state actors who provide services that may both facilitate and constrain international migration.

MULTIPLE ROLES
Secondly, it is important to appreciate the continued link between the migration industry and government policies. While some actors, such as for example transportation companies or human smugglers, appear to operate entirely independent of government involvement, state structures such as immigration policies, labour market regulation, visa requirements, border controls etc. almost always remain an essential backdrop for understanding how these migration industry actors emerge and function. The essential role of the state becomes even more visible when considering cases where labour immigration agencies are organised as
TAkING ThE mIgRATIOn InDuSTRy INTo ACCOunT

From individual migrant entrepreneurs to international organisations, migration industry actors are exercising influence and authority at all levels of the migratory process. The migration industry therefore constitutes a factor that must be taken into account if we are to understand current migration flows, make sense of migration policy discourse, and provide better analytical tools for theory and politics.

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen

quasi-governmental agencies or operate under government licenses. Last but not least, the use of private security companies, contractors and NGOs to carry out anything from border security to running asylum centres not only significantly blurs the line between public and private but also raises a number of questions as to the impact of the migration industry on government policies through knowledge, standard-setting, lobbying and lock-in effects.

The pervasiveness of the migration industry, from contractors to entrepreneurs, both formal and informal, may thus well end up fundamentally reshaping global migration governance.

THE mIgRATIOn InDuSTRy AND mARKETS

Finally, the migration industry must be located in the larger context of global migration governance and the political economy shaping both migratory patterns and government responses. The privatisation of migration management is intimately related both to the politicisation of immigration and to the governmental paradigm of new public management. Labour immigration agencies tend to operate in larger frameworks of labour market policies and economic structures. Even the informal migration industry tends to be closely linked to legal and political structures in the countries of destination and origin. Understanding the migration industry thus requires a concurrent understanding of the growing commercialisation of international migration and what may be seen as a set of emerging ‘markets for migration management’ in which the migration industry operates.
Over the past five years a growing number of Western donors, international organisations, and NGOs have sought to build development cooperation with China in Africa. China’s role in Africa has been widely vilified in the United States and Europe. China has been portrayed as exploiting Africa’s oil, minerals and other natural resources while ignoring human rights and social and environmental standards. These negative stereotypes fail to relate the nuances of China’s activities in Africa, and neglect the far from clean track record of Western countries, but they nonetheless continue to prevail. As a result, some might find Western donors extending a hand in partnership to China in Africa puzzling. The move nonetheless can serve a purpose, both for Western donors and China. What it will result in for Africa’s development however remains to be seen.

A GROWING INFLUENCE
Where does the eagerness of Western donors to cooperate with China come from? First, cooperating with China on development issues in Africa can facilitate the long-term ability of Western donors to manoeuvre in a changing landscape of international development cooperation. China and other emerging economies are playing an increasingly significant role in Africa through aid, trade, investment, and political cooperation. China’s aid to Africa has grown steadily, but it is still a mid-level donor with an estimated aid disbursement of US$1.4 billion in 2009 through grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. Nonetheless, Western donors are interested in better understanding and learning from Chinese development cooperation. They also seek to understand how Africa can learn from China’s own experience with poverty reduction. Although Chinese aid to Africa is on the rise, economic ties through trade and investment are centre stage.

China overtook the United States to become Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009. In 2011, China’s trade with Africa measured $160 billion, an astonishing rise from only $10 billion in 2000. Western donors are increasingly beginning to understand that China’s economic ties will influence their activities and national interests in Africa. As a result, bringing China into the fold of international aid norms has been a goal of many Western donors in recent years. Yet with so much going for it in Africa, why should China care about answering the call of its would-be suitors?

THE WINDS OF REFORM?
China is highly sensitive to upsetting its position as Africa’s alternative development partner through its distinctive brand of South–South cooperation with Chinese characteristics of political equality, non-conditionality
and mutual benefit. China will typically seek the approval of the African governments and institutions before it will cooperate with any Western donor. It will, in principle, be open to any suggestion for cooperation provided there is the self-interested prospect of economic or political returns. However, China will generally respond positively to African initiatives, in contrast to any potentially more loaded, politically problematic, approaches from Western donors. Nonetheless, China has made some important steps towards becoming further engaged with the international aid community.

The State Council, China’s highest government administrative body, released its first white paper on foreign aid in April 2011. It reiterated China’s commitment to reform and innovation in foreign aid and, for the first time, expressed a willingness to engage in cooperation with others if it meets the needs of recipient countries. Changing domestic conditions, internal reflection on its recent African engagements and criticism from within Africa have all led the Chinese leadership to re-evaluate and consider reforming its policies.

Quietly, China is increasing its interest in the experiences of other foreign engagements in Africa, partly in response to the increasing complexity of its own engagement. There is interest from Chinese government institutions in learning from Western donor experiences in aid programming, project management and evaluation, social and environmental feasibility studies, and approaches to sustainability. As a result, and in the face of China’s strong normative commitment and pragmatism, the current situation presents opportunities for Western donors, as well as other international organisations, to cooperate with China on development in Africa. But significant challenges stand in the way of transforming such cooperation into substantial development impacts for Africa.

AFRICA FIRST?

Those partnerships that have been established between Western donors and China are still in the early stages. Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID) has emerged as a donor leader on China–Africa work. It has carried out a wide variety of activities involving the funding of research studies, organisation of conferences and workshops, and facilitation of training sessions and joint study trips. Norway has been another early mover, carrying out a project on responsible business practices with Uganda and China. The UNDP supported the establishment of the International Poverty Reduction Centre in China in 2004 in order to leverage efforts to share China’s poverty reduction and economic development experiences. Based on a similar rationale, the World Bank Institute supports an annual visit by African officials to China to carry out on-site investigations and discussions with Chinese officials and experts. Yet it remains the case that there are few actual trilateral activities in which an African government or institution has significant involvement in planning or implementation. Many African governments doubt the sincerity of Western efforts to cooperate with China.

