Forged in Crisis

THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT
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This report is written by Christine Nissen, PhD Student

DIIS – Danish Institute for International Studies
Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
Tel: +45 32 69 87 87
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
www.diis.dk

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### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/DAP</td>
<td>Implementation Plan on Security and Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUGS</td>
<td>European Union Global Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Framework Participation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security/Vice President of the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPP</td>
<td>NATO Defence Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDIP</td>
<td>Security and Defence Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION
As the French civil servant and EU founding father Jean Monnet once said, ‘Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’ (Monnet, 1978). And indeed, there are examples of how European integration has taken some of its biggest leaps forward in response to crises. For example, it was the exposure of the EU’s failure to respond to the devastating wars in the former Yugoslavia that forced EU member states to form the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the first place.

EU member states are increasingly acknowledging that this new security context means that ‘soft power is not enough’ and that it is necessary to ‘strengthen the EU as a security community […] that is ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect itself against external threats’.

Following the decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the Union, the EU is currently facing what is probably its biggest internal crisis so far, and it might seem as if Jean Monnet’s prophecy will materialise once again. Many have feared that Brexit could become the first domino to fall, signalling the beginning of the end for the EU as we know it. But instead of increased fragmentation, the remaining 27 member states decided that the Union was doomed to unite if it was to survive and that it would have to strengthen cooperation further in certain policy areas to show its continued relevance. One of these areas is the Common Security and Defence Policy, with proposals for greater defence collaboration quickly emerging as a new kind of unifying project to draw attention to the EU’s continuing ability to deepen integration (Council of the EU, 2016). Such declarations of intent have quickly evolved into concrete initiatives, including the setting up of a new European defence fund (EDF) to support the development of common military capabilities, with money from the EU budget. Another development has been the launch of an until now never used EU provision – the so-called ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence (PESCO), which allows groups of willing member states to make binding commitments to each other on security and defence.

Strengthening collective defence as a response to the most militarily capable member state leaving the EU seems an odd choice at first. It was not until 2003, with the operationalisation of CSDP, that the EU managed to add a military dimension to its repertoire. Since then, security and defence policy has continued to be a domain where integration is particularly timid and slow, given the centrality of this policy area to national identity and the varying security interests and capabilities of EU member states. And without Britain, the EU is left with substantially degraded defence capabilities.

However, the momentum for greater cooperation on defence has not emerged out of thin air. In a challenging security landscape, the European territory is under an increased pressure. In the east, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine conflict have brought back an existential threat that Europeans thought belonged in their past. In the south, the conflicts in the Middle East have brought hundreds of thousands of destitute migrants to the European continent. Most recently, Trump’s election as president of the United States (US) has cemented a trend against the post-war system of institutionalised cooperation between nations, exemplified most notably by his questioning of the security guarantee – and fundamental value – of the NATO alliance.

In turn, EU member states are increasingly acknowledging that this new security context means that ‘soft power is not enough’ and that it is necessary to ‘strengthen the EU as a security community (…) that is ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect itself against external threats’ (EEAS, 2016: 19, 44), as stated in the EU’s newest security strategy, published just a few days after the vote on Brexit.

The fact that the UK has often acted as a brake on further EU integration in the field of defence is another factor that makes EU member states, including the dynamic new French–German ‘Mer-Cron’ duo, determined to turn Brexit into a catalyst for greater EU defence cooperation. Thus, two contradictory forces seem to have come into play since the Brexit vote when it comes to the CSDP and wider European security. While enthusiasm has emerged following this rarely seen momentum for greater defence cooperation, an overwhelming sense of uncertainty about the future of European security is also a constant. Given the UK’s military, political and economic position in the world, its strong transatlantic relationship and the fact that its military capabilities will now be less readily accessible to the EU, the post-Brexit picture could also be one of a CSDP with diminished potential. There may also be wider practical, political and strategic challenges for wider European security, including the relationship between the EU and NATO, as well as for bilateral European defence cooperation.
Objectives and Methodology
This report will focus on European security cooperation after Brexit, asking in particular how the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy will be affected by the UK leaving the Union. It proceeds in three steps. First, it examines how the UK has contributed to the formation and further development of CSDP (section 2). This section will also provide a context for understanding what the EU and CSDP will lack when the UK departs. Then the report turns to assessing the most recent developments in the CSDP following the Brexit referendum (section 3). Whereas, since being agreed in 2003, the CSDP has mainly functioned as a tool for the member states to use in the management of international crises far away from the Europe’s geographical core, CSDP is now seemingly also becoming a framework for military cooperation among member states, as promised by the recently launched initiatives on the CSDP after Brexit. This section also examines the recent shifts in the European security paradigm after the Brexit referendum and discusses the feasibility of the new initiatives that have been launched, in particular the EDF and the PESCO. The next section of the report draws up possible scenarios for the relationship between the EU and the UK in defence cooperation after Brexit (section 4). Here, an underlying premise of this study is that such cooperation is governed by deep uncertainty, given that the outcome of Brexit will be shaped by British and European policy-makers and as yet unforeseen events, with unpredictable causes and effects. In this report, ‘scenario thinking’ is thus used as an approach to formulating different ideas on the future of European defence cooperation after Brexit.

The report draws on relevant data, such as official documents, including relevant legal provisions, policy proposals and summit conclusions, and speeches. Moreover, background interviews with key policy-makers in EU institutions and NATO, policy experts and national officials of different member states, including the UK, Germany, France and Denmark, also feed into the report’s analyses.
THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT

THE CSDP AND THE UK’S ROLE IN IT
British participation in European integration has from the beginning been fraught with difficulties, not least when it comes to the policy area of security and defence. The UK has always been one of the most sceptical member states, but also, given its size and military weight, an essential one in the creation and further development of an EU security and defence policy.

The present section focuses on the role played by the UK in creating the CSDP in the first place and aims to shed light on its vision of and contribution to the CSDP.

The Birth of a Common Security and Defence Policy for the EU

Developments in EU security and defence owe much to the UK. The birth of the CSDP largely resulted from the 1998 Franco-British compromise at St. Malo, where it was agreed that the EU should have ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so in order to respond to international crisis’ (Joint Declaration, 1998). The St. Malo declaration thus represented an agreement between the two most powerful European states in military terms to make the EU an effective international actor, willing and able to use military means. Some have described the bargain struck as ‘constructive ambiguity’, as it provided both the UK and France with a deal that was politically acceptable to two differing views on European security cooperation (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011). On the one hand, the UK accepted the idea of adding a military dimension to the EU, which it had traditionally opposed, fearing it could compromise NATO as the main pillar of European defence cooperation and the transatlantic relationship on which it largely rests. At this point, however, Tony Blair, the new and pro-European British Prime Minister, was beginning to realise that the EU needed to take more responsibility for Europe’s own security following the devastating Balkan conflicts. France, on the other hand, had always wanted to add a military dimension to the EU that was strategically autonomous, but it now came to accept that military cooperation in the EU could only become a reality if it was included in the NATO framework (Heisbourg, 2000).

Following the bilateral St Malo agreement, the other member states adopted the goal of setting up the CSDP at the Cologne European Council in 1999. Shortly after this ‘statement of good intentions’, words were put into action, and half a year after the Cologne Council, the EU adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal, enabling the EU to deploy military forces and carry out crisis management (Rutten, 2001). Moreover, the EU also decided to launch permanent new crisis management structures and created the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a military committee (EUMC) and a military staff body (EUMS), as well as a Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) as sub-divisions of the Council within the CFSP framework (Cornish and Edwards, 2005).

The Berlin Plus agreement was the result of negotiations with the US and allowed the EU access to NATO’s military assets. The conditions as formulated by then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was that the EU should avoid the three ‘D’s: no decoupling (between NATO and EU decision-making), no duplication of capabilities, and no discrimination against non-EU members of NATO.

Now the EU was almost ready to conduct its own crisis management operations. Before being able to do so, however, a standing issue was how the relationship between a newly operationalized CSDP and NATO would be tackled in practice (Howorth, 2000). The Berlin Plus agreement was the result of negotiations with the US and allowed the EU access to NATO’s military assets. The conditions as formulated by then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was that the EU should avoid the three ‘D’s: no decoupling (between NATO and EU decision-making), no duplication of capabilities, and no discrimination against non-EU members of NATO (Rutten, 2001). The Berlin Plus arrangement thus governed the relationship between the EU and NATO in crisis management and largely provided legitimization for establishing the CSDP, since the EU would not have been able to develop its military mission without an agreement with the US and an institutionalized framework for cooperation and coordination with NATO (Pohl, 2013; Smith, 2017). The idea was that the EU could either conduct military operations autonomously or make use of NATO capabilities. In case of the later, NATO would give the EU access to NATO planning facilities, assets and capabilities. The Berlin Plus agreement allowed the CSDP to become operationalized, which rapidly happened after agreement had been reached, namely in Macedonia under ‘Operation Concordia’. Soon after followed the EU engagement in Bosnia with the launch of a large civilian mission, EUPM Bosnia, taking over from the existing UN mission, UNPROFOR, which had been installed in the country after the Dayton Peace Accords had been signed in 1995.
**The EU and CSDP: What Kind of Security Actor?**

When the EU emerged as a security actor, its main purpose became to carry out conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building in response to regional conflicts outside the borders of Europe. Thus, the CSDP was not created in response to any existential threat facing the Union, and it did not involve the creation of what were potentially armed forces to provide territorial defence of the European continent (Howorth, 2000). The overall scope and direction of the CSDP thus also largely followed the UK’s preferences, with a division of labour between NATO as the privileged partner for territorial defence and ‘hard’ security tasks, and the CSDP as a ‘soft’ provider of crisis management in conflicts far away from Europe’s geographical core.

