SOMALI AND AFGHAN DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS
in Development and Relief Cooperation
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ABBREVIATIONS

ADECPT The Africa–Europe Diaspora Development Platform
ADPC African Diaspora Policy Centre
AFFORD The African Foundation for Development
CGI Common Ground Initiative
CGMFD Coordination Générale des Migrants pour le Développement
CISU Civil Society in Development
CSO Civil Society Organisations
DAI Development Alternatives Incorporated
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFID Department for International Development
DMFA Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DO Diaspora Organisations
DRC Danish Refugee Council
ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management
FAFT Financial Action Task Force
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FMU Fund Management Unit
FORIM Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale
Issues des Migrations
FSTF From Street to School
FGM Female Genital Mutilation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI Gross National Income
HTA Hometown Association
ICMFPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDP Internally Displaced People
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JMDI Joint Migration and Development Initiative
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoS Ministry of Social Affairs
MPI Migration Policy Institute
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGC Nordic Consulting Group
OCA Ogaden Concern Association
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDPF People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
ROI The Regions of Origin Initiative
SBF The Somaliland Business Fund
SD Statistics Denmark
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
TOKTEN Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/ UN Refugee Agency
UNSDN United Nations Social Development Network
WB The World Bank
QUESTS/MIDA The Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support – Migration for Development in Africa project
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Refugee and migrant diasporas, residing outside their countries of origin, are increasingly recognised as agents of change. Under the right circumstances and supported in the right way, diasporas may be important new partners for development cooperation and humanitarian relief.

Based on a comprehensive literature review, and interviews with representatives of diaspora associations, academic experts, ministry representatives and involved practitioners, this report provides: i) an overview of current knowledge on diaspora engagement in countries of origin related to collective remittances and the potential barriers, concerns and pitfalls related to their transfer; ii) an analysis of the activities of two particular diaspora groups residing in Denmark, namely Afghan and Somali diaspora associations; and iii) lessons learned and recommendations for future engagement.

The definition of diaspora used throughout the report covers groups of people originating in a shared homeland, who are dispersed in several territories outside their country of origin but nevertheless maintain a collective identity and sustain transnational practices directed towards this place. Diaspora groups are not homogeneous and individual members often act from different positions. The diaspora organisations included in the study share an overall common relation to their countries of origin that provides an important background for the associational activities carried out.

Renewed interest in the development potential inherent in migration emerged in the early 2000s. After an initial ‘euphoria’ predicting positive impacts of migration, most involved parties today agree that there is no simple relationship between migration and development. Virtually all discussions on making migration work for the involved parties today agree that there is no simple relationship between migration and development. Virtually all discussions on making migration work for the involved parties today agree that there is no simple relationship between migration and development.

Realising that organised migrant and refugee diasporas can play a vital developmental role – that may expand well beyond the sending of remittances and include the transfer of knowledge, skills and associational practices – has made the international development community interested in building institutional cooperation between diasporas and home country development. Diaspora engagement in community projects and humanitarian relief are typically organised by associations centred on a specific hometown, country or region. Collective diaspora projects range from the provision of electricity, sanitation and clean water systems, to the construction of schools, libraries, orphanages or health clinics in particular areas. Not only money and goods are transferred. Given the wide range of competences, skills and qualifications that diasporas possess, their engagement may expand to trade and direct foreign investments, business creation and entrepreneurship.

Not all projects supported through diaspora associations succeed equally well, and a certain hesitation to engage in partnerships is observed among development agencies. However, most weaknesses identified, including the perceived tendency among diaspora associations to be too narrowly focussed and driven by external community interests, may not actually differ much from problems related to ‘ordinary’ ODA-financed activities. Negative perceptions of diasporas as bearers of conflict have also prevented collaboration. The issue of diaspora partiality in conflict settings is important, but should not overshadow the range of constructive ways diaspora organisations themselves address the issue. In this respect better levels of integration in the host societies seem to be conducive to diaspora transfers of impartial and democratic values.

Development agencies offer support to diaspora organisations in different ways. The report identifies three main diaspora support models, including general co-funding schemes for development NGOs, special diaspora initiatives and network support. The models usually coexist and activities often overlap. A certain tension exists between engaging diasporas ‘in their own right’ and ‘professionalising’ or ‘mainstreaming’ their activities to correspond to official development modalities. Establishing platforms for sharing experiences with successful initiatives based on mutual recognition seems a fruitful way forward.

Afghanistan and Somalia are among the main recipients of Danish and international development aid. Afghans and Somalis also constitute two major diaspora groups in Denmark, with more than 16,000 Afghan and close to 20,000 Somali refugees and descendants as of 2014. Both groups are identified as strategic partners by Danida in the Regions of Origin Initiative directed towards Afghanistan, the New Deal Compact for Somalia, the Civil Society Fund (CISU) directed towards civil societies organisations working in developing countries in general, and the Danish Refugee Council’s Diaspora Programme providing matching funds and capacity building for Afghan and Somali diaspora organisations. In addition to these Danida-funded activities, smaller funds can be accessed through Danish municipalities and
the Ministry of Social Affairs for activities focusing exclusively on projects based in Denmark and directed towards issue areas such as inclusion, integration and anti-radicalisation efforts.

The study has mapped 80 Somali and 40 Afghan associations and representatives scattered across larger cities in Denmark. Somali associations are apparently more active and have been so for a longer period than the Afghan associations. Somali associations have also embraced the diaspora–development discourse to a larger extent than the Afghans, whose engagement is more recent and a direct consequence of Danish Refugee Council (DRC) outreach activities. Nevertheless, the Afghan diaspora is also engaged in a combination of inclusion, relief and development activities spanning residential municipalities in Denmark, and transnational networks in the wider diaspora and the home country.

Three motivational aspects for diaspora involvement are identified. Moral obligation involves support for both personal family members and humanitarian and civic projects in the countries of origin. Personal ambition refers to aspirations to make a career within humanitarian or development projects, sometimes spurred by a general lack of employment opportunities in the Danish labour market. Whether involved in inclusion in Denmark or development back ‘home’ the search for spaces of recognition points to the human need to do something meaningful and to be recognized as a person who makes a difference. These motivational aspects often overlap.

Afghan and Somali diaspora organisations stress their knowledge of local conditions and circular mobility trajectories as unique qualities facilitating their engagement in development and relief efforts. Traveling to the project areas for periods ranging from a few weeks to six months, or being able to ‘return’ on a transient basis, are closely related to having obtained permanent residence or citizenship in Denmark. Major obstacles to engagement are identified in the areas of burdens and institutional barriers. The administrative work required by grant regulations clashes with the fact that projects are expected to be carried out by volunteers. Institutional barriers arise when diaspora associations see their work on integration in Denmark and development in their countries of origin as closely related, but different funding structures insist on their separation and suspect diaspora associations of misusing funds if separation is not strictly maintained.

**STRESSING THE NEED TO REMOVE BARRIERS THAT HINDER DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT, THE STUDY RECOMMENDS THAT:**

- The heterogeneity of diaspora associations is recognised and seen as a strength, not a hindrance, for engaging diasporas in development cooperation and relief activities.
- Divergent funding conditions and requirements set by ministries, municipalities and other public funding institutions recognise the unique potential for embracing integration and development efforts within the same projects.
- A flexible and enabling approach to funding projects in fragile situations is adopted to enable diaspora associations to make use of capacities required by integration projects in development projects simultaneously, and vice versa.
- A forum for policy dialogue and consultation is established. The representation of diasporas at the local, national and international level must be ensured to facilitate engagement and mutual learning.
- Development agencies strive to partner with diaspora associations by including them in decision making processes, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of concrete policies and activities in both countries of origin and residence.
- The objective of engaging diasporas in development cooperation and relief includes the ideas and needs of diaspora associations, rather than harnessing the diaspora for the needs of national and international development agencies.
- Successful diaspora initiatives are upscaled through more – and more long-term – funding.
- Further research into diaspora private business investment experiences is conducted.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades migration and population displacement have become central political topics. Conflicts often produce large groups of refugees both in neighbouring areas and further afield. For years an issue on the periphery of international politics, forced migration once again has become a central geopolitical concern. Refugees and migrants who reside outside their country of origin are increasingly conceptualised as diasporas. Since the early 2000s, moreover, a focus on diasporas as development actors has gained prevalence in development policy and practice (cf. Sørensen et al. 2002, Newland & Patrick 2004, Kleist 2014, Ionescu 2005).

Refugees and migrants who reside outside their country of origin are increasingly conceptualised as diasporas.

In addition, organised groups of refugees and migrants have begun to employ the identity of diaspora themselves (Van Hear 2014, Kleist 2008), in particular when originating from countries in fragile situations. If it was once expected that refugees break ties with the countries they have fled, it is now widely accepted that refugee diasporas are inclined to sustain ties and even support development of the country of origin (Van Hear 2009). Some ambivalence regarding the role of diasporas in conflict and post-conflict settings nevertheless persists, including the fear that diasporas may fuel conflict, or, on the contrary, that they play a potential role as peacekeepers (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi 2009). Remittances, i.e. money or other resources sent by migrants or refugees to networks in the country of origin, have been under suspicion of providing support for armed conflicts or financing corruption, crime and extremism (FAFT/OECD 2013), while simultaneously being celebrated as an important resource for development (Lindley 2014). However, recent studies indicate that refugees are not only to be seen as recipients of aid but also as ‘agents of change’ whose transnational affiliations potentially serve as an advantage in development cooperation under the right circumstances (Sørensen et al. 2002, Saggiorno & Ferro 2014, Kleist & Vammen 2012). To shed light on the potential link between diaspora and development, experiences with diaspora engagement and related policy initiatives will be examined throughout this report.

OBJECTIVES

The report is part of DIIS’ Development Tendencies Studies commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of the present report is to update knowledge related to diasporas as development actors in fragile situations. The report examines this issue through a focus on individual and collective remittances sent to the countries of origin and neighbouring areas, identifying specific concerns, opportunities and hindrances in relation to development and relief. It further examines case studies of two significant refugee and asylum seeking groups in Denmark, respectively Afghans and Somalis, with particular focus on their collective involvement in development projects. The Somali and Afghan diaspora cases have been chosen partly because both are important recipients of Danish development and humanitarian aid, partly because both constitute large groups of refugees in Denmark. In addition, Somalia and Afghanistan are the exclusive target countries of the Danish Diaspora Programme, a diaspora development cooperation initiative funded by Danida and managed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

THE REPORT HAS THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES

- To provide an overview of how development cooperation initiatives can assist and upscale diaspora engagement and collective remittances in countries of origin and neighbouring areas. This includes focus on potential barriers, concerns and pitfalls.
- To examine how and to what extent Somali and Afghan diaspora groups engage in collective development and reconstruction activities in their countries of origin and neighbouring areas, including focus on potential barriers, concerns and pitfalls from their perspective.
- To identify lessons learned and provide policy recommendations for future cooperation.