African governments may see few opportunities to produce a ‘win–win–win’ outcome and prefer more straightforward bilateral China ties rather than so-called trilateral cooperation with Western donors. However
unlikely convergence may be, African governments (and indeed Chinese interests) worry that a cartel between Western donors and China will be formed, socialising the Chinese in OECD-DAC principles and enforcing new political and economic conditions that upset their current bargaining position. This would threaten the diversification of external partners that China has enabled, as well as the empowered ability of African countries to choose between competing alternatives. Nonetheless, Africa should not be treated as one block when it comes to China–Western partnerships for development.

Views of trilateral cooperation can differ across different African constituencies, between and within African governments, and may adapt in the face of new political leaders or agendas. African regional institutions, civil society organisations and academic think tanks also seem more open to the prospect. The challenge is therefore about how individual cooperation projects relate to specific African contexts rather than about whether or not cooperation with China can continue.

There may be tangible benefits for African development through the complementary advantages of Western donors and China. Western donors have typically approached cooperation with China as a trade-off between their expertise in development cooperation ‘software’, such as in project management and evaluation, and Chinese expertise in development cooperation ‘hardware’, such as infrastructure construction. This complementary approach is somewhat misleading and neglects the reality of a greater variation, but it does represent the main thrust of the possible benefits of development cooperation between Western donors and China for Africa. However, African ownership remains a foundational prerequisite, best able to promote longer term, more sustainable development, for any partnership between Western donors and China to make a significant impact.

Luke Patey
CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

“A period of strategic opportunity for China” – this is how Jiang Zemin, third generation paramount leader, described the first two decades of the 21st century in his final report to the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002. A decade on, fourth generation leader Hu Jintao would undoubtedly use different wording to capture China’s present strategic position. With the War on Terror on the wane, the United States is in the midst of a strategic reorientation which, in late 2011, led the Obama administration to launch a comprehensive plan to expand US political, economic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. As a consequence, China’s window of strategic opportunity seems to be closing much faster than expected.

For as long as the United States had its gaze fixed upon the Islamist terrorist threat, Beijing could concentrate largely on feeding its potent growth engines while pacifying its citizens with the prospect of steadily rising living standards. Alongside this domestic focus on economic development the Chinese government has, so far, taken pains to reassure the outside world that China should be regarded as a responsible stakeholder in international society. Firstly, China has managed to become the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations of the five permanent members of the Security Council, dispatching more than 2,000 medical, engineering, logistical and policing troops annually. Secondly, the Chinese government has revised its long-held opposition to multilateral organisations, engaging itself actively not only in the WTO but also in the regional institutional framework surrounding ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Moreover, from Beijing’s perspective, the ‘peace-loving character of the Chinese people’ and the non-interfering nature of Chinese foreign policy are intended to brook other countries no pretext for fearing the rise of China. In a recent speech at DIIS, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi, echoing similar, previous declarations by Chinese policymakers, stated, “[W]e do not engage in arms race or pose a military threat to any country. The path of peaceful development is a strategic choice made by the Chinese government and people in keeping with the trend of the time and China’s fundamental interests.” In other words, China has deliberately embarked on a course that is to break the historical pattern of conflict accompanying rising powers.

Despite all this, Sino-American relations seem to be entering a new and more problematic phase now that the United States has pledged to involve itself more deeply in Asia. In fact, a symptomatic precursor to the changing relationship between the world’s two largest
powers (in terms of GDP) came during 2010 when Beijing and Washington clashed several times over the status of the South China Sea, the vast majority of which China lays claim to for historical reasons. Conversely, US foreign minister Hillary Clinton recently stressed in a *Foreign Policy* article that the United States wants not only to ensure unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea but also to uphold key international rules for defining competing territorial claims in this area. As Washington immerses itself more deeply in the Asia-Pacific region, the risk of conflict grows, not so much due to misunderstandings but more for reasons of differing strategic interests.

The United States is already strategically well positioned to contain the rise of China. Apart from the long-established formal alliances with key regional actors such as South Korea, Japan and Australia and the close US military ties with Taiwan and Singapore, Washington has recently stepped up its military cooperation with several Southeast Asian states like Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, thus adding further to ‘the feeling of encirclement’ that allegedly pervades strategic thinking in Beijing. Indeed, of its 14 land-based neighbours only North Korea and Pakistan may be viewed as close alliance partners of Beijing, leaving China in an altogether vulnerable position.

Against this backdrop then, it should not come as a complete surprise that China is carrying out an extensive military modernisation. Not only does China face neighbouring rivals such as India and even Russia, along with a US-orchestrated strategic encirclement, but the rapidly expanding Chinese economy is also making increasing demands on the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PLA, especially when it comes to its force projection capacity.

Firstly, the PLA needs to be able to defend the lines of supply of the Chinese economy, which may involve, for instance, distant naval operations such as the UN-mandated counter-piracy operation that China is currently carrying out in the Gulf of Aden. Secondly, the Chinese government now seems to have established a precedent that the PLA must be able to secure Chinese citizens in conflict zones at short notice, as witnessed during the recent Libya crisis where the PLA assisted in evacuating almost 40,000 Chinese citizens.

On the surface of things, the pace of China’s military modernisation does appear impressive with average growth rates in the region of 12 per cent so far this century. However, if one takes China’s overall economic growth rates of about 10 per cent into consideration, the real expansion of China’s military budget is negligible. Moreover, the Chinese military budget constitutes only around 1.4–1.8 per cent of GDP whereas, by comparison, the US military budget amounts to 4 per cent of GDP. Finally, the sustained Western weapons embargo has forced China into relying heavily on indigenous or Russian technology, in this way reducing the net effect of Chinese investment in military hardware.

Quite symptomatically, both of the front-page stories about the PLA in 2011 – the testing of a new stealth fighter plane and the maiden voyage of China’s first aircraft carrier – speak volumes about the challenges facing China’s military modernisation. The fighter plane
proved to be a not entirely stealthy prototype in need of several years of further testing before going into actual production. The aircraft carrier, a refurbished ex-Soviet vessel, is in effect a far cry from being fully operational insofar as China still lacks the requisite aircraft, pilot training, support vessels etc. In this sense, the latest acquisitions of the PLA merely testify to the huge military-technological gap that exists between the United States and China. The second decade of the 21st century is gradually turning into a period of strategic restraint for China, rather than one of opportunity. Washington is set on channelling more resources into the Asia-Pacific region to hedge in a rising China and to provide assistance to those of China’s neighbours worrying about the strategic implications of growing Chinese power. This puts Beijing in a difficult position, leaving it with two main options to pursue. Either Beijing may seek to hasten its military modernisation to be better able to engage the United States and defend key national interests pertaining to, among others, Taiwan, the South China Sea and China’s lines of supply. Or it may simply ignore the change in US grand strategy and stick to its domestically oriented development path, thereby accepting increased US strategic dominance in the region.