Thus, the CSDP is mainly seen as a crisis management tool for the EU and its member states. CSDP missions have indeed become the most visible activity of the EU in the international security domain (Tardy, 2015). Since operationalisation of the CSDP in 2003, the EU has carried out 34 crisis management missions as part of the CSDP. There are currently sixteen ongoing missions (as of November 2017), with a total strength of 6000 personnel. Six of the current sixteen missions are military operations.

The overall scope and direction of the CSDP largely followed the UK’s preferences, with a division of labour between NATO as the privileged partner for territorial defence and ‘hard’ security tasks, and the CSDP as a ‘soft’ provider of crisis management in conflicts far away from Europe’s geographical core.

The CSDP has a comprehensive toolbox whose comparative advantage vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g. NATO) is its ability to tackle crises in a comprehensive manner, mixing soft and hard power tools for conflict prevention and crisis management, but with no ambition to engage in high-intensity or combat operations. Thus, the EU’s broad approach to international security is more similar to that of the UN than NATO’s, which has a narrower approach focused on military protection or enforcement (Smith, 2017).

Tardy (2015) has consequently defined much of what the CSDP has done in international crisis management as ‘sub-strategic’, meaning that CSDP missions rarely drive major change in the recipient state or region alone, as they are often small in scale and focused on limited capacity-building, not large-scale peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions like those deployed by NATO or the UN. Specifically,

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**Objectives**

- Keeping the peace, preventing conflicts
- Strengthening international security
- Supporting the rule of law
- Prevention of human trafficking and piracy

**Map 1: Ongoing CSDP missions and operations**

- **EU NAVFOR**
  - Med
  - Since 2015

- **EUFOR ALTHEA**
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - Since 2004

- **EULEX**
  - Kosovo
  - Since 2008

- **EUCAP**
  - Somalia
  - Since 2008
  - Niger
  - Since 2012
  - Central African Republic
  - Since 2016

- **EUTM**
  - Mali
  - Since 2013
  - Sarh
  - Since 2013

- **EUBAM RAFAH**
  - Palestinian Territories
  - Since 2005

- **EUAM**
  - Moldova and Ukraine
  - Since 2005
  - Ukraine
  - Since 2014
  - Georgia
  - Since 2009
  - Iraq
  - Since 2017
  - Libya
  - Since 2013
  - Atalanta
  - Since 2010
  - Med
  - Since 2015

**EUMM**
- Georgia
- Since 2008

*This mission is not managed within CSDP structures and is thus not strictly speaking a ‘CSDP’ mission but European Commission-led.*

CSDP missions are often training, advisory or monitoring missions, such as the regional training missions in the Sahel (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger), a reform programme training mission for the civilian police service in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) or the Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM).

There are also exceptions to this trend where we see the EU playing a major role, such as the EUNAVFOR counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the latest Operation Sophia (EUNAVFOR Med) in the Mediterranean – both naval missions launched in a context where the EU has been one of the driving forces in countering the conflict.

Beyond crisis management missions, EU security and defence policy is increasingly focused on the promotion of military capability cooperation among member states (European Council, 2013). Here, the EU is seeking to harmonise the European defence industry and help member states maintain an acceptable level of military capabilities through the development of joint projects aimed to overcome the structural shortcomings and capability gaps that hamper Europe’s ability to act in crisis (De Borja Lasheras, 2014). Following the Brexit vote, a lot has happened within this dimension of the CSDP, which is examined further in the next section of the report.

**British Participation in CSDP Crisis Management**

For the UK, the CSDP has from the beginning been perceived as either an influence multiplier or a constriction on national foreign policy in so far as it goes against British interests (Whitman and Tonra, 2017). Consequently, the UK has generally been supportive of the CSDP when it has had instrumental advantages for the UK, legitimizing EU security and defence cooperation by its perceived utility for the UK.

Just after operationalisation of the CSDP in 2003, the UK saw the EU defence dimension as a valuable complement to NATO and as a potentially useful vehicle for persuading other member states to develop usable military capabilities (Faleg, 2013). Moreover, the UK quickly came to value CSDP as a civilian and military crisis management tool because it strengthened its own comprehensive approach to crisis management and capacity-building (Gross, 2009). Consequently, the UK was a significant contributor to the first CSDP missions, such as Concordia, Artemis and EUFOR Althea, which were all-important for the launch of the CSDP. The UK also supported key institutional developments to the CSDP in the early years, including the EU Battlegroup concept together with France in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011).

At the same time, there was still substantial scepticism in parts of the British establishment (especially among the Conservatives), as well as among the general public, towards the potential change of the CSDP into an ‘EU army’ (Howorth, 2005; Whitman, 2006). Thus, while continuing to support the CSDP as a pragmatic choice for crisis management on a case-by-case basis, the UK did not push for greater involvement or greater scope for the CSDP (Gross, 2009). The UK has continued to pursue a policy on the CSDP preventing it from developing in directions that went against the UK’s key interests, most notably ensuring that it would not conflict with the preservation of NATO as the main framework for European security cooperation or become a source of transatlantic tensions. Consequently, the UK has also continued to enjoy the role of an interlocutor between the US and the EU (Whitman and Tonra, 2017).

The CSDP has not been considered a core component of the UK’s approach to providing for its own national security and defence insofar that the EU’s security and defence ambitions have not been seen as central to British national ambitions (Whitman, 2016). Rather, the UK has preferred to channel its military commitments through the framework of NATO, US-led missions outside NATO and bilateral defence cooperation with the US and European partners, notably France.

Relative to its size and military weight, the UK has been a fairly modest contributor to CSDP crisis management missions. While the UK accounts for 20.8 percent of the EU member states’ total military expenditure, compared to 21.4 percent for France and 16 percent for Germany (SIPRI, 2016), Britain deploys just 4.19 % of the total personnel provided to CSDP missions by EU member states (Faleg, 2016).

As appears from figure 1, the UK has contributed modestly to military CSDP operations in the past decade. The UK ranks fifth among the contributors to CSDP military operations, after France, Italy, Germany and Spain, despite the fact that it has one of the highest shares of the EU’s assembled military equipment (Black et. Al., 2017).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Operation</th>
<th>Total military personnel</th>
<th>UK contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>2261</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>2307</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>2126</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>3420</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>6785</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>3867</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>3463</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>2845</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YEAR 2012</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MILITARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>2300</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database
A significant exception is the UK’s contribution to the large-scale EU counter-piracy operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden, which would hardly have been possible without the participation of the UK. The UK is one of five EU member states to have made its headquarters available to CSDP operations. Since the launch of the EU Atalanta in 2008, the UK has provided an operational headquarters for the operation in Northwood, as well as the operational commander – since January 2013, Rear Admiral Bob Tarrant – in cooperation with NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield, to which the UK also contributes (UK Government, 2017).

The UK has also continued to enjoy the role of an interlocutor between the US and the EU.

The UK has been more eager to contribute to the civilian side of the CSDP, as appears from figure 2. The civilian missions fit readily into the UK’s development of the ‘comprehensive approach’ to international conflict management, which brings together diplomacy, defence and development resources to address the problems of failed and failing states. As the former British defence minister Desmond Browne has put it: ‘Working with our EU partners comprehensively, we have an opportunity to bring to bear capabilities that NATO does not have and is unlikely ever to have.’ (Browne, 2008).

Relative to its size and military weight, the UK has been a fairly modest contributor to CSDP crisis management missions.
Besides being a somewhat modest contributor to CSDP missions and operations, the UK has been even less supportive of developing EU defence bodies further, acquiring a certain reputation for its perseverance in obstructing the further development of the CSDP against the wishes of many other EU members (Aktipis and Olver, 2011). It has, for example, consistently blocked increases to the budget of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and has continued to proclaim its long-standing opposition to the building of EU defence bodies, in particular an EU operational headquarters (Telegraph, 2011; Bishop and Fiott, 2013; van Ham, 2016). Even after the Brexit referendum, London has opposed the setting up of the new Military Planning and Conduct Capability for non-executive military CSDP operations (EU Observer, 2016).

Concluding Remarks

The attitude of the UK to the CSDP is one of contradictions. Even though it has not been a main contributor to CSDP missions, the UK still values EU security and defence cooperation, as long as it is able to control the agenda. As this section has shown, the CSDP has developed largely in accordance with British preferences, and in cases where it has not, the UK has managed to block unwanted developments such as a permanent command and control HQ or more funds being channelled to the EDA. Now that the UK is going to withdraw from the EU, it will no longer be able to steer the direction of EU security and defence policy.

The next section explores the latest EU defence initiatives, which have been launched since the Brexit referendum and which largely appear to go against the interests of the UK and its vision of the CSDP.