METHODS, APPROACH AND DEFINITIONS

The report is based on a literature review of European policy initiatives and academic literature on diaspora engagement, qualitative interviews, and participation in Somali and Afghan associational activities. In addition, meetings and interviews with academic experts, ministry representatives and practitioners have been carried out (see appendix...
As part of the initial interview recruitment, approximately 80 Somali organisations and 40 Afghan organisations, and active members from the two communities located throughout the country were mapped. It is difficult to establish an accurate number of associations as many do not have websites, some are online communities, some are not formally registered and some might no longer be active. Accordingly this is not to be understood as a definite number.

Representatives of diaspora organisations were identified through the Danida-funded DRC Diaspora Programme (see chapter 2), social media, desktop research and, not least, through the networks of the associations themselves and their contacts. The associations have been a platform of access to Afghans and Somalis who engage in associational activities and, for the majority, aspire to engage in development projects in some form. A total of 29 qualitative interviews with representatives from Afghan and Somali communities around the country have been conducted to examine if and how associations engage in development and relief in their home countries, and how they themselves perceive this engagement. Furthermore, the researchers behind the report have participated in various diaspora events within the DRC Diaspora Programme, events organised by diaspora representatives themselves, and events of a more academic nature.

The report employs the notion of diaspora to refer to groups originating from a homeland or home area who are dispersed across several territories outside this origin, who maintain a collective identity and transnational practices oriented towards the homeland/area and who, in some cases, aspire to return in the near or distant future (Brubaker 2005, Van Hear 1998). This understanding is widely used in policy discussions, sometimes glossing over internal differences, positions and interests among and between diaspora groups. It is therefore pertinent to emphasise that diasporas are not to be understood as a homogenous group of refugees (or migrants or their descendants) sharing the same national or ethnic background. Diaspora organisations thus encompass a wide range of organisations, such as hometown associations (HTAs), political or legal oriented organisations, cultural associations, women’s associations and migrant youth associations (cf. Kleist 2014, Sinatti & Horst 2014). Most of the associations interviewed in this study identify themselves as diasporas, while a few simply refer to (volunteer) associations or NGOs. In the report the terms ‘organisation’ and ‘association’ are used interchangeably.

The report uses the term ‘diaspora association’ to refer to organisations where the majority of members identify as having a shared origin outside their country of residence and where this origin is important for the goals of the association. Diaspora organisations thus encompass a wide range of organisations, such as hometown associations (HTAs), political or legal oriented organisations, cultural associations, women’s associations and migrant youth associations (cf. Kleist 2014, Sinatti & Horst 2014). Most of the associations interviewed in this study identify themselves as diasporas, while a few simply refer to (volunteer) associations or NGOs. In the report the terms ‘organisation’ and ‘association’ are used interchangeably.

The report is structured around four main chapters. First, some overall tendencies in development policies with regard to individual and collective remittances are presented. Chapter 2 then looks at how institutional support is offered to diaspora organisations. The context and migration histories of Afghan and Somali refugees are presented in chapter 3. Finally, in chapter 4, the diaspora organisations are examined with a view to the activities, motivations, opportunities and barriers as articulated by the organisations. By way of conclusion, rather than making strict divisions between the two, the report identifies lessons learned and gives policy recommendations for future engagement with diasporas as partners in development and relief cooperation.

**MIGRANT VS. REFUGEE**

The term ‘migrant’ encompasses a great variety of people motivated by different circumstances, including permanent emigrants; labour migrants; students; refugees and asylum seekers; rural–urban migrants; and people who seek safety from conflict within their own countries (IDPs). With the increasing number of people crossing the Mediterranean to Europe, a debate about the terminology of refugees vs. migrants has come to both media and academic and policy attention. In this report we use the term ‘migrant’ as an all-inclusive category, whereas the term ‘refugee’ is used when a person has obtained asylum according to the refugee convention. It is increasingly recognised that much migration is fuelled by mixed motivations and that many migration flows include people fleeing both conflict and poverty. For the debate on ‘mixed migration’ see Van Hear (2011), for confusion in the public debate on migrants and refugees: Sørensen (2015).
Policy interest in the development potentials related to migration is not new. It emerged in policy and academic debates in the 1960s following modernisation theories (Faist 2009, de Haas 2009) that coincided with economic growth and demand for labour in Western countries. Following the oil and subsequent economic crisis in the 1970s, migration became debated in terms of the problems it leads to in both destination and home countries. As international migration played only a minor role in development research (Bakewell 2008) and migration research tended to deploy a rather outdated or rudimentary concept of development (Piper 2009), linking migration and development often resulted in simplistic assumptions, for example that development would be the remedy to stop unwanted migration. In the following, the links established between remittances and diaspora engagement are elaborated.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT REDIcovered

Since the early 2000s, when migration and development appeared in international policy planning, increasing attention has been given to the ‘migration–development nexus’ potential (Sørensen et al. 2002). Numerous studies, policy analyses and recommendations on how to make migration work for development in practical ways have been produced, resulting in, among other initiatives, efforts to include migration concerns in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

After an initial euphoria, predicting ‘positive impacts of migration’, most involved parties today agree that there is no simple one-way relationship between migration and development.

For most of its policy history, migration and development policies have been dealt with in separate and isolated ways, typically managed by ministries of respectively internal and foreign or external affairs. This division reflects the gap between domestic politics and international relations, which the discipline of political science is organised around (Gamlen 2014). Yet, from the early 2000s various international institutions began to express an interest in discussing possible gains from incorporating development-related concerns into migration and refugee policy and practices, and vice versa. This interest resonated with important problems perceived by both sending and receiving countries who joined the discussion, albeit from different positions and with different interests. Two significant trends explain the apparent convergence of interests among differently situated actors: First, a spectacular surge in remittances. Second, a changing policy environment in which the prevention of unwanted migration was given high priority on the migration policy agenda. These interests resulted in policymaking in the area of diaspora cooperation, sometimes related to return, sometimes related to collaborative engagements, but mostly related to the (economic) resources generated by migration.

POLICY INTEREST IN REMITTANCES

Virtually all discussions of the migration–development link have touched upon remittances for the obvious reason of their sheer magnitude (Skeldon 2008). The size of remittance flows destined for developing countries and fragile states—a and evidence that these flows typically lead to improvement in the living conditions of the families and communities that receive them—have fuelled the policy assumption that financial transfers from migrant and refugee diasporas are beneficial to development. Interestingly, much early migration–development research initially found that migrant remittances led to ‘conspicuous’ consumption and dependency, whereas refugee remittances were under suspicion of providing support for armed conflicts and extremism (Lindley 2009a). The large and growing volume of remittances may explain commercial interest in remittance markets and corridors as well as the development of remittance service products. The perception of remittances between suspicion and celebration may explain political efforts to influence and regulate how migrants send their money and for what purposes (Lindley 2009a). An example of this is the UK–Somali Safer Corridor pilot (funded by DFID and implemented by the World Bank), which ‘aims to create a more transparent and safer system for Somalis in the UK to send money back home’ (Gov.uk 2015a).
Whether remittances contribute to development in the places they end up depends on how they are used and what activities they finance. A widespread assumption is that consumption has less developmental impact than the financing of productive investments. What productive investments exactly include nevertheless varies considerably. Different assessments, using different data material and methodology, generally come to divergent conclusions. Early policy discussion around remittances generally relied on conceptions drawn from economics emphasising individual choice, stimuli and motivation (Page & Mercer 2012). In these discussions migrants were understood as resources to be ‘mobilised’, ‘harnessed’, ‘leveraged’ or ‘tapped into’ (ICMPD & ECDPM 2013). Realising that migrant remittances are private transfers directed towards maintaining family members and local livelihoods, attempts to direct them for ‘productive investments’ became supplemented with initiatives to lower transfer costs and in general facilitate fast, reliable and cheap channels, since lack of these continue to be an issue for remitting migrants.

Migrants and refugees alone cannot remove structural development constraints.

Research on migration–development has primarily focused on capital flows, investments and, more recently, institutional factors. The latter focus has highlighted the importance of the institutional context in which remittances operate. While remittances may create resilience by increasing human development and reducing extreme poverty, it is states, not mobile populations, that play a vital role in shaping local development conditions (Julca 2011). Migrants and refugees alone cannot remove structural development constraints. Nor can their remittances be expected to trigger development take-offs in otherwise unattractive investment environments (de Haas 2012). Local financial sector development and stability influence a given developing country’s capacity to take advantage of remittances (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009) as does the existence of democratic institutions and distributional policies. As such, development in migrant and refugee producing regions seems to be a prerequisite for productive migrant investments, rather than a consequence of migration (de Haas 2009).

REMITTANCE DATA

Exact data on remittance flows is hard to come by. The main source of official data stems from the annual balance of payment records of individual countries, compiled in the Balance of Payment Yearbook published annually by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). ‘Migrant remittances’ generally refer to transfers in cash or kind from a migrant or refugee to his or her dependent family members in the country of origin. The IMF Yearbook also includes compensation of employees and other migrant transfers. The former refers to the wages and other forms of remuneration paid to individuals who work in a country other than where they legally reside and includes, for instance, wages earned by seasonal and short-term workers on temporal migration schemes (IMF 2014). The latter refers to capital transfers of financial assets made by migrants as they move from one country to another for more than a year. While formal remittances refer to the share of remittances entering a given country through official banking channels, informal remittances include transfers through private, unrecorded channels, such as money brought home during visits or sent through travelling friends and relatives. Estimates of the volume of informal remittances to developing countries vary widely, ranging from 35% to 75% of formal remittances (Freund & Spatafora 2005).

REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT

Even though the volume is uncertain it is beyond doubt that remittances provide a vital lifeline for many families, especially in fragile situations, covering basic needs such as food, and healthcare (Gupta et al. 2009). Additionally, remittances may be utilised for building or improving housing, often because migrants and refugees hold on to an idea of return. While such remittance flows generate an immediate demand for products and services in the areas of origin, the longer lasting impacts – the multiplier effects in economic terms – may vary considerably. In some instances, remittances may spur renewed migration as more and more people come to rely on remittances for immediate basic needs. In other instances migrant investments may distort local markets and lead to inflation in land and housing prices and contribute to a construction boom of gated communities for the middle classes that may challenge sustainable urbanisation (Klaufus 2010).
In 2014 the estimated diaspora contribution to developing countries tripled official development assistance (ODA) by reaching 436 billion dollars according to the World Bank (WB 2014a). The steady increase in reported remittance flows is estimated to slow down for 2015 (from 4.4% in 2014 to 0.9% in 2015), due to slow European recovery after the 2008 recession, the effect of low oil prices on the Russian economy, and stricter global migration control measures (WB 2015). Weak European economies and generally weaker currencies are among some of the factors that, according to the World Bank, explain the slowing remittances growth. Yet, the World Bank estimates that at least 100 billion US dollars could be directed towards development by mobilising diaspora savings, reducing transfer costs, reducing recruitment and travel costs, and mobilising philanthropical diaspora investments through, for instance, HTAs. In sum, World Bank figures indicate that remittances in many countries exceed ODA as well as private capital flows (Phillips 2013, Mohaparta & Ratha 2010), as illustrated in figure 1 below.

Figure 1: ODA vs. personal remittances

Not only individual diaspora members, but also organised diasporas send home money, often with the intention of financing specific community projects or providing humanitarian relief in the wake of natural or human disasters. Such collective remittances are typically organised and sent by diaspora associations – centred on a specific hometown, region or country, as is the case with many of the associations included in this study. Collective remittance projects can range from the provision of electrification, sanitation and clean water systems to the construction of health clinics, schools or orphanages in a particular area. When used in this way, collective remittances can provide communities in developing countries in fragile situations with access to vital services and goods that would otherwise not be available (Adida & Girod 2011). In addition to infrastructural and socially-oriented projects, collective remittances may also be used to finance productive, commercially viable projects, as for example when groups of migrants invest in equipment to upgrade the production of traditional handicrafts or agricultural crops in their home area. In these cases remittances may be hard to distinguish from foreign direct investments (Skeldon 2008).

A considerable amount of remittance research has been carried out over the past 15 years. This research shows that not only migrants but also refugees remit considerable shares of their income to help family members survive during conflict and sustain communities in crisis, both in countries of origin and refugee settlements in the region and neighbouring areas.
Realising that organised diasporas can play an important developmental role in their countries of origin that may expand well beyond the sending of remittances and include issues of trade and foreign direct investment, business creation, entrepreneurship and the transfer of knowledge and skills, is exactly what has made sending and receiving governments and the international community interested in building institutional cooperation between diasporas and home country development. Diaspora institutions set up by home country governments have sought to encourage expatriate populations settled temporarily or permanently abroad to contribute to development through formalised channels, often in exchange for certain diaspora rights such as dual citizenship and political representation. But such arrangements also allow home country governments to reach beyond state geographical limits and project new kinds of extraterritorial governance on dispersed populations (Gamlen 2014).

Support to migrant and diaspora development activities is mentioned in several European development cooperation portfolios, including those of Germany (BMZ 2014), Norway (Erdal & Horst 2010), the UK (Thornton & Hext 2009, Vammen & Brænden 2012, Govuk 2014), the Netherlands (Dutch MFA 2008), and to a lesser extent Denmark (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). In addition, so-called co-development policies are part of French, Spanish and Italian development cooperation (Nijenhuis & Brokehuis 2010). While some accentuate the positive potential and opportunities in development cooperation with diaspora organisations (Erdal & Horst 2010, JMDI 2011, Sinatti & Horst 2014, Saggiomo & Ferro 2014, Horst et al. 2010) others are more hesitant in identifying a clear relationship (de Haas 2006, Newland 2011). In the following, examples of diaspora support models are highlighted.

DIASPORA SUPPORT MODELS

Since the 1990s development aid agencies have offered support in different ways to diaspora organisations. First, through general NGO funding schemes and supplemented with special diaspora initiatives from the middle of the 2000s. The table below identifies three different diaspora support models employed by development agencies. First, general co-funding schemes for development NGOs, second, special diaspora initiatives, and third, network support. As the table shows, capacity building activities and matching fund schemes are the two most common ways of supporting diaspora organisations. The three models usually coexist and their activities often overlap.

A common way to support diaspora organisations is through funding schemes targeting small and medium-sized development NGOs. Such grant schemes are often administered by large NGOs or umbrella organisations, rather than by the development aid agencies themselves. In addition to matching funds, capacity building activities for diaspora organisations and other small development organisations in relation to proposal and project management are a common feature. Specific objectives may include upscaling of projects, strengthening the quality of proposals, enhancing participation in policy decision making and public debates on development, and enabling common platforms of understanding. Courses offered as part of capacity building cover a great range of fields, such as civil society, organisational development, project cycle management, leadership, proposal writing and fundraising capacity, procurement, and financial management.

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schemes limit their target group to organisations focusing on selected countries, offering context-sensitive programmes and activities. They are often pilot projects, expected to show quick results and with the objective of making the involved diaspora organisations able to participate – and compete – in regular programmes and funding schemes. Furthermore, the initiatives usually target larger migrant or refugee groups originating from states that receive substantial development or humanitarian aid. Like mainstream funding schemes, the schemes are often administered by a large professional NGO. Examples of special diaspora initiatives include the Norwegian Pilot Project Pakistan, a three-year NORAD-funded project running between 2008 and 2010 (Erdal & Horst 2010) and the Common Ground Initiative (CGI), which is a fund supporting African development through UK-based diaspora organisations. The initiative is co-funded by DFID and managed by the NGO Comic Relief (Gov.uk 2014). Another example is the DRC programme, funded by Danida, which is explained in more detail below.

**DIASPORA FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES IN DENMARK**

There are two main ways in which Somali and Afghan diaspora organisations in Denmark can obtain institutional support for their project ideas. First, through the so-called mainstream model, practiced by the umbrella organisation Civil Society in Development (CISU). CISU administers the DANIDA grant, the Civil Society Fund, which all Danish CSOs working in developing countries can apply to (CISU 2015). CISU grants to diaspora organisations are rare, however, only occurring about once every second year and mainly to small-scale projects (up to a max. of 200,000 Kroner / approx. 27,000 euros). The requirements of this scheme are very strict and therefore only more professionalised NGOs or CSOs are likely to receive the funding (Frederiksen 2007, NCG 2010). This situation seems to parallel other European countries with similar schemes (Kleist & Vammen 2012), such as Forum Syd in Sweden and Dutch Oxfam Novib.

The second approach is a special diaspora funding scheme targeted exclusively at two selected groups. It is funded by Danida and implemented by the DRC. The Diaspora Programme was initiated after an evaluation concluded that the CISU scheme was difficult to obtain for diasporas as described above. According to a civil servant from Danida involved in the pilot phase, the grant is placed with the DRC because they can offer both experience with volunteers (e.g. Frivillignet.dk) and have the capacity to monitor the diaspora projects on the ground in Afghanistan and Somalia where they are already engaged. The DRC Diaspora Programme offers matched funding and capacity building to Somali and Afghan diaspora organisations. To be eligible for funding, candidates must form a legally recognised association with most of their members originating from the country they wish to engage in. Eligible projects can focus on social service and civil society development and must adhere to a range of criteria including having a local partner, aiming at ensuring local needs, sustainability, measurability and capacity. Project proposals are evaluated by an elected advisory board consisting of diaspora members themselves, whereas final decisions are taken by an executive committee including members from the DRC country offices. Project ownership lies with the diaspora organisation. So far the DRC has granted 1.1 million euros to 12 Afghan projects and 25 Somali projects. According to the head of programme, Mingo Heiduk, the programme has benefitted 40,818 direct recipients. At the political level collaboration with diasporas thus constitutes an, albeit modest, part of the Danish development cooperation agenda, reflected by the fact that the Diaspora Programme received continued support following the pilot phase running from in 2008 to 2012. However, the programme operates with a relatively small budget frame and the target groups are limited to Afghan and Somali diaspora associations only.

In addition to the development oriented funding financed by DANIDA, there are options of applying for smaller funds through, for instance, the Danish local municipalities, and the Ministry of Social Affairs (see MoS 2015, Municipality of Aarhus 2015), which many diaspora associations included in this study actually do. Nevertheless, these funds are also difficult to access for the associations. Contrary to the development funds, municipal and social funds are exclusively for projects directed towards the local communities in Denmark, such as anti-radicalisation projects and so-called integration or inclusion-related projects.

**NEW TRENDS**

Two emerging trends in development cooperation support in relation to diaspora organisations can be identified: private sector engagement with diasporas (see for instance Horst 2015, Agunias & Newland 2013), and emphasis on networks and platforms. Examples of these two tendencies are provided on page 28-29.
Private business as part of development cooperation strategies

The importance of diaspora contributions to the private sector has been emphasised both in relation to Afghanistan (Oppeen 2010) and Somalia (Hammond et al. 2011). While official figures are difficult to track, investment channelled through the diaspora – either as shareholders or as investors – is estimated to constitute significant parts of the FDI in both regions. Investment may be for profit but could also be aimed at establishing a sustainable livelihood for relatives or in relation to future return (Hammond et al. 2011, Hansen 2007). Furthermore diaspora investment is sometimes perceived as a development contribution (Ibid.).

An example of how investment in the Somali region is linked to development is the Somaliland Business Fund. SBF is part of the 29 million dollar Somalia Private Sector Development Re-engagement Project – SOMPREP-II – (UNSDN 2014). The fund is managed by the World Bank and financed by DANIDA, DFID (the UK Department for International Development), and the World Bank’s State and Peace-building Fund. SBF is implemented by Landell Mills International Development Consultants (UK) and run by a Fund Management Unit (FMU) based in Hargeisa (Wargane 2014). The purpose as stated by SBF is to ‘mobilize the creative energy and resources of the private sector to increase sustainable employment and incomes for Somalilanders’. The fund supports private sector development in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, and green energy. The grants range from 5,000 to 150,000 US dollars. Projects are based on co-payment of up to 50% of the grant. SBF has awarded approximately 10.5 million dollars in grants to investment projects and 10 million in matching funds since 2012. Thus, the idea behind the SBF is linked to the potential of the private sector as a key actor in development cooperation (Horst 2015, Agunias & Newland 2013) – including the recognition of diasporas as a source of private capital. However, in Somaliland and elsewhere, the work of SBF has not always been well received. Allegations of bad management and corruption have been made. The project is nevertheless ongoing and has increased its capacities.