As the fourth generation of Chinese leaders is due to step down during the autumn of 2012, this basic strategic dilemma will be handed over to Xi Jinping and his fifth generation colleagues. And given the still widely authoritarian and clandestine nature of the Chinese polity, no one really knows how the new leaders are thinking about Chinese grand strategy.

Andreas Boje Forsby
ITALY IN SEARCH OF A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

The saying that ‘countries deserve their governments’ has rested heavily on Italy for quite some time. It is true that the Italians have provided several Berlusconi-led governments with a relative majority, time and again. Prior to that, from 1948–1993, although in ever decreasing numbers, they had re-elected the Christian Democratic party to power. But in both cases, as the famous historian and journalist Indro Montanelli once put it, they often only managed to place their vote by ‘holding their noses’, in other words trying to avoid the bad odour emanating from the many scandals, rampant clientelism and the ‘culture of impunity’ which characterise parts, but surely not all, of Italian politics.

Often overlooked among the many bases of Berlusconi’s electoral success – not least his extraordinary control of media outlets – has been the promise to provide Italy with a new social contract. Appearing as a new force may sound odd in the person of a man who has been close to power since the 1960s, both on the local level when building up his real estate business empire (Milan), and on the national level (in particular to Bettino Craxi’s governments) when building up his media empire. Nevertheless, Italians speak about their ‘Second Republic’ starting in the 1990s, and this is not because the constitution was formally changed: rather, the former contract between people and government was gone and up for grabs. It was then that Berlusconi, a businessman not a politician by profession, officially entered the fray.

In a sense though, Berlusconi won on the tacit promise that this new social contract should not be altogether too new. In the turmoil of the early 1990s a vibrant public debate did raise the issue of the voters’ past collusion with an often-corrupt regime. In defence of their previous collaboration with that political system, Berlusconi’s repeated anti-communist campaigns mobilised and reapplied the one acceptable excuse for it – however absurd it may have looked to outsiders (Prodi governments – communist?). In the end, Berlusconi’s governments consolidated the two axes which had been already the power base of the ‘old’ governments. The deal offered (some) tax evasion in the prosperous North – which has a per capita income among the highest in Europe, with almost no unemployment in some places – in exchange for providing support to the more welfare-dependent south where, as in Sicily, his party harvested very high electoral results. Voters understood that with a person like Berlusconi there was not much reform on the horizon that would undermine what was surely one of the main weaknesses of the old contract, namely the special privileges arising from the enmeshment of private and public interests.
Putting much old wine into new bottles, the political system ended up in an increasingly exasperating political stalemate. Berlusconi’s governments were not really willing to reform the system, despite heavily marketed claims to the contrary, whereas the centre-left governments were inherently too weak and disoriented to do so. Many Italians, be they on the right or left, had given up all hope of a possible Second Republic. Resignation and, sometimes, sheer rage abounded.

It is therefore all the more curious to observe the standing of the present Monti government among the population. Its origin hardly represents a pinnacle of democratic procedure. Pressured by the European Union and financial markets, an already weakened government gave way to a caretaker executive, appointed from the top and staffed mainly by ‘professors’ with no (direct) party affiliation – as far away from the people’s vote as it is possible to be. It obviously cannot stay in power for long (its ‘mandate’ ends in 2013 at the latest). Yet there is a general sense of legitimacy, as if a government above the parties has suddenly been able to connect with the people. Even the Lega Nord, which does not support the Monti government, feels its attraction. This was revealed, for example, when on the website of its ‘Radio Padania Libera’ a web-based (hence unrepresentative) opinion poll rather embarrassingly showed no less than 71.1 per cent of people ‘very satisfied’ with Monti. (The webpage was then quickly taken down by the Radio.) Alongside the easy critique of an alleged EU diktat, there are many voices, again both on the right and left, who quietly wish that foreign pressure to stay.

Yet the public seems to be going along with it for now. In order to provide the basis of a new social contract, however, attacking established privileges can only succeed if it combines the efficiency of liberalisation with a sense of meritocracy and fairness, if not solidarity. It must appear to be for the common good and in the general interest – and this beyond mere budget fixing – and not as just another way to uphold certain privileges at the expense of others. A policy which targets undue privileges can easily be seen as applying double standards if it stops short of some. And Italians are wary of ‘trasformismo’ – made famous in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s *Gattopardo* which is set in the years of the
Risorgimento leading up to the new unified Italian Kingdom in 1861 – where it is the very appearance of change that permits the tacit continuity of the old.

If the ripping of the social fabric is not both comprehensive and yet also buffered, people will easily lose faith in the possibility of true change and return defending their own corner of society. If so, a majority of the electorate will end up again preferring the sparrow of special interests in the hand to the dove of the general interest on the roof. And, by striking again the old deal, many of them will do so with an awareness of their own defeat. For, as the late Giorgio Gaber, a famous musician and artist once put it: “I do not fear Berlusconi as such (‘in se’), but the Berlusconi in myself (‘in me’).”

They will again cast their ballot while holding their noses.

*Stefano Guzzini*
IRAN AND THE US IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ

It is a familiar image: two opponents trying to stare each other down. Who will be the first to blink? The tension between the West and Iran continues. But how will it end?

The Strait of Hormuz is of global strategic importance simply by virtue of the quantities of oil shipped through it, and Iran is well aware of this. Earlier this year it attempted to claim the strait with the Iranian parliament drafting a law by which foreign warships would be obliged to seek authorisation to pass through. Yet hardly any country does or would comply with such a law. Why?

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STRAITS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) lays down guidelines on territorial claims over straits. The Convention has been ratified by 162 countries, including the majority of the Gulf States, but not by either the US or Iran. The Convention stipulates that in waters such as the Strait of Hormuz, ships have the right to transit without the authorisation of the coastal state involved, and this also applies to warships.

