THE DESIRE FOR ORDER: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO (WORLD) ORDER

Lars Erslev Andersen
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Lars Erslev Andersen
Senior Researcher
lean@diis.dk

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DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies
Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
Tel: +45 32 69 87 87
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
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INTRODUCTION

This working paper is a chapter in a book project on theories about world order. The first part of the book describes three different but related approaches to understanding order.

The first approach is pragmatic and is based on classical Greek philosophy, German conceptual history and modern physics. It suggests a model for an order encompassing four dimensions: time, space, boundary and hierarchy. Inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, it replaces the concept of history with that of genealogy. Inspired by Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, it introduces an understanding of world order as will and representation. This is followed by a discussion of theories of international relations, which are criticized for placing too much emphasis on a ‘post-Westphalian proto-concept’ as the standard for understanding the system of states in theories about world order. Finally, inspired by the theoretical paradigm shift in theoretical physics brought about by Einstein’s theories of relativity and the development of quantum mechanics, an argument is made for the need for a paradigm shift in social science theory in the study of international relations.

The second approach is theoretical. Based on Kant and Schopenhauer, and including Einstein’s theories, this approach proposes a definition of the will to life as the desire for order. Finally, this is put into perspective using Nietzsche’s determination of two fundamental desires based on his studies of Greek tragedy, namely the Apollonian and Dionysian. The approach discusses and argues for a number of theories about world order to be rethought based on the definition of world order as will and representation and the will to life as the desire for order.

This is the chapter that is presented in this working paper. In the book project it is followed by a third approach to an understanding of order, namely a historical narrative of different international orders from the Catholic Order of the Middle Ages to the American Order in the 20th and 21th centuries. Following a discussion of the civilization thesis put forward by Samuel P. Huntington and theories about regional security complexes, this approach describes the European order by analysing how developments in the international order have been interpreted from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 via the Vienna Congress of 1815 to the establishment of the new American order in the contemporary era. The framework for this discussion is the establishment of a so-called ‘New World Order’ in light of the ending of the Cold War and disagreements between the US and the Soviet Union about what this new world order should look like and how it should be understood and realized.

In this working paper, we present the theoretical approach to the development of a Model of Order. We very much welcome comments on the ideas and theses it represents.
SPACE AS INTUITION

In this working paper, we set out to describe a theoretical and principal understanding of order. As we have previously demonstrated, in Greek philosophy space was understood as finite and bounded, whereas today it is understood as infinite. Similarly, time, including perceptions of historical time, has been subject to many different interpretations, from Classical thinking to contemporary physics. Although there have been earlier theories and notions about linear time, the idea of historical time as a process of linear development shaped by humans did not become prominent until the Renaissance. Within the framework of Enlightenment philosophy, this idea was reinterpreted as the idea of progress, that is, of humanity’s perpetual progress towards something better in a development called civilization, until this idea of progress itself came under fire from many different critics, for example, during the Romantic period, but most spectacularly perhaps from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and his idea of ‘eternal recurrence’.

Theories about time have also kept natural scientists busy, and Albert Einstein’s revolutionary ideas in his theories of relativity have led to theories about time that go against all the usual representations of space and time – theories that allow us to use mathematics to describe time travel and that inspire film producers to show us travelling between galaxies using wormholes. Einstein merged time and space in a theory of space-time that completely abandoned mathematics’ traditional foundations in Euclidian geometry, that is, the geometry that Euclid presented more than two thousand years ago and that is still being taught in most schools around the world today.

This means that space is not just space, which in a way it never was. Particularly in the second half of the 1600s and subsequently, mathematicians and philosophers debated fiercely what space is and how to describe it. Discussions between the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and the English scientist and mathematician Isaac Newton (1643-1727) played a crucial role in debates about space for centuries ahead. They both developed differential and integral mathematics. Even though Newton came first with his discovery in 1669, he did not publish his results until 1711. So, when Leibniz arrived at his own results in 1675 and published them in 1677, he did not know about Newton’s work, which was not published until much later. Subsequently, there was a bitter debate between the two positions, with Newton’s followers wrongfully accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. The debate turned even more hostile when Leibniz criticised Newton’s theories of time and space following the publication of the latter’s Principia Mathematica in 1687. The English theologian Samuel Clark represented Newton in correspondence with Leibniz, who criticised Newton’s...
concept of ‘motion’ and argued for a different understanding of space than that described by Newton in his principal work.\(^1\) One problem was how to understand the difference between absolute and relative motion. This problem is illustrated by the fact that you can experience yourself to be moving when, in fact, it is objects around you that are moving. One familiar example is the situation of sitting in a train standing in a station and thinking that it has started to move, but then realising that it is another train next to it that has started to move. Both Newton and Leibniz believed that we have to be able to describe space in order to understand absolute movement. This raised a number of questions: Does space exist on its own and independently of the objects that exist in it? Does space exist independently of our knowledge of space, and what is the relationship between space and our mental representation of space? Newton maintained that space exists as an absolute phenomenon independently of the objects in it. We therefore say that he had an absolute understanding of space. Leibniz, who argued that space exists only as relations between objects, contested this understanding. Subsequently, therefore, Newton's description of space has been called absolute and Leibniz's relational. The debate touched upon several problems, such as those of 'same place', which Leibniz used to argue his relational theory of motion, of empty space, etc.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who started his academic career as a professor of mathematics in Konigsberg, was strongly inspired by both Leibniz and Newton. Therefore, it is no coincidence that, in his dissertation on the conditions for cognition, Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason], from 1781 (revised edition 1787),\(^2\) Kant based the introduction to his critical philosophy on their earlier debates about time and space. This work has been described as Kant's break with the empiricists, primarily the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), and as an epistemological argument for the validity of scientific knowledge about the physical world presented in Newton's Principia Mathematica. Although Kant wanted to save Newton’s theory from the scepticism of the empiricists, he refrained from choosing sides in the Newton–Leibniz debate and interestingly struggled more with Leibniz’s 'metaphysics of nature' than with Newton’s 'mathematical exploration of nature', as he so beautifully described the latter's endeavours. Kant addresses the Newton–Leibniz debate in the introduction to his epistemological theory in a section titled transcendental aesthetics. By ‘transcendental’, Kant refers to conditions that are necessary and universal before