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RECENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION SINCE THE BREXIT REFERENDUM
According to the High Representative for EU Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, more has happened in the past year following the Brexit vote than in ten years of European defence cooperation (Scheffer and Quencez, 2017). Thus, for the EU, the most immediate impact on the security and defence policy area since the British decision to leave the EU has been to give impetus to ideas on reforming EU defence policy that have been in circulation for some time.

Before turning to discussing the substance of the new EU defence initiatives, including the EU Defence Fund and the launch of PESCO in particular, the following sections explore three new trends that characterise the current push towards strengthened security and defence cooperation: the increasing focus on protecting European internal security, the strengthened partnership between NATO and the EU, and the role of the EU Commission in European defence.

Protecting EU citizens
Just five days after the UK referendum, the EU Council welcomed a new EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) updating the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. The EUGS constituted a fundamental change from the 2003 ESS in the way that it conceived security and the EU’s role as a security actor. As mentioned in the previous section, the CSDP has traditionally been an instrument of international crisis management and capacity-building focused on promoting peace and other European core values far away from the EU’s geographical core.

With the new EUGS and other recent developments to further internal defence cooperation, the CSDP is increasingly being legitimised as a means to guarantee the protection of European citizens and to tackle the security challenges that fall along the nexus of internal and external security. As stated in the EUGS: ‘the European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ (EEAS, 2016: 10). In November 2016, High Representative/Vice-President Frederica Mogherini delivered an implementation plan for the European Global Security Strategy on Security and Defence (SDIP), which articulated a number of significant initiatives focusing on the ‘internal defence union’, including the suggestion of a voluntary Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) that would assist member states in better synchronising their defence planning, to be conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The SDIP also reinforced the changing focus of the EU as a security actor as expressed...
in the EUGS, in which the security interests of European citizens are becoming a driving force, besides wanting to respond to external crises away from the geographical core of Europe (Fiott, 2017).

Similarly, most of the new initiatives that have been launched, including the Defence Fund and PESCO, emphasise the protection of European citizens as a key guiding aim of a defence union. The Defence Fund, for example, has three stated objectives, two being straightforward: ‘to support member states’ more efficient spending in joint defence capabilities’ and to ‘foster a competitive industrial base’. The third objective of the Fund is specifically to ‘strengthen and protect the internal security of EU citizens’ (EU Commission, 2016). When PESCO was launched in November 2017, the new initiative was highlighted as a means to provide security for EU citizens: ‘PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens’ (Council Notification, 2017).

With the new EUGS and other recent developments to further internal defence cooperation, the CSDP is increasingly being legitimised as a means to guarantee the protection of European citizens and to tackle the security challenges that fall along the nexus of internal and external security.

Recent CSDP missions are also being framed according to the proximity of the conflict to the European continent and thus their implications for the internal security of European citizens. A notable example is the EU’s external response to the surge in migration and the protection of the EU’s external borders, which brings together the previously separate areas of the CSDP, Justice and Home Affairs (EU Commission-led) and the JHA agencies, principally Frontex, Europol and Eurojust (Blockmans, 2016). The intertwining of the EU’s external and internal policies sets the EU further apart from other crisis management actors.

A Stronger NATO-EU Strategic Partnership

While focusing increasingly on the abilities of the EU to protect its own citizens seems like a feasible strategy legitimising the CSDP and the EU as a whole at a time of both internal and external crises, this shift in focus might also raise fears that the EU is moving into NATO’s role as the main framework for protecting the European territory. As mentioned in section two, a primary reason for the reluctance of many EU member states (most notably the UK) to increase EU military cooperation has been the fear that such cooperation would undermine NATO as the main framework for territorial defence. Although the UK is leaving the Union, the EU will need to tread carefully in seeking increasingly to legitimise its security and defence project as a way of protecting European citizens. As discussed in the previous section, the CSDP was created as an instrument for humanitarian crisis management outside European borders, not for security protection of the European continent. A main point of contention for many EU and NATO member states will therefore be the continued role of NATO in European security, and the EU’s increased strategic autonomy will have to rest on a strong relationship between the two organisations. For an EU defence union to work, therefore, it must be complement NATO and avoid duplication of roles with it.

Indeed, the EUGS states that NATO remains the main framework for collective defence (EEAS, 2016: 20), thus recognising that developments in the CSDP, which has a ‘protection perspective’, will have to be complementary to NATO capabilities and institutions. In July 2016, EU and NATO members met in Warsaw and adopted a plan to give new impetus and substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership (EU and NATO, 2016). The Joint Declaration outlined seven concrete areas where cooperation between the two partners should be enhanced, including countering hybrid threats, migration and maritime security, and cyber security. Moreover, it was stressed how the two organisations will have to develop complementary and interoperable defence capabilities and facilitate greater research and industrial cooperation.

The recent Warsaw Declaration, which was endorsed by the European Council in December 2016, could serve as a crucial basis for overcoming some of the existing issues in EU-NATO cooperation and help enhance formal cooperation between the two organisations.

A Role for the EU Commission in the CSDP

Yet another new trend characterising the EU’s new-found assertiveness when it comes to EU defence cooperation after Brexit has been the increased involvement of the European Commission in this field. In November 2016, the Commission launched its own implementation plan for security and defence (EDAP), which focuses on the industrial and capability development elements of EU defence
cooperation. Specifically, the EDAP articulates the new idea of the European Defence Fund (EDF), to be financed through the EU’s multiannual financial framework. In June 2017, the Commission launched a final communication for the Defence Fund, which was welcomed by the European Council later that month (European Council, 2017) and which has received very positive initial reactions from EU member states.

Just a few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to imagine the EU budget being spent on anything related to EU defence cooperation or the EU Commission playing a substantial role in the CSDP. The latter is governed by an intergovernmental decision-making framework that rests on unanimity among member states’ executives. Here, member states are traditionally expected to be reluctant to yield their decision-making capacity to the European level, thus leaving no room for supranational institutions of security and defence.3

With the Defence Fund becoming part of the EU’s multiannual financial framework and being linked to other recent EU defence initiatives, including PESCO and CARD, there seems to be a move away from the standard understanding of the CSDP as solely an intergovernmental policy area. As Jyrki Katainen, one of the Vice-Presidents of the EU Commission, put it in September 2016, ‘Security has always belonged to member states, and that reality has changed’. (Financial Times, 2016).

An increased role for the Commission could be decisive in pushing forward integration of the intergovernmental, ‘often lowest common denominator’ field of the CSDP, but it may also lead to increased inter-institutional divisions and turf wars between the different EU institutions. Thus, post-Brexit the CSDP will not just be a source of quarrels between EU member states over the direction it should take, it will also be likely to have a large EU institutional element.

The European Defence Fund

The EDF focuses on the industrial and capability development elements of EU defence cooperation. The idea of the Fund is that the EU, led most notably by the Commission, will coordinate and boost investment in defence research, the development of new military prototypes and the procurement of defence equipment and technology. After two decades of budget cuts in military spending, as well as increasing demands on the armed forces of most EU member states, European capabilities today are in many ways stretched, outdated and suffering from an availability crisis. The European defence market is also characterized by fragmentation, duplication and protectionism, as well as the lack of an EU single market in the defence industry (Trybus, 2014; EU Commission, 2016). Currently, eighty percent of defence procurement in Europe is purely national (EU Commission, 2016). The EU has tried to regulate the European defence industry to some extent since the passing of the EU ‘defence package’ in 2007, which aimed to create a more competitive European defence industrial base, though with limited success (Besch, 2016). Procurement is still mainly carried out outside the framework of EU legislation, made possible by the ‘exception clause’ of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 346 TEU), which member states can invoke on the grounds of national security.

Now, however, most European governments are finding national security of supply increasingly costly, and many member states will also soon be needing to buy new generations of weapons systems that are too expensive for them to acquire on their own. By means of the EDF, the EU seeks to incentivize member states to spend more money on defence and to collaborate on development and acquisition by including a budget for defence in the EU’s multiannual financial framework.

The Fund consists of two legally distinct but interlinked ‘windows’ related to defence research and capability development, which aim to cover the entire cycle of defence industrial development, starting from research through to placing products in the market. The underlying premise here is that the development of joint capabilities cannot be considered separately from the defence industry providing the required military equipment (see figure 4).
The research strand of the fund will offer direct funding for research in defence products and technologies and will be fully financed by the EU budget.

**2017-2018: 90 mio EUR.**
A budget of 25 mio EUR has been agreed for 2017, and the Commission has proposed a budget of 40 million EUR for 2018 and 25 million EUR for 2019 as part of the Preparatory Action on Defence research and the pilot project. Only collaborative projects involving at least three member states (and as many as eight after 2020) will be eligible to receive funding.

**After 2020: 500 million EUR annually.**
From 2020 the fund aims to have a yearly budget of 500 million EUR. That would make the EU one of the biggest defence research investors in Europe after the UK, France and Germany.

The capability strand of the fund aims to support the development and acquisition of new joint military capabilities.

**2019-2020: 500 million EUR**
In the first year, starting from 2019. Before then, decisions will have to be made regarding which projects the fund will support.