The fact that neither the US nor Iran have ratified the Convention does not mean that Iran can impose restrictions on the United States or any other country with regard to passage through the strait. The unimpeded passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz throughout the centuries and up into recent decades has given it a customary legal nature. Freedom of navigation has become customary practice and such practice cannot be changed overnight. Thus, as a result of Iran’s statements, other countries now feel obliged to send warships through the straits to ensure that this non-statutory law can continue to be a right. Since Iran can derive no support from international law, the US, Britain and France have also subsequently sent warships through the strait.

IRAN’S OPTIONS
There is a tangible fear of the crisis escalating into a confrontation but a confrontation is not necessarily likely. Iran will not be able to obtain backing for its claim either from the UN Security Council nor the Arab League as all the members have an economic interest not only in the oil, but also in transporting it out through a Hormuz Strait that does not belong to Iran. An Iranian attack would force China or Russia to react against Iran in the Security Council. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are all concerned about Iran’s ambitions to become a regional superpower and thus want to support US access, if not actively, then, at least passively.
This situation stands in sharp contrast to Iran’s tough statements. However, if the country is to avoid a loss of prestige as a regional superpower, it does have to act in response to the American naval presence.

Rather than launching an outright attack on the US Navy, which could hardly end in success, Iran could choose instead to challenge America. The make-up of the Iranian military is such that it could dispatch fast-deploying naval units to aggravate the Americans and try to provoke an American reaction. Equally, the Americans could perceive Iran’s mini submarines and air force as a menace. Iran could threaten a missile attack, make mock attacks or otherwise appear to act aggressively without actually firing one shot. If this provoked retaliation, with the US or another Western country firing the first shot, this would be in Iran’s favour because then it would be the West, not Iran, who appeared to be the aggressor in the region.

Apart from provoking the West, Iran could choose to disturb civilian maritime traffic in order to affect the global oil market and thus elicit a reaction from the US or another Western country. Such a step might seem natural to Iran, which contributed to a similar development in the Tanker War in the 1980s. At that time Iran did not have any major influence in the oil market, but its actions resulted in the Americans accidentally shooting down a civilian airliner carrying 290 passengers. The Iranians would welcome a similar incident today.

THE FIRST TO SHOOT LOSES
This is exactly how the game might unfold if Iran does not back down. Tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz would rise and jeopardise the fragile balance, where just a minor miscalculation could upset the security situation. Neither party is interested in a direct conflict but the slightest lack of caution could cause one of them to falter and shoot first. In all probability, the one to shoot first would be the one to lose.

Johannes Nordby
THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF BIOFUEL

As it now seems, developing countries will be paying the price for Europe’s biofuel ambitions. Instead, the EU should play an active role in promoting sustainable production and utilisation of biofuels that take into account rural development, smallholders’ conditions and deforestation in developing countries.

The EU’s plan for how we can secure our energy future includes that 10 per cent of the energy for the transport sector should come from renewable energy sources, mainly biofuels, by 2020.

The major argument for a shift to biofuels is that it will reduce emissions from fossil fuel uses, as well as address issues of energy security and rural development. However, the EU target on transport energy has already been criticised by many scholars, environmental NGOs and advocacy groups, for its negative impact on the environment and on poor people in developing countries. And because of the land shortage within the EU (unless the second generation of biofuels enter into use within a short period of time) it will be impossible to meet the EU targets without massive imports of biofuels from developing countries.

The land that has already been claimed by European firms in developing countries in this regard is estimated to be around 5 million hectares. A study shows that about 500 million hectares of land would be required to satisfy the global demand for biofuels by 2020. Research on the impacts on rural people’s livelihoods in developing countries is inconclusive. However, some findings suggest that the rapid expansion of large-scale biofuels feedstock production, in a situation where the investment-receiving countries are not well-prepared to manage and monitor the implementation, is displacing vulnerable groups from their land and pushing them further into poverty.

At the same time recent research shows that in some cases biofuel production may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions or reduce them less than originally thought. Another major concern is that using agricultural land and crops for biofuels instead of food has impacts on food prices, as it became apparent with the food crises in 2007 and onwards. The current rush for agricultural land in developing countries (frequently described as ‘land grabbing’) is driven by both food security concerns in investor countries and by the increasing demand for biofuels. In October 2011, nearly 200 international scientists and economists involved in the fields of climate change, energy and land use wrote a letter to the European Commission urging it to recognise and take into account the indirect land use changes that are
caused by the use of biofuels. These scientists suggest that, for renewable energy polices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions successfully, it is very important to include all sources of emissions when analyzing the emission savings due to the use of biofuels.

So the EU 10 per cent target, which can only be met by importing large quantities of biofuels from developing countries, leaves many questions unanswered. To what extent are investments in large-scale biofuels production leading to forced displacements of local people and their livelihood strategies? How can we ensure that biofuels are not displacing food crops in developing countries, where food scarcity is already a critical problem? How can we ensure that biofuels are not actually contributing to increased greenhouse gas emissions through deforestation?

These uncertainties imply that EU member states should take the main responsibility for ensuring that the biofuels they import from developing countries are produced under acceptable social, economic and environmental conditions. The EU has already approved about seven voluntary sustainability certification systems for biofuels. But many of these initiatives are far from implementation. And even those which have been implemented, do for the most part not guarantee sustainable production, since there are inconsistencies in considering the full aspects of economic, social and environmental impacts of biofuel production. Thus, aiming at solving energy and climate problems, the EU may at the same time be contributing to poverty in developing countries.

Mengistu Assefa Wendimu
RUSSIA IN THE WORLD, ACCORDING TO PUTIN

The presidential elections in Russia in 2012 contested Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy – opinion polls in the aftermath of the State Duma elections in 2011 showed support below 40 per cent. Still, he nevertheless regained most of what was lost and will govern Russia for the next six years.

As usual Putin did not participate in public debates with his opponents during the presidential election campaign. But he did set out his vision in a series of articles in different Russian newspapers. In the newspaper article, “Russia and the Changing World” (Moskovskie Novosti, 27 February 2012), he offers an interesting insight into his foreign policy thinking. I will briefly sum up the most important points here.