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(a priori) any sensory experience and conceptualisation, that is, to a priori conditions that shape and categorise the empirical expressions in the cognitive process. This is where he disagreed with both Newton’s and Leibniz’s respective descriptions of space: neither of them provides an exhaustive and consistent definition of space because all their definitions already include a representation of space. For example, in his description of ‘same place’ and the empty space between objects, Leibniz argues that, by abstraction from these, a pure mathematics can be developed that leads to a formal concept of space. However, Kant argues that throughout this abstraction, at every level, there is always an immediate representation of space prior to any experience of space. The same arguments, he claims, can be applied to time. Here, however, we will restrict ourselves to the discussion of space (space structures our external sensory experience geometrically, while time is what Kant calls an inner sense that allows us to experience change).

Does this mean that space is a concept that is a priori to the cognitive process? No, says Kant, because our representation of space does not lend itself to exhaustive conceptual analysis, on which he elaborates in a lengthy discussion of the definition of ‘concept’. However, we will desist from commenting on this here and will proceed directly to his conclusion: ‘Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore, the original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.’

Thus, space is not a concept; it is a form of intuition. Because space depends on, and in itself contains, an infinite number of representations of space, says Kant, it cannot be a concept but is pure intuition, or a form of intuition. He works with two forms of intuition in his epistemology: space and time.

If we agree with Kant’s argument that space is not a concept, we could claim that the same applies to the representation of order. An analysis of order reveals that the representation of order in itself contains an infinite number of representations of order and that, before any discussion and analysis of order, we always already have a representation of order. Furthermore, we could reason that, strictly speaking, order is not a concept but a form of intuition, and so it would follow

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that, prior to any given experience of a given order, we have a pure intuition of order. However, there is a catch to defining order as a form of intuition, which is that order always contains a measure of judgement: is it beautiful, ugly, coherent, incomplete, etc.? Therefore, order cannot be a (third) form of intuition; it cannot be pure intuition. We will come back to the notion that order is a cognitive schema and an idea produced by reason.

THE WORLD IS MY OWN REPRESENTATION

Kant’s forms of intuition were only the first building blocks in his grand and complex theory. After the introduction, in which he describes how sensory experiences in the perceiving subject are always already shaped by time and space, he goes on to present his categories of understanding: a series of concepts (twelve in total), which also come before experience and which, together with forms of intuition, allow us to make analytical and synthetic judgements, that is, to acquire new knowledge. With this, Kant achieved what he alluded to as his Copernican shift in epistemology: it is not the world and the objects in the world that determine our understanding of the world, but the subject who shapes the world, thanks to the subject’s a priori transcendental functions. We use the word functions here because Kant is primarily concerned with how our cognitive process works. Thus, Kant works with a subject that understands and navigates the world based on a priori functions in the mind, a subject who can therefore never know the world as it exists in itself, separate from the subject, but only as it is produced in the subject’s cognition through the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding: through the way the subject orders and organises the object of its reflection. In order to establish his epistemology and provide a supportive basis for the validity of Newtonian science and Euclidian geometry, and thus to defend its truth values against the criticisms of the sceptics, Kant therefore had to make a distinction between the world as it appears to – or, rather, as it is produced by – the sensing subject, and the world as it exists in itself, which does not lend itself to the subject’s understanding.

Kant’s successor, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), expressed this point even more succinctly in a tart, ironic comment to his contemporaries at the University of Berlin, the theoretical philosophers Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854): ‘In the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-professors we are still taught to this day, that perception of the outer world is a thing of the senses, and then there follows a long
dissertation upon each of the five senses; whereas no mention whatever is made of the intellectual character of perception: that is to say, of the fact, that it is mainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means of its own peculiar form of Causality, primarily creates and produces the objective, outer world out of the raw material of a few sensations’.4 In other words, the world is my own representation!

This Kantian conclusion was unacceptable to the philosophy professors because it shook the very foundations of their grand philosophical systems. In his comprehensive systematic philosophy, Hegel, the builder of systems par excellence, insisted on dismantling Kant’s (and Schopenhauer’s) rejection of the possibility to know the world as it is in itself (Ding an Sich), and thus ultimately his aim was to reject the conclusion that the world is my own representation.

In contrast to Kant, Hegel insisted that knowledge is a synthesis of the subject’s knowledge of an apprehensible outer world, and thus Hegel’s system is the culmination of a way of thinking about cognition that gained precedence in the Renaissance, first and foremost with the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes (1596-1650), and which is often referred to as the subject–object or mind–body dualism or the philosophy of mind. However, Hegel’s system was merely the last effort of a dying philosophy, on which the Danish religious author and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) ironically remarked on several occasions, as in his book The Sickness unto Death: ‘A thinker erects an immense building, a system, a system which embraces the whole of existence and world-history etc. – and if we contemplate his personal life, we discover to our astonishment this terrible and ludicrous fact, that he himself does not live in this immense high-vaulted palace, but in a barn alongside of it, or in a dog kennel, or at the most in the porter’s lodge. If one were to take the liberty of calling his attention to this by a single word, her world be offended. For he has no fear of being under a delusion, if only he can get the system completed by means of the delusion.’5

Although Kierkegaard’s remark is mostly a polemical rejection of Hegel’s philosophy, it is nonetheless a good illustration of the epistemological turn that came after Hegel and German idealism, and which had begun with Kant, that is, in the form of a shift away from the philosophy of mind. While Hegel can be said to have brought this paradigm to its grotesque perfection (if we are to go along with Kierkegaard’s polemical judgement), Kant, with his Copernican turn, can be

credited with initiating the deconstruction of the paradigm that was to become the trademark of widely different theoretical formulations in the twentieth century, for example, within linguistics and structuralism after Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss, within phenomenology and hermeneutics after Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl and Hans-Georg Gadamer, within linguistic philosophy after Ludwig Wittgenstein, within psychoanalysis after Sigmund Freud, and within the natural sciences with quantum mechanics after Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr. All of these schools of thought involve a rejection of the notion that cognition can be described as the relation of a subject to the world (object), and that such a relation is characterised by a congruence (a direct correspondence) between human reason and cognition on the one hand, and the actual design and nature of the world on the other hand (correspondence theory). This is not to say that all of these radical trends in the history of philosophy are based on Kant – that is, that they are in essence Kantian – but only that Kant, with his Copernican turn, made possible new perspectives on cognition and philosophy that were vital for the birth of these new trends.