**After 2020: 1 billion EUR annually**
To co-finance new prototypes. The Commission hopes that this amount will work as an initial funding opportunity that will incentivize member states to invest larger sums. The aim is that the figure of one billion will equal approximately twenty percent of the member states’ financial burden in the development phase, and that national governments will bring in four times that amount altogether on a yearly basis, although this cannot be known for sure at this stage. For projects in the PESCO framework, an additional ten percent in funding is foreseen.

To test the waters, the first steps towards a fully-fledged programme have already been taken with the launch of the Pilot Project and the Preparatory Action Plan on the research window. The Commission, assisted by an advisory group consisting of the EEAS and the EDA, will implement the Preparatory Action Plan and assess it on an annual basis. The first grants are predicted to be agreed by the end of 2017 (EU Commission, 2017).

The Fund's capability window has not yet been settled with respect to the funding and governance structure. In June 2017, the Commission launched a proposal for a regulation (COM (2017) 295) to establish the capability window of the research fund. The regulation is currently being negotiated and is likely to be adopted by the EU Council and the European Parliament likely during spring 2018. At this stage, both member states and the European Parliament are being positive about the proposal, but there still remain a lot of details to be settled before the EDF can become a reality (Besch, 2017). Unresolved issues at this point include which capability projects to prioritise, how exactly they will be financed and governed, and the extent to which non-EU member states can take part in them.

In terms of governance and prioritizing which projects to choose, a key question becomes the role to be played by the EDA. Until now, it has been a small agency operating under the EEAS that was set up in 2004 by a joint action of the FAC to ‘support member states to improve European defence capabilities’ (EU Council, 2004). Among other things, it also manages the so-called capability develop plan (CDP), which outlines the capability priorities that member states have agreed to invest in jointly in the future. Until now, however, the EDA has not been allowed to develop fully into what it was designed to be – an agency that can fully support member states and the EU in improving their defence capabilities. Certainly there is disagreement about the role the EDA should play in the EDF, precisely because it currently has limited resources, which makes some, not least in the Commission, doubt that it can handle EDF coordination (Besch, 2017). Nonetheless, giving the EDA responsibility for managing the EDF would also enable EU member states to develop fully into what it was designed to be – an agency that can fully support member states and the EU in improving their defence capabilities. Certainly there is disagreement about the role the EDA should play in the EDF, precisely because it currently has limited resources, which makes some, not least in the Commission, doubt that it can handle EDF coordination (Besch, 2017). Nonetheless, giving the EDA responsibility for managing the EDF would also enable EU member states to keep control of the process and to curtail the Commission’s role in the field of defence. However, an enlarged role for the EDA will require a significant increase in its resources. There is reason to believe, also considering that the UK is leaving, that the remaining member states will invest significantly more in the EDA. This issue also touches upon the potential challenge of increased inter-institutional turf wars between the EU Commission and the sub-divisions that fall under the Council.
It also remains unclear which part of the budget the money for the EDF will come from after 2020. Since the EDF will fall under the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2020-2026, it will come up for negotiations concurrently with future negotiations over the EU budget. There is therefore no guarantee either that the Commission will reach its aim of being able to take 5.5 billion EUR from the budget. This is indeed a large amount of money to draw from the budget, not least in view of Brexit and the future loss of the UK’s budgetary contribution.

It has not been settled either whether defence companies from non-EU member states will be eligible to participate in future EU defence capability projects. At present, Norway is participating in the pilot project, and it has also signalled an interest in taking part in the Fund’s capability window (Aftenposten, 2017). The UK has also hinted that it would like to take part in the EDF. Judging from a recent UK government position paper on what the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU regarding security and defence might look like, Britain has declared itself open to ‘future UK collaboration in European Defence Agency projects and initiatives’ and ready to ‘consider options and models for participation in the Commission’s European Defence Fund including both the European Defence Research Programme and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme’ (UK Government, 2017:20).

Giving the EDA responsibility for managing the EDF would enable EU member states to keep control of the process and to curtail the Commission’s role in the field of defence. However, an enlarged role for the EDA will require a significant increase in its resources.

In sum, there are still various unknowns regarding the EDF, and its success will ultimately depend on whether EU member states and institutions will take it seriously and manage to channel the promised funds into joint capability projects with criteria that facilitate the industrialization of European defence. If they do succeed in doing so, it could be a game changer for both the European defence industry and the EU as a means to develop its own strategic autonomy as a defence and security actor. Moreover, since NATO does not offer similar options, it is not seen as undermining the alliance and the transatlantic link, but rather works as a means to strengthen the European pillar in NATO at a time when American leadership is declining.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

Concurrently with the launch of the EDF in June 2017, member states also decided to move forward with implementing the so-called ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence’ or PESCO. On 13 November, 23 EU states took the first formal step in launching PESCO by signing a joint notification and handing it to the High Representative and the Council (Council Notification, 2017). The High Representative, Federica Mogherini, hailed PESCO as a ‘historic moment in European defence’, while the German Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, welcomed it as ‘a great step towards self-sufficiency’ (DW, 2017). Following the notification, a Council decision establishing PESCO is expected to be adopted by a qualified majority before the end of 2017 (EEAS, 2017).

PESCO was originally ratified by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, whose Article 42 (6) TEU provides for member states to strengthen their military cooperation and capability development by creating ‘permanent structured cooperation in defence, where a group of member states that fulfils certain criteria can enter into closer cooperation to enhance European defence capabilities’. [...] ‘Those member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework’. Article 46 of the TEU and Protocol 10 to the Treaty lays down further guidelines for a successful PESCO. Member states may join PESCO provided they meet the criteria set out in Protocol 10, such as making certain budgetary and deployability commitments, whereby the participating member states enter into binding commitments in the field of defence (Protocol 10, Art. 1:2). The Protocol also states that the EDA will assess the performance of the participating member states (Protocol 10, Art. 3).

Article 42 (6) TEU provides for member states to strengthen their military cooperation and capability development by creating ‘permanent structured cooperation in defence, where a group of member states that fulfils certain criteria can enter into closer cooperation to enhance European defence capabilities’.

The incorporation of PESCO into the Lisbon treaty was intended to provide a more flexible framework for the development of the CSDP, reflecting the continuous realities of European defence cooperation, with many member states seeing the
benefits of cooperating more at the multinational level in achieving relevant capabilities in a cost-efficient way, while also recognizing that there are very different visions of what the level of ambition of the CSDP should be. Thus, deeper cooperation through differentiation within the EU framework would be one way to address some of the obstacles facing the CSDP and defence in Europe more generally, leading to deeper integration in the field of defence. Closer cooperation among willing groups of member states who have made more binding commitments to one another and whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria would strengthen the CSDP generally in developing common capabilities more quickly and by increasing participating member states' national levels of ambition in terms of deployability and sustainability (Nissen, 2015).

Until now, PESCO has remained only a theoretical possibility – or, as Commission President Juncker has called it, 'the sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty'.

The idea underlying PESCO is that cooperation on defence should be 'permanent' on the part of the participating group of countries that have committed themselves to more ambitious collaboration 'structured' through a coherent set of joint capability projects. Thus, there are two elements to PESCO: its overall framework, which has now been launched by 23 participating states by means of the recent Council Notification; and ongoing concrete PESCO projects, which smaller groups of participating states falling within the PESCO framework can launch together.

Until now, PESCO has remained only a theoretical possibility – or, as Commission President Juncker has called it, 'the sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty' (Juncker, 2017). Implementing PESCO has been discussed on a few occasions, but neither EU member states or EU institutions have been particularly eager to move forward with its launch until now. Following the changing security context of Europe's neighbourhood, the British Brexit referendum and the surprise election of Donald Trump as US president, the EUGS (2016: 47) managed to re-launched the debate on PESCO by calling on member states to 'make full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential'. At the June 2017 European Council summit, the Council agreed to launch PESCO in the near future. From the outset, PESCO has received strong endorsement from member states as a way to strengthen EU defence cooperation without the need for treaty change.

Following a compromise between France and Germany in particular, PESCO has now been launched in a form that is inclusive and focused on future commitments and deliverables, rather than on strict criteria and past performances (Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy, 2017). A main bone of contention between Germany and France in particular was to find the right balance between ambition on the one hand and inclusiveness on the other. As France has otherwise envisaged PESCO as an instrument for operational efficiency geared towards the EU’s strategic autonomy, it wanted it to be as ambitious as possible, with high entry criteria and strong operational commitments. Germany, by contrast, wanted it to be as inclusive as possible and was afraid that having strict criteria might create new dividing lines separating out a core of member states with strong defensive capabilities and thus alienate non-participating member states before cooperation had even started. France accepted a compromise in which PESCO will follow a ‘phased’ approach, member states being able to join the framework, even if they do not possess a high level of capability or many operational assets (Galland and Quencez, 2017).

The notification to the Council by the joining member states that launched PESCO on 13 November 2017 further specify PESCO’s principles and entry criteria. Here, the emphasis is on PESCO as an ‘ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens’ (Council Notification, 2017: 1). The entry criteria consist of twenty commitments that participating member states ‘subscribe to’ (Council Notification, 2017: 2-6). This also reflects the compromise mentioned above that PESCO is more of a phased process, which participating member states can join even if they do not possess a high level of capability or operational assets or other criteria as set out in the notification. In fact, few of the participating countries meet these criteria, but instead they are committing themselves to doing so at a later stage.