The main theme is how to restore and sustain Russian power, and the problems which need to be dealt with if the country is not to decline as a great power. Putin expresses his belief that the country is meant for a unique destiny as a global great power and that he is the only Russian leader with the necessary experience and willpower to carry this vision through. But, according to Putin, Russia is facing difficult and dangerous challenges in unpredictable times. Still, Russia intends to be consistent in pursuing its own interests and goals and will not accept foreign attempts to dictate its decisions. “Russia is only respected and has its interests considered when the country is strong and stands firmly on its own feet”.

Putin believes that the basic principles of a secure world – every state’s inalienable right to security; the inadmissibility of excessive use of force; and the unconditional observance of the basic principles of international law – are under pressure – and that the neglect of these principles will lead to the destabilisation of international relations. In particular, he points out “some aspects of US and NATO conduct that contradict the logic of modern development, relying instead on the stereotypes of bloc-based mentality”, and he specifically refers to the NATO expansion and the plans to establish a missile defence system in Europe close to Russian borders. This, according to Putin, gives rise to legitimate fears in Russia, “because it affects the strategic nuclear deterrence forces that only Russia possesses in the theatre and upsets the military-political balance established over decades”. There is an inseparable link between missile defence and strategic offensive weapons as reflected in the New START Treaty of 2010, he argues, expressing that, “one would not like to see the deployment of the American system on a scale that would demand implementation of our declared countermeasures”. Putin concludes by stating that, “in gen-
eral we are prepared to make great strides in our relations with the US, to achieve a qualitative breakthrough, but on the condition that the Americans are guided by the principles of equal and mutually respectful partnership.

Putin also restates what he sees as the foundation of the world order, which is the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Until now no legal concept has been developed which can replace the principle of sovereignty. Putin characterises the protection of human rights from the outside as ‘outright demagogy’, since the abstract values represented in the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, the R2P, are being interpreted and applied arbitrarily on a case-by-case basis by a coalition of the willing. Putin is, of course, referring to Libya: “Foreign interference in support of one side of a domestic conflict and the use of power in this interference gave developments a negative aura. A number of countries did away with the Libyan regime by using air power in the name of humanitarian support. The revolting slaughter of Muammar Gaddafi – not just medieval but primeval – was the manifestation of these actions”. And he continues: “No one should be allowed to employ the Libyan scenario in Syria. The international community must work to achieve an internal Syrian reconciliation. It is important to achieve an early end to violence no matter what the source, and to initiate a national dialogue – without preconditions or foreign interference and with due respect for the country’s sovereignty”. For that reason Russian diplomacy has worked hard to prevent a large-scale civil war and opposed the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions that may be interpreted as a signal for armed interference in Syria’s internal affairs. Putin is warning against the temptation to repeat past errors: that again, if a resolution in the UN Security Council is denied, a coalition of the willing will be established, and that strikes will take place even without the legal mandate. In general, Putin is very sceptical regarding the so-called Arab Spring which he believes to a great extent to be orchestrated from abroad (read: the Western World). Again and again he is urging the countries to stick to the rules laid down in the UN Charter.

Putin is also worried about the Western way of handling the Iranian and North Korean issues. The West has shown too much willingness to punish these countries. “At any minor development, it reaches for sanctions if not armed force” he remarks and continues: “All this fervour around the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea makes one wonder how the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation emerges and who is aggravating them. It seems that more frequent cases of crude and even outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries may prompt authoritarian (and other) regimes to possess nuclear weapons. If I have the A-bomb in my pocket, nobody will touch me because it’s more trouble than it is worth. And those who don’t have the bomb might have to sit and wait for ‘humanitarian intervention’.” Granted, it is essential to do everything possible to prevent any country from being tempted to obtain nuclear weapons, but it requires that the incentives for becoming a nuclear power are eradicated.

Neither is Putin impressed by the Western countries’ attempt to stop terrorism and drugs trafficking in
Afghanistan. He finds the future of the country alarming. The NATO-led operation has not met its objectives: “Having announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the United States has been building, both there and in neighbouring countries, military bases without a clear-cut mandate, objectives or duration of operation. Understandably, this does not suit us”. According to Putin, the Afghan problem can only be contained and solved by a global effort with reliance on United Nations and regional organisations – the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

When it comes to China, Putin’s attitude is much more positive. He asks how Russia should conduct itself in the face of the rapidly strengthening Chinese factor. Firstly he sees China’s economic growth not as a threat, but as a challenge “that carries colossal potential for business cooperation – a chance to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of the Russian economy, especially in order to develop the economy of Siberia and the Russian Far East”. Secondly, China and Russia share the same vision of an emerging equitable world order. Thirdly, all the major political issues between China and Russia have been resolved and the two countries are acting in a spirit of partnership, rooted in pragmatism and respect for each other’s interests.

Russia will also prioritise the cooperation with its old partner, India, as well as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC. In particular Russia will prioritise the cooperation with its BRIC partners (Brazil, India, China) and South Africa – “a striking symbol of the
transition from a unipolar world to a more just world order”.

Putin finally turns to Europe: “Russia is an inalienable and organic part of Europe and European civilisation. Our citizens think of themselves as Europeans. We are by no means indifferent to the developments in a united Europe”. He maintains that the current level of cooperation between Russia and the EU does not correspond to the current global challenges, above all the challenge of making the entire continent more competitive. His proposal to create a community of economies from Lisbon to Vladivostok, eventually evolving into a free trade zone and to more advanced forms of economic integration – ‘The Union of Europe’ – should be seen in this light.

Summing up, in Putin’s vision Russia is an open country prepared for economic cooperation with any state, and he sees the promotion of strategic alliances between big businesses as an opportunity for closer political cooperation.

However, it should still be noted that Vladimir Putin continues to be deeply mistrustful towards the United States due to the disappointments he experienced during his first and second terms as president. At that time the US ignored a series of Putin initiatives aiming at a rapprochement and a reset of the Russian–American relationship. In his speech at Wehrkundetagung in Munich in 2007, Putin gave vent to his disappointments and frustrations with the US and the Western world. Back then this speech was perceived – in my opinion wrongly – as rather offensive. In the article referred to here you will recognise much of the same language as in that famous speech, but this time there can be no doubt that it is defensive rather than offensive in its content.