Thus, Kant initiated a paradigm shift in our understanding of cognition. Some people refer to the new paradigm as constructivist because cognition is understood to be a result of – i.e. is constructed by – our a priori conditions for cognition. This means that the way our brains and senses are constructed is what produces our cognition or representation of the world. However, this does not lead to relativism, to a situation in which anything goes: naturally, Louis Hjelmslev’s empirical principle also applies to the philosophy of the transcendental subject (Kant and Schopenhauer) that in modern language we call constructivism, and thus constructivism is obliged to obtain general knowledge that can be verified both empirically and theoretically within the paradigms that predominate in the various scientific disciplines.

6 The theory of quantum mechanics is often dated to the beginning of the year 1900, when the German physicist Max Planck (1858-1947) calculated the energy of a field by looking at energy as divided into packets or quanta. Albert Einstein further developed this idea in 1905 in his thesis on the photoelectric effect in which he proposes that light consists of quanta, or particles, which he calls photons. Einstein received the Nobel Prize in Physics for his thesis in 1921, but was not happy about this because of his failure to come to terms with quantum mechanics, the real father of which was, in fact, Niels Bohr.

7 The Danish Linguist Louis Hjelmslev suggested in a published lecture what he called the Empirical Principle. Louis Hjelmslev: Omkring sprogteoriens grundlæggelse (København: Københavns Universitet 1943), p. 12: Beskrivelsen skal være modsigeløsefr, udtømmende og den simpelst mulige [vi kursiverer]. Kravet om modsigeløsefrheden er overordnet kravet om udtømmende beskrivelse. Kravet om udtømmende beskrivelse er overordnet kravet om simpelhed. Vi vover at benævne dette princip empiriprincippet. Men vi er villige til at fravige denne benævnelse dersom erkendelsesteoriens gennem undersøgelse finder den inadækvat. Dette er for os kun et terminologisk spørgsmål, der ikke berører principets opretholdelse”. Unfortunately, the lecture has not been published in English. The main points in Hjelmslev’s principle for valid scientific knowledge are that the description is (1) free of contradictions, (2) exhaustive, and (3) the simplest possible.
Kant did not complete his project; from an epistemological perspective, it was actually completed by Schopenhauer. However, Schopenhauer’s determination of the forms of intuition and the concept of causality was also restricted by an outdated mechanistic-Newtonian world view, which, given the new insights brought about by the twentieth century, obviously places serious limitations on the theory. Even so, we concur with the assessment of Kant’s philosophy set out by a group of young Kantian philosophers and researchers in their book on his final work, *The Critique of Judgement* (1790), which was published for the first time in a complete Danish translation in 2005. In the introduction to their book on Kant’s work, Esther Oluffa Pedersen, Per Jepsen and Carsten Friberg maintain that Kant irrevocably changed the basis for all later philosophy and that, even though not every philosophical endeavour following Kant can be said to be Kantian, most are nonetheless characterised by a certain Kantian way of asking philosophical questions.⁸

This is lavish praise, given that Kant did not complete his project. On the one hand, the project aimed to set epistemology apart from all sorts of dogmatic expressions about everything imaginable, and he definitely succeeded in this. On the other hand, it was a project to rescue the natural sciences and Newton’s Laws of Physics from the empirical acid bath of scepticism. He was only partially successful in this latter endeavour, it would seem, because Newton’s theories did not give us the final, true answer about physics, astronomy and the world, restricted as it was by the postulates upon which Euclid’s geometry is based. Einstein’s theories about the relativity of time, the curvature of space and the existence of space waves based on non-Euclidian geometry, coupled with his rejection of Euclid’s parallel line postulate, revealed large deficiencies in the theory, the truth value of which Kant wanted to demonstrate with his epistemology. We will return to this shortly.

**ORDER AND COGNITION**

Kant, with his Copernican turn, was nevertheless able to establish a new agenda for the way we ask philosophical questions. This was due to the ensuing widespread support for his rejection of the assumption that our consciousness and the world follow the same rules and logics and consequently that, if we can

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understand the architecture of consciousness, we can understand the architecture of the outer world. Kant did not merely discredit this assumption; he completely dismantled it and instead insisted on asking the philosophical questions all over again, thus making a new beginning by examining transcendental assumptions. Here, he applied a transcendental method that insists on examining the functionality of cognition before experience, and he developed a theory about how the cognitive process works – or rather, he developed a model of human consciousness, although understandably he was reluctant to use this wording.

He restricted his definition of cognition to cover knowledge of the physical world, but he was obviously not blind to the fact that there is much more to humans than understanding and reason: we also have emotions, we act morally, and we ask grand metaphysical questions. This was also something he addressed in his thinking, especially in his later works, but under the regime of reason. Reason produces ideas and asks questions for which there are no definitive, valid answers: in the context of this paper, it would be natural to identify ‘world order’ as an idea that is produced by reason but which cannot be validated with the same stringency with which our knowledge of the physical world, according to Kant, can be validated. All of these aspects – morality, the relationship between necessity and freedom, and differences and similarities in man’s duality of nature and reason – became the field of interest for his critical philosophical examinations after he had established his epistemology, and thus the field of interest for his remaining active career as a philosopher. He presents his philosophical examinations in his two subsequent works, of which we have already mentioned the Critique of Judgement, which could be seen as an endeavour to tie together his entire critical-philosophy project. The very important work carried out by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason and in his second critical work on moral philosophy, Critique of Practical Reason of 1788 (and in his examination of judgement, in which analyses of the beautiful and the sublime bring him into the field of aesthetics), together constitute his complete system. As we are only touching on aspects of Kant’s system that are relevant to the context of this paper we cannot do justice to its full complexity here. For more comprehensive expositions, see, for example, the excellent book by the younger Kantian researchers mentioned above. We are not interested in Kant’s philosophy as such, but in the equally important aspect that describes the process of cognition or, in very un-Kantian terms, his functional theory about the way humans sense, perceive, know and are in the world in order to examine what this says about order, including world order. In this context, it is sections in the first and third Critique that are the focus of our interest.