Thus, PESCO is now being envisaged as a process leading to ambitious cooperation on defence rather than being an end in itself, where a ‘pioneer group’ will pave the way for genuine defence integration, and the remaining member states can follow once they can meet the criteria. In a commentary following the launch of PESCO, N. Witney (2017), former executive director of the EDA, argued that its inclusive and modular form has watered down the initiative to such an extent that it may actually provide little added value. This criticism is well-placed and emphasises that PESCO is being implemented in a form that seems to differ from its original rationale. Consequently, this could mean that its advantages in achieving flexible integration in a policy area characterised by very different interests and means is being levelled
down. That said, it seems as if the chosen form is the one that member states have been able to agree on, and it may also be wise to keep the process transparent and inclusive at a time when the Union is facing an existential crisis.

Despite having found a compromise between an ambitious yet inclusive framework for PESCO, there still remain a number of unanswered questions, including the identification of priority projects for PESCO, how it relates to other EU defence initiatives, and how non-EU members may be involved.

Unlike the EDF, PESCO is a member state-driven process, the main decisions and activities being the responsibility of the participating member states. The overall discussions regarding policy direction and assessment are taken at the Council level, meaning that non-PESCO member states can also follow its development. However, only PESCO members have the vote, decisions being taken by unanimity with the exception of decisions on the participation of a new member or on suspensions of membership, which are decided by qualified majority voting. At the project level of PESCO, each project is managed by the member states that have agreed to contribute to it (EEAS, 2017a). EU Council bodies, notably the EEAS and the EDA, will also play a key role in the PESCO governance structure, including assessing the extent to which participating member states are fulfilling the commitments that were agreed upon and supporting the capability projects launched by groups of member states.

It has yet to be decided which concrete priority projects PESCO will embody. At this point, there are allegedly close to fifty PESCO projects on the table, but the stated goal has been to identify two or three for the short term, to be launched at the end 2017 or in early 2018 (Franke, 2017). Here, different member states have different preferences with regard to the kinds of projects that can best meet the EU level of ambition and help close the capability gap. Discussions are also taking place over whether PESCO projects should also support existing projects or whether they should primarily be used to develop new ones. Some of the current proposals for PESCO include work on a European medical unit, a network of logistic and knowledge-sharing hubs, the creation of a crisis response centre and the joint training of military officers. There are also capability projects on the table, such as the next generation of Tiger helicopters, a joint fighter jet to replace the current national ones, a joint fighter tank and artillery system, and a European maritime surveillance system (König and Walter-Franke, 2017). It should be noted, that many of these projects are longer-term ones that will not materialise any time soon.

EU member states also need to figure out how PESCO will relate to other EU defence initiatives, in particular the EDF and CARD. There are, however, grounds for believing that there will be significant overlaps between the new initiatives. For example, the Commission has decided to offer a higher co-financing rate (a ten percent bonus) to projects financed by the EDF if they are carried out under the framework of PESCO. The EDA will also play a role in the regular assessment of contributions and capabilities in respect of those countries that are engaged in PESCO, as foreseen by Protocol 10, Art. 3. However, it has yet to be decided whether such reviews will be linked to the CARD process, or whether instead there will be a separate capability review process for PESCO. Indeed, the potential of the new defence instruments will be increased if they are interlinked and can reinforce each other.

A final question is how non-EU states will be able to join PESCO, a core issue with regard to the UK. According to the principles of PESCO as emphasised in the notification sent to the Council, ‘third states may exceptionally be invited by project participants, in accordance with general arrangements to be decided in due time by the Council in accordance with Article 46 (6) TEU. They would need to provide substantial added value to the project, contribute to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP and meet more demanding commitments. This will not grant decision powers to such Third States in the governance of PESCO’ (Council Notification, 2017: 8). Thus, it will be possible for non-EU members to join actual PESCO projects, but they will not be able to shape them.

**Concluding Remarks**

Spurred by Brexit, as well as other external and internal events, EU defence and security cooperation has taken some significant steps forward in the past year. The most concrete step is the launching of the EDF and PESCO, providing a clear focus for the scope and aims of European defence cooperation in the years to come. In light of these new initiatives, a key question that remains to be settled is the role of the UK in EU defence and security cooperation after Brexit. The following section will examine different scenarios for what a future UK-EU relationship might look like.
THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION AFTER BREXIT
Britain will remain a crucial part of the European security architecture even after it leaves the EU because of its military weight and its place in NATO, and because the UK and the EU share the same interests and values when it comes to foreign and security policy. The question is then how it will be affiliated with the CSDP post-Brexit. Is it feasible for the EU to allow the UK to shape EU security and defence policy as a non-EU member, and how would the UK government convince the rest of the UK to stay ‘inside’ EU defence and security policy after it has chosen to part with the European Union as a means to win back national sovereignty?

Having in the previous section described how the EU has reacted to Brexit by launching new and ambitious initiatives which have the potential to change EU security and defence cooperation fundamentally, this section will explore possible scenarios for what the future relationship between the UK and the EU might look like.

Three Scenarios

The UK’s immediate reaction to the new EU plans for increased defence and security cooperation post-Brexit was one of strong disapproval. After the Bratislava summit in 2016, the then defence minister, Michael Fallon, said that the UK would veto any decisions leading to a stronger EU defence union so long as it remained a member of the EU (EU Observer, 2016). Chalmers (2017:4) has described the situation as ‘some of those involved in shaping policy have been tempted by the argument that the UK should use its security surplus – i.e. its role as the leading Western military and intelligence power – as a bargaining chip that could be traded in return for commercial concessions in the post-Brexit settlement with the EU.

As part of their Brexit negotiations, London and Brussels will have to decide on the UK’s future arrangements in the areas of security and defence policy, and determine the degree to which the UK should remain linked to the CSDP and EU defence cooperation.

This approach, however, now seems to have been buried with the UK’s new official stance on how it envisages the future EU-UK defence and security cooperation after Brexit. This appeared in a position paper published by the UK government in September 2017, which foresees a model of surprisingly deep cooperation between the UK and the EU on security and defence (UK Government, 2017). However, severe political and legal challenges will arise for both the EU and the UK if the UK government’s proposal should be implemented. Moreover, the UK’s post-Brexit position in the CSDP will largely rely on the overall Commission-UK negotiations in the run-up to the March 2019 exit date. In sum, the UK-EU relationship in security and defence matters in a post-Brexit future cannot be fully anticipated at this stage. The brief scenarios presented in this section describe three ‘ideal types’ of action, their aim being not to predict the future, but to help guide the reader in imagining the different directions in which EU security and defence cooperation might evolve.

Three alternative scenarios for the future of the EU/European security architecture can be envisaged: ‘flexible security and a defence Union’, ‘European strategic autonomy, and ‘every man for himself’.

SCENARIO 1

A Flexible ‘Security and Defence Union’ with the UK

In this scenario, the UK would have a strong affiliation with the EU on security and defence matters and will be invited to take part in key EU security institutions and initiatives, including the new PESCO Framework and the EDF. The transatlantic link and the partnership between NATO and the EU would be upheld or strengthened.

This scenario resembles the official position of the UK in envisaging the future EU-UK security and defence relationship after Brexit, namely through a partnership cooperation which is ‘unprecedented in its breath’ and ‘deeper than any third country relationship’, as noted in the UK government’s so-called ‘Future Partnership Paper’, published on 12 September 2017 (UK Government, 2017: 3). The main part of the document is spent in spelling out the many shared characteristics between the EU and the UK on defence and by emphasising the main role the UK has played in building the CSDP. The shared values of the UK and the EU, for example, are ‘historic and deeply rooted in our societies, [which is] why the UK will always be an indefatigable advocate for them’ (ibid.: 3). Such values also underpin shared security threat perceptions between the UK and the EU, which in today’s complex security environment requires that the UK and the EU work closely together to be able to tackle future security challenges.

The position paper moves on to highlighting the UK’s contribution to European security and the CSDP by referring to its (i) defence capabilities and budget, (ii) defence and security relationships with European partners through bilateral and other frameworks, (iii) positive impact on the growth and competitiveness of the EU
defence and security industries through research and development, (iv) its leverage in support of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and European security, and (v) use of its permanent membership of the UN Security Council to support EU priorities.

In terms of post-Brexit cooperation, the paper sets out a very ambitious plan for how the UK and the EU will continue to be interlinked in security and defence matters, ‘offering a deep and special relationship that will make available UK assets, capabilities and influence to the EU’ (UK Government, 2017: 18). The paper also addresses the new EU defence initiatives in which the UK also wishes to become involved. Specifically, the UK hopes to participate in the CSDP and European defence cooperation by means of:

- A continued contribution to CSDP missions and operations, including UK personnel, expertise, assets or the use of established UK command and control facilities
- Staying part of mandate development and detailed operational planning
- Collaboration with the EDA, including participation in EDA projects and initiatives
- Participation in the Defence Fund

Thus, in this scenario the UK would take part in CSDP missions and operations, remain involved in CSDP decision-making (FAC, the PSC), retain affiliation to EU agencies (the EDA) and be involved in the new EU defence initiatives.