With Putin as president the basis of the foreign policy of Russia will not be changed but the tone might be altered. The former president, Medvedev, represented a friendly face – at least on the surface. Putin’s face is not necessarily as friendly, but it is pragmatic and he will vigorously defend Russian interests in a more distinct way. One of the differences might be Putin’s obsession with the United States, which apparently he still considers to be a former, present and future strategic adversary, and this might be seriously counterproductive in the coming years. If his declared intentions for modernising Russia are serious – and I think they are – it is of utmost importance to Russia to keep close relations to the countries which are capable of contributing with resources and know-how to this process, first and foremost the European Union. But one of the prerequisites for that is at least a reasonable relationship with the United States. This remains the key to a ‘modernisation partnership’ with the Western world.

Karsten Jakob Møller
On 16 April 2012 Anders Behring Breivik faces trial, and Norway faces him. The news last November that Breivik had been declared psychotic and unfit for prison destabilised Norwegian narratives about the mass murder that occurred on 22 July 2011. This diagnosis posed a threat to the ways in which the moral and political implications of the events had been understood. It was thought that it might even challenge Norwegian ability to work through the cultural trauma in a meaningful way. Unsurprisingly, intense public debate ensued in the aftermath of the psychiatric report. And while neither prosecutors nor defenders asked for a second psychiatric evaluation, the amount of disagreement and confusion about Breivik’s psyche eventually compelled the court itself to ask for a new examination. On 11 April 2012 the conclusion was clear: Breivik is not psychotic. Instead of an emerging psychiatric consensus on Breivik’s psychopathology, the struggle to explain him and his actions remains unresolved, freed, at least momentarily, from the confines of a partly discredited psychiatric discourse. The trial brings the various interpretations of the perpetrator and his actions into focus – and into conflict.

Until the conclusion of the first psychiatric report became known in November, the mass murder had been accorded a specific meaning: the act of an ideologue seeking to overthrow the prevailing social order who had attacked multicultural, democratic Norway. The violence was not random, not meaningless, but political. When the immediate shock wore off the first reactions to the violence were, therefore, also political: calls for more openness and a rallying behind democratic ideals.

After this political response came attempts in the media to personalise and degrade the perpetrator. He was effeminate, insecure, vain, suffering from a personality disorder. But the fascination with Breivik was ambivalent, for attention was precisely what he craved. Several prominent media outlets claimed that they would never provide him with a chance to speak, but at the same time people were reading and quoting from Breivik’s manifesto, creating the image of a fanatic, a ‘lone wolf’.

“ONE OF US”

It was this tendency to see the killer as an outsider, as someone different, this attempt to turn him into an individual problem, that the well-known Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie reacted against in a September issue of Aftenposten, arguing that Breivik was “one of us”. Christie worried that the perpetrator might slip away from us and become an irresolvable riddle, a representative of ‘evil’. His attempt to bring Breivik closer to us involved drawing a line between the perpetrator and his
terrible deeds: “The actions may be evil, but the man himself?” Christie wrote, proceeding to remind us that even Breivik had once been a normal little boy. The reference to the child points toward innocence, toward the human being before it has been formed – and, in this case, corrupted – by society. Christie evidently meant to distinguish between the killings as a moral problem and the reasons why Breivik ultimately chose to act in a manner that society deems immoral and punishable by law. Neither the principles of the justice system nor the pursuit of understanding should succumb to the need to condemn Breivik as evil.

THE KILLER AS VICTIM
In the days leading up to November 29, when two court-appointed psychiatrists submitted the first report on the killer’s mental condition, it was precisely the story about the ‘child Breivik’ that dominated the news coverage of him. Images of a young boy, lost innocence, evidence of parental neglect, rumours of sexual abuse: the mass murderer was psychologised and humanised. Commentators adopted Freudian reasoning and implied that Breivik’s actions might be explained by events in his childhood. Attention shifted from his moral and legal responsibility to consideration of the possibility that the killer might himself also be a sort of victim. In this perspective the story about an ideologue, killing in the name of ideas, began to crumble. The alternative narrative of victimisation still contained meaning and a moral lesson, but it was a very different one. Now the message was no longer that we should fight against ideologies, but rather that we should care for our fellow human beings, since the individual can be ruined by the lack of love and support. Perhaps the violence had not been primarily politically motivated, aimed at Arbeiderpartiet and its youth, but instead the result of one lonely person’s hatred toward society and the well-integrated young campers. The isolated individual feels alienated, an alienated person feels superfluous, and one who feels superfluous may easily be tempted to do anything in order to become visible, meaningful and important in the eyes of others as well as in his own self perception.

FROM SOCIOLOGICAL TO PSYCHIATRIC EXPLANATION
This explanatory model was challenged by the claim that Breivik is psychotic. With the diagnosis of ‘paranoid schizophrenic’ a fundamental shift occurred, from a sociological to a psychiatric explanation. Breivik was placed in a different category: away from Christie’s criminology, which deals primarily with relatively normal people, to that of forensic psychiatry. The pathological, the delusional, is defined as that which diverges radically from our shared sense of reality. As a result, it can be tempting to use the diagnosis to acquit our society and its cultural ideas of any responsibility: for we do not share Breivik’s worldview. His thoughts do not spring from our own cultural traditions. He does not recognise our elected leaders as legitimate and has instead identified a higher authority. But the truth is that in this sense he does not differ from many others among us. What immediately appears to set Breivik apart from more widespread ideas in his culture is the fact that he granted himself the right to decide who gets to live and who gets to die.

ABSENCE OF A MORAL AWARENESS?
The second psychiatric report confirms that Breivik’s worldview is not in itself sufficient to define him as psy-
chotic – it also implies that the distinction between psychological delusions and ideological ideas is less useful than the first team of psychiatrists would have had us believe. While the first two psychiatrists were right to point out the many inconsistencies and distortions in Breivik’s worldview, they were never quite convincing in their argument that this should be seen as evidence of psychosis rather than as the ramblings of a misguided ideologue. Most all-embracing ideologies such as, for example, the one promoted by the Nazis, contain elements of irrationality. Part of the reason why the Holocaust and its perpetrators have fascinated so many great thinkers is precisely the fact that the Nazi genocide exemplified how rationality can be deployed in the service of the irrational. Breivik confronts us with a question similar to that posed by the Nazis: how can a calculating mind plan and execute such a crazy project without itself being insane? How can human beings act rationally while being motivated by mad ideas?