Previously, in a section on the pragmatic approach to order that is not included in the present working paper, we mentioned that, according to Kant, concepts without intuition are empty, and that intuition without concepts is blind. Therefore, before we arrive at an object for cognition, a series of syntheses must take place. Our consciousness and our body are exposed to a constant stream of sensory experiences are constructed in time and space into representations which can be distinguished from other representations, and which can then be recognised by virtue of the categories of understanding. As a result, the object for our cognition is constructed. This process is carried out through a creative cognitive
ability that Kant calls the productive power of imagination, but which in more modern usage could be termed image-creating or figure-shaping imagination. We have to imagine a pre-language (pre-discursive), unconscious and spontaneous process that immediately produces coherent images, figures and objects – i.e. entities – out of the diversity of sensory impressions with which our understanding is constantly bombarded.

If our consciousness is exposed to more sensory impressions than our power of imagination can manage, our faculty of understanding is stressed, and the process breaks down. The US military exploited this principle at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba, where they exposed prisoners to flashing lights and loud heavy-metal music for hours on end. In a normal context, the productive power of imagination will be constantly active, producing images, figures and objects that our understanding processes as it navigates the world and masters it. This second process, taking place after the power of imagination has produced the entity for cognition, follows a schema, or, as we would rather call it, a model. In principle, we can say that for every concept there is a model that the understanding unconsciously uses to arrive at a conceptualisation, which Kant refers to as a judgement: we judge the world through concepts. This same process takes place as we enter a new space and immediately feel a sense of belonging or of repulsion. Moreover, we employ the same process spontaneously and unconsciously when we sit down to solve an equation or interpret a text. In the latter situation, however, we consciously apply certain formalised rules and models, although the productive power of imagination constantly plays a contributory role, but we often also formalise our encounters with unfamiliar spaces or unfamiliar people. In other words, the productive power of imagination produces the object for our attention before our understanding and reason begin to perceive and grasp what that object is. Now, the question is whether the schematism in our productive power of imagination and the processing in our understanding are universal or relative with regard to the context of the subject.

Here we should keep in mind the fact that Kant examines the transcendental subject and that, for him, the schematism involved in our knowledge of the physical world is universal because it is given through the categories of understanding that he establishes based on Aristotle’s logic. Things are more complicated when it comes to reason. However, Kant has great confidence that reason, even though it is not bound by the laws of nature, nonetheless produces general (i.e. universal) laws, and that true enlightenment will propagate these laws.

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in the world until a state of perpetual peace is reached. Nonetheless the idea of true knowledge of the physical world and of universal reason is as questionable as it is beautiful. Although it is correct and very useful within its own fields, Newton’s *Principia Mathematica* was by no means the consistent, exhaustive and simplest theory about the laws of nature that Kant thought it was, just as universal reason has only gained moderate ground in the world today. Not even in Enlightenment’s own backyard, Europe, has reason managed to find a solid foundation in states, the relationships between states or the populations in these states. This problem, namely the relation between the universal and the relative, as well the question of social cohesion, we shall return to at the end of the working paper. Here, we will continue to examine the functional structure of the cognitive process in its simplified form.

Andrew Brook, Professor of Cognitive Science and Philosophy at Carleton University, Canada, summarises the process thus: ‘Kant argues as follows. Our experiences have objects, are about something. The objects of our experiences are discrete, unified particulars. To have such particulars available to it, the mind must construct them based on sensible input. To construct them, the mind must do three kinds of synthesis. It must generate temporal and spatial structure (Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition). It must associate spatio-temporally structured items with other spatio-temporally structured items (Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination). [Moreover,] it must recognize items using concepts, the Categories in particular (Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept)’. Kant calls this process *transcendental apperception* and says that it is always accompanied by a *cogito* – an ‘I think’ – whereby the manifold representations in intuition become the subject’s own in the latter’s own synthesis: from the manifold sensory experiences and representations/ideas or impressions, apperception constructs unities in our cognition and constructs self-consciousness: ‘I think’. This is a spontaneous and unconscious, but also a necessary and inevitable process, without which the individual’s navigation in the world would be impossible: without apperception, we would be merely drifting along in the world like jellyfish in the ocean.

**THE DESIRE FOR ORDER, THE CURVATURE OF SPACE AND THE SIMULTANEITY OF TIME**

Apperception organises – i.e. constructs order in – the impressions, data, information and sensory experiences the subject receives, and creates unity i.e. order – in intuition, without which no conceptualisation would be possible for the

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perceiving subject: through apperception, the representation becomes my own representation. Apperception is a spontaneous and unconscious condition for our navigation in the world and for our thinking. Syntheses are precisely about joining and constructing order, and thus it follows that we spontaneously and unconsciously seek order in everything we do. To seek order is our most constitutive and fundamental way of being in the world. Therefore, the desire for order is by definition a basic instinct in our way of being in the world – in line with our sexual desire, which Sigmund Freud identified. Thus, we can identify the representation of the will that was to become central and constitutive in Schopenhauer’s, and later Friedrich Nietzsche’s, interpretations of our being in the world as the basic and irresistible will to life which expresses itself as a desire for order.