Opportunities and Constraints

Focusing narrowly on the security interests of both the EU and the UK, such interests will continue to be closely matched after Brexit. Thus, from this perspective it would be of mutual benefit to have the UK’s diplomatic capacity and military capabilities integrated into the EU’s foreign and security policy. The loss of the UK will significantly reduce the credibility of the CSDP, given the UK’s political and military weight and its international connections. The UK spends more on defence than any other EU member state, is the second largest defence spender in NATO (behind only the US) and the fifth largest in the world (UK Government, 2016). Apart from France, the UK is the only EU member state that has nuclear weapons, a veto power in the UN Security Council and military bases in third countries through bilateral agreements, including the option to deploy troops there. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, the UK is one of five EU member states to have made an operational headquarters available to the EU and currently running the EU’s large-scale maritime operation, Atalanta, out of Northwood. There would thus be major implications if the UK cannot participate in ongoing CSDP actions post-Brexit. For the UK too as a single actor on the international stage, it would become harder to pursue a leading role without the EU as a legitimising framework (Dashwood, 2016).

The possibility of this scenario is further strengthened by the election of President Trump, which could lead to further pressure on European states, including the UK, to take a greater share of responsibility for their own security. Given this, the UK is likely to want to further deepen existing efforts to improve bilateral defence cooperation with European NATO members, leading to a greater willingness on the part of the UK post-Brexit to discuss greater defence cooperation with the EU itself, as already seems to be envisaged in the UK partnership policy proposal.

When the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer be a member of the Council, which means that it will no longer have any legally decisive influence. Only members of the Council can engage in CSDP decision-making.

However, the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU is more complicated than “just” external security interests, and here there is a lot at stake for both parties. The CSDP and the prospects of a defence union as a new project to draw attention to the EU’s continued ability to deepen integration might lose its unifying effect and lead to decreased internal legitimacy if the UK is allowed to shape EU security and defence cooperation. If the UK is allowed to cherry-pick which aspects of EU cooperation it wants to remain involved in after Brexit, others might be tempted to seek similar differentiated solutions, and the EU project as a whole could suffer. It would also be hard for the UK government to defend the benefits of strong affiliation with EU security and defence policy post-Brexit to the British public, especially when one of the core reasons for leaving the EU was to regain national sovereignty and an independent place in world affairs (Gifford, 2017).

From a legal perspective, the Union treaties also place restrictions on allowing a non-member state to participate in the CSDP. When the UK leaves the EU, it will no longer be a member of the Council, which means that it will no longer have any legally
decisive influence. Only members of the Council can engage in CSDP decision-making (Art. 42 (6), TEU). Thus, the UK government’s proposal to retain a special role in the CSDP with the ability to influence CSDP decisions will not be possible within the EU legal framework. Currently, third countries can and do take part in CSDP missions on a case-by-case basis through a so-called Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA). Approximately thirty non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations since the first mission in 2003 (Tardy, 2015). There are also options for third parties to take part in the EDA and thus potentially its initiatives, including EU battle groups. However, third states cannot become full members of EU decision-making bodies or processes. They may be able to influence such processes informally, for example, by means of political dialogue with the High Representative or the PSC, but only to a limited extent, which is not likely to meet UK preferences regarding how to stay linked to the CSDP. For example, research into Norway’s ability to influence CSDP issues suggests that it has largely been excluded from information regarding the CSDP and has not been able to have a say on any CSDP-related issues. However, since the UK knows the EU decision-making processes from within, it will necessarily have better options for influencing it than other non-EU states.

The new defence initiatives discussed in this report may be a way for the UK to retain close ties with the CSDP, not least given that these initiatives will be guiding the latter’s direction for years to come. As mentioned in the last section, it has yet to be determined whether the UK will be able to participate in the EDF or PESCO, but it does not seem to have been ruled out. While the legal provisions regarding PESCO (Art. 42 (6)) state that a PESCO must consists of EU member states, this could be circumvented by, for example, an association agreement like the Schengen Association Agreements with non-EU states. The UK will also be able to conclude a so-called ‘administrative agreement’ with the EDA giving it associate status and a seat on a Consultative Committee, where it can present its views on the EDA’s programmes. As already noted, the EDA is likely to play a key role in both the EDF and PESCO, so this may be a key opportunity for the UK to cooperate with the EU on defence and security post-Brexit. The level of integration in the EDA will depend on the willingness of the EU member states within it, and the UK is unlikely to be given any voting powers (Black, et al., 2017).

However, there are a lot of unknowns, not least with regard to the new EU defence initiatives. Thus, the possibility exists that the EU and the UK do not managed to agree a deal for the security and defence area. This largely hinges on how negotiations in other areas proceed. If no deal is made, then some form of either scenario two (autonomous defence EU) or scenario three (every man for himself) will be the result.

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**SCENARIO 2**

**Strategic Autonomy for the EU and a Reduced Transatlantic Link**

If no agreement is made with the UK on formal cooperation with the EU on security and defence matters, the relationship between the UK and the EU will be a detached one in which the former will play no part in CSDP missions, EU decision-making or the EDA. In the scenario outlined here, the remaining 27 EU member states move towards increased integration in security and defence. With the end of the British veto and the possibilities raised by the new initiatives on defence, including the EDF and PESCO, the EU could launch a genuine security and defence union with strategic autonomy, which has hitherto been out of the question. As security challenges around Europe are increasing, and the election of President Trump has made Europeans question the transatlantic relationship, the latter will become weaker, and with it, the EU will grow stronger.

This scenario resembles to some extent the visions already set out by Germany and France, united in their common hope for stronger EU security and defence cooperation. Germany has increasingly been reorienting itself away from the US and the UK towards France (EU Observer, 2017). As Angela Merkel declared when speaking at a campaign event in March 2017, ‘the times in which we could completely depend on others are on the way out (…) Europe really must take its fate into its own hands’ (Reuters, 2017). In France, Macron made a genuine ‘L’Europe de la défense’ one of his core priorities early in his campaign for the presidency (Frontini, 2017). After being elected, he has repeatedly emphasised the objective of strategic autonomy for the EU, for example, suggesting that by 2020 it should ‘establish a common intervention force, a common budget and a common doctrine for action’ (Macron, 2017). This new line will provide Germany and France with the opportunity to co-operate further within the Union. The two countries have already announced a raft of new joint equipment projects, including EU military drones and the ambition to design a new European jet fighter (Reuters, 2017). Thus, the Franco-German vision for EU security and defence policy is one that includes strategic autonomy for the EU.
This vision is also promoted by the EU institutions, where also the EU Commission has emphasised the objective of strategic autonomy. As Commission President Juncker put it when launching the EDF, ‘If Europe does take care of its own security, nobody will do it for us (…) A strong, competitive and innovative defence industrial base is what will give us strategic autonomy’ (Kanter, 2016).

Indeed, the operational dimension of strategic autonomy comes down to the ability to act without the US whenever necessary. As stated by Bishop (2016:3) ‘the industrial dimension follows on from this, namely having a defence industry that can produce everything this requires, notably the strategic enablers’. The newest EU defence initiatives could be a means to achieve just that if implemented ambitiously enough. To strengthen the new initiatives further, there would have to be linkages between PESCO, the EDF and CARD. Moreover, new initiatives may emerge: for example, the recently launched Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) structure could be transformed into a fully-fledged civil-military EU headquarters.

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Opportunities and Constraints
Given the crises in Europe’s neighbourhood, geopolitical tensions and an unreliable US, all of which require Europe to take more care of its own security, it seems appropriate to set the level of ambition high when it comes to being able to take care of Europe’s security concerns in a more autonomous manner. Added to this, many EU member states will soon be facing the need to buy new generations of weapons systems, which will be too expensive for most of them to acquire on their own. If done at the EU level by making full use of the new EU defence initiatives, this would be a more cost-effective way of providing the necessary weapons systems and enablers. Finally, since recent developments in the CSDP is about more than ‘just’ defence cooperation, but also a litmus test for the value of the EU project post-Brexit, it will be undeniable proof of the strength of the EU project if EU member states manage to turn their words into action when it comes to security and defence cooperation and the EU’s strategic autonomy.

The disadvantages of a strategically autonomous EU at the expense of the transatlantic relationship and a formal relationship with the UK in the CSDP post-Brexit are also obvious. As already described, the credibility of the CSDP would be seriously reduced by the loss of the UK, both symbolically, given the UK’s position in the world, and practically, given the size and quality of its defence and diplomacy. Moreover, since the UK has traditionally acted as an interlocutor between the EU and the US, the EU would lose a strong partner for cooperation with the US (Whitman and Tonra, 2017).