The idea of mobilising business investment has not been a theme for the diaspora associations included in this study, and it is worth noting that private sector engagement is more complex in fragile situations, since the willingness to take risks is often low (Sharma et al. 2011). More research into the possible impact and opportunities for combining business and development strategies is nevertheless needed.

Transnational network cooperation and joint support programmes

Establishing transnational networks and platforms for and between diaspora groups and other development actors is another significant trend that has been taken up by diasporas and grantmakers. One example of this is the so-called DiaGram where diaspora grantmakers come together to share experiences and best practices in terms of diaspora support models. DiaGram was initiated by the DRC (DK), and is composed of the latter together with UK-based Comic Relief, the Norwegian Development Fund, Forum Syd from Sweden and the German aid agency, GIZ. The main objective of the initiative is to link policy with practice, and research with experience, ensuring the relevance and performance of programmes and policies promoting diaspora in development (DRC 2015a).

The Africa–Europe Diaspora Development Platform formerly known as AEDP, now called ADEPT, is another network-based initiative, constituting a joint diaspora sharing initiative rather than a grantmakers network (AEDP 2015). ADEPT is funded by the European Union and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The background for the platform was that EU and African leaders formally expressed the wish to engage African diaspora groups in development processes. In 2009 the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) initiated the process and a pilot project was supported by the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC), AFFORD, the Coordination Générale des Migrants pour le Développement (CGMD), the Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues des Migrations (FORIM), and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). The platform pilot phase was funded by the European Union, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Germany’s GIZ. The platform aims ‘to improve and enhance the capacity and impact of African diaspora organisations involved in development activities in Africa’ (ADEPT 2015). By operating as a platform for African diaspora organisations the aim is to improve the possibilities for sharing experience and professional expertise. Thus, platforms where diasporas themselves can share experience as well as diaspora grantmaker sharing networks can be seen as new trends in engaging diasporas as development agents, making it easier to share experiences of already-successful initiatives, rather than inventing new strategies over and over again (Newland & Patrick 2004). Recent trends in private sector and network engagements could be further explored for future development cooperation with diaspora associations.
AFGHAN AND SOMALI DISPLACEMENT – HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Afghans and Somalis constitute two major refugee groups in the world today, displaced all over the globe. Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be characterised by conflict, political instability, fragility and recurring humanitarian crises, and consequently both countries are recipients of humanitarian and development aid – internationally and from Denmark. In the period 2013–17 Afghanistan is set to receive an average of 530 million DKK per year – making the country the largest recipient of Danish development aid (DMFA 2015a). The target points of the Danish assistance include economic growth, education, good governance, democracy and human rights.

Afghans and Somalis constitute two major refugee groups in the world today, displaced all over the globe.

The focus is on capacity building of the Afghan police, returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, the Danish state has initiated The Regions of Origin Initiative (RoI), which had a budget of 75 million DKK in the Afghan context in 2011 alone. The diaspora is mentioned as a strategic partner in the report setting out the goals of the programme (RoI 2008). In the case of Somalia, the Danish state has recently initiated the Somalia Country programme ‘New Deal Compact Support’ running from 2015–2018 with a budget of 450 million DKK (DMFA 2015b). Working with the diaspora is also mentioned here, through highlighting the Danida-financed support schemes: CISU and the DRC Diaspora Programme, as mentioned above. Against this background, we shall now outline Somali and Afghan history in relation to conflict and forced migration.

AFGHAN MIGRATION HISTORY

The history of Afghanistan has been marked by conflict for years, leading to large number of refugees leaving the country (see figure 2). In 1978 the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) established a Marxist regime in Afghanistan in a coup d’état. Arbitrary detentions of political opponents and members of religious communities came with the new leadership which, together with the Soviet invasion of 1979, led to large numbers of refugees fleeing from Afghanistan (Jazayery 2002). The refugees were at that time primarily members of the Western-oriented educated elite (e.g. university professors, teachers and students), high-ranking public officials or well-situated businessmen (Baraulina et al. 2007).

The internal fighting following the Soviet exit from Afghanistan in 1989 led to ongoing refugee outflows, but the numbers were especially high when the Government of Najibullah, the PDPA, lost power to the Mujahedeen in 1992. People who had worked for or were associated with the communist regime now fled the country. The third phase began during the Taliban regime, from their takeover of Kabul in 1996 to the deposition of the regime with the NATO coalition of 2001 following 9/11 (Jazayery 2002, Kuschminder & Dora 2009).

Following years of conflict and displacement, Afghanistan has a large and diverse diaspora. The near diasporas in Pakistan and Iran are estimated to constitute of 2.5 million Afghan registered refugees (O’Leary 2014). The two countries are estimated to have an equivalent number of unregistered refugees. In addition, in mid-2014, Afghanistan had at least 683,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The majority of international refugees reside in and outside of refugee camps in the neighbouring areas of Iran and Pakistan (Ibid.).

Besides the near diaspora, is estimated that some 300,000 Afghans have settled in the United States, at least 150,000 in United Arab Emirates, 125,000 in Germany, and smaller numbers in Canada, Australia, and across Europe (Koser 2014). The Afghan diaspora groups that reside in the western countries are socio-economically relatively affluent and with higher education than Afghans constituting the near.
diaspora (Oeppen 2010, Fischer 2015). Even if most Afghans tend to stay where they have been granted asylum due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan (Oeppen 2010), more than 5.8 million Afghan refugees have returned since 2002, 4.7 million of whom were assisted by the UNHCR. Since 2001 Kabul has increased its population from one million to four million inhabitants, another indication that a large number of refugees from the near and wider diaspora have returned to Afghanistan. Furthermore, under IOM’s initiative, around 1,000 Afghan experts have returned, either temporarily or permanently. Additionally, through their participation in a range of NGO initiatives, the Afghan diaspora have participated in skill development and knowledge transfer, such as the TOKTEN programme, Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (Fatima 2014).

The history of Afghans in Denmark is related to the long history of conflict and political instability in Afghanistan. 97% of Afghans in Denmark were recognised as refugees in 2009 (SD 2010). Figure 3 shows the number of Afghan nationals in Denmark from 1980–2014. The numbers have increased since the 1990s, in particular after the ISAF coalition entered Afghanistan in 2001 – thus most Afghans have arrived since the beginning of the millennium. According to the most recent statistics there are 12,509 Afghans and 3,972 descendants in Denmark (SD 2015).

Figure 3. Afghans in Denmark

Source: Statistics Denmark (SD 2015)

The figures cover number of people in Denmark with Afghanistan as country of origin.

DEVELOPMENT AID AND REMITTANCES TO AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and receives billions in international development aid (Oeppen 2010). The total population in Afghanistan is numbered as 31.28 million people for 2014 (WB 2014b). Even though Afghans constitute one of the largest groups of refugees in the world, little attention has been paid to this large diaspora by migration and development research (Monsutti 2008). Yet, the few studies that have been done indicate that an estimated one third of Afghan households receive remittances from abroad through informal channels, such as the Hawala system, or private companies such as Money Gram, Western Union and the like. That a third of the population relies on remittances demonstrates the importance of the diaspora (Oeppen 2010). In 2013 the total volume of remittances was estimated at 537.5 million US dollars, a raise from 385.1 in 2012, and 247 in 2011, constituting approximately 30% of the GDP. Diaspora funds have been an important source of investment and capital. The Afghan diaspora has made numerous business investments in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, civil aviation, and real estate. An example of this is in the mobile communication sector, where the three leading companies are owned and/or governed by diaspora members (Oeppen 2010). The contribution of the diaspora in economic and social welfare sectors also highlights their participation. However, the narrative of the involvement of the Afghan diaspora is not complete without consideration of the political implications. In terms of power structure, highly educated diaspora members have risen as a new power group. It is estimated that around 80% of the present Afghan government ministers and officials are members of different diaspora groups (Jazayery 2002).

SOMALI MIGRATION HISTORY

Somalia has experienced more than 25 years of state collapse, causing general instability, fragility and poverty. This situation has led to great numbers of internally and internationally displaced Somalis (cf. figure 4). Somalia has one of the lowest development indicators, although the rate of development varies within especially three regions: Somaliland, Puntland and the south central region (UNDP 2012). The civil war in 1991 and the subsequent famine in 1992, after militias and resistance movements challenged the longstanding government of President Barre, led to many years without a central government in Somalia. At least 800,000 people left the country up until 1992 (Gundel 2002). The large number of refugees from Somalia
is linked to the general unstable and fragile state, internal conflicts between different political groups, and interference from radicalised groups including Al-Shabab (Hansen 2013). In 2012 the first government since 1991 was installed, and there are indications of a transition towards a more stabilised situation in the central region. Since then the number of people visiting or returning to south-central Somalia has increased considerably, especially to the Mogadishu area (Horst 2015), though most returnees tend go back for short visits. The self-declared state of Somaliland, former British Somaliland, is however considerably more stable. Nevertheless, the situation in the Somali region continues to be complex, and internal conflict based on issues such as clan, still risks undermining the progress made in many areas (Albrecht & Lambo 2015) – consequently flight from Somalia is ongoing.

**Diaspora funds have been an important source of investment and capital.** The Afghan diaspora has made numerous business investments in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, civil aviation, and real estate.

On this basis, and paralleling the case of Afghanistan, Somalis are dispersed across the world. The wider diaspora constitutes more than 1 million Somalis (Hammond 2011) out of a local population estimated at around 10.5 million people (WB 2014c).

**Figure 4. Somali refugees in the world**

![Graph showing Somali refugees in the world](image)


The figures cover Somali refugees, including ‘refugee-like’ situations, asylum seekers (pending cases), and others of concern.

**DEVELOPMENT AID AND REMITTANCES TO SOMALIA**

According to the World Bank, Somalia remains a low-income country with a GNI per capita of 150 US dollars. There is a thriving remittance economy provided by transfers from Somalis dispersed around the world (Lindley 2009b), almost exclusively through the Hawala system. Many Somali families are dependent on external resources for basic livelihood, healthcare and education, often supplied by their families abroad. In 2011 private family remittances to Somalia were estimated to range somewhere between 1.3 to 2 billion dollars sent through formal and informal channels. According to some sources, in 2014 Somalia received 1.3–1.5 billion dollars in remittances (Halane 2015). The remittance flow accounts for approximately 50% of Somalia’s GNI and 80% of investments in the country. According to the World Bank, 40% of Somalis are reliant on remittances to make a living (Gov.uk 2015b). Based on the assumption that 80% of the Somali diaspora send remittances, a report by Oxfam estimates that the Danish Somalis remitted 45 million dollars and Somalis living in the UK sent 162 million dollars in 2007.