Now, one might object that the will to life sometimes seems suspended, most radically if a person commits suicide, but also in connection with other forms of self-destruction. It makes sense that suicide and other acts of self-destruction are serious challenges to our definition of the will to life as the desire for order, just as these phenomena have been given much attention in both philosophy and literature. For example, the topic of the Danish poet and novelist Tom Kristensen’s (1893-1974) novel Hærværk [Havoc] is self-destruction, and the same topic appears several times, for example, as decadence, in the writings of the Schopenhauer-inspired German novelist Thomas Mann (1875-1955). The phenomenon of suicide is also analysed by the French author and philosopher Albert Camus (1913-1960) in his essay The Myth of Sisyphus, the opening lines of which go: ‘There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.’ We will not examine this problem here but only note that the act of suicide appears as a possibility for those who have another choice, while the will to life remains unfailing against all odds for ‘the naked human’ (Homo Sacer) who has lost all other choices but the struggle for survival, like the boat refugee on the rough Mediterranean Sea or the prisoner in his cell in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. This could suggest that suicide is an exceptional, tragic, distorted expression of the desire for order.

Even though the desire for order is therefore a basic human desire, any given representation of order will always be shaped by time and space and, as a recognisable construction, it will always also have been shaped by the specific social and historical context in which it is constructed. This is also reflected in the fact that Kant’s interpretation of the order of physics was determined by the contemporary scientific debate, primarily scepticism’s attempt to erode Newton’s knowledge of the physical world. The paradigm that modern-day physicists apply

12 Tom Kristensen, Hærværk [Havoc] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1960); Fitness for life is a recurring motif in Thomas Mann’s authorship. Mann was inspired by Arthur Schopenhauer and edited and wrote the introduction to a collection of his works: Thomas Mann: Schopenhauers Udødelige Tanker. Abridged and with a preface by Thomas Mann (Copenhagen: Martins Forlag 1939); Albert Camus, Sisyfosmyten [The Myth of Sisyphus] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1975). The translated quote is from: https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/29516-there-is-but-one-truly-serious-philosophical-problem-and-that.

13 Giorgio Agamben: Homo Sacer: Den suveræne magt og det nøgne liv (in English, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Århus: Klim 2016).
in their thinking about our knowledge of the physical world is fundamentally different from the paradigm applied by Newton. This in no way means that all of Newton’s thinking was wrong; Einstein and his contemporaries were in fact deeply indebted to Newton’s work, the historical significance of which can hardly be exaggerated. However, the theory for which Newton is probably best known, his theory of gravitation, was wrong: there are no mystical forces in objects attracting other objects. Instead, heavy objects bend space, which makes lighter objects move towards them. Gravitation, as Einstein proposed in his general theory of gravity, is therefore due to the curvature of space, and his theses helped create a new paradigm, the assumptions and predictions of which have been empirically confirmed time and again, despite the mystery of dark matter [which we discuss in the section on the pragmatic approach to order].

What, then, are the consequences of Einstein’s theory and the insights of modern physics for Kant’s temporal and spatial forms of intuition? Kant rejects the idea that space can be defined as a concept. He therefore agrees with neither Newton’s nor Leibniz’s theories of space and instead points out that space is a form of intuition. Even so, there is hardly any doubt that he thought of space within the framework of classic Euclidian geometry. He was, in fact, very interested in Euclidian geometry and wrote several papers on the subject, leading him to an understanding of space as a fixed plane in three dimensions. However, according to Einstein this is not possible if we want to understand gravitation, and he then went on to develop his own theory of the curvature of space based on non-Euclidian geometry. Einstein’s idea of genius was to understand universal space as both geometrical and non-Euclidian: if we project the plane on to a sphere, we acquire an entirely new geometry in which the sum of the angles does not follow the Euclidean calculations and in which the dogma that parallel lines do not intersect no longer holds. In other words, we have abandoned the well-organised, Euclidian universe and joined Alice in Wonderland.

Physicists often describe this new space using the metaphor of a rubber sheet. When marbles of different weights are dropped on to the sheet, they make depressions of different sizes in it, making the marbles move and roll around, which illustrates gravity in a way that is much easier to grasp than mystical forces in matter. We believe that the Italian physicist and philosopher Carlo Rovelli offered a better, or at least a more plastic metaphor to illustrate Einstein’s curvature of space, namely that of a mollusc: ‘Space is no longer something distinct from matter, it is one of the “material” components of the world. An entity

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that undulates, flexes, curves, twists. We are not contained within an invisible rigid infrastructure: we are immersed in a gigantic flexible snail-shell. The sun bends space around itself and the Earth does not turn around it because of a mysterious force but because it is racing directly in a space, which inclines, like a marble that rolls in a funnel. There are no mysterious forces generated at the center of the funnel; it is the curved nature of the walls, which causes the marble to roll. Planets circle around the sun, and things fall, because space curves.\(^{16}\) In his special theory of relativity from 1905, Einstein rejected Newton’s theory of absolute time and demonstrated that the time between two events depends on the speed of the observer. If we combine this insight with the theory about the curvature of space, we arrive at the concept of a four-dimensional space-time system.

**THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING**

Our current understanding of time and space is therefore very far from Newton’s paradigm, as well as from the way Kant understood space and time, both still being based on Euclidian geometry. Despite Einstein’s genius and dizzying theory about the curvature of space-time, we are still within (or on the threshold of) the classical paradigm. This is because Einstein’s notion of space is still understood as a continuum, that is, as coherent, and his notion of time is understood as intervals between events, albeit the time we measure depends on the speed of the observer. This is a big challenge in the many post-Einsteinian attempts to combine his theory with quantum mechanics because these theories operate with a non-continuous perception of space and time.