But, again, what would constitute madness in this particular case? Breivik’s assertion that he killed out of love for his people? The diagnosis ‘paranoid schizophrenic’ would not be helpful in explaining Breivik’s case if it simply referred to such delusions of grandeur. From a legal point of view the diagnosis has to indicate something else: namely, the absence of a moral awareness. Such awareness was what the philosopher Hannah Arendt required of the notorious Nazi bureaucrat, Adolf Eichmann: the ability to engage in critical thinking and realise the kind of suffering his actions would inflict on defenceless human beings. He should, and he could, have acted otherwise. This is not a question of free will, but is about the very ability to perceive the wrongfulness of one’s actions. Breivik made many choices in the years leading up to 22 July 2011, and he knew that it would be difficult to face his victims. Is this empathic impulse, no matter how sadly ineffectual, not in itself proof of a form of moral awareness? If not, at least it indicates a measure of insight into the human realities that his actions would create. Breivik understood that great suffering was inherent in his plan, but he did not care. Instead he employed his own brand of utilitarian logic, defining the killings not as good, but as necessary. What appears utterly meaningless and tragic to us is a source of pride for him.

MEANING AND MEANINGLESSNESS

The meaningful national narratives about 22 July 2011 become vulnerable in the shadow of pathology, just as our moral and legal confrontation with Breivik risks being forestalled by a medicalisation of his psychology. But, because the stakes are so high, the psychiatric discourse of pathology has itself become vulnerable, its blind spots and internal contradictions exposed by intense scrutiny.

The second psychiatric evaluation presents a welcome rejection of the first report’s conclusion, but it should also lead us to question the very terms of the debate. For instance, it now seems clear that any sharp distinction between insanity and criminality is a false dichotomy, as is the one between ideology and psychosis. Furthermore, it has become evident how psychiatric diagnoses reduce complex and elusive meaning to easily identifiable categories, how the psychiatric discourse reduces the search for complicated explanations down to a choice between generic descriptions, and how a single diagnosis can serve to consign grotesque yet dangerous ideas to the self-refe-
against humanity in at least one important respect: where those perpetrators pleaded insanity or referred to superior orders, Breivik struggles to be recognised as sane and responsible. 16 April 2012 marks the beginning of the process whereby the court, as well as the nation, decides whether he is.

Johannes Lang
DEFENCE AND SECURITY

International order is challenged in many ways. Interstate conflict, nuclear deterrence and transatlantic cooperation continue to occupy the minds of researchers and politicians. At the same time, new issues such as terrorism, failing states and piracy increasingly challenge the institutional frameworks, political bargains and ideas that have underpinned our thinking about defence and security. Security policy overlaps more and more with diplomacy, development and other forms of soft security. As a result, defence has long ceased to be a purely military matter. We examine these developments on the global, transatlantic, European and Danish levels. Our current research is organised into six themes:

1. Danish Defence and Security
2. European and Transatlantic Security
3. Global Security Dynamics
4. Failed States, Conflict Management and Capacity Building in Africa
5. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
6. Trends in Security

Our goal is to provide interdisciplinary and in-depth knowledge of issues central to international security and Danish defence.

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Flockhart, Trine: “Me Tarzan – You Jane; The EU and NATO and the (Re-)Construction of Roles”. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 12 (3).


Mette Buskjaer Christensen
MA, Research Assistant

Svend Aage Christensen
PhD, Emeritus Researcher

Stefano Guzzini
PhD, Senior Researcher

Morten Heiberg
PhD, Chief Adviser

Ulla Holm
PhD, Senior Researcher

Njeri Jensen
BSc, Research Assistant

Peter Munk Jensen
MSc, Senior Analyst

Hans Mouritzen
Dr.scient.pol., Senior Researcher

Mikkel Runge Olesen
MA, PhD Candidate

Fabrizio Tassinari
PhD, Senior Researcher, Head of the research unit

Gry Thomasen
MA, PhD Candidate
FOREIGN POLICY AND EU STUDIES

Our research focuses on foreign policy analysis, as seen from different theoretical perspectives and with different empirical foci in the foreign policies of several European countries (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Italy, and France). Our basic research aims to further develop neo-classical realist, constructivist and discursive analytical models for foreign policy analysis. Our empirical focus covers European relations, both past and present, to US and Russia as well as other world actors, analysed in relation to both individual national foreign policies and the EU. In terms of EU external relations, our work focuses on selected issues relevant to foreign policy, such as EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood, development, migration, the European Security and Defence Policy, and EU-NATO relations. As the EU institutional architecture becomes operational following the Lisbon Treaty, the functioning of and prospects for EU external relations will also relate more closely to the foreign policies of individual EU member states – and especially Denmark, which holds the rotating EU presidency for the first half of 2012.

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Guzzini, Stefano: “Marxist Geopolitics: Still a Missed Rendez-Vous?”. *Geopolitics*, 16 (1).


GLOBAL ECONOMY, REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In this research unit, we examine international development in the setting of current transformations in the global economy. Since the onset of the global financial crisis, widespread consensus has emerged that the previous two decades of de-regulation and related institutional dismantling bear a considerable part of the burden of responsibility for the crisis. As a result, a wide range of proposals have emerged to re-regulate the financial sector and the global economy more generally. Of particular interest to our research agenda are:

1. the nature, scope and limitations of these re-regulation efforts.

2. the kinds of tools, expertise and knowledge that are being mobilised in the process.