Brexit could also seriously undermine the UK’s opportunities to acquire a broader strategic voice in Europe, as well as potentially change the balance of calculation on the part of key powers in world politics, including in the context of US-UK bilateral relations. From the perspective of the UK, arguably its withdrawal from the EU will also mean that it will lose some leverage in its bilateral relationship with the US because it can no longer act as a shaper of European affairs (ibid.). Other key bilateral relationships will also be complicated by Brexit, including with the UK’s European partners, most notably the Franco-British relationship. The Lancaster treaties of 2010 for example are premised on closer cooperation between the UK and France to facilitate greater burden-sharing within the EU and NATO. Brexit risks misaligning the UK and France on security issues if one side seeks to deepen EU defence cooperation and the other places the emphasis on NATO. Thus, the rationale for closer links between the UK and France could now be weakened (Whitman and Tonra, 2017). If no ties are developed with the UK, there may also be a potential increase in competition and divergence in some areas between the UK and the EU. The effect of an EU with strategic autonomy could thereby be corrosive for intra-EU, EU-NATO and transatlantic trust.

Finally, moving towards a genuine defence union, including by allocating EU money to a policy area as distant as defence at a time when the EU is still struggling to close the gap between its citizens and its institutions, with anti-EU political forces also moving into the mainstream, is a risky plan that could seriously backfire (Youngs, 2017).

However, achieving strategic autonomy for the EU at the expense of the transatlantic link, and the NATO framework in particular, does not seem particularly plausible. As described in section two, the CSDP is providing a way of conducting a different type of crisis management than what EU member states can do through the NATO framework or through other multilateral intervention forums. CSDP missions and operations are much smaller in scale and do not have the option of being fully autonomous in crisis situations. Therefore, it would take a long time for the EU to
build up a high-end security framework on its own, even if this is the goal, which is not the case for most member states, which prefer the NATO framework as the main pillar of European defence. This will be even more difficult with the UK leaving the Union, with its 25% share of the total military capability available to the EU (Black et. al., 2017).

Moreover, most member states (and the US, which has long demanded that European states take more responsibility for its own security) do not see a more autonomous EU as ruling out retention of the NATO framework as the main pillar of European security – quite the contrary. As also explored in section three, there has been a recent trend for the EU and NATO to draw closer, as emphasised by the Warsaw Declaration, as well as in most recent EU policy papers on strengthening EU defence cooperation. Even though the UK will no longer be involved in EU defence cooperation, EU with 27 member states can still pursue strategic European autonomy, where the UK can contribute on an ad hoc basic, all of which would complement NATO action as well (Bishop, 2016).

If the EU however fails to establish its new defence initiatives and the UK is left with no formal ties with the EU on security and defence, we may see increased fragmentation of European defence cooperation as a result, as set out in the following ‘Every man for himself’ scenario.

Most member states (and the US, which has long demanded that European states take more responsibility for its own security) do not see a more autonomous EU as ruling out retention of the NATO framework as the main pillar of European security – quite the contrary.

If the UK leaves the EU with few if any formal ties to EU security and defence cooperation, and if the EU’s newly launched plans for strengthening security and defence cooperation are watered down or simply not implemented, inertia or resistance among the remaining 27 member states may take over, and fragmented non-institutional formats for cooperation could gain prominence after Brexit. Such fragmentation will lead European states to act more unilaterally and less within the EU framework. Security interests will also have a more inward-looking focus, for example with any increases in defence budgets being diverted to domestic security.

Today, most security and defence cooperation already takes place outside international organisations such as the EU and NATO. The UK’s defence capabilities, commitments, policies and investments are now driven principally by its role in NATO and its bilateral strategic partnerships, notably with the US and its ‘Five Eyes’ partners (also the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), but also with European states, notably France. The UK will have clear incentives to act increasingly through smaller formats of cooperation – and push others to do the same – as they will provide an alternative way for the UK to shape European defence if it fails to retain formal ties with the EU. It will be in the interests of the UK to deepen cooperation with the US, even if the transatlantic link has become more uncertain following the election of President Trump (Chalmers, 2017). The UK will also aim to deepen further existing efforts to improve bilateral defence cooperation with European NATO members, not least France, with whom it already has a deep defence partnership cemented most recently by the Lancaster House treaties as earlier mentioned. Also the defence links with smaller countries such as Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands will continue to provide the UK with channels to contribute to strengthening European defence cooperation (Bakker, Drent and Zandee, 2017). Taken together with the efforts it will require to develop new national policies, reduced influence in Brussels is also likely to lead to a further deepening of the UK’s focus in those areas that are in its immediate national interests (Chalmers, 2017).

From the perspective of the remaining 27 EU member states, the disappointment of the EU not being able to deliver on its ambitious plans as now set out will promote similar trends of re-nationalisation, involving a shift in emphasis away from developing new EU approaches and towards the protection of direct national interests. There is a real possibility that the EU fails in its current pursuit of a strong security and defence union. EU security and defence policy is an area that has commonly been characterized by a gap between political visions and real action. Thus, although an ambitious EU security and defence agenda is emerging of a sort that has not been seen before, this need not necessarily mean that implementation
will be equally ambitious. As described in the previous section, not all assessments following the launch of PESCO have been positive, with Witney (2017) arguing that, once again, EU defence has ‘missed an open goal’, since the form of the launched PESCO has been watered down in order to meet the German interest in an ‘inclusive’ PESCO. In the same commentary, Witney also argues that Poland joined PESCO only to slow it down. Thus, while there exists a unique consensus between France and Germany on moving EU defence forward – and a strong German-Franco engine is definitely needed to push forward EU integration – not all countries may wish to follow their lead when the proposals come to be implemented.

There will also be internal and domestic constraints, not least in France and Germany, which will prove to be an impediment to how far Macron and Merkel can go. Macron will have to show that France is willing to put the necessary efforts into EU defence cooperation. In Berlin, it remains to be seen whether Merkel will emerge from the current unsettling political limbo in which she finds herself and still be in a strong enough position to deliver change in Europe (Dempsey, 2017).

The election of Donald Trump as US president and the uncertainties over the emerging international order could also further increase the EU’s disintegration in defence matters, instead of the opposite effect described in the previous scenario. As Kundnani argues (2017), Trump’s election may create severe differences between EU member states regarding whether or not to keep relying on the US security guarantee or move towards more internal integration.

Moreover, Trump has aligned himself with ‘Eurosceptic forces’, for example, in supporting Brexit, which may provide a further push to such forces (ibid.). In an increasingly nationalistic context, some EU member states might move towards reaching an accommodation with Russia to protect their own security interests, the result being to aggravate the disintegration of Europe that has already started with the Brexit vote.

Opportunities and Constraints
UK defence and security plans do not, nor have they ever, aligned particularly naturally with any version of the European project as previously described. If the UK leaves the EU and the CSDP the ‘hard way’, there is arguably also something to gain for the UK. It would be less dependent on weak states and ineffective EU collective security mechanisms and instead be free to assume a more independent and assertive role as ‘a global power’ in international affairs. This would be significantly easier for the UK if the EU fails to launch a strong EU security and defence union of a sort in which the remaining 27 EU member states would be less willing to act in clusters outside the EU framework. If the UK can no longer take part in EU security and defence cooperation, it may be tempted to try to torpedo it and then try to convince its former partners to work bilaterally with it or through NATO (Chalmers, 2017). However, it should also be kept in mind that the UK is leaving the EU, not Europe, and that its capabilities will still be available to European security, most likely in NATO and coalitions-of-the-willing contexts. Thus, if the EU fails to launch its current defence plans successfully, European security cooperation will still hinge on the NATO framework, and very likely to a greater extent.

In a more fragmented and non-institutionalised European security context, renationalisation could thus become the main modus operandi, with institutionalised frameworks being reduced to instruments for furthering national interests.

For the EU there are no clear benefits in a scenario resembling the one described here. In a European security context where clusters of cooperation are increasingly based on bilateral agreements, the EU will be reduced to a toothless club for the mere coordination of positions and will be even more toothless than it is today if it fails to implement its current plans for strengthened defence cooperation. In a more fragmented and non-institutionalised European security context, renationalisation could thus become the main modus operandi, with institutionalised frameworks being reduced to instruments for furthering national interests.

Concluding Remarks
By the middle of 2019, it is highly likely that the UK will no longer be a part of the EU. In direct response to Brexit, the EU has embarked on a path towards developing a much stronger EU security and defence union. Thus, a crucial question in the coming years will be how the UK-EU relationship will be organized after Britain leaves. As the scenarios put forward in this section have pointed out, the future relationship between the UK and the EU may develop in significantly different directions. While both the EU and the UK have an interest in retaining some relationship, it will not be a straightforward political or legal exercise to do so.
CONCLUSION
The central theme of this report has been that a rare momentum for strengthening EU security and defence cooperation has emerged since the 2016 bombshell of the UK referendum. Within the past year, EU leaders and institutions have launched a plethora of new proposals aimed at raising the EU’s ambition level for security and defence cooperation as well as showcasing the unity of EU27 and the resilience of the EU project as a whole. This renewed drive for security and defence cooperation in the EU also reflects how European leaders have started to take collective European security more seriously, because of growing challenges in Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods as well as the new Trump administration’s tougher stance on the transatlantic partnership. A fundamental issue in the coming years, especially as Brexit materialises, is the extent to which the UK will remain affiliated with CSDP and the wider European security architecture.

This concluding section highlights some of the key takeaways from the report on the pertinent questions facing the EU’s security agenda in the coming years.