**Figure 5. Somalis in Denmark**

![Graph showing Somalis in Denmark](image)

Source: Statistics Denmark (SD 2015).

The figures cover number of people in Denmark with Somalia as country of origin.

The number of Somalis in Denmark has steadily increased since the civil war years. In 2014 there were close to 20,000 Somalis in Denmark including 7,941 descendants (SD 2015). As seen in figure 5 the vast majority have arrived as refugees aligned with the conflicts in Somalia – thus from the civil war in the 1990s and onwards. In 2009, 96% of Somalis arriving in Denmark were recognised as refugees (SD 2010).
AFGHAN AND SOMALI DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS IN DENMARK
The advantage is that in a concrete way we have adopted the Danish norms and values in the form of democracy and of organisational values. That is what I am raised to do. I see the value in having a welfare system. I see the value in a well-functioning state, because I live in one on a daily basis. I don’t sit and fantasise about one. So the advantage is the personal mandate or the personal experience that I am working on passing on to Somalis at some point. You won’t get this from the locals. (Somali informant).

Associations have been seen as a cornerstone in Danish political life and civil society for years, and migrant and refugee participation in associational activities has been articulated as an aspect of integration efforts since the 1990s (Mikkelsen 2003, Ministry of Employment 2015, Dahl & Jakobsen 2005). The associations mapped in this study have formed a platform of access to Afghan and Somali nationals who aspire to engage in development projects in some form, and at the same time to those who do not engage in such activities. As part of the mapping exercise to locate interviewees, we found the number of organisations indicative of the level of interest in associational activities among Somalis and Afghans, although the activity level of the associations varies. The conducted interviews have shown how there are differences and commonalities between the two groups in Denmark. A key difference between Somali and Afghan diaspora associations is the history and scale of involvement. Somali associations are more numerous than Afghan ones and have a longer history in Denmark, dating back to the mid 1990s (Kleist 2007). Likewise many Somali associations have embraced the diaspora–development discourse and articulate many of the considerations also highlighted by development organisations. According to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalis constitute the group in Denmark who most often approach the ministry with the wish to engage or initiate collaboration on home country-related issues. In comparison, representatives of the Afghan associations mention that their engagement is more recent and that they did not see themselves as ‘diasporic’ or as development actors until after being introduced to the DRC DP. To comprehend the differences between the associational activities of the two groups it is important to consider both the size of the organisations and the generational differences and variations in migratory flows. The local context of the home country also plays a role (Lacomba & Cloquell 2014, Pirkkalainen 2013). Even if coordinated organisational engagement is less apparent within the Afghan communities, there seems to be a growing interest within the Afghan diasporas to get involved, especially after the NATO coalition entered the country in 2001 – not only in Denmark but also globally (Baraulina et al. 2007) – although some Afghan diaspora associations mentioned that with the retreat of the ISAF coalition, the security situation has changed radically for the worse.

In the following, we will examine the practices of the associations interviewed and give four case examples of associations. The case boxes demonstrate overall tendencies and exemplify the diversity that prevails in the field of diaspora associations.

CHARACTERISTICS, AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS

Most Somali and Afghan associations are organised with an elected board, a chairman, a cashier and a vice chairman, following Danish requirements for registration of associations. The size of associations varies from a few to more than 400 members, and membership rates range from 5 to 500 Danish kroner per month. The fees are often used for fundraising, besides operating the associations. Some associations have a very active core of board members with most of the remaining members being mainly paying members. Other associations have various local branches across the country in which active members facilitate local activities.

Many of the associations are historically dynamic in size and scale depending on financial opportunities and the activity level of the current volunteers and/or boards. Some associations have existed almost since the founders obtained asylum in Denmark (e.g. Hiil Naafo & Tolana) whereas others are more recent (e.g. Aeupa) and established as recently as this year (e.g. Familiecenter Rose). According to the DRC some associations have even formed as a result of a project idea, rather than forming a project idea from the associations, which also points to the fact that members of the diaspora tap into the model of professionalisation and organisation if they strive to engage in development projects with external funding. Many of the representatives interviewed state that membership overlaps – meaning that some have engagements, be they passive or active, in more than one organisation.

The table on page 42-43 summarises the main types of associational activities among diaspora groups in Denmark and shows how some associations engage in activities in both the Danish context and in the country of origin or a neighbouring area (for an example of this see case box 2 on page 48), such as for instance focus on education, anti-radicalisation and FGM awareness raising. The examples provided in the table include associations interviewed and associations identified via a mapping exercise. Activities and aims in relation to the country of origin often overlap, for instance in education and infrastructure, when associations support renovating or building a school, library and teaching. It should also be emphasised that many associations engage in so-called integration activities, such as anti-radicalisation strategies, sports activities or Danish lessons, simultaneously with conducting development/relief projects in the country of origin (cf. Choudhury 2012, Kleist 2007). Furthermore, many activities are facilitated or supported by transnational networks.
### Activities among diaspora groups in Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN – DEVELOPMENT/RELIEF</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE – INTEGRATION/CULTURAL ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Clinics, hospitals, mental health</td>
<td>Sports/fitness, anti- FGM information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Schools, libraries, skills and livelihood training</td>
<td>Danish lessons, homework cafes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Water/sanitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social activities/ vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Orphanages, street children, disabled, anti-radicalisation</td>
<td>Youth activities, sports clubs, anti-radicalisation, afterschool activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political involvement</td>
<td>Lobbying, political events/activities, demonstrations</td>
<td>Lobbying, hosting political diaspora events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Private investment, business corporations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Cultural exhibitions, mother tongue, celebration of national days, traditional dance lessons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Activities among diaspora groups in Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN – EXAMPLES OF ORGANISATIONS</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE – EXAMPLES OF ORGANISATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Hiil Naafo (Som), Mental Health in Somalia, Foreningen mod Pigeomskæring (Som)</td>
<td>Hiil Naafo, Foreningen mod Pigeomskæring (Som)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>AEUPA (Afg), Tolana (Afg), Katib (Afg), Kaalmo–Denmark (Som), Danish Somali Unity</td>
<td>Aarhus Dansk Afghanisk forening, Somalia Street Children, AVAD (Afg), Tolana, Somaliisk Forening Kolding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Ogaden Concern Association (Som), Aquashabelle (Som), Katib (Afg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social activities/ vulnerable groups</td>
<td>FSTS (Afg), Hilnafso (Som), Somali Street Children</td>
<td>Viborg Somali Association, Aarhus Dansk Afghanisk forening, Somalia Street Children, AVAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political involvement</td>
<td>International Somali Diaspora Movement ATM (UK)</td>
<td>Viborg Somali Association, Foreningen af Afghanske Jurister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Somali Fair Fishing, Aquashabelle (Som)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Katib (Afg), AVAD, Viborg Somali Association, Tolana (Afg)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The country of origin projects vary in size and scale, mainly dependent on whether they receive external funding or not. Some organisations are inspired by funding schemes to embark on development projects, such as the DRC DP, who scout for associations within the two communities.

Most of the development projects that are externally financed are driven by individual, engaged, members of diaspora associations. If the associations apply for funding through, for example, the DRC, it is often an individual project manager that engages in the actual process of implementing the project rather than all the members of the associations. As one project manager revealed: “When I say, “I” all the time, it is because I ran the project on my own, at least in the beginning. Not many from the association were active in it. It was very much a ‘one woman show’ and I didn’t even think of asking’. The roles played by project managers also include employing professional skills. Examples of this include the Danish–Somali psychiatrist, Fatuma Ali, who started a mental health centre in Burao, Somaliland, funded by Somali diaspora organisations with ad hoc support from the DRC Diaspora Programme. She moved to the area for a period of time to train local personnel and develop local capacity. Because of the success of this project Fatuma Ali will now be starting up a similar project in Mogadishu in the near future. Likewise an Afghan pharmacist applied for funding from the DRC to build a library for pharmacists in Kabul and to update their book collections, engaging the local Afghan pharmacists in international networks of pharmacists to develop capacity in the area of medical treatment in Afghanistan.

Associations that have obtained external funding in the form of the DRC DP grants include both relatively small associations of around 30 members to associations with more than 300 members. This underlines the importance of the individual or core group members who run the project. It can be seen from the DRC DP that a large number of the projects that obtain support are upscaling of existing schools, sanitation, health clinics, agricultural production and libraries. Yet projects that aim at implementing new projects, for instance a school in a district without one, are also found among the projects that are funded through the DRC DP (DRC 2015b).

Seven of the diaspora associations included in this study have obtained support from the DRC DP. The Afghan Cultural Association (Tolana) has achieved funding in the pilot phase and in a second round to further the development of the Library and Cultural Centre (see case box 4 on page 52). Katib Cultural Association has achieved funding for three projects, carried out by different project managers within the association. A further six associations had applied to the DRC DP but their projects were rejected.

The process of applying and the following review within the DRC have caused some grievances between the associations, among diaspora representatives included in this study as well as among members of the DRC advisory boards. The advisory boards are described as a way of creating ownership and including the diaspora representatives themselves in the selection process. However, there is a risk of creating conflict between the associations in relation to this process. The rejected applicants express disappointment and disagreement. They often fail to understand why other projects are eligible over their own. Strengthening the credibility and capacities of the boards, as places where potential conflicts within the communities can be addressed or even overcome, could be a way forward. Associations that fail to, or even refrain from, applying for external funding often find other ways to engage in inclusion, relief or development projects – or a combination thereof (see case box 1 on page 46).

Thus, an important finding across the associations is that there is not one diaspora or one type of diaspora association. Rather, the diaspora landscape constitutes a heterogeneous group of associations with several and diverse strategies and aims.
CASE BOX 1. HIIL NAAFO

Alternative funding measures and self-financed projects
The name Hiil Naafo means ‘support to the disabled’ in Somali, the main objective of this association. It was established in 1998 in Aarhus, a few years after the chairman came to Denmark through the UNHCR refugee programme. The association has 78 members. The aim of the association is twofold. First, it is directed towards anti-discrimination campaigns targeted at families with a Somali background living with physical disability. Second, the association aims at assisting disabled people in Somalia and east Africa more broadly. The chairman was himself injured in Somalia and is now a wheelchair user. He went to Somalia to experience how disabled persons living in Mogadishu were handling their everyday lives. Following the visit, the association has sent used equipment, such as wheelchairs and medical equipment, in containers to Somalia. They applied for funding through MS Action Aid when this funding option was still available. The association approaches private hospitals in Denmark regarding donation of used equipment. Hiil Naafo also works with technical schools to update and repair the equipment before shipping it to Somalia. In terms of funding of transportation, they fundraise within the Somali diaspora in Denmark and abroad. Besides supporting Somalia, the association has also supported refugee camps in areas neighbouring the Somali regions.