Einstein himself had some harsh comments to say about Kant, whose works he studied as a student. He rejected Kant’s epistemology, his determination of an a priori synthetic judgement, and he ridiculed Kant’s understanding of time. Kant concluded that Euclid’s dogmas were true knowledge and a new cognition, understood as an a priori synthetic judgement, but Einstein and Kant’s other critics were right in saying that this could not be the case because of the theory of the curvature of space. Therefore, in this regard Kant was mistaken, and his theory must therefore be modified; that is, Einstein was rightly critical of Kant’s a priori determinations, and his thoughts must be modified so that a priori principles are not understood as eternal and universal but rather as the dominant principles in a paradigm.\(^{17}\) Nonetheless, we believe that Kant’s notion of time and space as forms

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of intuition remains valid and that, in principle, Einstein’s space-time, with some necessary modifications, can be incorporated into Kant’s theory. Moreover, for this purpose, Schopenhauer comes in handy.

However, things become even worse with the introduction of quantum mechanics, as the determinations of space and time in quantum mechanics completely break down the framework for how mere mortals experience and sense time and space, regardless of how gifted and schooled they might be in theoretical physics. This is particularly true in those theories that attempt to combine Einstein’s theory about the curvature of space-time with the notion in quantum mechanics of space as a discontinuum – i.e. it is not a coherent continuum – and with a concept of time in which the differences between past, present and future are cancelled out in what, in the absence of a better word, we will call the simultaneity of time. Such theories, such as Stephen Hawking’s *Theory of Everything* (or M-theory as he calls it) or loop quantum mechanics, operate with mathematical theories and images of the universe (or universes) that lie beyond human intellectual sensibility. Wise people who understand the theories can illustrate them through metaphors that give us mortals an idea of what is at play in the universe according to these theories. Again, let us turn to Rovelli and his beautiful, popularising metaphors, through which he explains that, if we are to understand time, we must study heat (i.e. thermodynamics): ‘The flow of time emerges thus from physics, but not in the context of an exact description of things as they are. It emerges, rather, in the context of statistics and of thermodynamics. This may hold the key to the enigma of time. The “present” does not exist in an objective sense any more than “here” exists objectively, but the microscopic interactions within the world prompt the emergence of temporal phenomena within a system (for instance, ourselves) which only interacts through the medium of a myriad of variables. Our memory and our consciousness are built on these statistical phenomena. For a hypothetically supersensible being there would be no “flowing” of time: the universe would be a single block of past, present and future. But due to the limitations of our consciousness we only perceive a blurred vision of the world, and live in time.’

This brings us back to Augustine’s deliberations about time referred to above [in the section on the pragmatic approach to order]. Augustine had these deliberations when he meditated over the possibility of understanding ‘the moment’: only God is able to understand ‘the moment’, that is, everything at once, while man is forced to think in terms of time events unfolding in sequences and understood in narratives. Whether Rovelli is thinking about Augustine or God when he talks about ‘a hypothetically supersensible being’ is uncertain, but as is well known, since Augustine ‘God is dead’, so there is really no one left on Earth with a vision sharp enough to sense the universe as a single block of past, present and future. Perhaps there are creatures elsewhere in the universe that interact

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19 Rovelli op. cit. p. 60.
better with quantum phenomena than we do, or perhaps our future cousins will
develop brains capable of such interaction. As of now, however, we experience
and sense time and space as the forms of intuition that Kant and Schopenhauer
teach us: we can develop theories about loop quantum mechanics, but with our
limited brains we cannot sense it intellectually. Kant and Schopenhauer’s
constructivism hold water so far after all.

Even though in his system Kant described the functionality of consciousness and
reflection in a priori determinations – i.e. before empirical experience – it is, as
Einstein and others have pointed out, misleading to understand a priori
determinations as universal and eternal principles as Kant does when he promotes
Euclid’s hypotheses to the status of universal, valid knowledge, which, as we have
demonstrated, is wrong. However, this does not necessarily mean that Kant’s
description of how the cognitive process works is wrong, but rather that he was
restricted in his argumentation by the knowledge that the prevailing scientific
paradigm of his time could produce. It is obvious that his confidence in the
universal validity of Euclid’s and Newton’s theories constitutes a problem in
relation to his analysis of individual judgements and hypotheses. However, this
by no means excludes the possibility that his description of the way in which the
cognitive process works may still be valid, albeit with the necessary adjustments
that began with Schopenhauer.

The more knowledge we have about the laws of nature, and not least about how
little we actually understand about gravity and the world revealed to us by
quantum mechanics, the more we become aware that the world is our own
representation, that is, that theories are made possible by the paradigms within
which we think. Paradigms, including scientific paradigms, are constructions and
are therefore, in principle, changeable. However, they cannot be replaced as easily
as democratic societies choose new governments: they are tenacious, and they are
confirmed by discussions, studies, testing and theories. Moreover, they establish
principles for thinking and language about thinking, axioms, theorems and even
narratives about life and the world, which appear as if they were given a priori.
And, as we have seen, they are replaced, but how such replacement takes place
and what driving forces lead to the collapse of old paradigms and to the
establishment of new ones are complex matters about which theories have been
created, as we will discuss when presenting our hermeneutic approach. However,
taking further the notion that paradigms of interpretation are decisive for the
development of theories and for the production of our representation of the world,
it would seem self-evident that Kant’s a priori determinations need tidying up – a
task that Schopenhauer initiated. Some of these determinations are either wrong
or superfluous, while others wedge themselves between the non-experienced and
the immediately experienced, and these are subject to change, but only extremely
slowly. Finally, there are the spatial and temporal forms of intuition, which,
despite the major limitations they pose on our brain capacity, we will hardly be
able to escape unless we as Homo sapiens mutate into a new species.

As we have already described, conceptualisation takes place in understanding by
virtue of schemata or models. We call this process schematism. Kant believed that
this process led to true knowledge, but we know today that this was not that true after all. We can thank Einstein and quantum mechanics for this realisation because they established a new paradigm for our knowledge of the physical world. We explained above how Kant made a distinction between the knowledge (which he, somewhat misleadingly, believed to be true) of the physical world that we reach through understanding and the knowledge we reach through reason, and which pertains to what we called the realm of freedom, that is, moral and metaphysical questions about, for example, the infinity of time, the immortality of the soul, the meaning of life, or questions of world order and perpetual peace. Kant believed the schemata to be hidden within the primeval depths of the soul, whereas today we would say that they are theoretical models that have been carefully developed over long periods based on mathematical logic and our knowledge of the physical world. Kant also believed that the work of reason within the realm of freedom – when it produces ideas to help us understand moral and metaphysical questions – followed a schematism, though a schematism that was not bound by the laws of nature. Rather, he believed it was a reflection on, and a questioning of, the knowledge of the physical world gained through understanding – i.e. self-reflection.