**Capability development as a new driver for EU security and defence cooperation**

The policy field of EU security and defence has often been characterized by a considerable gap between lofty visions and concrete actions. For a long time, EU leaders have recognized the potential value of more EU cooperation, yet they have been divided on how to collectively deal with the security and defence responsibilities they face. In turn, cooperation has often been driven forth by lowest common denominator bargains – or no bargains at all.

This time, however, it could be different. Apart from the pressure of new external threats, a forthcoming Brexit, and a diminished American security guarantee, which all seem to have helped align the stars for more EU defence cooperation, the format of the process to move forward chosen by EU states and institutions also gives promises of success. For the first time, security and defence cooperation is driven by developing joint capabilities, supported by a focus on harmonizing the European defence industry, rather than on institution-building or launching new operations. The latter has time and again proved difficult and exposed the fact that EU member states have diverging views on the end goals of EU defence and security. Thus, some of the difficult questions can be left unanswered at this stage with no need for a treaty change, and the national sovereignty of member states can be retained through a practical, ad hoc process driven by the national governments. While the Commission has a role in the process, the capabilities eventually developed will be nationally owned, and free for member states to deploy via the EU framework, or other channels, such as NATO, or bilaterally. The current developments therefore, also rest on the promise that there is no contradiction between strengthened EU defence cooperation and NATO. In fact, they are mutually reinforcing, as claimed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (NATO, 2017).

Moreover, with a new focus on what the EU can do to address the security concerns of EU citizens, the legitimacy of CSDP is being raised. By strengthening its defence dimension, CSDP is increasingly focused on the internal security protection of the European territory and its citizens, thus constituting a fundamental change from being a tool mainly for crisis management far away from the EU’s geographical core.

Finally, the recent impetus on EU defence and security should also be seen as a way for the remaining EU27 to demonstrate the resilience of the EU project following the Brexit referendum. EU defence and security cooperation has thus also become a symbol of unity for the EU27, which means that the political incentives for the new defence initiatives to become successful are high. While divergence between the EU27 will unavoidably occur when further implementing the new defence initiatives, the desire of many EU states to work together on security and defence matters cannot be disputed.

- The current process for strengthened EU defence and security cooperation focuses on developing joint capabilities rather than on institution building or the deployment of new missions.
- CSDP is increasingly about internal security protection of the European territory and its citizens, strengthening the EU’s credibility as a provider of security.
- Besides moving the EU towards more cooperation on defence, the recent initiatives should also be seen as a means to show off the continued relevance of the EU project.

**The challenges that remain**

While the practical step-by-step approach which has been taken to further the defence agenda seems to be a clever strategy, there is also an underlying reason why this is probably the only way forward: there exists no common end-goal for European defence. The hurdles that have characterized EU defence and security cooperation in the past decades have not magically disappeared following the Brexit referendum. Member states still do not agree on when and where to engage, and national preferences — as well as the convergence/divergence of such
preferences – will continue to be determining factors in the future. Nor do member states agree on the extent to which the EU should develop into an autonomous actor, although agreement exists on the need to strengthen European collective security in a way that does not compromise NATO.

Diversifying EU defence cooperation via legal arrangements such as PESCO was thought to be a way to address these eternal differences by giving ‘those who are willing’ the opportunity to engage in deeper cooperation. Consequently, EU defence and security cooperation could increasingly raise itself above the lowest common denominator style of progress. However, the inclusive form of PESCO, which has now been launched, does seem to weaken the potential feature of differentiation that was the aim of the Lisbon treaty provision of PESCO.

Moreover, while the member states have agreed on the short term goals, there is still some way to go and decisions to be made before the new defence initiatives launched will have any concrete impact. The process of enhancing military cooperation through joint capability development and harmonization of the defence industry is a long-term process, which will not yield noticeable results within a short- or even medium-term future. The success of the initiatives will therefore still depend on whether EU member states and institutions will take it seriously and manage to channel the promised funds into joint capability projects with criteria that facilitate the industrialization of European defence.

The EU Commission has made it clear that it want to play a decisive role in building a European defence union in the years to come. This will bring a significant new kind of energy to the policy area with as yet unknown consequences. What is certain, however, is that CSDP post-Brexit will not just be a source of quarrels between EU member states, it is also likely to have a large EU institutional element with a potential risk of inter-institutional ‘turf wars’.

- While member states agree on a step-by-step plan towards enhanced capabilities, there is no clear end-goal for EU defence.
- The inclusive form of PESCO weakens the prospects of differentiation within EU security and defence.
- There could be increased inter-institutional turf wars following the launch of new initiatives, given the plethora of EU institutions and bodies involved in managing these initiatives.

The prospects of keeping the UK affiliated with CSDP post-Brexit

When debating the future of EU defence and security cooperation, the question of what the nature of a new relationship between the UK and the EU will be after Brexit is crucial for obvious reasons. While the UK alone cannot be blamed for the slow-paced progress of CSDP, it has generally been reluctant to act militarily through the EU and has not been particularly supportive about strengthening the policy field in general. Consequently, EU27 leaders seized on the Brexit referendum as an opportunity to strengthen CSDP, because of the foot-dragging role often played by the UK in the policy field.

At the same time, the loss of the UK will significantly reduce the credibility of the CSDP, given the UK’s political and military weight and its international connections. With the UK’s place in NATO as well as its close relationship with other European allies, not least France and Germany, the UK will remain a central part of the broader European security architecture after Brexit. Therefore, it seems crucial for the UK and EU27 to remain good friends post-Brexit as the consequences for a strained relationship would not serve Europe well. With shared security interests and a common neighbourhood, the security and defence policy component of the EU-UK relationship could become one of the areas in which cooperation could thrive to mutual benefit.

The UK government has already indicated that it wishes to have a new style of relationship with the EU on security and defence that is deeper than any other third state, and that it is willing to make its assets, capabilities and influence available to the EU. The UK also changed its mind on the new EU defence initiatives, and now sees prospects in being involved in both the EDF and PESCO. Indeed, retaining access to the UK’s diplomatic capacity and military capabilities would be of great value to the EU. However, it would also come at a price, which will be for the UK to retain a say on CSDP issues and concrete actions. While the political reasons for paying this price do exist, it will not be easy to find a legal solution – particularly one that will satisfy both parties. The current EU treaties do not promise much in terms of involving non-EU states in the decision-making of CSDP.

At this point, it is still unknown how big a role security and defence issues will play in the Brexit negotiations in the run-up to the March 2019 deadline. It will be difficult to find a fitting legal solution that reflects the ongoing interdependence of the EU and the UK and, in the process, many obstacles can get in the way. The UK could still be tempted to use security and defence cooperation as a bargaining chip to achieve
better terms in other areas. There is also the possibility that the difficult negotiations will lead to resentment among the parties, which would hamper a fruitful cooperation on security and defence not only in the EU but also for the wider European security.

- While Brexit can reduce opposition to a stronger EU defence and security policy, it will also reduce the EU’s military and political weight. At the same time, the UK will lose influence in Europe, with the US and on the global stage.

- From a political perspective, there are thus good reasons for continued involvement of the UK in CSDP post-Brexit. From a legal perspective however, it will be a difficult process to retain this involvement since the EU treaties only give decision-making competences to EU member states.

A Final Remark
This report has provided an overview of the UK’s hitherto role in the CSDP in order to assess the implications of the UK’s coming position shift from being ‘in’ to being ‘out’ of EU security and defence cooperation after Brexit. Undoubtedly, the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU will have defining consequences for both CSDP and the wider European security and defence. Whether the Brexit negotiations will lead to a scenario resembling a ‘flexible defence union with the UK’, ‘strategic autonomy for the EU’ or ‘every man for himself’ as set out in the report, depends not only on British and European policy makers but also on external and as yet unforeseen events. In any case, everything seems to be at stake for the UK as well as the EU over the years to come with the incentives for stronger EU defence and security being as imperative as ever.

NOTES

1 The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon renamed the ESDP the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). For purposes of simplicity, from now on this report will also refer to the CSDP when discussing the policy before 2009.
2 Since then, however, there have been no CSDP operations under the Berlin Plus Agreement and thus no official cooperation between CSDP crisis management and NATO. Due to the long-term political conflict over the borders between Cyprus and Turkey, and since Cyprus is not a NATO nor a PfP-member, Turkey has been able to block any involvement of Cyprus in receiving classified information and thus block any new agreements under Berlin Plus. On the EU side, only states that have a security agreement with the EU may participate in CSDP meetings, and only states with an administrative arrangement with the EDA are allowed into EDA meetings, excluding Turkey (Græger, 2016).
3 There are nonetheless some noticeable exemptions, according to a growing number of studies of the Commission’s informal role in the CSDP. See, for example, Kostadinova (2013) and Djiejkstra (2014) on the Commission’s role in CFSP decision-making, Riddervold (2016) on the cases of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the EU’s maritime security strategy, and Strikwerda (2017) on the Defence and Security Procurement Directive.
4 The joining EU member states include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. It is possible for other member states to join at a later stage (Council Notification, 2017).
5 Article 27 (2) TEU entrusts the High Representative to conduct political dialogue with third parties. A political dialogue could also be held within the format of the PSC. See European Council (2000), which shows that joint meetings between the PSC and allied non-EU members do take place.
6 See, for example, Græger (2005) on Norway’s role in the CSDP.
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