Local partners
Hiil Naafo cooperates with the UNHCR, the International Red Cross, and seven local organisations in Somalia. When it comes to transportation equipment locally, in the receiving countries, the association cooperates with the governments of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia.

MOTIVATIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT

Three aspects are identified when analysing the motivations of diaspora involvement: moral obligation, personal ambition, and spaces of recognition. Even though these three modes are distinguished analytically, it is important to emphasise that they often are interlinked and overlapping.

A sense of moral obligation to contribute has been pointed out in a range of studies of diaspora involvement and positioning (Kleist 2008, Werbner 2002). Moral obligation relates not only to supporting one’s own family, but also to engaging in humanitarian and civic projects in the country of origin more broadly (cf. Horst 2013). All representatives of diaspora associations in this study except one stated that they send remittances to their families and networks, and none them knew of anyone who do not send money home. Collective diaspora involvement was often articulated as grounded in a more generalised humanitarian motivation, with added obligations towards those ‘left behind’: ‘I try to help because I am touched by it. I often think: What if I was in that situation, I would want help’. Another interviewee stressed that she felt very lucky to have had a ‘new chance’ as a refugee and stressed ‘the obligation’ to help the once that have not had the same chance. Interestingly, individual transfers do not diminish when the senders involve themselves in more collectively-oriented diaspora projects. It should therefore be recognised that engagement in relief and development happens on both individual and collective levels, and that collective remittances do not diminish individual remittances but rather add to them.

A sense of moral obligation is sometimes combined with personal ambitions, such as when diaspora members aim to make professional careers within humanitarian or development projects. Such an engagement can be a way of boosting CVs for future career paths while at same time assisting the country of origin. Yet funding for salaries by grants such as the DRC DP and other funding schemes is rare, and according to interviewees with these aspirations, the general scarce funding opportunities and lack of ‘real’ job opportunities makes a career in the humanitarian sector a rare or unrealistic option.

Finally, associational involvement may be related to processes of recognition (cf. Kleist 2007). Involvement in organisations, whether focusing on inclusion in Denmark or development in the country of origin, offers a way of using or developing competences and being recognised for that. This does not mean that associational involvement implies an attempt at raising status, but rather points to recognition for doing something meaningful and for being a person who makes a difference. This may partly be the case for many first generation refugees, who have not been able to use or fulfil their professional competences or ambitions in Denmark or elsewhere. Here organisational engagement offers a way of using oneself and one’s competences. Whereas the labour market and political scene may be difficult to enter for some refugees, associations constitute an open sphere in Danish society, offering a potential space of recognition.
CASE BOX 2. OGADEN CONCERN ASSOCIATION

A Project in a Neighbouring Area

Ogaden Concern Association (OCA) was established in 2012 in Copenhagen and has 60 registered members. Ogaden refers to the easternmost area of Ethiopia, mainly inhabited by Somali-speaking people, where the establishing members’ grandparents originate. The purpose of the association is twofold: OCA engages in integration activities in Copenhagen where they meet every second week, but simultaneously engages in development activities in Somalia and more broadly in East Africa. Initially OCA engaged in development activities without support from external partners or funds. Their early, small-scale, development activities were member-financed and resulted in the collection for three projects of approximately 2000 dollars to finance education of orphans and other education-related activities in Somalia. After being informed of water shortages in the Kabribeyah Refugee Camp in Ethiopia, OCA applied for approximately 200,000 DKK (circa 285,00 US dollars) from the DRC Diaspora Programme in 2014. The project aims at ensuring access to sufficient safe drinking water and improved sanitation and hygiene practices in the camp. The project was initially dismissed by the DRC DP on the grounds that it was not aimed at Somalia as such. However, OCA managed to convince the DRC to expand the target areas of the DRC DP, as the project arguably would support Somali refugees in Ethiopia. OCA subsequently received funding from the DRC and one of the establishing members went to the area for six months to monitor the project.

The project has developed and updated five existing Birkas (cisterns made from concrete that collect rainwater and filter it to provide clean drinking water) in the Kabribeyah refugee camp. OCA estimates that both the local population as well as Somali refugees from the camp benefit from the project, since they share the same water resources.

Local partners

Part of the DRC Diaspora Programme entails cooperation with a local partner to achieve funding. OCA has a branch in the local area, consisting of people from the refugee camp and from the founding members’ network, who had initiated the contact with Denmark. OCA Ethiopia helped identify the local need for water and water sanitation.

NARRATIVES OF NATIONAL ORIENTATION

A point of scepticism towards diaspora involvement in development and relief efforts is the perception that diaspora initiatives tend to be directed at specific regions or groups that do not necessarily constitute the main target groups of poverty-oriented development aid; that projects often are based on the diaspora’s own assumptions (and not necessarily pressing local needs) or are directed only at clan affiliates and co-ethnic groups. This concern was also raised by policy officers and civil servants interviewed for this study. However, a majority of the diaspora organisations articulated having adopted a broader national focus to qualify for funding, especially when it concerns relief projects. As stated by a Somali diaspora organisation: ‘Our aim is exactly to move beyond only supporting our immediate families, and only supporting our ethnic groups and so on. (...) To assist the whole community, without making it about ethnic group belonging (...). Strategically we would like to create credibility by supporting different ethnic groups around the country’.

This quote reflects that some diaspora associations actively work against the assumption of being biased towards a particular place or region. The Afghan association From Street to School (see case box 3 on page 50) also aims at working beyond ethnic or regional orientation, as do many of Danish–Afghan associations. For instance, they came together to arrange a demonstration following the public stoning of Fakhunda, a woman who was blamed for burning the Quran in Afghanistan (Kaplan 2015) and again after a group of young Hazaras were abducted from buses in Southern Afghanistan (Reuters 2015). Likewise, several Somali associations mentioned the need for a Somali umbrella organisation and one of the Somali diaspora representatives, Said Hussein, general secretary of Somali Diaspora Organisation, has worked actively towards building an umbrella organisation for Somali development associations.
CASE BOX 3. FROM STREET TO SCHOOL

Aiming at overcoming ethnic barriers
From Street to School (FSTS) is a non-profit Afghan association in Odense, based on voluntary work. The main objective of the association is to financially support primary school education for street children in Afghanistan. The association has existed since 2011 and is a result of the DRC’s outreach to the Afghan community in Denmark during the DRC DP pilot phase. FSTS applied for funding to build up the association, including funding for the website, marketing materials, collecting boxes, and the establishment of six local branches of FSTS. They were granted 37,500 kr. in the pilot phase. Since 2011 the association has not received any external funding but relies on membership fees only. According to the chairman the association went from an income of 120,000 kr. in 2012 to around 400,000 kr. in 2014. The association has 330 members who pay a self-determined monthly fee – ranging from 20–500 kr. The members are mainly Danish–Afghan but approximately 30% are of other nationalities. The association consists of around 90 active volunteers, divided between the six local branches.

FSTS currently have 60 children in their education programme in Afghanistan, for whom they finance materials, school uniforms, and monthly school fees. The programme is directed at three larger cities that historically have been dominated by different ethnic groups: Jalalabad, Bamiyan, and Kabul. Overcoming ethnic barriers and working across ethnic groups, political entities and tribes, is an explicit objective of the association. The local staff (three students hired as consultants and monitors of the programme) are paid a small salary through the income of FSTS. The fact that salaries cannot be covered by external funding has been a reason for not applying, according to the association.

In addition to the education programme FSTS also throws fundraising events in relation to sudden humanitarian situations, or collects money as part of the Zakat, a traditional religious collection. The money from Zakat or the fundraising events has been used for different purposes. As an example the FSTS collected 100,000 kr. to buy 870 blankets, when several IDPs in the refugee camps of Kabul froze to death during the winter of 2013.

FSTS’ local partners
The association works locally in Kabul on an ad hoc basis with the DRC office to assist their student employees. This has been relevant when they experienced prejudice from the schools when trying to enrol the children. FSTS thus considered that a larger player such as the DRC would be able to assist in explaining the terms of the programme to the schools. They have also worked with the DRC when they have had large fundraising efforts, to try to ensure that the funds are channelled to the right beneficiaries and the right locations in Afghanistan.

Representatives of Somali and Afghan associations underline how they use their knowledge and networks to navigate in their countries of origin and thereby are able to assist areas that cannot be reached otherwise. One of the highlighted strengths of diaspora support to development is the local knowledge, affiliation and networks that diaspora organisations may possess to a larger degree than international development agencies or humanitarian organisations (Phillips 2013). Previous studies emphasise that the local knowledge, language skills and cultural elements are valuable and important for the success of any given activity (ibid.) Representatives of Somali and Afghan associations underline how they use their knowledge and networks to navigate in their countries of origin and thereby are able to assist areas that cannot be reached otherwise. The Afghan association Tolana provides an example of the importance of local networks for the implementation and sustainability of projects (see case box 4 on page 52). As is also indicated in the following quote, the organisations see their local knowledge as imperative both for identifying needs and implementation: [Being diaspora] you know the culture as well as the needs. I have seen many organisations that have tried all kinds of things that didn’t work, because the local community didn’t need it.

If you know the local community, they will also come to you and you can advise them on their ideas and recommend to them, which projects will be feasible from what you have learned [in the country of residence]. Local knowledge is worth its weight in gold’. The emphasis on local knowledge corresponds to the general assumptions concerning diaspora engagement as a potential opportunity for international development agencies. According to many diaspora representatives, being informed on local conditions is easier today with the impact of communication technology. Some organisations have worked with the idea of implementing long distance training as part of their projects. However, since technology is also connected to stability, this is still an uncertain method, meaning physical visits remain an important measure to maintain and nurture local networks and gain knowledge of the local needs. Local scepticism is also easier to overcome by
recurring visits: ‘People are a bit sceptical. The locals first thought of us as people who came to Somalia for some vacation and then we would just go back again’. By staying for a longer period, explaining the incentives of a given project and collaborating with local people, scepticism may be overcome.