**THE SCHEMATISM OF REASON**

The schematism of reason is free from the laws of nature but follows a logic as if the same causal relationships and intentions exist in the realm of freedom as in the realm of necessity (our knowledge of the physical world). When we produce ideas and interpretations about the moral nature of the world and the social order, we are actually regulating our free imagination. Our ideas and interpretations are regulatory, as well as linked to the paradigms of interpretation that our understanding has developed through its process of cognition, which requires empirical confirmation. It was the productive power of imagination that formed the object of cognition for our understanding through images, figures and shapes, where with schematism it reached conceptualisation. Reason reiterates the productive power of imagination. Here, as opposed to the conceptualisation of the laws of nature by understanding, it produces ideas about the nature of the world, including interpretations of social order and world order. Because the process of interpretation and the production of ideas take place as if they follow the schematism of understanding but in reality take place in free reflection, the ideas and interpretations that reason produces will always be a matter for discussion: they can always be questioned. The desire for order leads to interpretations and ideas which can never be universal and eternal, but which are always co-determined by the perspectives of the interpreting will, precisely because this
interpretation is the result of free thought in reason and is not bound by the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{20}

Now, we might object that, with the relativizing of the a priori synthetic judgement, the rigid separation between nature and freedom is blurred, and the shutters between the realms of necessity and freedom are slightly ajar. This does not mean that the way has been paved for knowing the world as it is in itself (Ding an Sich); cognition is still a product of the subject’s process of cognition (constructivism). On the other hand, nature and the laws of nature have sneaked a little further into reason, and, thus reason has been profaned with regard to the almost religious position Kant attributed to it as an entity separated from and raised above nature. However, reason is nothing more than an evolutionary development of the human brain and, regardless of whether we like it or not, it is therefore a sophisticated result of processes in nature (these thoughts were not contrary to Kant in his later writings).\textsuperscript{21} This has consequences for the representation of free will, which we do not hesitate to assess as nothing more than an illusion: as Einstein puts it, ‘If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the Earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord…. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man’s illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.’\textsuperscript{22} However, this does not mean that people do not act individually: the processes that create will and thought are so complex that they differ from individual to individual, and the individual therefore has both idiosyncrasies and excellence, just as individual wills seldom want the same thing, unless they have firmly agreed or been forced to want the same thing. My representation of the world is truly my own representation. However, our ideas are regulated and influenced by the paradigms of interpretation within which we live and with which we cannot refrain from interacting, being developed in specific historical, social, cultural and technological contexts.

Therefore, the desire for order will always unfold within a context that inevitably shapes how it unfolds. The desire for order will never achieve ultimate satisfaction, and thus the ideal and eternal representation of order only exists in the form of regulatory ideas in reason’s free thought. Furthermore, in the same way that we will never arrive at irrefutable proof of God’s existence, and therefore God will remain a matter of faith, it is impossible to define the ultimate, consistent, exhaustive concept of world order, which will thus always be subject to interpretation.

\textsuperscript{20} For a more stringent explanation of Kant’s schematism, see Bo A. Christensen and Steen Brock op. cit. and Klaus Frovin Jørgensen op. cit. Both expositions are undoubtedly more sympathetic to Kant’s analyses than we are.


A desire needs to be satisfied, as is apparent in our emotional life, and the desire for order will therefore always, spontaneously and unconsciously, lead to feelings of calm, pleasure, harmony, belonging and joy, or unrest, anxiety, discomfort, anger, frustration and a lack of belonging. Representations of order or disorder are thus intimately associated with strong emotions that may trigger a sense of coherence and community, but also the opposite, such as a sense of marginalisation and exclusion, which can sometimes lead to violence, conflict and ultimately war and terrorism. Consequently, there is no exhaustive, consistent and simple definition of world order that can claim universal validity.

NIETZSCHE: THE APOLLONIAN AND THE DIONYSIAN

In our definition of the desire for order, we have found inspiration in, and described, Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will. Schopenhauer’s successor, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), presented his thoughts on ‘the will to power’ (for which he is at once both famous and notorious) in his writings in the 1880s. In addition to Schopenhauer, the young Nietzsche was strongly inspired by the German composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883), as well as by classical Greek tragedy. Nietzsche eventually broke dramatically with Wagner, but he was still enthusiastic about Wagner in his first book on the birth of Greek tragedy from the spirit of music. This book represents a controversial interpretation of the art of the Greek tragedy, followed by a description of how a decadent European civilization has become addicted to a weak nihilism, a criticism not unlike that presented by Søren Kierkegaard in his review of the novels of Thomasine Gyllembourg (1773-1856). According to Nietzsche, however, Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk was able to reconstruct classical tragedy in modernity and thereby contribute to a reassessment of all values. However, Nietzsche became disappointed with Wagner and his submission to Christianity, seeing in him instead the incarnation of nihilism. Nonetheless he continued to be inspired by Schopenhauer and classical Greek tragedy, an inspiration that was fundamental to his philosophical concept of the will to power in the 1880s. The first foundations were laid in Nietzsche’s first book, which encountered fierce criticism from the classic philologists of the time, but which, in our opinion, sowed the seeds of his later philosophy. He identified two basic desires of the human will in Greek tragedy: the Apollonian and the Dionysian. We understand these two desires as basic forms in the desire for order, the one directed at the beautiful, the large, impressive architectural buildings, the imposing empire, the other at the sublime, at the destruction and subversion of architectural buildings and empires – that is, at creating disorder in order to make room for a new order. Theologically, the