3. the specific role that standards (for products, practices, corporate organisation, policy) may be playing in re-regulatory efforts.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher, Head of the research unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solvej Berlau</td>
<td>MSc, Head of Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tine Brøndum</td>
<td>MA, Head of Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johannes Lang</td>
<td>PhD, Postdoc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robin May Schott</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stine Thuge</td>
<td>MA, Head of Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anne Wæhrens</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
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DIIS’s research unit on Holocaust and genocide is dedicated to research, dissemination and teaching on the subject of Holocaust, genocidal processes and political mass murder. We investigate the processes that lead to genocide – with special focus on the role of the state, both in relation to committing genocide and to combating it – and the international community’s possibilities for intervention. Furthermore, we work with the politics of memory and the culture of remembrance that has evolved in the wake of the Holocaust and other instances of genocide. Our research includes studies of European reactions to genocide, both historically and in the present; it includes the commemoration culture and the significance of the past in current policies; and it includes philosophical studies of the role and responsibility of the state in relation to genocidal processes. A current research project explores the social-psycological features of genocide.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


The focus of this research unit is on socio-political dynamics, transnational links and international relations in and with the Middle East – from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east. The study of socio-political dynamics covers mainly three aspects: namely, processes of radicalisation; the relationship between incumbents and opposition; and the use of religion as a source of identity and legitimacy among both state and non-state actors. The study of transnational links concerns a wide array of connections between state and non-state actors, which encompass relations among terrorist organisations and projects promoting cooperation and dialogue between the Western World and the Middle East. In the study of international relations, the primary focus is on the regional structures of security and alliances and the relationship between the Middle Eastern states, the US and Europe.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


Sheikh, Mona Kanwal: *Guardians of God. Understanding the Religious Violence of Pakistan’s Taliban*. Copenhagen: Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.


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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Theodore Baird</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jette Kjertum</td>
<td>MSc, PhD Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauja Kleist</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianne Mosebo</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anne Sofie Westh Olsen</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sine Plambech</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finn Stepputat</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninna Nyberg Sørensen</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher, Head of the research unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jairo Munive Rincón</td>
<td>PhD, Postdoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Turner</td>
<td>PhD, Senior Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ida Marie Vammen</td>
<td>MA, PhD Candidate</td>
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Migration has become significant in the public debate – both in Denmark and the rest of the world. Millions are fleeing from conflicts, undemocratic regimes, natural calamities, failed states and poverty. In both sending and receiving countries, governments and populations see migration as a potential threat to security and stability. Countries in the South fear that their best talents are leaving, while countries in the North generally fear that welfare, security and cultural identity are threatened by increasing immigration. At the same time, migrant remittances are celebrated as important development finances, sometimes without considering the personal and familial costs involved. The migration research unit examines how on the one hand states and international organisations seek to control, regulate and optimise international migration, and how on the other hand, migrants and migration industries circumvent control efforts. We explore migration from the perspectives of both sending and receiving countries – as well as from a migrant perspective, including the hope and despair of migrants en route.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


Ian Christoplos
PhD, Senior Researcher

Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde
MA, PhD Candidate

Mikkel Funder
PhD, Senior Researcher

Ida Peters Ginsborg
MSc, Research Assistant

Kurt Mørck Jensen
MA, Senior Analyst

Rane Baadsgaard Lange
MSc, Research Assistant

Nawa Shalala Mwale
MA, PhD Candidate

Helle Munk Ravnborg
PhD, Senior Researcher,
Head of the research unit

Rachel Spichiger
MA, PhD Candidate

Jon Lausten Vilsen
MSc, Research Assistant
Rural populations’ access to and use of natural resources is increasingly shaped by global processes such as climate change and global flows of water, investments, e.g. in land, energy, minerals and people. We examine how such global processes and flows express themselves in developing countries at the national, sub-national and local level and what the implications are in terms of poor people’s access to natural resources and more generally in terms of poverty, inequality, sustainability and institutional practices.

Our research unit brings together different activities, ranging from comparative research programmes to individual research projects and policy studies. Currently, we focus on the following issues:

- Climate change
- Water governance
- Land tenure and land conflict
- Environmental governance

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS


Peter Alexander Albrecht  
MA, PhD Candidate

France Bourgouin  
PhD, Project Researcher

Lars Buur  
PhD, Senior Researcher

Lars Engberg-Pedersen  
PhD, Senior Researcher,  
Head of the research unit

Esbern Friis-Hansen  
PhD, Senior Researcher

Tina Maria Jensen  
MA, PhD Candidate

Helene Maria Kyed  
PhD, Project Researcher

Luke Patey  
PhD, Postdoc

Rasmus Hundsbaek Pedersen  
MSc, PhD Candidate

Marie Juul Petersen  
PhD, Postdoc

Ole Therkildsen  
MA, MSc, Senior Researcher
New development crises and new actors in the field of development have changed the context of national policy-making processes in the developing countries. Development is less a consequence of nationally adopted policies than we normally expect. Rather, it is the outcome of political processes in which substantially different actors engage and pursue their own agendas. These actors range from private global foundations, to non-OECD donors, multinational corporations, customary authorities, warlords, economic elites and diaspora associations. As a result, policy responses to crises are to be found in the daily practices of diverse groupings that consist of both state and non-state actors. This research unit strives to understand how politics influence practices, where states and other actors interact to create alliances, negotiate and contest each other in the processes of policy implementation.

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<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
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<td>MA, MCC, Head of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Fræmohs</td>
<td>MA, Communications Officer</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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Holm, Ulla, Helle Malmvig and Fabrizio Tassinari, “Growing jasmines: What should the EU do in Tunisia now?”, DIIS Policy Brief, January 2011

Hvidt, Nanna and Hans Mouritzen: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2011, 229 p.


Malmvig, Helle and Leila Stockmarr: “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, DIIS Policy Brief, October 2011


Pruzan-Jørgensen, Julie Elisabeth: “Islamic Women’s Activism in the Arab World. Potentials and challenges for external actors”, DIIS Report 2012:02

Ringsmose, Jens and Steen Rynning (eds.): “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment”, DIIS Report 2011:02


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• IPCC – Report and process Organised by the Danish Climate Change Task Force of which DIIS is a member 30 May, Copenhagen University

• 2011 Nordic Asylum Law Conference – The State of International Refugee Law, EU Harmonization and the Nordic Legacy 26 May, DIIS

• Party Politics and Private Sector Development in Africa 18 May, DIIS

• Brand Aid: Shopping Well to Save the World, book launch 13 May, DIIS

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DIIS, Danish Institute for International Studies
Strandgade 56
1401 Copenhagen
Denmark
Tel. + 45 32 69 87 87
Fax + 45 32 69 87 00
diis@diis.dk
www.diis.dk

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