**CASE BOX 4. DANISH–AFGHAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION IN GLADSAXE (TOLANA)**

**Local knowledge and networks**

Tolana is one of the largest Afghan associations in Denmark with around 400 members. Established in 2000, the aim was to gather Afghans in Denmark, offering a community, especially to newcomers. Tolana initially arranged sports activities, homework cafés and mother tongue education in Pashtu. In 2006 the association decided to visit and investigate how to assist people in Afghanistan as well:

“When the Taliban had fallen, it gave us the opportunity to access the country with the purpose of helping. We then started to think, what can we actually do [to help] from here”.

In 2008 a DRC briefing on the DRC DP inspired the association to move forward with their development project aspirations. In 2011 Tolana applied for funding for a library and cultural centre in the Alingar province of Afghanistan. They received a grant of 483,880 DKK for the project in the pilot phase and further 364,240 DKK from the programme in 2013 (DRC 2015b, 2015c). It is estimated that 2000 students and around 500 local families are beneficiaries of the project.

The chairman of Tolana arranged with his relatives around Europe and North America to create their own development fund, the Naemi Educational Helping Programme. Because interest has grown in the development projects funded by the family fund, it has changed its name to that of the region where they originate, the Alingar district in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan, to send the message that they support the whole community. The Alingar Educational Helping Programme has contributed with 10% of the own-contribution element out of 20% of the DRC-funded project. The local community of Alingar province raised the remaining 10%.

**Tolana’s local partners**

Besides the Alingar Education Helping Programme as local partner and as operator of the library, the Afghan association has been in contact with the local community and local authorities on many levels to be able to carry out the project. According to Tolana, cooperating with the locals has generally been positive, but since the local authorities often change, they have also experienced problems in continuity and encountered distrust from newly appointed officials. A new district leader once stopped the process because he feared that the Taliban would make use of the library buildings to aim at the authorities’ location very close by. He further questioned the intentions of the library. Why would private people build something that would be of benefit for the society but not for the association or the individuals themselves? The Tolana chairman contacted the district leader to convince him about the good intentions. By providing a document and getting his relatives from the Alingar Foundation all over the world to sign it, they ensured that the library would belong to the local community. Other locals that had to be addressed to ensure the project were the elders, the tribal leaders as well as local Mullahs. To convince these people of the character of the project, the association visited the various actors to make it clear that the library is open to all locals, no matter their background or religious beliefs.

The case examples suggest that diaspora involvement in development is facilitated by what could be termed ‘circular mobility trajectories’, in which development work facilitates circular mobility and vice versa. Generally, the interviewees express a desire to return to the country of origin at some point but none of them had plans of doing so in the near future. Rather they would travel back and forth when involved in development projects, facilitating knowledge and value exchanges. According to one associational representative: ‘The ones that defend the Danish values the most are in my opinion the ones that go back [to Afghanistan] to see how it is and actually visit their families ongoing’. Here ‘Danish values’ are articulated as part of the development projects, but closely linked to the importance of being updated with an ‘ongoing’ knowledge of local needs. Studies of circular migration movements have mostly been concerned with labour migration, whereas this study shows a similar – possibly more transient – form of circularity.
The associations with funding from the DRC DP in particular, or other large funds, travel to the project area for longer or shorter visits, ranging from a few weeks to six months (see for instance case boxes 2, page 48 and 4, page 52). Repatriation and return are topics often brought up in relation to development in policy initiatives, but the findings from several studies highlight the importance of being able to return on a temporary basis, holding a Danish (or other high-mobility) residence permit or citizenship (Hansen 2007, de Haas 2006, Eastmond 2006, Kleist 2007). In the words of an Afghan interviewee: ‘It [permanent residence/dual citizenship] makes it a lot easier. There are more incentives to go back and go into development work if there is an escape route. In that way you can pitch more into the job, if you have your base settled. If you take my dad who lives there, he has to compromise his work and his beliefs because he has to accept the local terms in Afghanistan’. Thus, unconstrained transnational mobility enables and facilitates diaspora engagement in development processes in their countries of origin.

ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS

It is really good that we learn how to run a project without corruption... but if there are so many requirements and restrictions attached that people [locals] won’t work with you, then it is difficult. They [the local partners] have never experienced that many requirements before. And some of them said that they would never work with us again if the money is little and the demands so hard. (Afghan informant).

The level of administrative work due to grant regulations clashes with the fact that the projects are run by volunteers, and that no money can be allocated for administration.

Somali and Afghan interviewees generally understood that requirements are needed and appreciate the assistance from funding organisations, but consistently mentioned administration as a burden for volunteers. The associations are pleased with the opportunity to act as project managers and develop capacity but working as a volunteer entails high demands on both a personal and a professional level. The level of administrative work due to grant regulations clashes with the fact that the projects are run by volunteers, and that no money can be allocated for administration. In addition, projects within the DRC framework include a 15% own contribution. The combination of voluntary work with high administrative demands - and an (implicit) expectation of a degree of professionalism that equals that of (other) NGOs - has to be considered and discussed. Many of the project managers interviewed expressed that they cannot see themselves as project managers again due to the workload and pressure on their job, studies and/or family. In the words of one of them: 'Every dime goes where it belongs. There is no waste. But it is very time costly for us. The administrative requirements are as massive as the ones that the large NGOs have to live up to. The difference is, though, that they have hired staff to fix the administrative part. They have secretaries and other paid staff members. We only have our good intentions and only very little time'. While such conditions may promote ownership they also hamper long-term engagement and may hence work against engagement in several development projects. The more administrative demands and the more professionalised the grants become, the harder it is to keep the voluntary approach.

INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS

The municipalities are more likely to cooperate or support associations that are focused on activities aimed at the local area of the municipality. Our young volunteers are activated in the local branches, they have to agree on by-laws, a board, they have to be elected. In a way you have to be democratic and be able to cooperate with other branches and other youth organisations. But even though our association’s work can be seen as indirect integration work, we can’t really cooperate with them because our main goal is helping in Afghanistan.

Funding opportunities and their priorities contribute to defining the official focus of Somali and Afghan associations, creating institutional barriers between activities focusing on Denmark and their countries of origin. Many of the associations apply for funding or other forms of support from the municipalities where they live and, for instance, the Ministry of Social Affairs. Such funding can only be used in a Danish context and not homeland development. However, many of the associations do not perceive their volunteer work in Denmark and, say, in Afghanistan as discrete processes but rather as an integrated approach driven by the motivation to help where they can. Funding regulations may thus push some associations to choose between inclusion activities in Denmark and development work in Somalia or Afghanistan. This tendency is aggravated when funding opportunities are scarce or not seen as transparent.
The clear-cut distinction between inclusion activities in Danish society and homeland development reflects policy incoherence that may delimit and hamper development contributions from diaspora associations. This is an important point as studies have shown that integration in the country of residence has a positive impact on the contribution to development activities in the country of origin (ICMPD & ECDPM 2013, Sharma et al. 2011). Integration and transnational activities should thus not be seen as opposed efforts but rather as complementing efforts that could feed productively into each other. Policymakers are therefore encouraged to work for better coherence between internal and foreign policy matters (Saggiorno and Ferro 2014, Newland & Patrick 2004, Van Hear et al. 2004, Mezzetti et al. 2010, Ionescu 2005). Building on this, it is suggested, for example, that policymakers and agencies look beyond (conceivable or imagined) conflicts among diaspora nationals (Horst et al. 2010). As well as the conflicts themselves, negative perceptions and preconceptions about diasporas as bearers of conflict risk being obstacles to collaboration. Establishing or improving open dialogue can be a means to overcome both imagined and ongoing conflicts between and within diaspora groups where fragmentation can be addressed in constructive ways.

**Funding opportunities and their priorities contribute to defining the official focus of Somali and Afghan associations, creating institutional barriers between activities focusing on Denmark and their countries of origin.**

Finally, several associations emphasised the importance of transparency in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Opportunities for dialogue and policy consultation were a widespread wish, also in relation to the work of embassies and consulates in their country of origin and neighbouring areas.
This report has examined diasporas as development actors with particular focus on two larger refugee groups residing in Denmark: Somalis and Afghans. Somalia and Afghanistan are among the main recipients of Danish and international development aid, and the role of Somali and Afghan diaspora groups is highlighted in the Regions of Origin Initiative directed towards Afghanistan and the New Deal Compact for Somalia. So far, Somali and Afghan associations are the only two targeted recipient groups for the DRC Diaspora Programme and thus constitute potential strategic partners for Danida. The report shows that the area around diaspora support remains complex. On the one hand, several funding opportunities exist and both Somali and Afghan associations are engaged in development activities in their countries of origin, in some— but far from all— cases supported by Danida-based schemes. On the other hand, a number of institutional barriers hamper further development of diaspora cooperation.

Three main diaspora support models are identified: general co-founding schemes for development NGOs, special diaspora initiatives, and network support. These models usually coexist and activities often overlap with matching funding and emphasis on capacity development as cross-cutting aspects. In the Danish context the two first models refer to funding administered by, respectively, CISU and the DRC Diaspora Programme, whereas network support is less tangible. A tension exists between engaging diasporas ‘in their own right’ and ‘professionalising’ or ‘mainstreaming’ their activities to correspond to official development modalities. Another pitfall is that development cooperation agencies, or other donors, engage or risk being perceived as engaging with diaspora groups with the aim of ‘tapping’ their resources or promoting a particular political agenda without considering the priorities or activities of the actors involved.

Both Somali and Afghan associations are engaged in a combination of inclusion, relief, and development activities spanning residential municipalities in Denmark, transnational networks in the wider diaspora and the home country. Somali associations are more numerous, tend to be more active and have been so for a longer time than their Afghan counterparts, whose engagement is more recent and often a direct consequence of DRC’s outreach activities. Somali associations are also more proactive at approaching the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in embracing the diaspora–development discourse. These differences notwithstanding, both groups stress their knowledge of local conditions and circular mobility trajectories as unique qualities that facilitate their engagement in development and relief efforts. Traveling to the project areas for periods ranging from a few weeks to six months, or being able to ‘return’ on a transient basis are closely related to having obtained permanent residence or citizenship in Denmark. This point accentuates the fact that facilitation of transnational linkages, circular mobility and inclusion in the country of residence enhance diaspora involvement in development.

Three motivational aspects for diaspora involvement were identified at the personal and community level. Moral obligation involves support for both personal family members and humanitarian and civic projects in the countries of origin. Personal ambition refers to aspirations to make a career within humanitarian or development projects. Whether involved in inclusion in Denmark or development back ‘home’ the search for spaces of recognition points to the human need to do something meaningful and to be recognised as a person who makes a difference. Such motivational aspects should be taken into account and nourished when engaging with diaspora actors.