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necessity and justification of war in the theory of the just war have always been seen as involving destruction and a struggle to build a new and better order.\footnote{See J. Daryl Charles and David D. Corey, \textit{The Just War Tradition: An Introduction} (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute 2012).}

In his book, Nietzsche describes the Apollonian as a desire for order exemplified in the orderly space of architecture, the tonal system of music and the beautiful forms of music, poetry, science and philosophy, while he described the Dionysian in terms of euphoria and the tense joy of destroying, subverting and lacerating the existing order.\footnote{Nietzsche, Friedrich. \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}, trans'. Ian Johnston (Blackmask Online 2003).} In Nietzsche, the Apollonian and the Dionysian condition each other because, without the expression of \textit{memento mori} which is included in the Dionysian, the Apollonian risks degenerating into fossilised forms, dogmatic narrow-mindedness and constrained behaviour – today we would probably say fundamentalism, extremism, authoritarian dictatorship and hegemonic empires. Later in his authorship, Nietzsche developed and reinterpreted his descriptions of the Apollonian and the Dionysian to ‘the will to power’, which, as the Danish historian of philosophy Jørgen Hass pointed out in his impressive book on Nietzsche’s philosophy, is not only about power as raw power and dominance, but also about mastering and being able to control order, that is, to construct order.\footnote{Jørgen Hass, \textit{Illusionens filosofi. Studier i Nietzsches firser-manuskripter} [Philosophy of Illusion. Studies in Nietzsche’s writings in 1880s] (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, Arnold Busck 1982), p. 53f.} In Nietzsche’s thinking, the desire for order is therefore also a constituent of man’s way of being in the world, being expressed in the will to power.

Order, interpretation and will are therefore intimately linked: although, with reference to enlightenment and reason, we often separate cognition and understanding from emotions and the unconscious, we can conclude with Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche that cognition and understanding are intimately associated with the unconscious, with our emotional life, or, as Søren Kierkegaard put it, with \textit{existence}, which was the focal point of his criticism of Hegel’s system. There are always emotions at play in our representations and productions about order, including world order, social and political communities, and civilisation.

The German-born professor of International Politics at Chicago University, Hans Joachim Morgenthau, who is famous for his book \textit{Politics among Nations}, gave an example of this in an interesting commentary from 1962 under the heading ‘Love and Power’: with inspiration from the Greek poet Aristophanes and from the philosopher Plato, he proposes the idea that love and power stem from the same desire, that is, from a fundamental human need for \textit{sense of belonging}. While, in love, the desire is met through mutual attraction and recognition, sense of belonging is developed in the raw political power relation through coercion as a form of perverted need for love. According to Morgenthau, the dictator’s incessant desire for the love of his subjects is driven by the constantly unfulfilled desire for love in the power relationship. Morgenthau’s idea gives us new and interesting perspectives in our understanding of leaders, such as Vladimir Putin in
Russia, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and perhaps also Donald Trump in the USA, with their staging of themselves as popular and powerful paternal monarchs loved by their people. In our context, it is interesting that Morgenthau takes his point of departure in his analysis of the contrast between loneliness and sense of belonging, that is, between exclusion or repulsion from an order and belonging to an order.27 We will therefore address Morgenthau’s theories later in a discussion of power in international politics.

With the determination of world order as will and representation, we also reject the notion that order is a phenomenon that can be exhaustively defined. Since order is always a representation, it can always be described; and the simpler it is, the better and more accurate the description will be. Does the joining together of cognition, order and the unconscious entail a risk of epistemological relativism, of undermining scientific stringency, of anarchistic multiculturalism, rendering all social forms of organisation equally valid and thus leading to normative indifference?28 This criticism has been raised many times, but most recently it has been aimed in particular at French poststructuralism (also known as postmodernism) represented by, for example, Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. One example is the critique of the Japanese-American literary critic and former chief book critic for The New York Times, Michiko Kakatani, in a book and an essay in The Guardian.29 In Denmark her points were taken up by a Danish politician who dramatically accused poststructuralists of being directly responsible for the fake news and populism that paved the ways for Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. This is, of course, nonsense. We will discuss it later and demonstrate how constructivism is fully committed to Hjelmslev’s empirical principle, as well as how the conditions for the production of knowledge in the information society are radically different from when we were still able to refer to the narrative about Bildung (education, formation, self-cultivation), which today plays no role in the relationship between knowledge and power.

28 It was a serious concern of the Danish philosopher David Favrholdt, in his masterpiece on epistemological theory: David Favrholdt, Filosofisk Codex: Om begrundelsen for den menneskelige erkendelse [Philosophical Codex: On the justification for human cognition] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1999). We do not agree with this position, but acknowledge it is necessary to treat it as a serious challenge.
PERSPECTIVES

Our theoretical approach to a determination of order makes possible several different perspectives on the study of regional and international order. As indicated above, we could apply a psychoanalytical approach to the study of world order. This is an interesting perspective, which, however, we will leave for others to pursue; in any case, we will not address it further in this context. Furthermore, as also indicated above, this approach allows us to use quantum mechanics as the basis for a theoretical perspective on the study of social order, as proposed by Alexander Wendt and others. We will address this discussion in a later chapter in the book, in which we present our hermeneutic perspective on theories about world order. However, before we get to that, we will consider three different approaches to the study of international politics, all three insisting, as we do, that world order should always be understood in the plural; that is, any world order must be based on and recognise that there are historical, social, political and cultural differences in how the desire for order is played out, and that these differences can lead to international cooperation in dealing with these differences peacefully as much as to war, conflict and terrorism. First, we will discuss the so-called civilization thesis prompted by Samuel P. Huntington’s hypothesis about a Clash of Civilizations. Here, we will include the famous debate between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis, two researchers within Middle Eastern studies. Then we will examine the theory of regional security complexes that Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver presented with their book Regions and Powers. Finally, we will look at some contributions from the so-called English School, which is developing further the basis presented by the Australian theorist of international politics Hedley Bull in his book The Anarchical Society.
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