Major obstacles to engaging in development or relief activities were identified in several spheres. First, issues of local security, trust and different political ‘cultures’ in the countries of origin vis-à-vis Denmark, for instance in regard to corruption, constitute challenges for diaspora associations as well as for other development actors working in fragile and (post-)conflict situations. Diaspora associations may have the comparative advantage of language and knowledge of local conditions, but may also be subject to considerable pressure. Second, diaspora associations face institutional barriers in regard to administrative burdens. The administrative work required by grant regulations clashes with the fact that projects are expected to be carried out by volunteers. Third, institutional barriers arise when diaspora associations see their work on integration in Denmark and development in their countries of origin as closely related but different funding structures insist on their separation and suspect diaspora associations of misusing funds if separation is not strictly maintained. The clear-cut distinction between inclusion activities in Danish society and homeland development reflects a lack of policy coherence that may limit or hamper development contributions from diaspora associations. This is an important point as several studies have indicated that integration in the country of residence has a positive impact on the contribution to development activities in the country of origin (ICMPD & ECDPM 2013, Sharma et al. 2011). Finally, some development professionals are hesitant to support or collaborate with diaspora associations because of a perceived fear that their projects are too narrowly focussed and that diasporas are bearers of conflict. In each their own way, these barriers may prevent effective collaboration and hence impede the development potential of diaspora involvement. Establishing or improving open dialogue as a means to overcome both imagined and existing conflicts between and within diaspora groups offers an avenue through which fragmentation can be addressed in constructive ways.
The study has focused exclusively on experiences related to Afghan and Somali diaspora associations in Denmark. Specific conflict/fragility and diaspora formation histories are important contexts for engaging in support and cooperation arrangements. Taking such contexts into account and adjusting cooperation arrangements accordingly would generate many findings and recommendations applicable to other organised diaspora groups with ideas and plans to engage in development and relief projects in their countries of origin. The feasibility of extending the number of national diaspora groups depends on the level of interest in homeland development expressed by such groups but also on the capacity of the project support administering bodies. As one of the benefits of diaspora initiatives is the tailormade support offered, sufficient existing knowledge and resources to continuously support and monitor activities are prerequisites for success.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Acknowledging the wide range of competences, skills, qualifications and dedicated efforts towards home country development in organised diaspora associations, the study recommends:

■ That the heterogeneity of diaspora associations is recognised and seen as a strength, not a hindrance, for engaging diasporas in development cooperation and relief activities. No ‘one-size-fits-all’ models should be adopted.

■ That divergent funding conditions and requirements set by ministries, municipalities and other public funding institutions recognise the unique potential for embracing integration and development efforts within single projects. Policymakers are encouraged to work for better coherence between internal and foreign policy matters and to break down divisions between different resort ministries. This would enhance the impact of both integration and development activities.

■ That a flexible approach to funding projects in fragile situations is adopted. The role of funders should be to create enabling environments, rather than constraining diasporas’ transnational engagements. It is important that more flexible funding possibilities are not accompanied by excessive administrative requirements. It is therefore suggested to develop more funding opportunities with less administrative burdens, particularly in relation to smaller projects and ‘start-up activities’ for inexperienced associations.

■ That a forum for policy dialogue and consultation is established. To facilitate transparency in the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diaspora representation, dialogue and policy consultation must be ensured at local, national and international level.

■ That development agencies strive to partner with diaspora associations by including them in decision-making processes, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of concrete policies and activities in both countries of origin and destination. For diaspora engagement to succeed and develop, it is important that diaspora associations are approached as equal partners, in policy formulation and as new and different partners in implementation. Frameworks for doing this should acknowledge that diasporas are different from traditional partners and that their strength lies in the transnational relations they are able to maintain.

■ That the objective of engaging diasporas in development cooperation and relief includes the ideas and needs of diaspora associations rather than harnessing the diaspora for the needs of national and international development agencies. Engaging with diaspora groups involves a certain level of risk taking.

■ Long-term funding is a consistent recommendation in international evaluations of diaspora support. It is recommended to upscale existing diaspora initiatives through securing long-term funding and through allocating more funds to existing programs and recipient diaspora groups.

■ Diaspora engagement cannot be a substitute for state or private investment in home country reconstruction and development. While private business investment has not been an important activity for Afghan and Somali diaspora groups included in this study, further opportunities for channelling direct foreign investments through the diaspora (as either shareholders or investors) should be explored.
ANNEX
Overview of interviews and meetings
## Somali representatives

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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abdi Kahin</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
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<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdirizak Farah</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Viborg Somali Association</td>
<td>Viborg</td>
<td>Email/phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Kadir M. Gaal</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>DRC Advisory Board</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Matan</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Anti-Tribalism Movement, UK</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed Dharbazo</td>
<td>Consultant/Founder</td>
<td>Capacity building consultant for the DRC programme/Næstved Africa Association</td>
<td>Næstved</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<td>Ahmed M. Elmi</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Hiil naafo (Dansk-Somalisk handikapforering)</td>
<td>Aarhus</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<td>Awil Abdi Ade</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Somali Street Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fara Issa</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Kulan</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatuma Ali</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Mental Health in Somalia, Foreningen mod kvindesoenskæring</td>
<td>Copenhagen/Frederikshavn</td>
<td>Phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hibo</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Familiecenter Rose</td>
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<td>Idris Moh</td>
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<td>Copenhagen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahad Yussuf</td>
<td>Advisor and Member</td>
<td>DRC Advisory Board/associations</td>
<td>Aarhus</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohamed Gelle</td>
<td>Former active association member</td>
<td>Various associations, active in politics</td>
<td>Albertslund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohamed Warde</td>
<td>Project Chief</td>
<td>Aquashabelle Natural Mineral Water</td>
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<td>Said Adam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Said A. Hussein</td>
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<td>Yasmin</td>
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### Afghan representatives

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<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hadi Belawal &amp;</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Twelve organisations</td>
<td>Vejle and other cities</td>
<td>General meeting/group interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colleagues</td>
<td></td>
<td>represented/28 participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arzo Afzali</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Aarhus Dansk Afghansk</td>
<td>Aarhus</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashil Farokh</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>From Street to School</td>
<td>Odense/branches in smaller cities</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Abachri</td>
<td>Volunteer/Project Coordinator</td>
<td>Walking Future</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gul Haydar</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Katib Cultural Association</td>
<td>Rødovre</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris Saber</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Foreningen af Afghanske Jurister</td>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maina Abbasi</td>
<td>Previous Chairman/Project Manager</td>
<td>Katib Cultural Association</td>
<td>Rødovre</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Sadad</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Afghansk Dansk Venskabs-forening</td>
<td>Vejle</td>
<td>FaceToFace/phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setara Nigar</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Afghan Youth Association Denmark (AYAD)</td>
<td>Copenhagen/branches in smaller cities in DK</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafiq Farsad</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>AEUPA/Forening af Afghanske Farmaceuter</td>
<td>Flensborg/Southern Denmark</td>
<td>Phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoukat Naeimi</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Tolana/ Afghansk Kulturforening</td>
<td>Gladsaxe</td>
<td>FaceToFace</td>
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</table>

### Experts, policymakers, practitioners, grantmakers etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maria Molde</td>
<td>Advisor with special focus on migrant and diaspora organisations</td>
<td>CISU – Civil society in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mingo Heiduk</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council, Diaspora Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Thomsen</td>
<td>Head of Humanitarian Team/Chief Adviser</td>
<td>DMFA (initiated the Diaspora Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernille Dueholm</td>
<td>Head of Section</td>
<td>DMFA – Office for Asia, Latin America and Oceania, Team Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louise Mariegaard</td>
<td>Chief Advisor</td>
<td>DMFA – Afghanistan team (ALD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Søren Skou Rasmussen</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>DMFA–UFT (formerly in Hargeisa at the Danish consulate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivian Mathilde Kuijpers</td>
<td>First Secretary, Political Counsellor</td>
<td>Danish Embassy in Nairobi, Somalia Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jette Michelsen</td>
<td>Chief Advisor</td>
<td>DMFA – Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthe Frederiksen</td>
<td>Anthropologist</td>
<td>Fieldwork in Afghanistan and among Afghan–British diasporas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgina Awonoor-Gordon</td>
<td>International Grants Programme Manager</td>
<td>COMIC Relief, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allison Rose Grady</td>
<td>International Grants Programme Assistant</td>
<td>COMIC Relief, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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1 Two interviews were additionally conducted in the UK with a Somali association and an NGO. See appendix.

2 In addition to homogenisation, the term ‘diaspora’ can be criticised for assuming belonging to and responsibility towards an imagined homeland with the implication that other kinds of practices and senses of belonging are ignored, for instance inclusion in the country of residence.

3 In destination countries much emphasis was put on migration as a threat to social cohesion, in origin countries fear of brain drain (losing highly skilled and locally needed professionals to Western countries) became the main emphasis.

4 The term ‘fragile’ is generally deployed to describe low-income states or regions with malfunctioning governments that cannot provide overall safety and stable livelihoods for the population. States that are termed fragile are often affected by internal and/or external conflict. However, the term is not neutral. First, because it reveals that some states have the power to define other states as fragile. Second, if states encompass the term, it might open up for e.g. development support. In this report the term is used to recognise how insecure situations in Afghanistan and Somalia might affect the opportunities to engage in development for actors including diaspora associations. For a thorough discussion on fragile states and terminology see Engberg-Pedersen et al. (2008).

5 Diaspora representative and civil servant, personal communication, and, for example, Salah (2014).

6 Other private initiatives that build on engaging the private sector exist, e.g. corporations such as Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI). However, the aim of DAI is not directed at diasporas or nationals in the country of operations as such but aims at a general ‘global outlook’ (DAI 2015).

7 For recent publications on the linkages between diaspora, displacement, investment and return, see Åkesson & Ibazz (2015) and Hammar (2014).

8 Hawala are money transfers made through setting of obligations in different countries without cash actually crossing borders (Phillips 2013).

9 Hazaras are one of several ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The group composes 9% of the population today (after a massacre in 1893, when the ethnic group made up 67% of the population). Hazaras face persistent discrimination in many areas of the country, although some sources indicate that the situation has improved since the fall of the Taleban (Minority Rights 2015, UNHCR 2012).


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Migrant Communities. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
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In 2015, the grant focused on three themes: urban spaces of development, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and diasporas as development actors.